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McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge

In: Filozofia, vol. 76, no. 6
Filip Čukljević Číslo ORCID

Details:

Year, pages: 2021, 423 - 435
Language: eng
Keywords:
Observational knowledge – Justification – Reliability – Empirical content – Inference
Article type: State
Document type: Časopis
About article:
In this paper, I will analyze whether John McDowell’s critique of Robert Brandom’s account of observational knowledge is a success. First, I will present Brandom’s view of observational knowledge. Then I will lay out the main objections that McDowell raises against it. I will argue that McDowell’s arguments can be divided into semantic and epistemic. The analysis will show that the epistemic arguments face serious difficulty and that McDowell should focus on semantic critique.
How to cite:
ISO 690:
Čukljević, F. 2021. McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge. In Filozofia, vol. 76, no.6, pp. 423-435. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.6.3

APA:
Čukljević, F. (2021). McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge. Filozofia, 76(6), 423-435. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.6.3
About edition:
Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV
Published: 22. 6. 2021
Rights:
Creative Commons License
Toto dielo je licencované pod Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License