What Is Real?

Rok, strany: 2023, 182 - 220

Two of the most fundamental distinctions in metaphysics are (1) that between reality (or things in themselves) and appearances, the R/A distinction, and (2) that between entities that are fundamental (or real, etcetera) and entities that are ontologically or existentially dependent, the F/D distinction. While these appear to be two very different distinctions, in Buddhist metaphysics they are combined, raising questions about how they are related. In this paper I argue that plausible versions of the R/A distinction are essentially a special kind of F/D distinction, and conversely, that many F/D distinctions imply an R/A distinction. Nevertheless, while this does suggest that the F/D distinction is more basic than the R/A distinction, it does not favor a particular understanding of the F/D distinction. There are many kinds of existential or ontological dependence that cannot be meaningfully combined into a single notion, and reality does not force us to accept any specific kind of dependence as more fundamental. Consequently, what we consider to be ‘real’, ‘fun- damental’, or ‘really existing’ is not entirely given by reality, but partially up to us.

ISO 690:

Brons, L. 2023. What Is Real?. In Organon F, vol. 30, no.2, pp. 182-220. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30210

APA:

Brons, L. (2023). What Is Real?. Organon F, 30(2), 182-220. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30210

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