What does the Premise “a Deceiver Deceives me” Conclude? － Descartes’ Deceiver Argument Reconsidered

Rok, strany: 2019, 308 - 317

Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me [...]” (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The interpretations that the earlier studies have shown is not a monolith. Then I will search for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction of the reasoning, “if a deceiver deceives me, I exist.” To be concrete, I show: 1) that it is not “I exist” but “I think” that is concluded from the supposition “a deceiver deceives me/I am deceived by a deceiver”; 2) that the attributions of the self as a thinking thing, i.e. understanding, affirming, and denying (AT-VII, 28; CSM-II, 19), are discovered in the very supposition of a deceiver.

ISO 690:

Tamura, A. 2019. What does the Premise “a Deceiver Deceives me” Conclude? － Descartes’ Deceiver Argument Reconsidered. In Filozofia, vol. 74, no.4, pp. 308-317. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2019.74.4.4

APA:

Tamura, A. (2019). What does the Premise “a Deceiver Deceives me” Conclude? － Descartes’ Deceiver Argument Reconsidered. Filozofia, 74(4), 308-317. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2019.74.4.4

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV / Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia