


Milan Olejník

*Subordination  
of the Communist Party  
of Czechoslovakia  
to Communist International*

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OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
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**Milan Olejník**

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### Subordination of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to Communist International

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A 1920s May Day Parade in Prešov

## FOREWORD

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (the CPC) held unique position in the political system of the Republic. The CPC was a political subject sui generis. As the only Party, the CPC was an integral part of a foreign political organization – the Communist International openly declared it. If any other political party would acknowledge such affiliation, it would be undoubtedly dissolved. However, during existence of the Czechoslovak Republic (CSR) this did not happen. Only after the Munich Agreement, when the CSR underwent a bitter process of submission to the Nazi Germany, was the CPC dissolved. In the region of the Central Europe, CSR was the only state allowing a legal status of the Communist Party. This was surprising, taking into consideration a political program of the CPC, which clearly stated the goal to overthrow existing parliamentary system and impose a communist dictate. However, the CPC could not carry-on its activities without restriction. The Marxist-Leninist ideology, which the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia professed, was classified by the Czechoslovak government as subversive and dangerous to the Republic. Consequently, activities of the CPC were monitored by security agencies and when, in judgement of representatives of state institutions, these activities violated law, their perpetrators were prosecuted. Similarly, public speeches of communist representatives were monitored and if speakers did break law, they were also prosecuted. Communist press was target of censure. In some cases publishing of communist periodicals was stopped for a various periods of time.

Activities of the CPC were influenced by the Communist International (CI). CI controlled development of all constituent communist parties not only in Europe, but also in USA and Asia. The CI, which was the highest authority in international communist movement, had an immense influence upon the Czechoslovak Communist Party. A history of the CPC is to a large extent a history of frequently occurring revolts against endeavor of the CI to instill a stern discipline and to eliminate any signs of “deviations” from ideological course prescribed by the Communist International. In this context, as the main obstacle to implementation of communist orthodoxy in the CPC, viewed by the CI, were social democratic traditions surviving in the Party. Bearers of social democratic practices, were primarily older members of the CPC, who were used to more democratic conditions prevalent in the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party.

The most serious reaction, threatening to destroy very existence of the CPC, was resistance to bolshevization, demanded by the Communist Inter-

national during the second half of twenties. It was a program of reconstruction of the CPC, aimed at rebuilding the Party in line with organizational structure of the Russian Communist Party. Changes demanded by the CI were resisted by members, the CPC lost a majority of its membership including prominent communist intellectuals. Only with help of the Communist International was the CPC chairman Klement Gottwald able to overcome resistance and carry-on the program of bolshevization.

After year 1989 interest in history of the CPC decreased. Decades of deformations in interpretation of Czechoslovak history, including interpretation of history of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was grossly misinterpreted by communist historians. Therefore, there is a need to create an objective picture of history of the CPC. Because the CPC was an integral part of the Czechoslovak parliamentary system and study of its history will provide a deeper knowledge of complex and vibrant political life in interwar Czechoslovakia.

The aim of monograph is at least in concise fashion elaborate main points of history of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during first thirteen years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The attention was primarily focused upon relation of the CPC and the Communist International. The influence of the Communist International had a formative impact upon ideological and personal development of the CPC and resulted in a profound submission of the Communist Party to the CI under leadership of Clement Gottwald. The CPC became an obedient satellite of the Soviet Communist Party, which had a fateful consequences in history of Czechoslovakia after II World War.

The monograph is drawing upon documents deposited in archives of Slovak and Czech Republic, contemporary press and literature published during existence of the communist regime, as well as literature published after year 1989.

## I. ROAD TO ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Defeat of the Central Powers at the end of the First World War and consequent demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire changed a geopolitical face of the Central Europe. A deep change of status of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians and members of other ethnic communities was enacted by establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic (CSR). In Slovakia, as well as in the Czechland, this led to a radically new political, economic and social situation compared to the life in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where political power was exclusively in hands of aristocracy. Contrary to aristocratic character of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, founding fathers of CSR were, without exception, men without pedigree. The Czechoslovak Republic was constituted as a democracy and privileges of aristocracy were abolished. According to the Constitution, all citizens were equal and entitled to participate on political development of state. Czechoslovak citizens had no only right, but even obligation to vote. Which was truly a rare privilege during inter-war period in Europe, even women in the Czechoslovakia had right to vote.

One of the most significant changes in political situation, as compared to the pre-war time, was inclination to leftist ideology by a large segment of citizenry. This development can be ascribed to several causes. Years of bloody war undermined sinews of existing social order and caused shift to a radical political views. This led to a process of formation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Czech historian Pavel Marek expressed opinion that "*Groups, which joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, could be characterized as a relatively heterogeneous mixture of excited people inspired by events in Russia in autumn of 1917. By their composition and aims they were a hotchpotch of various idealists accepting socialist ideology; radical dissenters reacting to burdening social problems; searching intellectuals, seduced proletarians, ambition politicians and adventurers.*"<sup>1</sup>

1 MAREK, Pavel. Komunistická strana Československa. In Malíš, Jiří, Marek, Pavel et al. *Politické strany vývoji politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861 – 2004*. I. Díl: Období 1861 – 1938. Brno: Nakladatelství Doplněk, 2005, p. 711.

War caused a catastrophic decrease of life standards, which contributed to a general dissatisfaction and made the Social Democratic Party (SDP) popular.<sup>2</sup> During the first years of the Republic, the SDP was so influential, that its representatives held important positions in government and had a significant influence upon political and economic development of Czechoslovakia.<sup>3</sup> However, despite leftist rhetoric frequently uttered by social democratic leaders, SDP refused program of revolution and destruction of government. On the contrary, social democrats became devoted supporters of a parliamentary democracy and existing form of political establishment of the state. This led to a rift between conservative and radical segment of the SDP. Political orientation of a conservative fraction of the Social Democratic Party, which was hardly consistent with a radical rhetoric of some leaders, led to criticism on part of radical members of SDP.<sup>4</sup>

Process of formation of left fraction inside of the Social Democratic Party gained more concrete form in January 1920, when representatives of left wing published in weekly *Social Democrat* "the Program Declaration of the Marxist Left". Declaration accused leadership of the SDP of abandoning "a true" Marxist ideology by refusing thesis of "a class conflict" and demanded a deep political and economic changes, which would drastically transform character of CSR. There were: - establishment of workers coun-

- 2 According to a collective work of communist historians "Stabile and powerful remained the Social Democratic Party... Even though number of its adherents during the first half of twenties decreased, it is impossible this party consider an irrelevant factor in the Czechoslovak political development." PLEVZA, Viliam, et al. *Prehľad dejín KSČ na Slovensku*. Bratislava: Pravda, 1971, p. 100.
- 3 "Social democratic politicians occupied important positions in government institutions, including post of the Prime Minister (V. Tusar) and in Slovakia post of the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (I. Déter). " PLEVZA, V., et al. *Prehľad dejín KSČ...*, p. 105.
- 4 The first open conflict between radicals and conservative leadership of the Social Democratic Party erupted on October 1919 during a session of the SDP. Delegates representing left wing requested that government will fulfil their radical demands, including expropriation of bank capital, industrial and mining plants and large estates without any compensation. In case that these demands would be refused, representatives of SDP in government should resign. Further, they demanded that government will establish diplomatic relationship with the Communist Russia and "commence an uncompromising class fight against bourgeoisie". Leaders of the SDP allegedly tried achieve some compromise, but were refused. CIHÁK, Miroslav. *Zrod komunistické strany Československa*. Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda, 1986, p. 61.

cils: - abolishment of army; - establishment of "a proletarian army"; - leaving existing coalition of political parties and joining the Communist International.<sup>5</sup>

At that time the Communist International (CI)<sup>6</sup> was well established and became an influential centrum of radical leftist movements across the Europe and beyond.<sup>7</sup> According to Slovak historian Juraj Benko, "In the beginning a small international organization during a period of several years asserted itself as a significant ideological and organizational alternative of opposition socialist movement in Europe."<sup>8</sup> Since its inception<sup>9</sup>, the Communist International, based in Moscow, was under dominance of Russian Bolsheviks.<sup>10</sup>

- 5 PEROUTKA, Ferdinand. *Budování státu III – IV (1920 – 1922)*. Praha: Academia, 2003, p. 277.
- 6 A term the Comintern was also used.
- 7 British historian B. Crozner expressed opinion that establishment of the Communist International was an event of momentous significance: "In history of the Soviet Empire is this a second most important event after the Bolshevik Revolution. The Comintern during its existence proved, that it is effective, even though not almighty tool of the Soviet imperialism on world scene". CROZNER, Brian. *Vzestup a pád Sovětské říše*. Praha: FORUM, 2004, p. 45.
- 8 BENKO, Juraj: K možnostiam, metódam a prostriedkom činnosti Kominterny v strednej Európe v prvých rokoch existencie (1919 – 1922): Na hraniciach legality a ilegality. In ŠMIGEL, Michal (ed.). *Radikálny socializmus a komunizmus na Slovensku Spoločnosť medzi demokraciou a totalitou*. Banská Bystrica: Katedra histórie Fakulty humanitných vied Univerzity Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici; Historický ústav Slovenskej akadémie vied v Bratislave, 2007, p. 15.
- 9 The First Congress of the Communist International convened on March 2, 1919. According to Czech historian Květoslava Volková, "The Fundamental significance in regard to theoretical and political aspect had Lenin's thesis about bourgeois democracy and dictate of proletariat... Participants of the Congress fully supported Lenin's thesis." VOLKOVÁ, Květoslava. Založení Komunistické Internacionály a mezinárodní revoluci proletariát. In VOLKOVÁ, Květoslava (ed.). *V bojovém zvačku Komunistická strana Československa a Komunistická Internacionála (1919 – 1943)*. Praha: Svoboda, 1988, p. 39.
- 10 K. Volkova admitted that the CI was under control of the Russian Communist Party in which held a position of undisputed leader V. I. Lenin: "An integral part of international policy of the Bolshevik Party and activities of V. I. Lenin was a conscious endeavor to help emerging communist parties and leftist socialists to get rid of centrist opportunistic relics as well as sectarian tendencies and to reinforce ability to carry conscious revolutionary fight based on creative understanding of the Marxism. This was reflected in declarations and appeals of the Bolshe-

In Slovakia, increase of leftist ideology among general population was to a large extent influenced by a dismal economic situation, radicalization and ethnic composition of society. Unlike in the Western part of the Republic, in Slovak society the Catholic Church was ideologically and politically much more influential. But, despite of all its fight against "bolшевism", Catholic Church was not able to stop penetration of leftist ideology into the Slovak society. In comparison to the Czechland, political development in Slovakia was more under influence of the Russian revolution.

A significant share in development of radical leftist movement in Slovakia had members of the Hungarian minority. According to Slovak historian Karol Fremal, "fight for establishment of the Communist Party was joined by many Hungarian members of the Social Democratic Party, especially in the Eastern and the Southern Slovakia... the Czechoslovak communists of Hungarian ethnic extraction and Hungarian emigres in a significant measure reinforced labor movement in Slovakia and contributed to formation of the Marxist Left and to founding of the Communist Party during January 16 - 17, 1921 in Lubochňa."<sup>11</sup>

Signs of discontent emerged when the Executive Committee of SDP, which represented a conservative fraction, cancelled a session planned on December 19, 1920 with aim to prevent a possibility that the left fraction will cause split of the Party. *Pravda Chudoby* (Truth of Poverty), a periodical informing about development of political strategy of the Marxist Left in Slovakia, published an article in which advised its members to ignore cancellation and to attend session.<sup>12</sup>

Leftist delegates attended session and elected the "Action Committee", authorized to manage the Party affairs.

*vik Party to some communist parties established in year 1918. These documents contained evaluation of the general situation of international labor movement and indicated also concrete orientation of activity of these parties."* VOLKOVÁ, K. *Založení Komunistické Internacionály...*, p. 51

11 FREMAL, Karol. *Korene bolševizácie na Slovensku, I. časť Iné pohľady na formovanie a vznik marxistickej ľavice*. In *Acta historica neosolensis*, Ročenka Katedry histórie Fakulty humanitných vied Univerzity Mateja Bela v Banskéj Bystrici, V. /2002, p. 39.

12 *Pravda Chudoby* advised not to accept cancellation of session as unjustified and appealed to delegates to attend session. *Pravda Chudoby*, September 15, 1920, no. 1, Politickým organizáciám soc. dem. strany na Slovensku (To political organizations of the Soc. Dem. Party in Slovakia), p. 1.

On the Republic level, a step further in a process of formation of the Marxist Left, was the XIII Congress of the Social Democratic Party held during September 25 - 28, 1920 in Prague. One of the most important results of the Congress was decision to join the Communist International.<sup>13</sup> Undisputed leader of the left fraction in the SDP became Bohumír Šmeral. He agreed that adoption of conditions stated by the Communist International is a goal of the Marxist Left, however, proposed that concrete steps should be discussed with representatives of the CI later.<sup>14</sup> Šmeral was active for years in the SDP and though he was critical of conservative fraction, was still in many aspects a social democrat.<sup>15</sup> He only hesitantly accepted communist ideology in its entirety.<sup>16</sup>

However, hopes that the SDP will be gradually transferred to a more radical political subject were unrealistic. On the contrary, split of the Social Democratic Party into two ideologically antagonistic fractions ended in violence and threatened to undermine political stability of the Czechoslo-

13 It was decided to send to Russia a delegation, which will negotiate conditions of entry to the IC. *Pravda Chudoby*, September 30, 1920, no. 3, XIII. právoplatný zjazd českoslov. soc. dem. strany robotníckej. (The XIII Regular Congress of the Czechoslov. Soc. Dem. Working Party), p. 1.

14 „The aim of the Marxist Left at XIII Congress was not transform the SDP to a revolutionary party, but legally impose control over the whole SDP and steering the Social Democratic Party toward "anti-opportunist" policy." ČADA, Václav. *Vznik KSČ jako revoluční strany nového typu*. Praha: Svoboda, 1986, p. 61.

15 According to Czech historian Michal Reiman, social democratic traditions had a strong roots which had a lasting influence upon a large number of communist party members: „Bolshevik totalitarianism, which fully proliferated only after October 1917, was trying suppress democratic attitudes and traditions, but was never completely successful. Influence of democratic tradition survived in communist environment namely there, where political system enabled to communists legal activity and participation on parliamentary and other democratic authorities and institutions". REIMAN, Michal. *O komunistickém totalitarismu a o tom, co s ním souvisí*. Praha: Karolinum, 2000, p. 19.

16 F. Peroutka opined that „Šmeral even disliked to be called communist... He wanted to be called a radical social democrat and for his associates coined more traditional names, such as, for example, "the Marxist Left". His aim was not to lead a small sect... His ideal was to take control of almost the whole Social Democratic Party... dr. Šmeral especially believed in automatic course of events; he believed also in automatic transfer of power. It seems that he was waiting for some great event, either internal, or in neighborhood... either army joining communists, revolution in Germany, or Russian invasion...". PEROUTKA, Ferdinand. *Budování státu...* Pp. 280-281.



vak Republic. Already tense relations between both factions erupted into an open conflict as result of contention which side is rightful owner of so called Lidový dům (the People's House).<sup>17</sup> Government interfered, radicals were expelled and conservatives assumed the sole ownership of the building. On December 10, the Central Committee representing left faction issued a call for a general strike. The Government responded by declaring a martial law and summoned the police and the army. Only in a few isolated areas, such as Kladno, strike had a massive character. On December 14, a delegation representatives of the Left, headed by Skalák and Vaněk, appealed to President Masaryk to issue an order security forces to stop arresting striking workers. The President refused to negotiate with them. On the following day, the Central Committee called of the strike.<sup>18</sup>

On December 14, 1920 representatives of the Left submitted an interpellation in the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, inquiring members of government to explain "unlawful action" of authorities, which resulted in expulsion of adherents of the radical Left from the People's House.<sup>19</sup> On December 17, 1920, an interpellation was submitted by communist deputies to the Minister of Interior, who demanded to explain a mass arrest of participants of the general strike.<sup>20</sup> *Pravda Chudoby* condemned occupation of the People's House by police and accused conservatives of "criminal" attack against workers: "Crime perpetrated by rightists united with bourgeoisie is impossible to describe. They knew very well that workers will voluntarily not give-up their property and that a bloody conflict will be unavoidable and still they were committed to it."<sup>21</sup>

The fight for the People House and suppression of a general strike resulted in a definitive break between both factions of the Social Democratic Party. The Left faction decided to convoke a congress at Lubochňa on

17 On September 16, 1920 members of left faction occupied headquarters of SDP. KLIMEK, *Antonín. Velké dějiny zemí Koruny České* Praha Litomyšl: Paseka, 2000, svazek XIII 1918 – 1929, p. 218.

18 ZINNER, Paul E. *Communist strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1948*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p. 32.

19 Poslanecká sněmovna N. S. R. Č. 1920 I. volební období 2. Zasedání, p. 1056.

20 Poslanecká sněmovna N. S. R. Č. 1920 I. volební období 2. Zasedání, p. 1102.

21 *Pravda chudoby*, December 18, 1920, no. 14, Hrozné násilie na robotom lude.

