Facebook Instagram Twitter RSS Feed PodBean Back to top on side

The Descriptive and Normative Versions of Scientific Realism and Pessimism

In: Filozofia, vol. 74, no. 4
Seungbae Park
Detaily:
Rok, strany: 2019, 278 - 290
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
No-Miracles argument – Pessimistic induction – Scientific realism – Scientific pessimism
Typ článku: State / Original Articles
Typ dokumentu: časopis / journal
O článku:
Descriptive realism holds that T is true, while normative realism holds that T is warranted. Descriptive pessimism holds that T is false, while normative pessimism holds that T is unwarranted. We should distinguish between descriptive and normative realism because some arguments against scientific realism require that scientific realism be interpreted as descriptive realism, and because scientific realists can retreat from descriptive to normative realism when descriptive realism is under attack. We should also distinguish between descriptive and normative pessimism because some arguments against scientific pessimism require that it be interpreted as descriptive pessimism, and because scientific pessimists can retreat from descriptive to normative pessimism when descriptive pessimism is under attack.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Park, S. 2019. The Descriptive and Normative Versions of Scientific Realism and Pessimism. In Filozofia, vol. 74, no.4, pp. 278-290. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2019.74.4.2

APA:
Park, S. (2019). The Descriptive and Normative Versions of Scientific Realism and Pessimism. Filozofia, 74(4), 278-290. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2019.74.4.2
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV / Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia
Publikované: 15. 4. 2019