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Wiredu contra Lewis on the Right Modal Logic

In: Organon F, vol. 26, no. 3
David B. Martens
Rok, strany: 2019, 474 - 490
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
C.I. Lewis, equivalence, identity, Kwasi Wiredu, modal logic, S4.
Typ článku: Research Article
Typ dokumentu: Research Article
O článku:
This paper is a critical study of an argument put forward by Kwasi Wiredu in his engagement with C. I. Lewis on choosing the right modal logic for logical necessity. Wiredu argues that Lewis “could have been more adventurous modally with perfect logicality” and could justifiably have accepted S4 rather than being “to the last cautious of any system stronger than S2” (Wiredu 1979). I address terse, incomplete, and provocatively incongruous notes on Wiredu’s paper by (Makinson 1980) and (Humberstone 2011), as well as a paper by (Cresswell 1965) that Humberstone cites, and I draw on recent work by (Lewitzka 2015; 2016). I conclude that Wiredu’s argument cannot be accepted as sound but a variant argument can be accepted as sound.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Martens, D. 2019. Wiredu contra Lewis on the Right Modal Logic. In Organon F, vol. 26, no.3, pp. 474-490. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26307

Martens, D. (2019). Wiredu contra Lewis on the Right Modal Logic. Organon F, 26(3), 474-490. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26307
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
Publikované: 24. 8. 2019
Verejná licencia:
David B. Martens