V Prahe tiekla robotnícka krv. (A horrific violence against working people. In Prague blood of workers was spilled.), p. 1.

January 16, 1921.<sup>22</sup> Despite interference of state authorities, which canceled gathering of the Marxist Left and forcefully dispersed participants, delegates were able to approve 21 conditions designated by the Communist International, which were mandatory for any political party desiring to join the CI.<sup>23</sup> In regard to the ethnic composition of participants of the Congress, it is necessary to note that the Hungarian Marxists played a significant role of in creation of the Communist Party in Slovakia. This is admitted also by Slovak communist historians: "The Hungarian Marxists were without doubt most competent organizers and propagandists and at the same time they were relatively well prepared also in sphere of theoretical knowledge... Directly during the Congress in Lubochňa they prepared a resolution, which became a program basis for conclusion of the whole Congress..." But, these historians also emphasized that the decisive position had the Slovak section, because "primarily Slovak working class had to stand-up in a decisive phase of class struggle as rival of the Slovak bourgeoisie."<sup>24</sup>

An important step in a process of creation of the Communist Party on the state level was the XIV Congress of the Social Democratic Party held during May 14 – 16, 1921 in Prague. The most important issue – acceptance of 21 conditions required by the Communist International, was unanimously agreed upon. Delegates of the Congress adopted a resolution confirming this decision: "The Congress of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Left is declaring its unconditional adherence to the Third International in Moscow. At this moment the Congress is changing name of the Social Democratic Left to the Czechoslovak Communist Party..."<sup>25</sup> *Pravda Chudoby* commented event with a pompous excitement: "May 15, 1921 is one of the most festive days of the Czechoslovak proletariat. Delegates of workers... were accepting

22 According to *Pravda Chudoby*, "Proletariat of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia will deliberate in Lubochňa how to prepare an unifying road of political movement. Till now, no other congress was as important as this one... We are going to Lubochňa to accomplish total unification of workers and poor land laborers". *Pravda Chudoby*, January 30, 1921, no. 11, Na zjazd! (Lets go to congress!), p. 1.

23 A communist representative in the Senate, František Zimák, submitted an interpellation in which he and his colleagues protested against refusal cancellation of the Congress of leftist faction enacted in Lubochňa and demanded that the Minister of Interior will investigate "unlawful conduct of Slovak authorities". Senát Národního shromáždění R. Č. r. 1921. I volební období 2. zasedání. Tisk 417. Interpelácia senátora Frant. Zimáka a súdruhov na ministra vnútra.

24 PLEVZA, V. et al. *Prehľad dejín KSC...*, p. 114.

25 ČADA, V. *Vznik KSC...*, p. 110.

21 conditions of the Third International – they stood from their seats, raised their hands and with determined unanimity were calling: Yes!<sup>26</sup> At the close of the Congress, participants adopted a resolution, in which they confirmed their decision to join the Communist International.<sup>27</sup>

This was a momentous decision with lasting consequences. It resulted in a loss of independence of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and led to a turbulent development of the CPC during following years.

Delegates of the Congress sent a letter to the Executive Committee (EC) of the Communist International in which they informed about decision to join the CI and their adoption of name “The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia”.<sup>28</sup> The Communist International responded in a positive fashion, congratulated delegates and invited representatives of the CPC to the Third international Congress of the Communist International. *Pravda Chudoby* informed that the Executive Committee of the CI obtained a resolution adopted by delegates of the CPC and dispatched to the “Czechoslovak working class” and to its Communist Party cordial greetings: “We are convinced that your Party with its hundred thousand members is capable to occupy a leading place in the Communist International... e are expecting that your Party will send to the Third Congress of the Communist International as many delegates as possible! Long live to the strong Communist Party of Czechoslovakia!”<sup>29</sup> The Communist International also pointed to reasons of failure of the December Strike: “The December Strike showed courage and energy of

26 *Pravda Chudoby*, May 22, 1921, no. 29, V mène ludu. (In the name of the People.)

27 „The Congress of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party Left is festively proclaiming its unconditional accession to the Third International. Hereby the Congress is immediately changing name from the Social Democratic Party Left to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia... Delegates representing their organizations are committed to uphold in any circumstances obligations expressed in 21 conditions...” Protokol ustanovujúcnho sjezdu Komunistickej strany Československé (The Protocol of the Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). In KLÍŘ, Miroslav (Ed.), *Studijní materiály k Dějinám Komunistickej strany Československa v letech 1921 – 1924*. Praha: Státní nakladatelství politické literatury, 1959, p. 55.

28 PRAŽÁKOVÁ, Irena (ed.). *Dokumenty moderní doby*. Praha: Svoboda, 1978, pp. 154–157.

29 *Pravda Chudoby*, June 5, 1921, no. 33, Výkonny výbor III. Komunistickej Internationaly Komunistickej strane Československa. (The Executive Committee of the Third Communist International to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.), p. 1.

the Czechoslovak revolutionary workers but also showed organizational and political shortcomings of the Left. The December Strike was lacking not only an organizational central leadership but also a political leadership and this had its reasons. In leadership of the Party there are numerous elements which knowingly or not knowingly, are sabotaging a case of communism... Only he, who is willing to concentrate communists in fight for life and death against capitalism and for dictate of proletariat... only he is communist and belongs to the Communist International.”<sup>30</sup>

The CI viewed the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as a valuable member of international communist movement because Party’s legal status in a political system of the Republic and also because of its mass character. The CPC was the largest Communist Party in the Central Europe.<sup>31</sup>

The Third International Congress of the CI convened on June 22 and lasted till July 12, 1921. The most significant event of the Congress was a speech of Vladimir I. Lenin, named “The Thesis in regard to tactic of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)”.<sup>32</sup> V. Lenin exhorted a heroic fight of “the Soviet people”, who defeated internal contra-revolution and foreign aggression. He admitted though, that rapidity of world proletariat revolution slowed down. In existing situation, emphasized V. Lenin, the most important was “To gain the decisive influence upon the majority of working class... it is now the most important question facing the Communist International. Because, despite objective revolutionary, economic and political situation which could lead suddenly to a revolution... there is not the majority of

30 KRÁL, Václav. *Cesta k Leninismu. Prameny k dějinám KSČ v letech 1921 – 1929*. Praha: Academia, pp. 68, 69.

31 „If we take into consideration frequently used estimation 350 000 members, then it belonged among the strongest sections of the Communist international”. ČIHÁK, Miroslav. *Prosažení leninského pojetí masovosti KSČ v letech 1921 – 1938*. Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1978, p. 173.

32 According to Russian historian Mlnajev, I. M. “Influenced by initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Congress approved a new Party name: the Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks) – CPR – (b). XIV Congress in year 1925 decided to rename CPR – (b) to the General Communist Party (Bolsheviks) GCP (b) and since XIX Congress in year 1952 the name is the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU). MI-NAJEV, I. M. Dějiny Komunistickej Internationaly – zdroj inspirace pro teorii a praxi revolučného dělnického hnutí. In VOLKOVÁ, Kvdětoslava (ed.), *V bojovní svazku. Komunistickej strana Československa a Komunistickej Internationaly (1919 – 1943)*. Praha: SVOBODA, 1988, p. 12.

working class yet under influence of communism."<sup>33</sup> *Pravda Chudoby* published an article penned by Lev Trocky, at that time the prominent member of the Communist International, in which he repeated Lenin's thesis that the main conclusion of the Third Congress of the Communist International was necessity to win the majority of working class. "The Third Congress came to conclusion that there is in progress a further dissolution of economic fundaments of bourgeois rule. But never before was an instinct of self-preservation of bourgeoisie armed with such methods of defenses and attacks as now. Economic conditions of victory of working class are sure... But this victory can be won only by rational execution of fight and in the first place by gaining the majority of working class. This is the main lesson of the Third Congress of the Communist International."<sup>34</sup>

Strategy defended by Lenin, was in stark contrast with opinion of German delegates who defend so called "the Offensive Theory".<sup>35</sup> Lenin ridiculed this approach as foolish and self-defeating. He accentuated necessity to gain adherence of the majority of workers to communist parties and pointed to the fact that "no communist party in the West was able yet to realize this goal".<sup>36</sup> The Offensive theory was criticized by V. I. Lenin also during the Third Congress of the CI: "Who is not capable to understand that in the Europe – where almost all proletariat is organized – we must gain the majority of working class, he is for communist movement lost and will never learn anything if he was not able to learn this during three years of the Great Revolution."<sup>37</sup>

A Czech historian M. Hájek wrote, that "The Third Congress enforced international validity of a new political line, which later began to be named a tactic of the Unified Front. But the Congress defined only its principle, it went no further. On the base of strategy formulated by the Third Congress, in leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was formed a united block

33 BRADÁČ, Zdeněk. *Boj za bojševizaci KSČ v období dočasné stabilizace kapitálu I 1924 – 1925*. Praha: Státní nakladatelství politické literatury, 1955, p. 37.

34 *Pravda Chudoby*, August 4, 1921, no. 50, Hlavné poučenie zo zjazdu III. Komunistickej internacionály (The main lesson of the Third Congress of the Communist International), p. 1.

35 The Offensive Theory was based on conviction, that the decisive factor in victory of proletariat is a small group of committed revolutionaries.

36 HÁJEK, Miloš. *Jednotná fronta K politické orientaci: Komunistické internacionály v letech 1921 – 1935*. Praha: Academia, 1969, pp. 23, 35.

37 ČIHÁK, M. *Zrod komunistické strany...*, p. 93.

*Smeral-Kreibich-Zápotocký*: This block, however, had no majority in the Executive Committee of the CPC, majority had Hlek and his adherents".<sup>38</sup>

A regional pro-government periodical *Slovenský Východ* (Slovak East), naturally less sympathetic toward communist movement, characterized the Third Congress of the Communist International as "remarkably boring", because adoption of 21 conditions allegedly "Curbed initiative of non-Russian communist parties, eliminated exceptional personalities of labor movement and thwarted possibility of establishment of large parties."<sup>39</sup> However, opinion expressed by *Slovenský Východ* was rather not accurate, because the German section of the CPC made sure that the Congress had a fairly existing course.<sup>40</sup>

21 conditions formulated by the Communist International imposed sternly delineated conditions on each communist organization. Even though a local situation of individual communist parties was allowed to be taken into consideration, in reality each party was obliged to accept decisions of the CI without objections.

The strict requirement addressed by the Communist International to all political parties to accept and follow strategy and experiences of the Russian Revolution, caused revulsion on part of membership of the CPC and lowered popularity of communists among general population. But, I. M. Minajev emphasized that "The Comintern truly considered as necessary condition for development of communist parties to become familiar with experiences of the October Revolution."<sup>41</sup>

Surprising and not welcomed by all members of the CPC was strategy of "The Unified Front", elaborated by the Communist International. It was

38 HÁJEK, M. *Jednotná fronta...*, p. 27.

39 *Slovenský Východ*, July 9, 1921, no. 154, Kongres III. internacionály. (The Congress of the Third International), p. 1.

40 Czech historian Jan Galandaauer in his bibliographical work devoted to life and work of B. Šmeral wrote: "Czechoslovak delegation must face a sharp remorse noticed by K. Kreibich, leader of the German section of the CPC. Objections were aimed especially at B. Šmeral. He was castigated for opportunistic remarks, which he expressed during the Congress, also for his – allegedly – improper carelessness, docility to the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, etc. Kreibich exaggerated mistakes of Šmeral and in many cases his objections were not justified... During session of the Third Congress V. I. Lenin refuted accusations and argued that the main task of communist parties was broadening their influence upon the majority of members of working class, especially in fight for partial demands." GALANDAUAUER, Jan. *Bohumír Šmeral*. Bratislava: Pravda, 1986, p. 87.

41 MINAJEV, I. M. *Dějiny Komunistické internacionály...*, p. 16.

# ROBOTNICKÝ A ŽENY MALOPOLNIKOV VY STA DVOĽNÁSOBNĚ V KO RISTOVANĚ A POLLACOVANĚ Protestujte proti drahotě! Hlasujte pře ledině stranu, která skuločte bojuje za Vaše oslobo- denie a za Vašu rovnoprávnost! Vojte komunistickú stranu!

result of understanding that immediate victory of proletariat revolution is unrealistic and all European communist parties must first gain influence among masses. Strategy of the United Front was delineated during the Third session of the Executive of the Communist International. According to Galandauer "The Session of the Executive of the Communist International held on December 1921 elaborated a thesis which obliged communist parties to develop initiative in build-up the Unified Front of the whole working class in fight against offensive of capital. The center of endeavor to establish the Unified Front should be based on mass propaganda among workers, but leaders of individual communist parties should also negotiate with leaders of reformist and centrist parties and submitting to their concrete suggestions... Thesis elaborated by the Communist International, named "In Regard to the Unified Front", delineated a tactical line only generally; individual communist parties should be creative in applying them."<sup>42</sup>

Perouka characterized the true essence of the Unified Front as a strategy flexibly adjusted to exiting situation, but not changing the primary aim to achieve victory of communism.<sup>43</sup> However, representatives of radical fractions in communist parties viewed this approach as incomprehensible on part of the CI. It seemed to them that this was a betrayal of revolution.<sup>44</sup> Despite dissenting voices, the CPC, obedient to the Communist International, presented the Unified Front as the only correct strategy of workers in reaction to economic crisis in Czechoslovakia. *Pravda Chudoby* published an article informing about official program of the CPC how to solve economic crisis: "The Executive Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in number of meetings discussed catastrophic economic crisis... stance of the Executive Committee is as follow: ... Recent catastrophic crisis is rousing all

42 GALANDAUER, J. Bohumír Šmeral... p. 91.

43 "This new tactics did not of course mean that communist movement is willing to forget its final goals. The Communist International at that time argued that after all, it is same under what flag communism will be able to concentrate in its ranks the majority of workers... Therefore, a true slogan of the Communist International was: not talk about it, but never forget it; act even as reformist... however in the right time, when strength will be gathered, act as a revolutionary". PEROUKA, F. *Budování státu...*, p. 789.

44 V. I. Lenin himself viewed instructions of the Communist International as hardly intelligible for foreigners, because he perceived these instructions as "too Russian". JIŠA, Václav. K organizační výstavbě KSČ In *V bojovém svazku. Komunistická strana Československa a Komunistická Internacionála (1919 – 1943)*. Praha: SVOBODA, 1988, p. 88.

workers to support the United Front. The Executive Committee in recent difficult situation is not looking back and again is declaring that is willing negotiate with all socialist parties and labor organizations with the aim to make the United Front a reality."<sup>45</sup>

At the close of year 1922, the Czechoslovak Communist Party endeavored to create an alliance with other left-oriented parties and to establish the Unified Front. But this initiative came to nothing.<sup>46</sup>

V. I. Lenin appealed to communist parties to establish a close connection between communist parties and industrial workers. He emphasized that "the main power of movement lies in organizations of workers in large industrial plants."<sup>47</sup> However, not every member of the CPC welcomed transfer of local organizations to industrial plants, demanded by Lenin. According to Czech historian V. Jiša, "an endeavor to implement Lenin's principles encountered a whole array of obstacles."<sup>48</sup>

In regard to a general tactics of communist parties, the Third Congress of the CI defined as the most important task to build-up unity of workers and led them to the "decisive fight" against capitalist class.<sup>49</sup> Czech historian Vojtěch Mencl wrote that instructions issued by the Third Congress of the CI included also an obligation of communist parties to struggle for unity of labor unions and gain them for revolutionary aims: "The Second principle confirmed by the Third Congress was to carry unceasing fight for unity of unions. Task of fractions (communists) was to gain union organizations for revolutionary union policy... without splitting their unity. Achieving unification of unions defined the Third Congress as the categorical directive."<sup>50</sup>

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was not ideologically homogeneous organization. Internal dissensions were caused especially by the ul-

tra-left fraction led by B. Jilek and V. Bolen. They refused to accept that there was only a small chance to successfully realize a communist revolution in the Western Europe at that time and were proponents the offensive theory.

Besides surprising change of tactic formulated by the CI, delegates of the CPC, who participated on the Third Congress of the Communist International, were astonished also by a horrific economic situation in Russia. They were shocked by an abject poverty of Russian people and widely spread hunger in cities as well as in countryside. Several reasons contributed to a catastrophic state of economy. The strict commandment of the economy caused a number of difficulties, which resulted in a rapid decrease of industrial production and collapse of agriculture. According to Czech historians M. Pečerka and B. Litera, "Characteristic feature of period from half of year 1918 till March 1921 was a system of so called War Communism. Its implementation was partly caused by civil war, but partly also by projection of utopic visions into reality. All resources of country were strictly centralized and utilized for supporting war. The most typical feature of the War Communism in countryside was violent requisition of all supplies of grain and foodstuffs from peasants. In addition, the Bolshevik Party was in countryside applying a class struggle. Consequences... were emerging already at the end of year 1918. Already a low production and area of cultivated land was decreasing still, causing uprisings... Population was decimated by recruitment to army, exhaustion by hunger and critical lack of fuel."<sup>51</sup> Even Pravda Chudoby admitted existence of desperate conditions in Russia and warned that starvation of Russian people can offer chance of world bourgeois to defeat Russia. Periodical appealed for an international help to ease a wide spread of hunger in Russian countryside: "If capitalist bourgeoisie would be able to defeat it (Russia), then attack upon rights of poor people in other countries would follow and oppression of poor people would follow as never before. Therefore, it is a duty of every worker to help to our unfortunate Russian brothers as much as is in his ability."<sup>52</sup> Hunger in Russia became a topic of article published by Slovenský Východ. Unlike Pravda Chudoby, which blamed hunger on drought, Slovenský Východ explained famine as a direct consequence of economic mismanagement of the Soviet regime: "Delegates of the Third Congress of the Moscow International are returning home disappointed, at least those for whom world revolution is not only busi-

45 *Pravda Chudoby*, September 10, 1922, no. 73. Komunistická strana Československa k terajšej kríze (Comment of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to present crisis), p. 1.

