Proč chápat Popperův kritický dualismus decisionisticky

In: Filozofia, vol. 75, no. 6

Jan Buráň

Detaily:

Rok, strany: 2020, 474 - 489

Jazyk: cze

Kľúčové slová:

Critical dualism – Is-ought – Karl Popper – Open society –Moral objectivism – Moral relativism

Typ článku: State

Typ dokumentu: Časopis / Journal

DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2020.75.6.4

Full text

O článku:

There is not much in The Open Society to suggest that Karl Popper was a moral objectivist. Yet, that is exactly what he himself claimed later in life. Was the widespread “decisionistic” reading of The Open Society just a grand misunderstanding, or did Popper change his metaethical views without acknowledging it? I give reasons as to why we should hold the latter to be true. I also argue that even were the former the case, decisionism would still be more compatible with the open society ideal.

Ako citovať:

ISO 690:

Buráň, J. 2020. Proč chápat Popperův kritický dualismus decisionisticky. In Filozofia, vol. 75, no.6, pp. 474-489. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2020.75.6.4

APA:

Buráň, J. (2020). Proč chápat Popperův kritický dualismus decisionisticky. Filozofia, 75(6), 474-489. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2020.75.6.4

O vydaní:

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV / Institute of Phillosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia

Publikované: 18. 6. 2020

Verejná licencia:

Creative Commons 4.0. Attribution NonCommercial