In: Organon F, vol. 30, no. 2
Lajos L. Brons
Details:
Year, pages: 2023, 182 - 220
Language: eng
Keywords:
Meta-ontology; Metaphysics; Ontological dependence; Phenomenal appearances; Reality; Svabhāva.
Article type: Research Article
About article:
Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things in themselves) and appearances, the R/A distinction, and (2) that between entities that are fundamental (or real, etcetera) and entities that are ontologically or existentially dependent, the F/D distinction. While these appear to be two very different distinctions, in Buddhist metaphysics they are combined, raising questions about how they are related. In this paper I argue that plausible versions of the R/A distinction are essentially a special kind of F/D distinction, and conversely, that many F/D distinctions imply an R/A distinction. Nevertheless, while this does suggest that the F/D distinction is more basic than the R/A distinction, it does not favor a particular understanding of the F/D distinction. There are many kinds of existential or ontological dependence that cannot be meaningfully combined into a single notion, and reality does not force us to accept any specific kind of dependence as more fundamental. Consequently, what we consider to be ‘real’, ‘fun- damental’, or ‘really existing’ is not entirely given by reality, but partially up to us.
How to cite:
ISO 690:
Brons, L. 2023. What Is Real?. In Organon F, vol. 30, no.2, pp. 182-220. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30210
APA:
Brons, L. (2023). What Is Real?. Organon F, 30(2), 182-220. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30210
About edition:
Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR
Published: 1. 7. 2023
Rights:
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0)