46 During December 1922 representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the National Assembly appealed to socialist parties to establish the Unified Front of labor deputies with an aim to solve economic crisis. Socialists refused offer: "We hold fruitless to negotiate about parliamentary politics with party, which is refusing parliamentary democracy". PEROUTKA, F. *Budování státu...*, p. 790.

47 Jiša, V. *K organizační výstavbě KSČ...*, p. 85.

48 Jiša, V. *K organizační výstavbě KSČ...*, p. 87.

49 MENCL, Vojtěch. *Na cestě k jednotě KSČ v letech 1921 – 1923*. Praha: Nakladatelství politické literatury, 1964, p. 31.

50 MENCL, V. *Na cestě k jednotě...*, p. 34.

51 PEČERKA, Marek – LITERA, Bohuslav. *Dějiny Ruska v datech*. Praha: Dokořán, 2011, p. 198.

52 *Pravda Chudoby*, August 7, 1921, no. 51, Pomoc sovietskému Rusku. (Help to the Soviet Russia.), p. 1.

ss... The Congress should bring clearance and encouragement, but brought neither one. The Congress convened in time of great nutritional crisis and the Soviet government was not able to hide before delegates of the Congress a desperate state of Russian country. Delegates saw in front of their very eyes depth of hunger and how horrifying was health situation caused by furious attack of cholera, typhoid and other diseases. Only blind did not see that disarray is threatening the Russian Communist Party.<sup>53</sup>

Already before the Third Congress of the Communist International, Lenin was not hiding a desperate situation in Russia before workers. At the Congress of traffic workers he declared that there was no time to be lost, because poverty, hunger and general disruption reached such a degree, that "The Very existence of the Soviet Russia is at risk."<sup>54</sup> M. Reimann defined reasons leading to disastrous state of Russian economy as consequences of lack of economic qualification and practical experiences of leaders of the Russian government, combined with an idealistic conviction that the Marxist-Leninist ideology will be able solve all difficulties associated with creation of a communist society.<sup>55</sup> There were, however, people devoted to idea of communism to such a degree, that they ignored bleak conditions in Russia no matter what. Ivan Olbracht, a Czech writer and an ardent communist who visited Russia, was dispatching reports home, in which he assured that there is no need believe to "fables" about hunger and that life standard in Russia is higher than in Czechoslovakia.<sup>56</sup>

53 Slovenský Východ, August 21, 1921, no. 190, Zo zjazdu komunistickéj internacionály. (From the Congress of the Communist International.), p. 1.

54 PEROUTKA, F. *Budování státu...*, p. 285.

55 "Situation was complicated by the fact, that at the help of state was Party, whose members - except of rare occurrences - were lacking competence in management of public affairs... core of the Party was constituted of publicists and revolutionists... They were gaining experiences in applying power in administrative and economic activity predominantly only in specific conditions of civil war, in which governing was realized via orders, disciplinary punishments and also via sentences of revolutionary tribunals." REIMANN, M. *O komunistickém totalitarismu...*, p. 34.

56 F. Peroutka, with a touch of sarcasm, was explaining Olbracht's blindness by way how he spent his time in Russia: "Ivan Olbracht read books in closed room in Moscow in voluntary solitary confinement. He was not in Russia, he was in a room... Result was of course that he was dispatching to Czechland only a reproduction of Bolshevik theory, with which he could easily become familiar also in Prague." PEROUTKA, F. *Budování státu...*, p. 284.

In summer 1921 radical left was divided to two separate organizations - the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the German Section of CPC. This division was criticized by Lenin, who in discussions with Šmeral and Kreibich - chairman of the German Section, demanded to remove differences between both fractions and create a unified communist organization. Obedient to decision of the Executive of the Communist International (ECL), both sections during October 30 - November 2, 1921 enacted the Unifying Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.<sup>57</sup> Delegates adopted a resolution in which they declared their determination to accept decision of the EIC and form the unified CPC: "Representatives of Czech, Slovak, German, Polish, Hungarian and Ukrainian communities... are saluting decision of the Third World Congress of the Communist International, which requested establishment of the Unified International Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. They are determined to carry-on unification, because requirement of the Third World Congress is in total agreement with will of proletariat of all nations of this state to create unified front of international proletariat."<sup>58</sup>

Despite determination of the CPC to increase activity of the Party, a number of problems remained. According to M. Čihák, "The Communist Party felt a serious lack of functionaries, a sizeable segment of membership remained passive... Precise definition of rights and duties of Party members was not defined and system of membership division to ten members<sup>59</sup> was only in its initial phase... All this had a negative impact upon discipline, ability to act and leading mission of the Party."<sup>60</sup>

A process of establishment of the Czechoslovak Communist Party organizations in industrial plants was negatively affected also by a defeat which the CPC suffered in labor unions. Leftist unions were expelled from organization of reformist unions. The CPC established the Red Unions, but was able attract to their ranks only the minority of workers.

57 ČADA, V. *Vznik KSČ...*, p. 115.

58 October 30, 1921 Rezoluce Slučovacího sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa. FALTYŤS, A. *Dokumenty moderní doby...*, Praha: Svoboda, 1978, pp. 158-159.

59 "Tents" were groups of ten CPC members forming a basic organizational structure. Originally established as streets units, in line with program of bolshevization were established in industrial plants. ČIHÁK, M. *Zrod Komunistické strany...*, p. 100.

60 ČIHÁK, M. *Zrod Komunistické strany...*, p. 101.

Another development, which led to open revolt in the CPC, was activity of the ultra-left fraction opposed to a political course of the Communist Party. The radical fraction refused to accept the concept of the United Front.<sup>61</sup> When situation in the CPC, as a result of dissent initiated by Jilek's fraction, became unacceptable, the Executive Committee of the Party expelled Jilek and his associates from the CPC. Leaders of the radical fraction complained to the Communist International, accused leadership of the CPC of willingness to cooperate with a "bourgeois government" and declared that they are determined to establish an independent communist party. The CI endeavored to prevent split of CPC and decided to postpone a definitive decision. The Executive of the CI on October 6, 1922 sent a letter to the CPC, in which abstained from unequivocal judgement how to solve conflict in CPC and delayed definitive decision till the Fourth Congress of the CI.<sup>62</sup>

The Fourth Congress of the CI convened on November 5, 1922. In resolution named "The Tactics of the Communist International", the CI emphasized that decisions made by the Third Congress are still valid and constitute principal guidelines for activities of the Communist International.<sup>63</sup> Meantime, new elements of tactics were elaborated. The most remarkable novelty, which was not formulated during previous congresses, was a possibility of communist parties to enter government coalitions. However, such an option could be realized only after consent of the Communist International was given and only when communist representatives in government would be under strict control. In coalition government, communist should

61 "They tried to prove that at a present time, the main task of revolutionary party of proletariat is to fight for removal of capitalist concurrence and achieve a "world of economic peace". By boycott of capitalist production, workers allegedly could destroy every capitalist and change capitalist economy into a cooperative..." BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 61.

62 The CI dispatched a letter to the CPC in which confirmed that "A General strategy of the majority is right and it is necessary to condemn activity of opposition as breaking of Party discipline". However, the letter also indicated that it is necessary to take into consideration, that perhaps there were not exhausted all possibilities how to settle conflict and therefore it will be proper to renegotiate the whole affair at the Fourth Congress of the CI. Till then, decision of the Central Committee of the CPC about expelling of opposition should be abolished. MENCL, V. *Na cestě k jednotě...*, pp. 258-259.

63 BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 63

create conditions suitable to set-up control of production and transfer burden of taxation on wealthy.<sup>64</sup>

A significant event, which had an impact upon development of situation in the CPC, was establishment of a special commission, authorized to evaluate situation in the CPC.<sup>65</sup> The Communist International took an ambiguous decision in regard to situation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Even though activities of opposition were sharply criticized, expulsion of members of opposition from the CPC was judged as "ineffective" and refused: "The Fourth Congress is judging expulsion of opposition from the Party as ineffective. It is replacing it by a stern rebuke and suspension from all functions till next congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Decision that expulsion is ineffective is not to be perceived as some sort of agreement with program line of opposition."<sup>66</sup>

Besides critical attitude to rift between fraction led by Šmeral and the leftists represented by Jilek, the Communist, International criticized also situation in the CPC as a whole. Objections were voiced against unsatisfactory management of communist press and against allegedly insufficient propagation of communist activities in ranks of the Czechoslovak army.<sup>67</sup>

On February 2 - 5, 1923 convened the First Regular Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Delegates representing the CPC at the Congress refused accusations that the Party is an abject servant of the Communist International, but indirectly confirmed this allegation by unanimously approving conclusion of the Fourth Congress of the CI in regard to the Czechoslovak situation. The General Secretary of the CPC Antonín Zápotočský in his speech emphasized that members of the CPC are proud to be a part of the CI and expressed total agreement with position of the CI in regard to necessity of establishment of "The United Front" and the "Go-

64 MENCL, V. *Na cestě k jednotě...*, p. 264.

65 *Pravda Chudoby* informed that „Purely practical issues will be analysed by a special commission...“ *Pravda Chudoby*, December 8, 1922, no. 99, Zo IV. zjazdu komunistickéj Internacionály. (From the Fourth Congress of the Communist International.), p. 2

66 *Pravda Chudoby*, December 22, 1922, no. 103 - 104, Rezolúcia IV. kongresu III. Internacionály o otázke komunistickéj strany v československej republike. (A resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Third International in regard to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.), p. 1.

67 BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 67.

vernment of workers and peasants”<sup>68</sup> *Pravda Chudoby* cited a speech uttered by chairman of the Executive Committee of the CPC Alois Muna, in which he assured delegates that despite “hostile attacks of bourgeoisie”, the CPC will eliminate its weaknesses and will prevail.<sup>69</sup> However, Muna’s speech was more an optimistic fantasy than a reflection of reality. Zápotocký admitted that the CPC, which initially was able to attract a sizeable part of original members of the Social Democratic Party, which was approximately 300 000 persons. From this number the Party retained only 132 000 members who paid their membership dues. Zápotocký stressed necessity to implement a detailed registration of all members and exclude from the CPC all persons who refused to pay their membership dues.<sup>70</sup> Šmeral expressed conviction that the radical Left was dangerous to unity of the Party and did not hesitate use personal attacks and confabulations against him. He characterized left opposition as representative of a “raw amorphous force of masses.”<sup>71</sup>

The Czechoslovak security authorities consistently monitored activities of the Communist Party and instructions of the Communist International addressed to the CPC. On February 28, 1923, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (MPS) dispatched a circular to all government branches in Slovakia, informing them about decision of the Fourth Congress of the CI to instruct communist parties how to increase activity among workers. The Communist International allegedly demanded that results will be repor-

68 „The Congress (of CPC) unanimously approved resolution of the Fourth Congress of the CI in regard to the Czechoslovak issue, which helped the CPC successfully deflect attack of „Ultra-left“ elements, overcame internal-Party crisis of the Party and with new energy is devoting itself to work and fight”. BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 73.

69 „Our Party is today, similarly as in December 1920, a target of attack and man-hunt... Congress these intrigues of governing stratum will tear apart. We will not be seduced by provocation to unwise fights. Our tactics for closest period is: To masses! The Unified Front! Unification of unions! The Workers government! This tactics will be by the Congress in front of public explained in detail”. *Pravda Chudoby*, Februar 6, 1923, no. 11, Prvý pravidelný kongres komunistické strany (The First Regular Congress of the Comm. Party), p. 1.

70 BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 76.

71 Šmeral summarized danger of this attitude to the Communist Party: „What actually in general aspect was opposition? „Raw, shapeless dissatisfaction... Victory of this raw dissatisfaction would atomize class fight, it would lead to decay of working class, to defeat of proletariat...“ GALANDAUER, J. *Bohumír Šmeral...*, p. 147.

ted to headquarters of the CI. The MPS requested government authorities to send gained information about activities of communist organizations.<sup>72</sup>

On its part, also the Communist International actively monitored political development in Czechoslovakia. According to Slovak historian L. Harbulová, “The Forth Congress of the Comintern in year 1922 enacted reconstruction of the organizational structure of the International on base of which were established section secretariats, which managed activities of communist and labor parties and their representatives and also monitored internal political situation in their home countries. Czechoslovakia constituted the Section Secretariat together with Hungary. In year 1927 section secretariats were transformed into territorial secretariats and Czechoslovakia was included in the Central European Secretariat... An increase in information garnered by the Comintern in regard to situation in Czechoslovakia occurred in year 1923. After signing a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Russia and the Czechoslovakia on June 5, 1923, a diplomatic mission of the Soviet Russia was established in Prague... Already a month after opening a diplomatic mission, in September 1923, first reports about internal situation in the Czechoslovakia began flowing to the Headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow. Reports from year 1923 were dealing with issues of labor movement, situation in the CPC, split in the National Socialist Party, economic situation in the Czechoslovakia, adoption of The Law for The Protection of Republic and about a general political situation in CSR.”<sup>73</sup>

Despite intensive propaganda, the CPC failed prevent adoption of a legal norm named “The Law for The Protection of Republic” by ruling coalition of political parties on March 19, 1923. This measure was designed to allow to state security forces a stricter suppression of activities organized by opposition political subjects.<sup>74</sup> Czechoslovak government agencies used

72 The State Archive Košice (SA K), fund (f.) County of Košice (CK), box. (b.) 8, no. 2142/D 23. Komunistická agítacia medzi robotníkmi (Communist agitation among workers.)

73 HARBULOVÁ, Ľubica. Slovenská otázka v materiáloch Kominterny. In *Národnostná otázka v strednej Európe v rokoch 1848 – 1938*. Prešov. Katedra slovenských dejín a archívničtva, Katedra všeobecných dejín Filozofickej fakulty Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove a Inštitút pre cirkevné dejiny v oblasti Dunajaja a Karpatá Evanjelickej teologickej fakulty Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave, 2005, pp. 259-260.

74 Bradáč, Z. admitted that resistance of the CPC against approval of the above mentioned Law was beset by serious mistakes: “The Communist Party was not able to utilize fight against the Law for “protection” of Republic to show to masses



above mentioned law to initiate a restrictive measures against communist organizations, namely at the time of increased danger to the Republic during thirties. According to Czech historian Z. Kárník, "Already during March 23, 1932 was stopped activity of "the International Workers Help (IWH)" ... A similar fate at the same day experienced also "the International Red Help (IRH)" in Czechoslovakia... Soon after ban of these organizations was prohibited "the Communist Union of Youth (CUY)". The CUY was a section of the Communist International of Youth... It was a very aggressive and in a way elite as well as a sectarian organization (it never had more than 10–12 members) known by its avant-garde nature... After prohibition the CUY, which was never renewed, followed arrests of several of its leaders and elimination of its press."<sup>75</sup>

As was already mentioned, a negative impact on popularity of the CPC among Czechoslovak workers had also a desperate economic situation in Russia. A critical state of affairs was criticized also in Russia itself. According to daily *Slovenská Politika* (Slovak Politics), dissatisfaction with situation in the Soviet Russia was openly admitted and criticized by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lev B. Kamenev. In speech published by *Izvestia*, an official periodical of the Soviet government, he acknowledged that the Soviet Russia, as a result of catastrophic economic situation, must temporarily abstain from aggressive policy against international bourgeoisie. However, Kamenev declared that these contemporary compromises will be in future replaced by an "offensive of world proletariat."<sup>76</sup>

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a true character of bourgeois democracy. Did not utilize this fight to realize revolutionary political education of masses, did not convince workers that it is necessary to overthrow the whole bourgeois democratic regime, which is democracy only for rich and supersede it by proletarian democracy, by dictate of proletariat."

75 KÁRNÍK, Z. *České země...*, p. 121.

76 „A difficult financial situation of the Soviet government and unendingly growing unemployment is pushing us to accept further unpleasant and undesirable concessions and compromises in struggle against international bourgeoisie and against our foremost enemy: against capitalism... Therefore, we are pushed, purely from tactical reasons, to give-up small positions to international bourgeoisie and capitalism. This retreat, however, will not stop us to prepare a broad front for offensive of world proletariat. And then we will redeem our recent setbacks". *Slovenská Politika*, July 14, 1923, no. 155, *Komunisti dozdvajú svoje neúspechy. Reč sovietskeho komisára Kameneva „Nemáme sily zničiť kapitál“*. (Communists are admitting their failures. A speech of Soviet Commissar Kamenev „We have no strength to destroy capital“), p. 2.

