Subject and Predicate in Existential Propositions: A Survey of Frege’s Problem and Its Solutions

Rok, strany: 2020, 522 - 538

Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that be Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems

ISO 690:

Asadi, S. 2020. Subject and Predicate in Existential Propositions: A Survey of Frege’s Problem and Its Solutions. In Organon F, vol. 27, no.4, pp. 522-538. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27407

APA:

Asadi, S. (2020). Subject and Predicate in Existential Propositions: A Survey of Frege’s Problem and Its Solutions. Organon F, 27(4), 522-538. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27407

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR

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