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Concepts May Still Be Objects

In: Organon F, vol. 2022, no. 3
Harold Noonan
Rok, strany: 2022, 376 - 388
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
Concept; objet; Wright; singular term; predicate; Frege.
Typ článku: Research Article
O článku:
In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chapter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says , it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Noonan, H. 2022. Concepts May Still Be Objects. In Organon F, vol. 2022, no.3, pp. 376-388. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304

Noonan, H. (2022). Concepts May Still Be Objects. Organon F, 2022(3), 376-388. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR
Publikované: 24. 9. 2022
Verejná licencia:
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0)