With an aim to find a way how to overcome difficulties plaguing communist movement on international level and to form a strategy for a near future, the Fifth Congress of the CI was convoked during June – July, 1924. The main task, accentuated by leaders of the CI, was to exterminate "opportunistic deviations" in communist parties. In relation to the CPC, criticism was focused upon remains of social democratic practices in structure and day-to-day activities of the Party. As unsatisfactory were also criticized tactics of the CPC in the Parliament and a "flawed agitation" among land laborers. More effort was requested in process of establishing of cells in industrial plants. The Communist Party was instructed to increase knowledge of the Marxism-Leninism as "irreplaceable tool in elimination of opportunism".<sup>77</sup> The policy of the CPC, vis-à-vis criticism of the Communist International, defend Šmeral. He admitted that decisions of the CI must be obligatory for everyone including the CPC. However, he asserted that a certain degree of a "free thinking" should be allowed to everybody during deliberations, because without a "free expression" there is hardly possible to adopt wright decisions.<sup>78</sup>

Though V. I. Lenin was ill for several years, his death on January 21, 1924 took communist parties by surprise and created a radically new situation in The Soviet Russia. Lenin was undisputed leader not only of the Russian Communist Party, but his advice and instructions were accepted without objections in communist parties outside of Russia.

Lenin's ability in setting-up strategy and tactic of communist movement acknowledged also participants of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International. As a chairman of the Congress was elected Zinoviev, to the Committee of the CI were nominated also Šmeral and Muna. In evaluating situation in Czechoslovakia, Zinoviev raised objections, namely in regard

77 FIRSOV, F. I. *Pomoc Kominterny...*, p. 99.

78 „Conclusion of the World Congress, when they are adopted, are binding for every comrade, for every party. That means that we are accepting and will fulfill all resolutions adopted by the Fifth Congress... But ... no one must be stigmatized as a „worse communist“, as an „opportunist“, if during period, when decision of congress was in preparatory phase, he defended, in limits of communist principles, a different opinion... Without free expression and differing opinions there will be impossible to explore issues and to come to right decisions.“ V. světový sjezd a úkoly naši strany. Referát soudr. B. Šmerala na krajské konferenci v Kladně 28. září. (The Fifth World Congress and tasks of our Party. Speech of comrade Šmeral during the Country Conference in Kladno on September 28.). KRÁL, V. *Cesta k leninismu...*, p. 128.



Let's to celebrate the International Week of Children!

to alleged passivity and low attention devoted to nationality issues. Šmeral admitted that there were mistakes committed in the past, but defended policies of the CPC in general and indicated that these objections could be caused by erroneous information, which Zinoviev received. Šmeral assured that "Party is not negligent of ethnic issues, is actively participating on activities of industrial plants councils and is creating communist cells in industrial plants."<sup>79</sup> However, Šmeral's arguments were hotly contended by young radicals represented by Friedl, Čulen and Hřešel.<sup>80</sup> Political stance of young radicals illustrated also a declaration adopted at regional conference of the Section of Young workers of the CPC in Košice. Delegates expressed their full support to criticism voiced by the CI and condemned the right wing of the Party.<sup>81</sup> The last word, as usually, had the CI.<sup>82</sup>

In its final part document the Fifth Congress, the Communist International delineated a tactic which communist parties should follow in future. As the most important task was decided to initiate creation of mass political parties and establishment of a "government of workers and land laborers". *Pravda Chudoby* summarized conclusions of the Fifth Congress of the CI: "The Watchword, 'To masses!', accentuated by the Third World Congress of the Communist International, remains wholly valid... To gain control of the majority of working class in America and Europe - that is a task of the Communist international... The watchword 'Government of workers and land laborers' was perceived and is perceived by the Government as the final part of tactics of the Unified Front. But, slogan 'The Government workers and land laborers', must be not in any case perceived by communist as a tactic of parliamentary agreements and combinations with social democrats. On the contrary, parliamentary activity of communists must bring to light a contra-

79 *Pravda Chudoby*, June 29, 1924, no. 78, V. svetový zjazd Komunistickéj internacionaly (the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International), p. 1.

80 According to critics, "Even during events of far reaching significance, leadership was carrying only parliamentary politics... the CPC yet did not become a real leader and organizer of working class". BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 97.

81 In adopted resolution representatives of young radicals declared: "We are condemning policy of right wing of Party... and we declare that with all our force we will support elements in the Party, which are accepting decisions of the Fifth World Congress". SA K, f. CK, b. 63, no. 13770/1924 adm. rev. January 23, 1925.

82 According to Mannilsky, Russian representatives proclaimed that: "We were supported and will support these segments of the Czechoslovak Party, which adhere to policy of the Communist International and will help to realize task of bolševization".

volutionary task of social democracy...<sup>83</sup> Tactics of the CI actually repeated Šmeral's opinion – the necessity to build-up a radical left party which would integrate a large membership advocated Šmeral already during the XIII Congress of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Labor Party convened on September 25 – 28, 1920: „In our country, where every political party has a broadly branched organization apparatus, a massive party is necessary, if this party is seriously intend to acquire a political power and don't want to be only a society of agitators. After events in Germany and December events in our country, it is no doubt that social patriots in decisive moments are acting as supports of capitalism. These parties are organized as parties of masses and we could overcome them and capitalism only, when we will be a large communist party, a party of masses... and to build a large communist party, which could decisively defeat patriotism and bourgeoisie is the categorical order of our political conditions and class structure.”<sup>84</sup>

The Czechoslovak government perceived the CPC as a dangerous and subversive political organization, which openly defined itself as a section of a foreign political entity. Therefore, as was already noted, security agencies were devoting a constant attention to the CPC. On July 24, 1924 the Presidium of the Ministry of Interior in Prague dispatched to subordinate agencies a circular elaborated by the diplomatic mission of CSR in Moscow, depicting results of the Fifth Congress of the CI and instructions given to the CPC. Resume included a report informing that „Success of the Fifth Congress – despite several frictions – was generally satisfactory and almost a total harmony and agreement was reached. This is confirmed in The „Manifest addressed to proletariat of the whole world”, signed by chairmen and foreign opposition delegates (Šmeral, Gerbard and others). Čs. delegates were instructed to watchfully monitor events in Germany and be ready for any eventualities. The Executive Committee of the Com. International is seeing an enormous significance of the Com. Party of Germany, because from it a first signal toward the world revolution will emerge... The Congress ended outwardly as a success, but not to full satisfaction of the Russian Com. Party, because many foreign delegates, in regard to substantial issues, disagreed with the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party. The main difference between the Russian Communist Party and foreign delegates is this: The Russian Commu-

nist Party wants that all communist parties act as actively as possible... But foreign sections argue that offensive actions are yet not proper.”<sup>85</sup>

The decisive influence of the Russian Communist Party upon the Communist International in reality gave the Russian communist control over the whole communist movement. Therefore, it became an obligation of all communist parties to perceive road of the Russian Communists to victory as their example. As I. M. Minajev stated, “The Comintern is truly considering to be necessary condition of development of communist parties to become familiar with experiences of the Bolshevik Party, experiences of the October Revolution”. Though Minajev cited Lenin's thesis that there is necessary not to copy blindly experiences and tactics of the Russian Communist Party, but to “creatively apply spirit, sense and guidance”, concrete experiences of years 1917 – 1921 illustrates that there was no indication, that the CI tolerated any “creativity” on part of the CPC.<sup>86</sup>

The aim of the CI was to eradicate any vestige of national traditions and to insert an essence of tactic and strategy of the Russian Communist Party into the CPC. Another goal was to get rid of social democratic mentality among a large segment of the CPC membership, namely among older members who were used to a considerable degree of freedom in expressing their political opinions. This was unacceptable for leaders of the Communist International, especially if such freedom became a breeding ground for “fractional” activities.<sup>87</sup>

85 SA Košice, f. CK, b. 47, no. 13.102. V. kongres Komunistickej Internacionály (The Fifth Congress of the Communist International).

86 MINAJEV, I. M. Dějiny Komunisticke internacionály – zdroj inspirace a praxe revolučního dělnického hnutí. In VOJKOVÁ, Květoslava (ed.) V bojovém svazku Komunistická strana Československa a komunistická internacionála (1919–1943), Praha: Svoboda, 1989, p. 16.

87 Jacques Rupnik characterized bolshevization as transformation CPC in line with Russian model. „Bolshevization of CPC was part of a general transfer of the Russian Bolshevik model upon the whole Comintern. A system of thinking and centralistic authoritarian arrangement, a product of specific conditions of backward Russia, where they were absent democratic traditions, was imposed as universally relevant model of divorce from tradition of decentralization of the social democratic Second International. These principles were utterly clearly expressed already in 21 conditions for entry in CI, which at the Second Congress of Comintern in August 1920 stated Zinoviev... Condition no. 2: „Every organization, which wants to join the Communist International must regularly and systematically strip reformists and centrists from positions connected to any responsibility in movement of party organizations (redactions, unions, parliamentary fractions,

83 Pravda Chudoby August 8, 1924, no. 95. Unesenia V. svetového zjazdu Komunist. Internacionály. Tézy o taktike. (Conclusions of the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International. Thesis about tactics.), p. 3

84 ŠMERAL, Bohumír. Výbor z díla 1902 – 1921. Praha: Svoboda, 1981, pp. 483, 462, 463.

## II. PROCESS OF BOLSHEVIZATION OF THE CPC AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Issue of bolshevization gained the supreme importance during the Second Congress of the CPC, which was held on October 31, 1924 in Prague. In adopted resolution, the CPC concluded that "The only road which is leading Party to theoretical clarity is... a deep penetration of the Marxism and Leninism in consciousness of leaders and members of the Party... Bolshevization is also the only road to overcoming of all internal crises, because every political or organizational crisis is also a deep crisis ideological".<sup>88</sup> The CPC documented its servility to the CI by declaring: "The Congress of the CPC is welcoming that the Fifth World Congress gave impetus to intensive activity in field of agitation and propaganda. The Resolution of the Fifth Congress in regard to this issue have especially for our Party a great significance, because namely in Czechoslovakia propaganda of the Marxism and Leninism is supremely necessary."<sup>89</sup>

The bolshevization was realized according to so called "The Organization order", adopted during the Second Congress of CPC. Territorially the CPC was divided to counties, where the highest authorities were district conferences and during periods between them county commissions. The basic organizational units became cells. The main task of cells, according to the Organization order, was to carry "a class" fight in sites where they were located.<sup>90</sup> Proclamation issued by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, defined a cell as "an organization fundament of every Bolshevik party". In regard to an organization structure of cells, as the principal location where cells must be established, were industrial plants, because "here the Party has strongest connection with masses".<sup>91</sup> But decision to transform the CPC

in line with instructions of the CI, though vehemently supported by a radical fraction, roused negative reactions from a sizeable part of the Party members.

Steps to implement the Bolshevization were initiated already before the Second Congress of the CPC, but process was slow and resulted in dissensions which threatened unity of the Party. A large number of members was not prepared to break so radically with organization structure based on territorial base.<sup>92</sup>

The Second Congress of the CPC did not adopted concrete measures in regard to implementation of bolshevization. Speeches of leading members were couched in general phrases and specific tasks waiting for the Communist Party to be solved in context of transformation, were bypassed.<sup>93</sup>

Cognizant of a precarious situation in the CPC, the Communist International dispatched to Prague one of its leading members Manuilskij, to make sure that delegates, especially members of the left fraction, would pursue a direction supported by the Communist International. In his speech Manuilskij called for an uncompromising fight to achieve unity of the CPC

Agitačně-propagační oddělení. Agitačně-propagační práce v buňce. I. Úvod. (The Agitation and Propagation Department of the CPC. Agitation and Propagation work in a cell. I Introduction.)

92 Mlnajev, I. M. defined several reasons for reluctance to depart from deeply rooted tradition: "In period of mighty revolutionary wave of years 1918 - 1920 were created communist parties, which were standing under the flag of October and which were struggling to lead workers against capitalist oppression. These parties and groups, however, were not able to get rid completely of social democratic ideology, which was a case of the CPC... Also in young CPC, a sizeable part of its cadres, which left social democracy, was ignorant of the Marxism-Leninism, negligent of significance of theory, insufficient attention was given to scientific foundations of the Party politics and to ideological and political education of Party members." MINAJEV, I. M. Dějiny Komunistické internacionály - zdroj inspirace pro teorii a praxi revolučního dělnického hnutí. In VOLKOVÁ, Květoslava (ed.). V bojovém svazku Komunistická strana Československa a Komunistická internacionála (1919 - 1943). Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda, 1988, pp. 9-10.

93 "Participants of the Second Congress (October 31 - November 4, 1924) came to conclusion that the CPC was at the very beginning of bolshevization... Results of the Congress indicated fact that further process of transformation of the CPC into the Bolshevik Party will be difficult and complicated". FIRSOV, F. I. Pomoc Kominterny... P. 102

city administrations) and replace them with proven communists..."; Condition no. 13: "Communist parties of countries, where communists are legal, must periodically enact purges in their organizations in reason to expel calculative or petty-bourgeois elements"; Condition no. 16: "All decisions of congresses of the CI and their executive committee are for all member parties mandatory"; RUPNIK, I. Dějiny Komunistické strany... pp. 57-59.

88 PRAŽÁKOVÁ, I. Dokumenty moderní... p. 181.

89 PRAŽÁKOVÁ, I. Dokumenty moderní doby... p. 182.

90 JiSA, V. K organizační výstavbě KSČ... p. 93.

91 "For these reasons the Bolshevik Party is moving gravity center to cells and to industrial plants. This is true also about agitation-propagation work of party". KSČ

"on revolutionary basis".<sup>94</sup> Also Zinoviev, with aim to neutralize threat to unity of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, sent a letter to delegates of the Second Congress in which he expressed dissatisfaction with a formal obedience of the CPC to decisions of the CI and appealed to delegates of the Congress to assume "a honest Bolshevik" attitude in their approach to solve issues vitally important to future development of the CPC.<sup>95</sup>

As Zinoviev predicted, delegates in "The Resolution addressed to the Fifth Congress of the CI" without any objections approved all decisions of the Communist International, including criticism voiced against the CPC. Same unequivocal agreement with the Communist International was pronounced in "The Resolution to national issue", "The Resolution to agrarian issue" and "The Resolution to labor union issue". Participants of the Second Congress also emphasized necessity intensify agitation and propagation of Leninism. An important change was election of the new Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the CPC.<sup>96</sup>

94 "I deem to be necessary... to point to experiences from history of the Russian Party, which documented how namely comrade Lenin was able to act in regard to ideological and political issues with utmost ruthlessness... The question is: Wants the CPC to direct itself in line with the avant-garde of revolutionary movement in Czechoslovakia... or in line with the passive fraction?" BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bojševizaci KSČ...*, pp. 176-177.

95 "We attribute to the Congress of your Party a great significance... The Party is presently passionately discussing a number of formative issues. Despite this, the Congress will most likely adopt unanimously resolution, fundamentally same as resolutions of the Fifth World Congress. However, honesty said, this "unanimity" is not especially welcomed to us. We think that it will be only a formal agreement... Comrade Šmeral is striving explain criticism of Executive: 1. As result of lack of information and 2. As false accusations by the Left fraction. According to Zinoviev "Such explanation is absolutely insufficient. As abnormal we must consider proclamations of comrade Zápotocký that resolutions of the Fifth Congress were adopted only for reasons of discipline. We would wish that leaders of the CPC adopted resolutions of the Fifth Congress from conviction... Comrades! The Comintern cannot exist only on the base of illusory unity. We are revolutionaryaries, we are Bolsheviks, above everything we need in our ranks total ideological clarity. The main task of your Congress is to impose this total ideological clarity, which unfortunately was till now lacking...". *Pravda Chudoby*, November 2, 1924, no. 132, Komunistická internacionála zjazdu KSČ. List sudruha Zinovjeva delegátom zjazdu. (The Communist International to the Congress of the CPC. The letter of comrade Zinoviev to delegates of the Congress.), p. 1.

96 BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bojševizaci KSČ...*, pp. 188-195.

In spite a formal consent with decision of the CI, existing internal discrepancies in the CPC were manifested by division of the CEC. The Central Executive Committee was almost equally divided between left and right fraction.<sup>97</sup> Situation in the CPC was not viewed by the CI with satisfaction. This was reflected in a resolution adopted by the CI, which was published by daily *Pravda* in Moscow on July 23, 1924.<sup>98</sup>

A bleak state of affairs in the CPC led official periodical of the Social Democratic Party, *Robotnické noviny* (Worker's News), to conclusion that crisis of the Communist Party was culminating.<sup>99</sup> *Robotnické noviny* also paid attention to events shaping up course of the Second Congress of the CPC. In their view the Congress remained a battle ground between left and right

97 "In Prague, the "Left" included Jan Šverma, Rudolf Slánský, Jan Vodička, and Josef Guttmann; in Moravská Ostrava, it was headed by Klement Gottwald and Václav Kopecký. Alois Neurath and Jenů Fried were the most vocal representatives of the German and Hungarian "Left". ZINNER, Paul E. *Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918 - 1948*. New York, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p. 40.

98 "The Czechoslovak Communist Party is composed in the decisive majority from perfect proletarian elements, however, it was till now not able to become the Bolshevik party. Therefore, it is inevitable: a, primarily to improve theoretical line of the Party; b, to admit mistakes in formulations of the Prague Congress of the Party and the latest Brno Conference; c, there is not enough to gain masses but there is necessary to led them toward revolutionary outcome and prepare them ideologically to leadership in decisive fight; d, in case of realization of the Unified Front, to fight against all aberrations, to follow decisions of the Congress and to carry them decisively; e, to intensify activity among peasants to insert a spirit of Leninism, to carry-on parliamentary activity of the Party in spirit of revolutionary parliament policy... and to be forthcoming to rightful demands of minority, especially to demands of the Union of Youth". SA, K. F. CK, b. 84, no. 14.112, Resoluce V. kongresu komunistické internacionály týkající se Československa (The Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in regard to Czechoslovakia).

99 "The conflict within the Communist Party erupted during the Moscow International Congress... Ungrateful sons of Father of Cs. Communism, dr. Šmeral, after they accused him of treachery, returned home with hope to take over leadership of the arty... Hence, a strong fight in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ensued, similarly as conflicts which led to destruction of communist parties in other states". *Robotnické noviny*, October 25, 1924, no. 246, Kriza komunistické strany vyyrcholuje. (The Crisis of the Communist Party is culminating.), p. 1.

## Robotníci ! Remeselníci !

Dňa 21. januára budú 3 roky čo umrel veľký vodca svetového proletariátu Vladimir Iľič Uľjanov Lenin.

Z tejto príležitosti poriada Komunistickej strane v nedeľu, 23. januára o pol 11. hodine v Bto Rádío veľké manifestatívne

## verejnú shromáždenie,

na ktorom bude prehovorené o tom, ako má kráčať proletariát republiky po cestách naznačených revolučným vodcom, aby aj v tomto štáte uskutočnená bola vláda roľníkov a robotníkov ako v Rusku.

Lebo smrť vodcu revolúcie len tak bude uctená, keď sa staneme vojakmi jeho učenia a činov. Nech niet jediného robotníka, robotníčky a remeselníka ktorý by na shromáždenie nepišiel. Príhovora rečníci z Ustredia.

Výkonný výbor XXIII. kraja

K. S. Č.

Dňa 30. januára bude v propagovaní Leninovho diela pokračované zahrnutím divadelného predstavenia

v Mestskom divadle,

## TYŽDENĚN

Týždeň je dňom priamo z ruskej revolúcie. Vňom vidieť zápas, boj, ktorý viedol ruský proletariát pod vedením Lenina, revolučného vodcu, za oslobodenie sa zdrapov, carizmu a buržoázie. Dielo napísal: Lebedinský, ktorý sám hrádzu boja prežíval ako účastník veľkej sociálnej revolúcie v Rusku.

Lístok na toto historické predstavenie sú k dostaniu:

Hlavná ul. 96, Poštový Spolok

An invitation to participate of memorial gathering on occasion of third anniversary of Lenin's death enacted in city of Kosice

fraction of the CPC.<sup>100</sup> No less gloomily interpreted situation of the CPC periodicals representing views of right oriented political parties.<sup>101</sup> However, these catastrophic predictions were rather a wishful thinking than a realistic estimation of future development of the CPC.

In regard to implementation of bolshevization, the CPC struggled with reluctance of membership and to certain degree also with incompetence of leadership. V. Čihák admitted that "With leadership of Bohumil Jilek coming to power during second half of twenties, gradually intensified in the Party unhealthy methods of work resulting in sharp conflicts, which were erupting among fractions. Fluctuation of members was reaching colossal measures... Besides numerous failures and partial successes, the CPC together with the Red Unions suffered a heavy defeat in the greatest class fight of these years - a struggle for a social insurance. Masses of workers supported tactic carried by reformist parties... Associates of B. Jilek were explaining these failures on the base of "a theory" of passivity of masses and as a result of stabilization of capitalism... In reality it was no passivity of masses, but passivity of the Party, which was frequently masked by radical phrases and campaigns."<sup>102</sup> Mismanagement of the CPC resulted in a lack of discipline. This was criticized

100 „Communist periodicals, if they referring to situation, are very stingy... However, even from these careful and mood of the Congress not precisely reflecting reports is evident that the Congress was carried on in atmosphere beset by anxiety and bellicose mood of delegates and on occasion was offering a picture of most furious fight between the Right and the Left... Fact is that leftists during the Congress gained a majority and Šmeral, one way or another, was compelled to repent. „Robotnické noviny, November 6, 1924, no. 254, Po zjazde komunistov. (After the Congress of the Communists.), p. 1.

101 Slovenská Politika informed about a steep decrease of the CPC membership. „Since the Congress at Lubovňa in year 1922 Communist counted approximately 600 000 their adherents in the Republic, whereas today they are officially admitting number no more than 136 000, which means during two years a tremendous decline“, Slovenská Politika, January 18, 1925, no. 14. Rozvrat v strane komunistov. (A disarray in the Party of Communists.), p. 1. Národný Denník (National Daily) characterized communist as irresponsible provocateurs prone to violence, who are responsible for bloody demonstrations causing only suffering to workers. Národný denník, February 7, 1925, no. 28. Úpadok komunistkej strany. (A downturn of the Communist Party), p. 1. Slovenský denník predicted an end of Communist Party. Slovenský denník, February 20, 1925, no. 41, Rozkol v komunistickej strane. (Break-up of Communist Party), p. 1.

102 ČIHÁK, M. Proszanti leninského pojetí...; pp. 93-94.

in a circular, dispatched by the Party headquarters to county secretariats on March 28, 1925.<sup>103</sup>

A serious conflict erupted in the CPC on February 17, 1925, after the Politbyro expelled Josef Bubník, a secretary of the CPC of the Prague County, from the Communist Party. He was accused of activities hostile to the CPC. This measure was criticized by several Party organizations, especially in Brno, Kladno and Hodonín. The CPC representatives in Brno dispatched "the Brno Memorandum" to the CI, in which they rejected Bubník's expulsion and openly attacked bolshevization of the Party. They also demanded a more independent status in regard to the Communist International. Objections against expulsion of Bubník, as too severe punishment, were expressed also by Šmeral and a Politbyro member Zápotočský. However, both of them succumbed to decision of the Plenum of the ECI, which endorsed Bubník's expulsion.

An interference into affairs of the CPC was enacted during session of the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the ECI, held on March 21 – April 6, 1925 in Moscow. The main issue was imperative to implement a network of cells into the organizational structure of communist parties. Unity, as irreplaceable principle, was emphasized and necessity of an international central authority was accentuated.<sup>104</sup>

In regard to situation in Czechoslovakia, the Plenum the ECI took a sharply negative stand toward dissent led by the Brno division of the CPC.<sup>105</sup> It condemned the Brno Memorandum as a "document hostile to the

Communist International and to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a program of betrayal of the Czechoslovak working class and a treacherous attempt to drag the CPC into a social democratic swamp".<sup>106</sup> Communist historian R. V. Daniels characterized discipline as indispensable precondition of communist victory.<sup>107</sup> In light of this policy was zero tolerance on part of the CI logical.

The Plenum of the ECI decided to support left fraction in the CPC: "At the conclusion of the Plenum, the ECI once again appealed to the Czechs to combat the "rightist" danger by the combined effort of "all revolutionary elements in the Party" ... the ECI also ordered the convocation of the next Party Congress within four months."<sup>108</sup>

Definitive decision to expel Bubník from the CPC was confirmed during session of the Central Executive Committee on March 2, 1925.<sup>109</sup> Bubník reacted by leaving CPC and together with a German member of the Parliament Franz Warmbrunnen established the Independent Communist

<sup>103</sup> According to a circular, "Secretariats were instructed to report every week to headquarters all meetings and speeches, which were enacted during last week as well as all meetings and speeches, which will be enacted in next week in their county. However, county secretariats this duty were mostly not fulfilling... Beginning from now we will continue to report in periodical the Red Law secretariats, who failed to send reports, we will make each comrade personally responsible for failure to perform his duties and he will be treated in accordance with the Party Organizational Order." SA K, f. KC, b. 77, no. 4091/1925 adm. rev.

<sup>104</sup> "The bolshevization – was stressed in thesis of the ECI – is incompatible with separatist and federalist tendencies in the Communist International. The Communist International must be unity of will and activity... Every communist party must instill in broadest working masses in its country a conviction that serious economic and political fights is possible to win only when they will be lead from one, international centrum". BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 233.

<sup>105</sup> "Already during mass protests on February 10 and 15, 1925 was clear that the County Secretariat of the CPC in Prague, controlled by member of the Parliament Josef Bubník and group of his adherents, sabotaged preparations and ma-

<sup>106</sup> BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 237.

<sup>107</sup> "Iron proletarian discipline is one of the most important pre-conditions of bolshevization. Parties which carry on their banner 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' must realize that there can be no talk of a victorious proletarian dictatorship without iron party discipline, acquired in the course of years and decades. The Bolsheviks... must realize that the civil war cannot be fought, political power conquered, or the proletarian dictatorship maintained and reinforced without the strictest internal discipline founded on principle of ideological unanimity; without this the civil war is doomed in advance to failure..." DANIELS, Robert, V. A *Documentary History of Communism, Communism and the World*, Volume 2, Hannover and London: University Press of New England, 1994, p. 65.

<sup>108</sup> ZINNER, P. E. *Communist Strategy...*, p. 41.

<sup>109</sup> "On February 28 was in Prague enacted a decisive session of the Central Executive Committee... Because of significance of session, five member delegation of the Executive of Communist International was present... comrade Haken again proved full guilt of Bubník... and then proved that it was unconditional duty of headquarters to enact Bubník's expulsion... discussion joined all members of the International. They marked the whole political character of crisis as a fight of opportunistic elements against bolshevization of Party". Pravda Chudoby, March 3, 1925, no. 27, Pre zachovanie jednoty komunistickéj strany Čsl. (For preservation of unity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party), p. 2.

Party (ICP). However, ICP in elections to Parliament (year 1925) was unsuccessful and Bubník was forced to terminate it.<sup>110</sup> Šmeral, always obedient to commands of the Communist International, reversed his stand in regard to Bubník and declared: "Truly openly and without discussion we are admitting correctness of objections of Russian comrades that we insufficiently valued size of danger of 'right' fraction..."<sup>111</sup> Without objections welcomed decision of the ECI also periodical *Pravda Chudoby*.<sup>112</sup> But Šmeral's servility was appreciated only to a limited degree. Leaders of the CI came to conclusion that Šmeral is not sufficiently radical and unwilling blindly execute orders of the Communist International. Therefore, he was relieved of leading post in the CPC and sent to "honorary exile" to perform various tasks abroad.<sup>113</sup> It that regard, it is necessary note that a very efficient tool how to neutralize representatives of communist parties who were not completely subservient to the CI, was to transfer them to Moscow and employ them in apparatus of the Communist International.<sup>114</sup>

110 KARNÍK, Z. *České země...*, p. 375.

111 FIRSOV, F. I. *Pomoc Kominterny...*, p. 106.

112 "Based on decision of the Fifth Congress of CI and the Second Regular Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, our Party adopted conclusions of the CI. At the same time assumed responsibility to become a truly Communist Party. During the Second Regular Congress were instructions of the CI adopted unanimously. Despite this, in the midst of our Party remained a group, which these instructions accepted only formally. Representative of this extremely opportunistic orientation, bordering directly with social-democracy, was secretary of the First District of the CPC and parliamentary deputy Bubník... For this reason the Party leadership had no option but sharply and unanimously stand against Bubník..." *Pravda Chudoby*, February 22, 1925, no. 23, Za jednotu robotnickéj a revolučnej strany (For unity of worker's and the revolutionary Party), p. 1.

113 Šmeral's docility and significance of his work for the CPC saved him from ultimate punishment – expulsion. Considering his centrist inclinations, he was treated uncommonly tolerantly by the CI. He retained important posts in the Executive of Communist International, was authorized by the CI to organize preparations of the Mongolian People Revolutionary Party and took part on activities of the CI in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Middle East. KOLÁŘ, F. (Ed.). *Politická elita...*, pp. 249-250

114 "One of the main tools of the Comintern in relation to the CPC was presence of a permanent delegation of the Party in Moscow. Selected representatives were sent to Moscow to a school managed by apparatus of the Comintern or in the School of Lenin. This served to ideological homogenization of the Comintern. Representatives who spent in Moscow several years, returned home completely separated from home reality and mostly became executors of intentions of

Objections to endeavors of Šmeral and Zápotocký to assuage policy of the radical fraction was expressed by *Pravda Chudoby*.<sup>115</sup> Šmeral and Zápotocký were criticized also by Mannilskij.<sup>116</sup> An interesting analysis in regard to a spectrum of ideological orientations in the Communist Party was elaborated by the Politbyro of the CPC.<sup>117</sup>

Despite fact that Šmeral was a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament, and therefore he was obliged to defend interests of people who voted him to office, he was ordered by CI to assume his duties in Moscow. Knowing that

the Comintern. Permanent delegation of the CPC in Moscow participated on session of the Czech Commission, regularly interfered when it was necessary... Dispatch to Moscow could be an elevation, but it could also mean a displacement to a secondary line... for example, in case of Gotwald, nomination to the Executive of the CI was a prologue to ascendancy in apparatus of the CPC, for others, like Šmeral and Kreibich, entry into international apparatus meant loss of leading post in the CPC... and a way how to distance them from Czech affairs." RUPNIK, J. *Dejiny Komunistické strany...*, pp. 60-61

115 "In internal situation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia occurred a reversal in that sense, that to the stage came till now silent group of so called center, represented by comrades Šmeral, Zápotocký and co. Emergence of this group... means support to rightist tendencies in our Party represented by supporters of eliminated Bubník". *Pravda Chudoby*, March 1, 1925, no. 26, K situácii vo vnútri našej strany. (In regard to internal situation in our Party), p. 1.

116 *Lidové noviny*, April 7, 1925, no. 175, Moskevský rozsudek nad brněnskými komunisty. (Moscow's verdict on Brno Communists), p. 1.

117 According authors of elaborate, in the Communist Party existed five groups, which adhered to different ideological orientations. Bubník's adherents after his expulsion were allegedly still in existence and were accepting capitalist order as a permanent political form. However, it was only a question of short time when they will fade away... A second orientation represented by Šmeral, Zápotocký and Kreibich, was allegedly openly rightist, opportunistic, with a great sympathy toward Bubník. These elements were refusing political and economic guidelines of the Comintern and were believing in consolidation of capitalism... This orientation was in recent past held by a majority of Czech workers and even today had so great a support, that total elimination of its leading representatives would end in an immediate break-up of Party. A third group, led by Neurath and Haken, supported bolshevization of the Party, but was not free of some centrist members. Further, there was a group of the CPC members representing anarcho-sindicalist orientation, but was without any significance. The truly leftist fraction in the CPC was represented exclusively by young workers. SA K. f. CK, b. 79, no. 4879/1925 adm. rev., Politické prúdy v kom. strane, dľa názoru kom. činiteľov. (Political currents in the Com. Party according to Com. Officials.), March 28, 1925, p. 2-3.



his position in the Communist Party is tenuous, he decided to fulfill the CI order without objections. *Robotnické noviny* criticized Šmeral's decision, pointing to fact that his responsibility was remain in CSR and were questioning legality of his decision.<sup>118</sup>

The CI, satisfied with development of situation in the CPC, condemned Bubnik and expressed conviction that the Communist Party will succeed in struggle to preserve unity.<sup>119</sup> Pleased was also chairman of the Communist International, Zinoviev. In name of the CI he send to the Headquarters of the Communist Party a letter in which he expressed satisfaction with successful solving of recent crisis and declared that "Guidance from crisis which the Communist Party recently underwent and which now completely ended, had for labor parties of the whole world a great educational significance... With right tactic and serious realization of bolshevization we can also in present times exclude from influence of social democracy new segments of workers and acquire a strong majority of working class".<sup>120</sup>

118 „Dr. Šmeral, who is a member of the Parliament representing the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, is already from December in Moscow. Recently he asked leaders of the Parliament to extend his vacation... Šmeral, who was elected by workers in Czechoslovakia, became a functionary of Zinoviev, who commanded him to Moscow. To us it does not matter, if Moscow wanted this way extract him from Prague... we are interested only to know why workers voted him, if he is not allowed to defended their interests“, *Robotnické noviny*, May 12, 1926, no. 108, *Poslanecké robotnická, či pisár Zinovievův* (A deputy of workers, or a scribe of Zinoviev?), p. 1.

119 The Comintern defined Bubnik's activity as treason and approved his expulsion from the Party. The Plenum of the Comintern declared that the Brno Memorandum has nothing in common with principles of the Leninism and conclusions of the Fifth World Congress and with conclusions of the Second Regular Congress of CPC. According to the Communist International, „DANGER that Bubnik's treason and hesitant acting of minority will result in split of the Party, disappeared... the Comintern is convinced, that slogan about preservation of Party unity at any price and slogan about ideological protection against right aberrations will be by the whole Czechoslovak Party approved... the Comintern is appealing to Party members to support leadership, which unambiguously assumed a road to elimination of any Party crisis and tirelessly aided to discipline and bolshevization of the Party“. *Pravda Chudoby*, April 15, 1925, no. 35, *Komintern a členstvu naší strany. Manifest Komunistické Internacionály členstvu Komunistické strany Československa*. (The Comintern to members of our Party. The Manifest of Communist International to members of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.), p. 1

120 KRÁL, V. *Cesta k leninizmu...*, p. 280.

The Third Regular Congress of the Communist Party was held on September 26 – 28, 1925. A communist periodical *Rovnost* (Equality) drew a festive picture of the Congress, which was presented as celebration of victory over opportunist elements and renewal of unity.<sup>121</sup>

An important event was election of Klement Gottwald to the post of chairman of the Congress. Gottwald was destined during following years to be the most influential person in the CPC. In his speech Gottwald declared that during period between the Second and the Third Congress of the Communist Party were implemented first steps in process of bolshevization and adopted measures against menace of "opportunism". However, he warned that "... defeat of opportunist elements does not mean the total victory of the Leninism in the CPC".<sup>122</sup>

But optimism in regard to stabilization of situation in the CPC, voiced by delegates of the Third Congress, did not corresponded with reality. A group of leftist radicals, led by Jilek, Bolen and Neurath, was elected to leading posts in the CPC and gained the decisive influence in the Party. However, their mismanagement of the Communist Party affairs gradually eroded their authority in the CPC. A dilemmatic situation in the Communist Party became a topic of article penned by Manniškij, which was published in periodical *Rudé Právo* (the Red Law) on July 16, 1925.<sup>123</sup>

121 "Prague, September 26... it is at the Smíchov National House, where our Third Regular Congress is held... from all sides of the Republic are coming warriors of revolutionary proletariat, grouped under flags of the Communist Party". *Rovnost*, September 27, 1925, no. 265, *Třetí řádný sjezd kom. strany Československa* (The Third Regular Congress of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), p. 2. According periodical *Pravda*, which succeeded *Pravda Chudoby*, the main themes of the Third Congress were "Surpassing of the first period of bolshevization crisis, unconditional approval of resolutions adopted during latest session of CI and confirmation of political line of the Second Congress of the CPC". *Pravda*, September 30 1925, no. 117, III. Zjazd strany v znamení bolševické jednotnosti (The Third Congress of Party in sign of Bolshevick Unity), p. 1.

122 BRADÁČ, Z. *Boj za bolševizaci KSC...*, p. 279.

123 On one side Manniškij positively valued a mass character of CPC as plus, but at the same time he expressed opinion that a large membership included many people who were harboring political views, which were different from the CI. He wrote: "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is the representative type of a mass workers party in the Central Europe... This is not illegal organization of best fighters, which is staying above masses, it is a mass itself which still did not get over prejudices and mistakes... This movement has also all weaknesses of a mass party. Above all, there is absent a type of professional revolutionary,

Agitpropoddel KSČ.  
Týka se: 10. výročí ruské revoluce.

Praha, 4. listopadu 1927.  
Oběžník č. 11 13.

## Všem buňkám KSČ!

Soudruzi!

Jednou z velmi důležitých zbraní v boji proti nebezpečí války a na obranu prvního státu dělníků a rolníků, jedním z nejdůležitějších způsobů získávání pracujících vrstev pro komunismus — jest osvětlování skutečného stavu Sovětského svazu, jest rozšiřování pravdy o SSSR. Proto vydala naše strana k 10. výročí ruské revoluce rozsáhlou knihu o Sovětském svazu, sborník, nazvaný »10 let diktatury proletariátu«. Kniha tato přináší podrobné informace o všech otázkách Sovětského svazu a je první českou publikací toho druhu vůbec. Naši soudruzi funkcionáři a agitátoři, naši záci i učitelé elementárních škol, naše sebevzdělávací kroužky najdou v ní nejen bohaté poučení, nýbrž i nevyčerpatelnou zásobu přesvědčivých dokladů a argumentů proti lžím, sřvanicím a pomluvám nepřátel sovětského státu. Zkrátka, kniha »10 let diktatury proletariátu« je nepostradatelnou pomůckou pro každého aktivního komunistu.

Ponevadž však kniha je poměrně drahá a pouze lépe situovaní jednotlivci si ji mohou sami poříditi, rozhodlo ústředí, aby knihu si opatřila každá buňka pro svoji organizační knihovnu. Při dobré vůli může každá buňka potřebné k tomu prostředky získati.

Leť nejen to: naše buňky se musí postarat i o to, aby i ostatní proletářské organizace — odbory, družstva, tělovýchovné jednoty, bezvěrní atd. — knihu tuto do své organizační knihovny získaly. Buňka se konkrétně musí postarati i o to, aby se kniha dostala do obecní knihovny.

Samozřejmě, že je povinností buňky rozšiřovati knihu i mezi jednotlivci.

Knih »10 let diktatury proletariátu« už vyšla. Má celkem 448 stran textu velkého formátu, 16 celostránkových obrázků, krásnou třibarevnou obálku, 4 velké mapky, diagramy a pod. Cena 75 Kč, kterýžto obnos možno splátni ve třech splátkách. Objednejte ihned u Komunistického nakladatelství, Praha-Karlín, Královská 13.

Za sekretariát KSČ:

V. Stern.

Práci čestí!

Za sekretariát KSČ:

Kl. Gottwald.

### OBJEDNACÍ LÍSTEK

Objednávám ..... vyisku sborníku »10 let diktatury proletariátu«

Na obnos Kč 75 — přílože ..... složenek.

Budílek: .....

Posla .....

*An information addressed to all organizations about publication issued by the Communist Party "10 years of proletarian" with instruction to include this publication in libraries*

A badly needed encouragement brought parliamentary elections in 1925. Despite a steep decrease of membership, the Communist Party ended surprisingly well.<sup>124</sup> M. Čihák wrote that a crisis, which the Communist Party underwent, did not damage its credibility among electorate — "intra-Party crisis had no essential impact upon elections result. Electoral base, which voted the Communist Party, was not unified and this heterogeneity made possible to maintain a long lasting influence upon given circle of voters."<sup>125</sup>

Also in Slovakia parliamentary election were characterized by representatives of the CPC as a success. The Party gained almost two hundred thousand votes. This result, however, was achieved mainly in regions inhabited by a large segment of Hungarian minority. For example, in regions where a large number of Hungarians lived, such as Nové Zámky and Košice, the Communist Party got half of the whole number of votes which the CPC obtained in Slovakia.<sup>126</sup>

Though the CPC achieved a relatively positive election results, it was rather a propagandistic victory, which had only a negligible impact upon political situation in CSR. For the Communist Party, determined to destroy existing democratic political system, a goal to achieve a coalition with socialist parties was unrealistic. No political subject, including social democrats, would accept alliance with the CPC. Therefore, the main aim after elections remained to streamline internal situation in the Communist Party and suppress any form of dissention which would threatened its unity.<sup>127</sup>

*which was formed in party suffering a heavy persecution... the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia primarily love peace, which formed during stability of class conditions and conditions inside the Party. D. Mannilski, Československá strana, jaká jest. (A true character of Czechoslovak Party). In KRAL, V. Cesta k leninismu... p. 238.*

124 "Consolidation of the Party during a second half of 1925 and active participation on organization of strikes contributed to increase of its influence upon masses. This was documented in parliamentary elections in autumn 1925, when the Communist Party obtained 934 thousands votes and gained substantially more votes than the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers Party." FIRSOV, F. I. *Pomoc Kominterry...* p. 107.

125 ČIHÁK, M. *Prosazení leninského pojetí...* p. 91.

126 PLEVZÁ, V (Ed.). *Přehládá dejin...* p. 141.

127 "Implementation of Leninist principles into practice in the Czechoslovak Communist Party was at that time very difficult. Representatives of left wing were still in minority... Because individual members of left wing were coming out of heterogeneous environment, they must ideologically fuse in regard to organiza-

Declarations uttered by Jilek, though peppered with revolutionary slogans, failed to increase anti-government activities. On June 16, 1925 the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia dispatched a circular to government agencies in Slovakia in which he informed about instructions issued by the General Secretary Jilek to all organizations of CPC. Jilek accentuated necessity of resistance against economic policies of coalition government, which was to be carried-on by communist cells in industrial plants. Criticism was to be focused also on oppression of ethnic minorities, government school policy and discharges of state employes. Constant attention was to be given to "treacherous policy" of social democrats. Jilek appealed to keep fight against hostile policy of "world bourgeoisie" against the Soviet Russia and the Communist International. Though in a final part of instructions Jilek drew an optimistic picture of situation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, exhortations to "fight against world bourgeoisie", remained in a general level.<sup>128</sup>

Also a military was aware, or pretended to be, of a potential danger to the Republic by the CPC. In year 1925 (more precise date not given) the Ministry of National Defense (MND) published a sizeable report (84 pages) named "Z činnosti Kominterny in ČSR se zvláštním zřetelém k čs. Armáde" (Activities of the Comintern in CSR with a special respect to the CS Army). In introductory part of the report is written that it was composed of a material gathered by "The Intelligence Department of Army General Staff" during years 1921 – 1925. In regard to situation in Czechoslovakia, according to report, the CPC maintained contacts with "elements hostile to the Republic".<sup>129</sup> Authors of report stated that after defeat of the General Strike in December 1920, danger posed by the CPC was underestimated.

tion and program. To these groups belonged many opportunistic elements and groups, which were striving to take over Party offices. They instigated personal attacks against some members of old leadership, which was very detrimental to true transformation of Party". JIŠA, Václav. *K organizační výstavbě...*, p. 93.

128 Jilek claimed, that „Crisis in the Party is liquidated. The decisive part of rightist danger in the CPC was terminated. But the rightist danger can re-emerge, if the Central Committee of the CPC will be not capable scrupulously work in line with decision of the Executive... and eliminate in the Party any attempt against policy of the CPC". SA K. f. CK, b. 84, no. 6387/925.adm. rev. *Komunistická strana v ČSR, důvěrné pokyny k další činnosti*. (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, confidential instructions to further activity.)

129 „The Intelligence Department has serious reasons to suppose that CPC actually entered into contact with extreme elements hostile to the state with aim to stir-up or increase internal tensions if opportune internal or foreign occasion emerge.“

However, MND warned, that on the base of reports of political and military sources, "it was clear that the CPC did not at all relinquish its aim to usurp power in state". Report informed about communist activities in army, where the main propagators of communist ideology were young people, serving in various formations, especially technically educated conscripts.<sup>130</sup> Propaganda in the Czechoslovak Army was allegedly carried in line with instructions formulated during the Third Congress of the Communist International.<sup>131</sup> Activities of the CPC were allegedly heavily dependent upon financial support from the Soviet Russia.<sup>132</sup> Attention was given also to organizational methods of the Communist Party. These methods were formulated as tactics which should be applied in fight against the Law no. 50 For Protection of the Republic.<sup>133</sup> They covered a broad scale of measures used as protection from persecutions enacted on base of adopted Law no. 50. Methods, allegedly, were drafted on the base of instructions of the CI. In conclusion, report stated that "By cited sources... it is sufficiently proved that Communist movement is seriously threatening security of our state... It must be therefore thoroughly monitored, intended treasonable action timely revealed and all attempts of subversive activities ruthlessly prosecuted".<sup>134</sup> However, in light of absence of real danger posed by the CPC to security of the Republic, war-

Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic (AMFA CR), f. kabinet (k.), b. 276, p. 9.

130 AMFA CR, f. k., b. 276, p. 9.

131 „An obligation is commitment to carry systematic propaganda in army... Desist from such activity would be same as betrayal of revolutionary duties and incompatible with the Third International... Soldiers must understand class differences between privileged officers and rank and file. Also it must be explained to them that their future is closely connected with destiny of exploited class.“ AMFA CR, f. k., b. 276, p. 32.

132 According to MND, "Assignments ordered by Moscow to individual sections is not possible to carry-on with Party's own insufficient financial means. Income of the Party from membership dues is negligible in comparison to expenses... Therefore, a sizeable help from abroad is necessary. Leadership of the CPC is openly admitting it. However, an official information, which would more exactly documented size of financial support to CPC from Moscow are scarce." AMFA CR, f. k., b. 276, p. 16.

133 Law no. 50/1923 Sb. z. n. was adopted on March 31, 1923 and defined a broad scale of political offenses such as plots against the Republic, attacks against constitution officials and against the peace in the Republic, which were classified as criminal offenses.

134 AMFA CR, f. k., b. 276, p. 84



Šmeral's endeavor had only a negligible impact upon disarray in the Communist Party.

On surface, the Fourth Congress of the CPC, which convened on March 25, 1927, exuded an atmosphere of optimism. The Communist International send a salutatory list to the Congress of the CPC in which voiced conviction that the Communist Party will successfully pursue activity in spirit of the Marxism and Leninism.<sup>139</sup> In his speech Jilek declared that elections proved growing influence of the Communist Party upon Czechoslovak workers, but admitted several serious shortcomings in activities of the CPC. In regard to discipline, Jilek opined that situation is not ideal but among members of the Party is growing understanding of its necessity. He also assured participants that there is a positive attitude toward implementation of system of cells and to applying of a "democratic centralism" in management of the Party. Despite critical remarks, Jilek characterized situation in the CPC as satisfactory.

In reality, political and economic situation in CSR was offering a scant chance to gain the decisive political influence by the Communist Party. Revolutionary sentiments were fading.<sup>140</sup> Situation of the Communist Party, which was criticized by radical elements in the Party, was noticed by government authorities also in Slovakia. On January 17, 1928 the Police Directory in Bratislava informed the Presidium of the County Office in Bratislava

about causes of growing dissatisfaction among membership of the Communist Party.<sup>141</sup>

Complacent attitude of general secretary Jilek and ineffective way how he managed policy of the CPC resulted in a disastrous failure of the Red Day (Rudý deň), held on July 5 – 6 1928 in Prague. The Red Day was intended to be a proof of the Communist Party popularity among workers and preparation for mass participation were intensive. CPC decided that the Red Day had to be an overwhelming protest on prohibition of communist sport festivity named the Spartakiáda by the Ministry of Interior. In a circular issued on April 19, 1928, the Secretariat of the CPC instructed all functionaries who were designed as speakers during the Red Day manifestation, to explain to public that prohibition of the Spartakiáda was a part of a general persecution of labor movement. Instructions dispatched to local organizations of the CPC contained also a resolution, which should be adopted during communist manifestations: "We are sharply protesting against shameful government prohibition of the Second Spartakiáda. We see in this prohibition a direct attack upon all class conscious workers. Bourgeoisie is persecuting worker movements, is implementing a white terror with the aim to not allow fights of workers and poor country laborers to improve their life standards and against danger of war. Prohibition of the Second Spartakiáda is a part of this persecution movement."<sup>142</sup>

Leaders of the Communist Party supposed, with unwarranted optimism, that the Red Day will be a giant manifestation which will have a momentous political impact on the whole Republic. *Pravda* predicted that the Red Day will be "an exceptional event, which will be a significant milestone

139 "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia got over its crisis before several years. Is working with masses and this is guarantee of its success. The Executive Committee of the Communist International is confident that the Csl. section... will enact even more energetic work with masses with labor unions, among small farmers and among workers of ethnic majorities, realizing revolutionary tactic of the United Front and increasing class awareness of masses. The Executive Committee of the Communist International is sure that great historical issues will be solved by the Party in spirits of the Marxism and Leninism, which was and will be the Flag of the Communist International". *Pravda*, Marec 26, 1925, no. 25, IV. zjazd KSC zabájeňy, (The Forth Congress of CPC launched), p. 1.

140 According to P. E. Zimmer "In 1927 and 1928, as the stabilization of capitalism continued, and prospects for an early social revolution became more and more unlikely, the Czechoslovak Party – as was to be expected – became ever more lachrymose in the performance of any kind of revolutionary activity. Its attitude was diametrically opposed to that of the Comintern, which perceived the stabilization of capitalism and the concomitant growing danger of a new imperialist war as sources of "intensified class contradictions" requiring ever greater revolutionary activity". ZINNER, P. E. *Communist strategy...*, p. 42.

141 "In the Communist Party during period 2 – 3 years among organized members is rising dissatisfaction with present unsustainable situation resulting from dictatorial and bureaucratic manners of the leadership. The leaders of the CPC are trying solve these circumstances by systematic expulsions of members who seems to them to be dangerous... There is noticeable a constant transfer of membership. Older members are leaving and newly recruited members are staying in the Party only till they become familiar with conditions. Of all this is gaining only the Soc. Democratic Party, to which the Communist Headquarters by its impossible policy is losing membership... As a result of these circumstances secretary Široký asked the Headquarters to send to the Bratislava a commission, which should investigate source of unfortunate conditions, otherwise he is not responsible for situation and will resign his position." SA K, f. Police Directory (PD), b. 7, January 1, 1928. *Situácia v komunistickej strane na Slovensku* (A situation of the Communist Party in Slovakia).

142 SA K, f. CK, b. 250, no. 20.019/28 prez.

## Čo je v Sovietskom Rusku?

Toto dnes zaujíma každého robotníka!

O tomto referovať bude: Skatula Em. Fedaktor, člen družstevnej delegácie; vrátnik sa zo Sovietskej Unie a L. Vydra (Košice).

## na Medzinárodnom Družstevnom Dni: v sobotu dňa 16. júla 1927.

**Odp. o 4. hod. hudebný verbujúci sprievod**  
z Robotníckeho Domu Éderova ulica do robotníckych štvrtí.

**Odpoludnia o 5 hodine sraz**  
na Legionárskom námestí, odkiaľ!

## PROTESTNÝ SPRIEVOD

proti drabofe a imperialistickej válke!

Na Legionárske námestie (v prípade nepriznania, počasia, vo veľkej dvorane Schalkháza.) Kde sa bude konať

## ľudovéschromaždenie

s programom: „Situácia robotníkov a Medzinárodný Družstevný Deň“.

**Robotníci!**  
Pracujúci!  
Ježi si nepravate nové imperialistické svetové vradenie,  
**protestujúte hromadne!**

**V nedeľu dňa 17. júla 1927, koná sa celodenný**  
**družstevný výlet**  
ku kaplnke na Bankove.

Očigod s hudobným sprievodom, ráno o 7 hodine: Robotníckeho Domu na Éderovej ulici.  
Na výlete účinkuje: Robotnícka Práca, my, jedec a skladac, behavetec, amuzecny turist.  
Sme družstevnej ľavice, naproti a vpravo.  
Veľký družstevný výlet, Na vna na Právech, v slavnost odmeny.  
Am. organiz. Československej strany robotníckej.  
Nech sa dostaví každý!

*Information about situation in the Soviet Russia and about protest parade on July 16, 1927 in Košice*

in fight of workers against bourgeoisie”<sup>143</sup> and assured that masses of workers, including foreign visitors, will arrive and “there will be no one capable to stop it”.<sup>144</sup> On May 25, 1928 section of propaganda of the Communist Party (the Agitpropoddel), dispatched to all secretariats and redactions of the Communist Party a circular in which notified them that in July will be enacted the Red Day, which will be “In present time the most important action organized by the CPC and therefore it is important for the Party and... to activate the whole apparatus to participate on the Red Day. The purpose of the Red Day is to organize a mass protest against prohibitions of public gatherings of the Communist Party, imprisonment of communist activists, which is a part of bourgeois plan against workers. In this situation it is necessary via mass demonstrations, to express a resistance of broad working masses against bourgeois plans. This must be in our Republic the Red Day.”<sup>145</sup>

A similar appeal issued the CPC to communist organizations in Slovakia. On June 8, 1928 the Secretariat of the Communist Party in Bratislava dispatched a letter to contributors of communist press (*Pravda, Münchás, Vorwärts*), in which informed about preparation of a special issue and exhorted all contributors to write an articles informing about attitudes of workers toward “policy of capitalist government”.<sup>146</sup>

The Ministry of Interior on June 21, 1928 informed government authorities in Slovakia about a circular issued by the Secretariat of the CPC in Žilina, containing following instructions: “1. All members of cells are obliged to participate on preparations of the Red Day manifestation; 2. A special issue of journal devoted to the Red Day will be published; posters propagated the Red Day will be prepared and will be distributed to individual cells; each members of the Communist Party is obliged to participate on manifestation of the Red Day in his location”.<sup>147</sup>

To make sure that the Rudy Day will be a success, the Secretariat the CPC informed all local communist organizations in countryside that they must send to Prague as many CPC members as possible. They were obliged to initiate an intensive propaganda about necessity fight against bourgeoisie and prove that success of the Rudy Day is in interest not only of industrial workers but also land laborers. Members of the Communist Party who as

143 *Pravda*, May 30, 1928, no. 97, Rudy Deň, 6. júla (The Red Day, 6 of July), p. 1

144 *Pravda*, May 25, 1928, no. 107, Nech žije Rudy deň v dňoch 5. a 6. júla v Prahe! (Long live to the Red Day during 5 and 6 July in Prague!), p. 1.

145 SA K, f. CK, b. 250, without number.

146 SA K, f. CK, b. 250, no. 29 362 prez.

147 SA K, f. CK, b. 250, no. 29 233 prez.

## Vojáci!

V těchto dnech počínají všude, ve všech garnizích, u všech pluků ležení cvičení, zosťovaná týden od týdne, která vyvrcholí v manévrech a sítěbě na ostru.

### Kdo potřebuje tyto manévry?

Ty jistě nel Avesk buržoasie, která chce si připravit kanonentuter pro příští válku. V severních Čechách blíže německých hranic budou dělaté manévry. Proč? Pracující lid Německa se sřikuje k osvobozovacímu boji proti svým úpirům a pollačovatělm ve vlastní zemi i za hranicemi. Českoslovenští kapitalisté přispěchají okamžitě na pomoc svým německým „smrtelným nepřítelům“ — německým kapitalistům, když jim přijde o chrániči. K této lakovské přeci německému revolučnímu proletariátu mále být znenáhu! Proto manévry u německých hranic!

Existuje ale země, kde proletariát sřicoval nadobro — Sovětský Svaz. Zuvřost nezřitřodní vykořisťovatělské třídy obraci se proto proti tomuto jednému státu dělníků a rolníků. Sovětský Svaz má být zařicen válkou a vř, dělníci, rolníci a vojáci — nejen v Č., ale celého světa — mále prověsti tento krvavý kšětí pro mezinárodní buržoasii: Buržoasie není osamocena — má věrné pomocníky — sociálněfasistické straay a jejich vůdce!

V pomělvách SSSR a v přípravách války proti němu jsou oni na špičce.

Jsou pro manévry a válečné přípravy bez omezení!

„Socialistické“ mládež, která zdělaně se stavi proti tomu, chce šřvindlem získati vaši činnost. není však o nic lepší, než její starí vůdcové.

Proti válečným přípravám, proti sociálněfasistickým válečným šřvácím, budou demonstrovati 1. srpna miliony dělníků a rolníků na celém světě pod vedením komunistické strany.

Vy nesmíte zřstati stranou!

Demonstrujte v kasárnách!

Svo šřvejte schůze ve světnicích!

Demonstrujte revolučními písněmi!

Demonstrujte svou pohotovost bojovat po boku Rudé Armády, po boku německé a mezinárodní revoluce, proti mezinárodní i československé buržoasii!

Proč s válečnými šřváci II. internacionály!

### Všemi prostředky na ochranu Sovětského Svazu!

*An appeal to soldiers to demonstrate against military maneuvers and to show their resolution to fight on side of the Red Army*

a result of “an invincible” obstacles could not participate on the Red Day in Prague, should join demonstrations in their county and district towns.<sup>148</sup>

Actual course of the Red Day was for leadership of the CPC a cruel disappointment. Despite all preparations, despite all energy spent to secure success of demonstration, the Red Day ended as peaceful demonstration, attended only by a modest number of participants. *Robotnické noviny* sarcastically commented on failure of the Red Day to mobilize masses and demonstrate a political significance of the Communist Party.<sup>149</sup> Scathing criticism of the Communist Party policy in general and of mismanagement of the Red Day in particular expressed also the Party opposition fraction. *Robotnické noviny* cited an article published in journal *Rovnost*, representing views of the opposition fraction, blaming the Central Committee of the Communist Party that its pursuing a policy detrimental to the Party, which will result in its liquidation.<sup>150</sup>

A deep crisis in the Communist Party admitted also communist historians. Roots of crisis, according to F. I. Firsov, were going back to beginning of the second half of twenties. Reformist parties were allegedly nimbly utilizing stabilization of economy to justify their cooperation with political subjects of ruling coalition and were able to inforce their influence upon masses. On the contrary, the Communist Party, as a result of mistakes committed by leadership was losing its adherents.<sup>151</sup>

148 SAK, f. CK, b. 250, no. 29 462 prez

149 „Abortive communist Red Day is clearly proving that only right is worker’s policy performed by the Social Democracy. Not revolutionary roar, senseless attacks and anti-republican noise, but rational parliamentary work, carried by the Social Democracy... It was again proved that no revolutionary clamor, paid for by foreign money, but only honest socialist work can bring a good result for working people.“ *Robotnické noviny*, July 8, 1928, no. 153, Flasko bolševické trázy. (The Fiasco of the Bolshevik phrase.), p. 1.

150 „From the beginning we were argued that one of the primary causes of crisis of the Communist Party is the fact that leadership of the Communist Party is realized in vacuum... The Red Day is a progress, but a progress in liquidation of the Communist Party as the Party of masses. Present leadership of the CPC is liquidating the Communist Party more quickly as the Czechoslovak government“. *Robotnické noviny*, July 8, 1928, Likvidácia komunistickéj strany. (Liquidation of the Communist Party), p. 2.

151 In activity of the CPC, especially in its leadership, in which after the Fourth Congress (March 1927) occupied a leading position group led by Jilek and Bolen, were growing opportunistic mistakes. Issues of bolshevization were dealing with only formally... This was fully manifested during the Red Day... Failure of the Red Day

Leaders of the CPC could not gloss over a bitter failure of the Red Day without investigating reasons which led to this situation. Therefore, on July 9 – 10, 1928 a session of the Central Committee (CC) was convoked. The Central Committee came to conclusion that the whole apparatus of the Party must eliminate all mistakes, namely in organization and accomplish a task of bolshevization. It was also decided to convoke a congress of the Communist Party.<sup>152</sup>

In constantly shifting sands of policy pursued by the Communist International, a new strategy emerged during session of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International held during August 17 – September 1, 1928. In regard to strategy of the Unified Front, the CI came to decision to eliminate contacts with representatives of social democracies. Instead intensive contacts had to be maintained with rank and file of these political subjects. According to resolution, adopted by the Sixth Congress of the CI, "This tactic, which is changing a form of tactics of the Unified Front, doesn't change its basic content in any way. Sharpening of fight against social democracy is shifting focus of the Unified Front to the ground level, however, it is not depraving communists of obligation to make difference between social democratic workers, who are honestly mistaking and leaders of social democracies, who are playing role of imperialistic servants, on the contrary, is increasing this duty".<sup>153</sup>

Hostility to social democratic parties increased as a result of power ascendancy of Joseph Visarionovich Stalin and his turn to left. A thesis about transference of bourgeois regime into a fascist state led to viewing social democracies as social fascists, because their close connections with bourgeois regimes. According to J. Rupnik, "In such a condition it was impossible to carry-on a policy of cooperation with 'social traitors': it was replaced by... combination of sectarianism and appeals to "a spontaneous actions of masses". As soon as social democracy became the main enemy, it became the foremost duty to suppress those who could serve as contact points between communist parties and social democracies, that is "rightist" dissidents from ranks of communists... The Point of purges was to create an insurmountable abyss between a communist party and a social democratic party. This policy was applied especially sternly in Germany and Czechoslovakia, where social

democratic parties were part of government and where communist parties were only a mass political subjects in the Europe."<sup>154</sup>

Victory of the Left changed political orientation of the CI and resulted in a tactic defined as "the class against class". Its main features were thesis about "social fascism", perceiving leftist segments of the social democratic parties as more dangerous than right fractions and accepted the Unified Front policy only on individual basis.<sup>155</sup>

In regard to the Czechoslovak Communist Party, leaders of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International expressed a mixture of positive and negative valuations. The CI dispatched a letter to the CPC, in which positively valued victory over "rightist fraction", especially in Prague and Brno. Also ongoing creation of cells in industrial plants allegedly "succeeded in preparation of fundamental conditions for bolshevization of the Party". But, according to the CI, field of ideological upbringing was still beset by shortcomings. Especially were criticized alleged passivity and loss of contact with masses.

On September 14, 1928 the Executive the Communist International sent "Open letter to members of the CPC", in which situation of the CPC was analyzed in detail. An increase of significance of Gottwald is documented by his cooperation on preparation of above mentioned letter.<sup>156</sup>

Meantime, internal strife in the Communist Party deepen. Resistance against Jilek and his adherents, was led by Gottwald, who became an epigone of the Communist International in the CPC.<sup>157</sup>

154 RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 97.

155 HAJEK, M. *K politické orientaci...*, p. 161.

156 "Executive of the Comintern disclosed in detail mistakes, which were made by the Communist Party and on their example showed that Party detached itself from masses... Beside this, the Executive of the Comintern suggested to evaluate a possibility to improve work of leading Party cadres and mass organizations and to secure entry of young revolutionary workers, not burdened by social democratic traditions, who became familiar with revolutionary ideas and gained practical experience in lower ranks of the Party and Union organizations." FIRSOV, F. I. *Pomoc Kominterny...*, p. 113.

157 "The struggle between the incumbent leadership (Jilek and his supporters) and the radical elements clustered around Gottwald, entered the decisive phase. In the fierce strife that raged throughout the fall and winter of 1928 – 1929, Gottwald was steadily gathering strength. He had a slim majority in the Central Committee, and in the course of the Party conferences held in preparation for the forthcoming congress, he managed to enlist support of four important regions –

sharpened conflicts in the Party. Against group Jilek – Bolen rose an opposition led by Klement Gottwald representing the Marxist-Leninist nucleus of the Party". FIRSOV, F. I. *Pomoc Kominterny...*, p. 108.

152 KRAL, V. *Gesta k leninizmu...*, pp. 300–301.

153 HAJEK, M. *Jednotná fronta...*, p. 143.



Po konštruktívnej diskusii, opravene vyžadní.

## Ani jedna pracujúca žena nezůstane doma v Medzinárodny deň žien,

pretože všetky ženy fabriek, zemerobníckej a roľníckej, ženy robotníčok a zriaďovateľov — všetky rovnako počítajú

### deň zo dňa stúpajúcu drahotu,

prehľadajú kapitalistickú racionalizáciu, biedne zárobky, za ktoré si nenahradia ani to najnižšie. A najviac im žiaľ, ktorá vidí, ako jej deti navidom sa matere biedou, ako sa prepukávajú podvýživou a tuberkulózou v mrazivých prúdych. Ženy najviac trpia nedostatkom s bývaním a zručnosťou domácich párov, spoľahlivých sa na to, že mestská vláda, ktorá spoločne s riaditeľstvom otvorene postupuje proti pracujú-

A všetka tá bieda, nedostatok a núdza — len a len pre všetky ženy fabriek, veľkoobchodných remeselníkov, domácných párov, športovcov a iných, ktorí sa pomocou reformistov hájajú, pretože a teroru snaha sa zložiť odpor pracujúcich, aby tak mohli hrať väčšie úlohy.

A preto všetky pracujúce ženy

### v Medzinárodny deň žien

spoločne so svojimi mužmi somerajú sa v prvý jednotný front, aby

### pod vedením komunistického strany,

bojovali proti biede, drahoty a za vyššie mzdy, proti kapitalistickej racionalizácii, proti nepriateľnosti domácich párov a rozmarov veľkostatkárných zradníkov, proti fašizmu, teroru a perzekúciám robotníckej triedy.

## Hor sa na Medzinárodny deň žien!

Príjajte všetci

dňa

do miestnosti

Komunistická strana — 7, rue de la République v Bratislave.

An invitation to participate on International Day of Women enacted  
under the leadership of the Communist Party

The Fifth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was held during February 18 – 23, 1929 in Prague. The most influential person, who had control of proceedings, was Gottwald.<sup>158</sup> He became an undisputed leader of the Party.<sup>159</sup>

To make sure that the Party will follow instructions of the Communist International, the Executive CI sent another letter - "The Open Letter of Executive of Communist International to the Fifth Congress of CPC". ECI stated that the Communist Party failed to realize goal to proceed from "opportunistic passivity to Bolshevik activity". Neither second goal was achieved - election young workers to leading posts in the Party, who were not influenced by social democratic traditions. The Communist International expressed dissatisfaction that the Party members were still perceiving social democratic parties as a labor parties. The CPC was advised to realize that its most important task is to carry incessant fight against social democrats with aim to assume control over proletariat.<sup>160</sup> As a positive development was valued creation of group of Gottwald's followers composed of "the most progressive members of the Party". In its final part, the Open Letter stated that "Closes task of the Party is to assume leadership of working masses and to become a center of actions of proletariat".<sup>161</sup> Additional interference

Prague, Klabno, Moravská Ostrava a Hradec Králové. "ZINNAR, E. P. Communist strategy...", p. 43.

158 "Gottwald, in a long speech, described critical situation: Development of state controlled by Masaryk and Social democrats allegedly is heading toward fascism: "Bourgeoisie is preparing fascist putsch, so it can more exploit proletariat and made preparations for war." According to Gottwald, Czechoslovakia was an "imperialistic state", whose "aggressiveness", and war preparations against ZSSR were condemnable. In this situation the Party remained passive and "detached from masses". RUPNIK, J. Dějiny Komunistické strany..., p. 78.

159 "At the end of the Congress he was unanimously elected to the post of the Secretary General of the Party. Sharing honors with him were Rudolf Slansky, Václav Kopecký, Paul Reiman and Otto Snyek, who were representatives of the younger generation... By nationality, thirty-two members of the Central Committee were Czechs, eleven Germans, four Slovaks, two Ukrainians, two Hungarians and one a Pole." ZINNER, E. P. Communist strategy..., p. 44.

160 "The Czechoslovak Party continued to regard the Social Democrats as "another proletarian party", a cardinal sin by Bolshevik standards according to which, it is impossible to conquer capitalism without eliminating social democratic principles from labor movement." ZINNER, P. E. Communist strategy..., pp. 45-46.

161 FILO, Milan (Ed.). Dokumenty k dejinám KSČ na Slovensku (1929 – 1938). 2. Bratislava: Pravda, 1980. Otvorený list Exekutívy Komunistického Internacionála-

of the CI aimed to support Gottwald's position in the CPC was formulated in the "Resolution of the Presidium of the Executive of the CI in regard to the Czechoslovak Issue". The Resolution expressed approval of conclusions of the Fifth Congress of the CPC and "with satisfaction stated that the Fifth Congress of the CPC drew correct guidance from defeat as result of failure of the Red Day... For this reason is the Fifth Congress an extraordinary important step on the road to bolshevization of the CPC and overcoming its social democratic relics".<sup>162</sup>

The Fifth Congress of the CPC changed its attitude to the Czechoslovak Republic. The Republic was not anymore characterized as "a colonial vassal" of imperialism, but allegedly became "a part of imperialist European system". As the main agent of fascist putsch was defined a group of politicians around the President Masaryk,<sup>163</sup> who was supporting Czech bourgeoisie.<sup>164</sup>

Imposition of political orientation pursued by Gottwald was not popular with the large segment of membership of the CPC and led to rise of a sharply negative reaction. Expulsion of Bolen, Jilek and Neurath from the Party provoked their adherents to an open revolt.<sup>165</sup> Gottwald was not able to suppress resistance of opposition and turbulence in the CPC.<sup>166</sup> Loss of po-

ly V. zjazdú KSČ (The Open Letter of Executive of communist International to the Fifth Congress of the CPC), pp. 41-44.

162 KRÁL, V. *Časť k leninizmu...*, p. 390.

163 The name "Castle" was used as definition of seat of the President T. G. Masaryk.

164 KLÍMEK, A. *Velké dějiny...*, p. 36.

165 „During one year lasting crisis three quarters of disgusted members resigned Party membership whereof base diminished from 100 000 to 25 000 persons. Twelve communist members of the Parliament and fourteen members of the Senate were following Bolen, Jilek and Neurath and established an independent parliamentary club. In common declaration they proclaimed that ultra-left orientation of new leadership is worsening isolation of the Party and requested that the Executive of the Communist will be informed objectively and its representative in Prague will be recalled.“ RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 79.

166 „Despite a change of leadership, the Party was not unable to mobilize the masses on a large scale political demonstration for the defense of the Soviet Union against imperial aggression. Demonstrations were particularly anemic in the great industrial centers – Praha, Kladno, Píseň a Moravská Ostrava.“ ZINNER, E. P. *Communist strategy...*, pp. 51-52.

pularity of the CPC reflected also a decrease of votes in 1929 parliamentary elections.<sup>167</sup>

Tense situation existed also in Slovakia. The so called the Hlohovec Memorandum reflected an atmosphere characterized by evident lack of optimism among members of the Communist Party. Document is peppered with pessimistic sentences such as "A radical workers movement is in agony... Everybody wants to live only for himself for his narrow circle, for his family. Times of great idealism of broad masses ran out."<sup>168</sup> The Hlohovec Memorandum, which was result of intra Party discussion carried before the Fifth Congress of the CPC, assumed a skeptical attitude to radical actions during stabilization of capitalism which, in opinion of its authors, was permanent. According to authors, with exception of eruption of world war, there was no possibility to overthrow existing political and economic order. The Memorandum was refused in its entirety by Gottwald during the Fifth Congress of the CPC.<sup>169</sup>

Facing a serious situation which could result in a break-up of unity of the CPC, the Communist International decided to utilize all measures to its disposal to help Gottwald. The Sixth Congress of the CI elected Gottwald to the Executive Committee of the CI and the Communist International appealed to all CPC members to distance themselves from Jilek, Bolen and Neurath and to stay firmly behind the Central Committee of the CPC. At the same time, leadership of the Party was instructed to resist any compromise with opposition. The Communist Party was directed to implement admittance of a larger number of workers to the Politburo and enlarge a basis of Gottwald's leadership.<sup>170</sup>


Supported by the CI, Gottwald managed to defeat dissenting fraction. In resolution "Against a block of 'liquidators' and their helpers" the Central Committee of the CPC informed that "A radical political turnover to left realized by the Fifth Congress of the CPC... roused a rebellion of all liquidators and elements hostile to the Party... Headquarters of Party initiated against liquidators immediately energetic fight... The Central Committee with

167 „A painful decrease in parliamentary elections 1929 - percentwise from 13, 2 to 10, 2 – a new leadership of CPC excused as a tax paid for bolshevization of the Party.“ KLÍMEK, A. *Velké dějiny...*, p. 356.

168 RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 163.

169 FILO, M. (Ed.) *Dokumeny k dějinám...*, pp. 46-47.

170 ŠUMBEROVÁ, I. *Nástup k plnění lince V. sjezdu KSČ. In VOLKOVÁ, K. (Ed.), V bojovní svazku. Komunistická strana Československa a Komunistická internacionála (1919 – 1943). Praha: Svoboda, 1988, p. 130.*



**Kapitalista uvažuje:**

Jai navždy spoutany. Od svého dětství až do smrti musíš pracovat pro moji kapru. A když bys se chtěl brátnit — máš za peníze, z tebe vyřídím, kompenzují a polští z vlastní své vůle, kteří tě pomocí pušek a bajonetů zženou zpět do svých služeb.

**Kapitalista si myslí:**

Ja ta držim vždy na rezi. Od školní doby až k hrobu musíš pro mňa robotit. A keď sa chceš proti tomu brániť — máš peniaze, máš tebe vydrancovať, za ktoré si kúpim poličkov, a vojsko z chudobnej bratry, ako si ty, ktorí sa strojíte na puškami a kanónami záženú späť do mojich služieb.

**Der Kapitalist denkt:**

Ich habe Dich immer an der Keite. Von der Schule bis zum Grab wirst Du für mich arbeiten. Und wenn Du Dich dagegen wehren willst — ich habe mit für das von Dir verdiente Geld Pistolen und Soldaten aus Deiner eigenen Klasse gekauft, die Dich mit Maschinengewehren und Kanonen in meine Dienste zurückdrängen.

**A tőkész azt gondolja:**

En téged mindig látnom tartalak. Az iskolától egészen a sírig értem kell dolgoznod. Én ha védekezni akarsz, ez ellen — én az általad kidolgozott pénzzel, a saját orszádjodbeli rendőrséggel és katonákkal velem szembeállítok, akik gépfegyverrel és golyókkal visszakeresztnek a szolgálatomra.

**Výkonný výbor**

**Komunistické Internacionály mládeže.**

*A poster issued by the Executive Committee of the Communist International of Youth*

satisfaction announces that in this fight the Party Headquarters successfully convinced about accuracy of its policy also these members who earlier were sympathetic to opportunistic groups and that under guiding of the Central Committee all workers loyal to the Party were united.<sup>171</sup>

As was already noted, victory was costly. According to Paul E. Zinner "The Party discussion of 1928-29, which led to a complete change in leadership and to the adoption of an entirely new, much tougher policy, cost the Party its mass character. Its membership, which at the outset of showdown hovered around 100 000 mark, dwindled to about 24 000... A number of intellectuals — among them several stalwarts of socialism, such as Ivan Olbracht, Marie Majerová, Jozef Hora, Helena Malířová, and Jozef Seifert — either withdraw or were expelled. The communist trade unions split, and one section, led by Josef Hais, joined forces with the Social Democrats. Several founding members, including Alois Muna, also left the Party."<sup>172</sup>


A goal to create united, ideologically homogenous and highly disciplined Party still wrestled with difficulties. Expressions of ultra-left ideology were brewing in the CPC already before the Fifth Congress. Radicals — Fried, Synek, Reiman and others during the Fifth Congress of the CPC demanded that no person should be voted to the new Central Committee who was not openly hostile to Jilek. Advised by a representative of the CI, G. Hendrichowsky, Gottwald refused such radical demands.<sup>173</sup>

Profound differences between the majority of leadership the Communist Party and the ultra-left fraction led by Jenů Fried, existed also in strategy of the Party in oncoming parliamentary elections. Tactic suggested by Gottwald in regard to activities the CPC in the Parliament, was refused by Fried as "a parliamentary cretinism". Instead, Fried proposed to organize public campaign and explain to workers, how the Communist Party will lead workers to a proletarian revolution. In a political atmosphere before elections, which was distant from radical tendencies, inflammatory speeches were lacking credibility and attracted only a small number of listeners. Election results confirmed a decrease of a revolutionary zeal of workers. Fried igno-

171 KRÁL, V. *Cesta k leninizmu...*, pp. 384-385.

172 ZINNER, E. P. *Communist strategy...*, p. 50.

173 According L. Šumberová, "Whereas Gottwald and a majority of Politbyro were pursuing activity of the whole Party on the base of concept of participation of all members on creation politics of CPC, comrades around Fried were relying on harsh discipline of most conscious members... During the second half of 1929 they began their sectarian approach increase up to open fractional activity against existing leadership of Party". ŠUMBEROVÁ, L. *Nástup...*, p. 132.



**Robotnícka mládež je zapriahnutá do káry kapitalizmu.  
Každý deň ste vy, mladí robotníci, vyčistiavaní a  
vykorisťovaní!**

**Pomôžte si oslobodiť sa z tohoto jarma!**

**Príjdite a demonštruujte spolu s komunistickou mládežou  
v nedeľu dňa 7. septembra  
proti utlačovaniu a vykorisťovaniu  
mladého proletariátu!**

Tlačou a nákladom: Rungce a spol., Liberec.

*A poster appealing to communist youth to join demonstration on occasion  
of X. International Day of Youth*

red a real cause of unsatisfactory results of elections and argued that it was a consequence of complacency of leaders of the Communist Party.

Fried demanded a general purge of leadership but with scant success. On the contrary, a firm support of the Communist International helped Gottwald to defeat Fried and his associates. During December 1929 a special commission of the ECI was established under leadership of a member of Presidium S. I. Gusev, who was authorized to solve situation in the CPC. Gusev criticized Fried and his associates and characterized their ultra-left strategy as sectarian. He expressed a "vigorous demand that group around Fried, which is blocking approach of the CPC toward masses, will cease their opposition activity".<sup>174</sup> Gusev concluded that in the Communist Party existed a "serious and utterly abnormal situation". The "left deviation", according to Gusev, had a negative impact upon fight against rightist danger. The most detrimental impact of leftist ideology was weakening communist ability to gain influence upon masses of workers. This was intolerable. Analysis elaborated by Gusev became a basis for resolution of the Communist International, which ordered Fried to renounce his criticism of Gottwald.<sup>175</sup>

After Fried's defeat, Gottwald had a free hand to implement in the Communist Party changes, which reinforced a dictatorial character of the Party. According to J. Rupnik, "Besides removal of leading personalities, who in certain points disagreed with the Communist International and besides extinction of internal democracy in the CPC, reorganization of the Communist Party apparatus ensued which led to occurrence of a new type of functional democratic past, but enjoying support of Moscow. Many of these communist activists became paid functionaries. It was a group to which Moscow trusted primarily. Its leading representatives were R. Slánský, J. Šverma, V. Kopecký, O. Šmek, J. Guttmán, J. Dolanský, J. Fried, P. Reimán, J. Háken a J. Hrubý. A majority of them occupied a high positions (Politbyro) in year 1929 during the Fifth Congress of CPC."<sup>176</sup>

The Sixth Congress of the CPC held during March 7 - 11 and following Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee held in July, 1932, to certain extent eased hostile attitude against the Social Democratic Party. According to J. Rupnik, "Even Gottwald stopped for period of time to use formulation "social-fascism".<sup>177</sup>

174 ŠUMBEROVÁ, L. *Nástup...*, pp. 135-137.

175 ŠUMBEROVÁ, L. *Nástup...*, p. 138.

176 RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 84.

177 RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 103.

Dogmatic and from reality detached policy of hostility to social democrats ended in catastrophe in Germany. Reluctance to join forces with social democrats in fight against the Nazi Party made Hitler's ascendancy to power easier. This had a repercussions also in Czechoslovakia. According to P. E. Zinner "In 1933, as a result of the disastrous policy of the German Communist Party, another – this time a rightist – deviation made its appearance. The culprit was none other than Josef Guttman, then one of the more influential leaders of the Party and editor of the official periodical, *Rude Právo*. Guttman was unwilling to give unqualified approval – even if only overtly – to the strategy and tactics of the German Communist Party and to hail it as the very model of revolutionary parties."<sup>178</sup> There was a considerable sympathy for Guttman's criticism, which resulted in a negative impact upon relations between the CPC and the CI. However, as in past, the CPC succumbed to dictate of the Comintern: "A year after beginning of crisis between the CPC and the CI, discrepancies were ended during conference in Moscow on August of 1933: a defeat of "Guttman's line" was accomplished and the Communist Party was again brought to obedience... Gottwald argued that for discrepancies between the CPC and the Comintern is responsible exclusively Guttman. Gottwald asserted that among comrades in leadership only Guttman doubted correctness of Comintern's analysis."<sup>179</sup> An affair ended in a total victory of the CI after Gottwald admitted his mistake. However, Guttman, convinced that his criticism of tactic of the German Communist Party was justified, refused to humble yourself.<sup>180</sup>

After victory of Hitler the Communist International could not ignore growing danger caused by the Nazi Germany. The sense of acute threat led the Communist International to reevaluate its attitude to social democracy. In words of communist historian K. K. Štířina "Under influence of increase of Fascist danger a certain regrouping in labor movement ensued. In ranks of social democracy were sprouting-up leftist groups and movement, demanding

<sup>178</sup> ZINNER, E. P. *Communist strategy...*, p. 52.

<sup>179</sup> RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 109.

<sup>180</sup> „Guttman remained convinced that he must defend his opinion; this he did in December 1933, when he dispatched a long list to the Headquarters known under name „the Guttman Memorandum“. Guttman demanded that all causes of victory of Fascism in Germany were investigated including mistakes of communist leadership... Central Committee renounced Memorandum. The Political Bureau characterized Memorandum as „Trotskyist“, „Contra-revolutionary“ and on December 31 1933 expelled Guttman from the Party.“ RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 111.

a more active defense against Fascism. Communist more clearly saw that it is necessary to create the Unified Front of workers against Fascism... Between the end of 1934 and the outset of 1935 leadership of the Comintern reevaluated social democracies. It was pointed that in their ranks were formed groups, which were inclined to left ideology and were struggled for active participation in anti-fascist fight. It was asserted that changes were occurring in nature of social democracies. Actually a formulation "social-fascism" was refused... The Comintern and communist parties concluded that the United Front, to which were endeavored also social democratic parties, is necessary to build on a platform of democratic and anti-fascist demands and not on base of communist requirements. On October 15, 1934 a political commission of the Political Secretariat of the ECI in its directives to sections of the Comintern in regard to preparations of the Seventh Congress formulated necessity to "a broadest anti-fascist front of workers".<sup>181</sup>

However, change of this strategy by the Communist International to more conciliatory approach to social democracies was not adopted also in instructions to the Czechoslovak Communist Party. On the contrary, according to Rupnik, "whereas western communist parties, with blessing of Moscow, were developing the United Front policy, the Czechoslovak Communist Party was at that time forced proceed in utterly different way: the Communist International ordered the CPC to stop any initiative to establish an alliance with socialists... During November session of the Central Committee Jan Šverma suggested a new version of rapprochement with social democrats. Adopted resolution called for creation of "The Government of workers and peasants", which will be a result of unified fight... the Comintern again categorically stood-up against any hint of new policy in Czechoslovakia. The Commission of the ECI, which met on November 23, 1934 harshly criticized Prague leadership, whose policy "threatens to abolish a fundamental difference of the Communist Party from The Social Democracy".<sup>182</sup>

Consequently, during the following years, despite growing danger of the German threat, Czechoslovak Communists remained in position of powerless observers of tragic development, which ended in destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic by the Nazi Germany.

<sup>181</sup> ŠTÍŘINA, K. K. Strategie a taktika mezinárodního komunistického hnutí v boji proti fašismu a válce ve třicátých letech. In VOLKOVÁ, K. (ed.), *V bojovém svazku. Komunistická strana Československa a Komunistická internacionála (1919 – 1943)*. Praha: Svoboda, 1988, p. 180.

<sup>182</sup> RUPNIK, J. *Dějiny Komunistické strany...*, p. 123.

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to Communist International**

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