In: Organon F, vol. 27, no. 2
Byeong D. Lee
Year, pages: 2020, 263 - 279
Horwich; deflationism about truth; the value of truth; moral values; epistemic values.
Article type: Research Article
On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed in this norm is a moral value. I accept a deflationary theory of truth, according to which truth is too thin a concept to be constituted by any substantial norms. Thus I agree that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. In this paper, however, I argue that the alleged value of true beliefs can be better explained in terms of epistemic normativity rather than moral normativity.
How to cite:
D. Lee, B. 2020. Horwich on the Value of Truth. In Organon F, vol. 27, no.2, pp. 263-279. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204
D. Lee, B. (2020). Horwich on the Value of Truth. Organon F, 27(2), 263-279. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204
Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR
Published: 2. 5. 2020
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.