For whom the Bell Tolls: Grievance Theory and the Rise of New Political Parties in the 2010 and 2013 Czech Parliamentary Elections¹

Pavel Maškarinec² – Petr Bláha³
Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University, Ústí nad Labem
Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague

For whom the Bell Tolls: Grievance Theory and the Rise of New Political Parties in the 2010 and 2013 Czech Parliamentary Elections. This article presents an analysis of the electoral success of new political parties in the 2010 and 2013 Czech parliamentary elections. The article uses the grievance theory for explaining the reasons behind inter-regional variation of electoral support for the Public Affairs Party, ANO 2011, and the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura. We use two grievance mobilization models which focus on economic changes and immigration/ethnic conflict. The study discusses grievance mobilization models and tests them on aggregate regional data using linear regression analysis. Overall, the study finds that the explanatory capacity of grievance theory mobilization models is very low. This is especially the case of economic grievances, but even ethnic mobilization models were only moderately successful. While neither model performed well when controlling for education and age structure, the models including contextual variables had the best explanatory ability. As the total amount of variance explained by the regression models was very low, future research should search for other factors explaining the reasons for the rise of the new parties. The theoretical model of grievance mobilization should be applied on individual data from surveys that are able to account more adequately for existing grievances in society, including political grievances, which are very difficult to observe at the aggregate level of analysis.

Key words: Czech Republic; parliamentary elections; new political parties; grievance theory; grievance mobilization; economic grievance; immigration; ethnic grievance; Public Affairs Party, ANO2011, Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura

Introduction

In contrast to many other countries of Central and Eastern Europe which suffered from marked instability and fluidity of their party politics, the Czech party system was relatively stable and closed during the first two post-communist decades, with low levels of volatility and with failure of most new

¹ The present article is one of results of the project Populist and radical right-wing political parties in elections to the European Parliament, which was financially supported from funds for institutional research of the Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University, for 2014.
² Address: Mgr. Pavel Maškarinec, Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University, České mládeže 8, 400 96 Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic. E-mail: maskarinec@centrum.cz.
³ Address: Mgr. Petr Bláha, Department of Civil Society Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, U Kříže 8, 158 00 Prague 5, Czech Republic. E-mail: blahapetr01@gmail.com.
political parties (Sikk 2005; Hloušek – Kopeček 2008; Deegan-Krause – Haughton 2010).

However, the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections resulted in a dramatic upheaval to what had been a relatively stable political landscape. The Czech party system underwent the kind of ‘electoral earthquakes’ as experienced by some other countries of post-communist Europe in the past two decades. The liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) and the Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálnědemokratická, ČSSD) achieved a historical low in 2010. Compared to 2006, the ODS’s vote share dropped by just over 15 percentage points, from 35.38% to 20.22%, and the ČSSD experienced a 10-point drop from 32.32% to 22.08%. The Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL) and the Green Party (Strana zelených, SZ) failed to reach the 5% electoral threshold, while two new parties – Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09 (Tradice, odpovědnost, prosperita 09, TOP09) and Public Affairs (Věci veřejné, VV) won parliamentary representation and joined the governing coalition with the ODS.4 The TOP09 and the VV together won 27.58%, and the total gains of non-parliamentary parties reached 39.60%. Even greater changes were brought by the 2013 elections. Of the two largest parties, the ČSSD won the elections with the lowest gain of the winning party since 1992 (20.45%) and the ODS, as the former main party of the right, achieved as little as 7.72%. After three years, the KDU-ČSL regained parliamentary representation, while the VV left the Chamber of Deputies. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM) and the TOP09 maintained their representation, but other two new parties entered the lower house as well ANO2011 (“ano” means “yes” in Czech) and the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura (Úsvit přímé demokracie Tomia Okamury, referred to as “the Dawn”) obtained 18.65% and 6.88%, respectively, i.e. 25.53% together.

With the exception of the TOP09 which was excluded from the analysis,5 all other new parliamentary parties of 2010 and 2013 can be generally categorized as populist or alternative parties (cf. Havlík – Pinková 2012; Bútora 2013). This terminology is sometimes used inconsistently, and therefore, the same parties can also be categorized as niche parties emphasizing a limited number

---

4 The KDU-ČSL, one of the country’s oldest political parties, founded in 1918 and with continuous parliamentary representation since 1920, lost all its seats in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in more than 100 years.

5 The TOP09 was established in 2009 as a brand-new party, yet at the initiative of several leading members of the KDU-ČSL. As a self-declared right-wing conservative party with liberal economic views, the TOP09 has a clear position on the left-right scale. Moreover, it rarely uses protest appeal to mobilize voters. With regard to all these characteristics, there is clear line between the TOP09 and the rest of the new parties (VV, ANO2011 and Dawn). Therefore, the theoretical framework of grievance mobilization (see below) does not seem analytically relevant to the TOP09.
of issues that are normally ignored by the other parties (cf. Meguid 2005; Adams et al. 2006; Wagner 2012; Cabada et al. 2013).

Public Affairs are on the top of our list of parties of relevance for the analysis. Established as early as in 2002, the VV was technically no longer a new party when it won parliamentary representation in 2010. However, most voters noticed the party only when popular journalist Radek John was elected its chairman (through an online ballot) in June 2009. As a seasoned investigative reporter of the largest Czech private channel, TV Nova, he presented himself as an advocate of the rights of ordinary people. This was consistent with the party’s self-presentation as an important mediator between the public and the corrupt political elites, or as a kind of pest control squad in top-level politics. Building on a contrast between the power elite and “ordinary people”, the VV promised bringing decision making back to the people. In order to do so, it would institute regional and national referendums with relatively easy conditions of initiative; a procedure for removing officeholders before the expiry of their term; a majority electoral system for the lower chamber of the parliament; and cuts in the benefits enjoyed by politicians and political parties. Interestingly, in their vision of eradicating extremism, the VV proposed treating the causes of the social pathology on the part of “social misfits”. It intended to take the wind out of the sails of political radicals by forcing minority groups to conform their expectations.

The ANO2011 movement, as the second political organization analysed here, was formed under the leadership of one of the wealthiest Czech entrepreneurs, Andrej Babiš. It campaigned on a centre-right platform of an “apolitical” nature, recruiting its candidates among non-politicians with unstained reputation. ANO2011’s ambition of political leadership was typically legitimized by an outstanding track record of its candidates from the private sector. As it often emphasized in the campaign, ANO2011 was able to give jobs to people and govern “so they can look their children in the eyes”. In sum, the party had two clear priorities, namely to eradicate political corruption and to boost employment. However, there were ambiguities in many other aspects of its programme, and the party was found difficult to place on the left-right scale, just like the other two political organizations analysed here.

Finally, we are going to examine the electoral success of the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura. As its title suggests, the party brought together a number of successful personalities with the primary aim of changing the Czech Republic’s constitution and introducing new elements of direct democracy into the system. The Dawn supported a plurality system of single-

6 Until then, the party primarily and almost exclusively operated in Prague and focused on local political issues.
member districts for parliamentary elections, directly elected governors and mayors, removal of officeholders by popular vote, and popular legislative veto. Elements of participatory budgeting were proposed as a means of kerbing the taxes introduced by the existing government. Finally, given the Japanese heritage of Tomio Okamura, it was somewhat paradoxical that the Dawn explicitly advocated strict restrictions on immigration, measures to promote patriotism, and enforcement of full “integration” of minority groups.

The present study primarily aims to verify whether grievance theory explains the electoral success of new parties. More specifically, it assumes a relationship between citizens’ protest behaviour (not necessarily protest voting) and the grievances perceived by them. As a member of the family of demand-side theories, grievance theory explains voter behaviour by examining sociological variables representing broader socio-economic and modernization processes.

The first section of the paper is going to present our theoretical framework, which connects grievance mobilization with party system dynamics in order to explain the electoral success of new parties in the context of various frustrations. In the second section, we present the results of the analysis which uses grievance mobilization models to explain voter support for selected political organizations. In the concluding section, we discuss the explanatory power of the models and formulate the possible implications of the results, suggesting several promising avenues of future research.

**Grievance mobilization and its effects on party system dynamics:**

* A theoretical framework

In her analysis of the causes of the rise of populist extreme right in Western Europe, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2008) pointed out that most theories of party system change agree, irrespective of the economic or socio-political traditions that exist in different countries, that certain processes of social change may give rise to frustrations or grievances and ultimately transform the party system as well. Similar conclusions were, after all, presented in Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal study of the ways party systems in Western Europe arose and changed over time.

Eventually, it was proposed that party system change tends to reflect the emergence of new grievances. Existing literature on grievance mobilization (e.g., Crossley 2002; Snow 2004; Ivarsflaten 2008; Kriesi 2012; Beissinger – Sasse 2014) generally distinguishes three separate models used by political parties in their effort to mobilize voters: (a) grievances due to economic changes, (b) grievances due to growing immigration, and (c) grievances due to political elitism and corruption.
Economic grievance mobilization

The most frequently used grievance model is directly associated with economic changes. Of primary importance in the context of the Czech Republic was the regime change towards democracy and the related transformation from central planning to a market economy, which were accompanied by a strong dynamic of political development. This era gave rise to a new social structure, increased social inequalities and a cleavage between the winners and losers of the transformation (Hloušek – Kopeček 2008). At the same time, the process of democratic consolidation itself may have temporarily increased people’s tolerance to the social problems that accompanied the transformation, and especially to economic recession (Beissinger – Sasse 2014).

In the Czech Republic as well as elsewhere in the post-communist world, such tolerance was enhanced by the sense of shared priorities, and in particular, by the vision of the country’s security and geopolitical status. The visions of NATO membership and, subsequently, EU membership motivated the population to tolerate the negative effects of economic transformation on certain social groups. Later on, another factor that mitigated the effects of economic grievance mobilization emerged when Czech right-wing political parties exploited the drama of Greek financial bailout for their framing of the issue of austerity measures in the election campaign of 2010. To generalize from these cases, it seems that a grievance becomes effective when it comes to be understood by voters as such; the existence of negative macroeconomic figures is not a sufficient condition. On one hand, the Czech Republic was unique in many respects because it is by no means usual for a society to exhibit such levels of tolerance of radical changes in terms of economic and social transformation, profound shifts in social structure and economic fluctuations (Greskovits 1998: 14). On the other hand, the historically determined tolerance of post-communist transformation difficulties did not last forever in the Czech case. By now, people living in Central and Eastern Europe tend to perceive economic issues basically in the same ways as Western Europeans (Beissinger – Sasse 2014).

According to Hanspeter Kriesi, economic recession is primarily reflected in governments’ austerity measures, which in turn mobilize voters (or protest in general). These austerity measures along with other policy reforms of the ruling cabinet in the context of macroeconomic difficulties are the main triggers of economic grievances and mobilization, most typically via unemployment. As Kriesi argues, the source of these grievances lies in the fact that people are losing their jobs, above all in structurally disadvantaged regions, combined with government measures that are, from the perspective of voters, responsible for unemployment. In this approach, the real effects of economic grievances
cannot be measured merely by macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth or decline, but rather by the (somewhat delayed) real effects of GDP change on subjective well-being (Kriesi 2012: 9).

Therefore, of primary importance in the economic grievance mobilization model are economic changes that may affect different parts of the territory in different ways. Based on the assumptions defined above, we expect higher levels of economic grievance mobilization in areas that are more affected by economic problems, where people are less satisfied with the economic situation of the country, and where government’s austerity measures may give rise to grievances among the local population. Given the limitations of available data at the preferred aggregate level of analysis, we have formulated the following two empirically verifiable hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** New political parties mobilizing economic grievances will be more successful in regions struck by higher levels of unemployment.

**Hypothesis 2:** New political parties mobilizing economic grievances will be more successful in regions with lower shares of the self-employed population.

**Immigration/ethnic grievance mobilization**

Another “classical” model of grievance mobilization in the Western European context is related to anti-immigrant sentiment (Mudde 2000; van der Brug – Fennema 2003; Carter 2005). The rise of new (especially populist extreme right) parties in Western Europe coincided with massive immigration flows which kept growing in spite of widespread legal restrictions. None of these countries had an elaborate asylum policy (Berthiaume 1995), and most of them failed to give jobs to immigrants. As a result, the unemployment rate among immigrants reached much higher levels than in the rest of the population (OECD 2004). This gave rise to antagonism between immigrants and natives, often exacerbated by cultural conflict, especially with regard to native populations’ reluctance to accept the Muslim minority (Ivarsflaten 2008).

The ways the immigration grievance mobilization model is applied in Western Europe cannot be simply transferred to the Czech context. As opposed to the Western European mainstream, Czechs tend to perceive immigration as a

---

7 Starting from 2009, survey data indicates a clearly negative trend of people’s evaluations of the economic situation in the country. Perceptions of the macroeconomic situation reached their trough in the years when parliamentary elections took place, namely 2010 and 2013; they were much lower than in the preceding election years of 2006 and 2002. Similarly negative were people’s expectations with regard to both the development of the economic situation in the country and the development of subjective economic well-being (CVVM 2014). In our opinion, negative evaluations of the macroeconomic situation can be reasonably expected to vary between regions, depending on their unemployment levels. Consequently, we expect spatial variation in the economic grievances for which political leaders are blamed in the different parts of the country’s territory.
rather marginal issue and established political parties in the Czech Republic have rarely played the immigration card in their election campaigns. This is associated with the small size of the country’s immigrant population and the relative absence of Muslim immigrants, compared to most Western European countries. A large majority of immigrants in the Czech Republic belong to the ethnic groups that are typically unaffected by integration problems in the Western European context, and there is a relatively high level of cultural proximity between immigrants and the native population in the Czech Republic. Moreover, almost one-fifth of “immigrants” in the country comprises of Slovaks, the sister nation that lived in a federation with Czechs prior to 1993. Thus, the original “Western European” grievance mobilization model can be implemented on Czech data but it has to be complemented by an additional dimension concerning anti-Gypsyism. Czech people hold much more negative attitudes to the Roma minority than to most immigrants, and the extent of Roma unpopularity is only comparable that of Muslims; however, there are relatively few Muslims living in the country (cf. CVVM 2005; 2011).

In 2010, there was a growth in the frequency of protest action organized by the extreme right (cf. Císař – Navrátil, in print) accompanied by increased media coverage of Roma issues, typically with a criminal framing of Romani citizens. It is reasonable to assume that these phenomena motivated many voters to seek alternatives to radical parties such as the Workers’ Party of Social Justice (Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti, DSSS) that were found unacceptable by many due to their peculiar membership and their extremist rhetoric. Given the continued ignorance of Roma issues by established parties, discontent voters sought an alternative among new parties that played the anti-immigrant or racist card much more openly. However, strictly speaking, the Roma living in the Czech Republic are not immigrants, and they typically do not present themselves as members of a national minority, but rather as natives with ethnic specifics (Koubek 2013: 21). Therefore, with regard to the mobilization of immigration/ethnic grievances (the latter adjective being more important in the Czech case) we have formulated the following empirically verifiable hypotheses:

---

8 As an historical exception, the immigration card was played by the Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa, SPR-RSČ) which had parliamentary representation from 1992 to 1998. In the following time period, only marginal political organizations mobilized immigration grievances. Recently, the immigration card was played again by the Dawn which won seats in the lower chamber in the fall elections of 2013. In its campaign before the European elections of 2014, the Dawn emphasized immigration as one of its central themes. Its anti-immigrant rhetoric was inspired by that of populist extreme right parties in Western Europe.

9 The share of immigrants in the population of the Czech Republic reached 4.15% as of 12/31/2012. More than one-fourth of them came (25.82%) from Ukraine, almost one-fifth (19.68%) from Slovakia, 13.14% from Vietnam, 7.56% from Russia, 4.41% from Poland and 29.38% from other countries of origin (CSÚ 2013). There is a high level of cultural proximity between the native Czech population and all major immigrant groups, with the exception of the Vietnamese minority which is traditionally perceived by the mainstream as “unproblematic”.
Hypothesis 3: New political parties mobilizing ethnic grievances will be more successful in regions with larger immigrant populations.

Hypothesis 4: New political parties mobilizing ethnic grievances will be more successful in regions with larger Roma populations.

Political grievance mobilization

The list of “classic” grievance models is concluded by the third model which is concerned with grievances resulting from people's perceptions of political elitism and corruption. While the radical political transformation after the fall of communism was accompanied by a myriad of changes, it was supported by most of the society which was united under the myth of a new, candid, unspoiled form of politics. In the “era of innocence”, as Kopeček (2010) termed it, Czechs believed in democracy as a panacea, a flawless polity that would replace the old regime of authoritarian socialism. Influenced the beliefs of former dissidents, an idealized, noble vision of civil society became the norm (Rakušanová 2007: 50-54). However, confrontation with political reality was disillusioning for many Czech citizens. Their shrinking trust in democratic institutions ultimately translated into a rapid decline of electoral participation. As Linek (2010) argues, many people lost interest in politics and came to regard it as an entangled system of behind-the-scenes clientelist deals. This was a result of the following sequence of events: the so-called Sarajevo assassination and a number of other financial scandals of the ODS in 1998; the so-called opposition agreement between the ODS and the ČSSD in the same year; and four years of ČSSD’s single-party government with limited political competition in the parliament. According to Linek, renewed competition between the ČSSD and the ODS after the elections of 2002 did not rebuild Czech politics in the same way as it had been in the mid-1990s, and people’s political trust never fully recovered. Traditional political actors are stereotypically seen as involved in corruption and clientelism, people are dissatisfied with them, and a number of new parties distance themselves from them. This phenomenon is regarded as another factor of the rise of new parties.

While the political grievance model described above is certainly interesting, were are unable to use it in the present analysis. The model cannot be tested at the preferred aggregate level due to the absence of relevant indicators. Due consideration has been paid to characteristics such as number of invalid votes or level of electoral (non-)participation, which can be expected to differ in regions with higher levels of dissatisfaction with traditional parties. However, we could not build our analysis on either of these variables because their
explanatory ability was very low and the results were insignificant. Unable to guarantee reasonable levels of validity, we chose to exclude the political grievance model from the analysis.

Data and methods

We intend to find out whether and to what extent we can explain the variation of electoral support for the new parties between the different parts of the Czech Republic’s territory. In order to answer that question, we defined our units of analysis as 205 “administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers” and the capital Prague. The reason for this choice is that an analysis operating at the level of seventy-six LAU 1/NUTS 4 districts might provide a somewhat distorted view of reality, blurring intra-regional differences. The LAU 1/NUTS 4 districts, as political and administrative units, do not correspond to catchment areas and contain areas with significantly different territorial patterns of voter support for individual political parties. The necessity to work at a lower level of aggregation was highlighted also by analyses of the geographical dimension of Czech social inequalities carried out in smaller territorial units (Musil 2004; Feřtová – Temelová 2011; Novák – Netrdová 2011). They conclusively proved that the choice of the district (LAU 1/NUTS 4) or regional (NUTS 3) level tends to hide profound intra-regional disparities. On the other hand, according to Musil and Müller (2008), municipalities (LAU 2/NUTS 5) are not considered fully adequate units of analysis because there is a large number of very small municipalities with extreme variance of selected variables.

Additional justification for the use of aggregate-level data lies in the theoretical orientation of the present study. We do not aim to investigate individual factors of electoral behaviour, but rather to analyse the success of new political parties through the lens of grievance theory, at the aggregate level. We are interested in the territorial variation of the above-defined factors of electoral support for the new parties that won seats in the Czech Parliament in 2010 and 2013. Given the aggregate level of analysis, it must be emphasized that the findings of our study do not apply to individuals because the unit of analysis comprises the entire population of people living in a given territorial

---

10 There is long-term stability in the levels of electoral (non-)participation measured for each of the Czech Republic’s regions. Voter turnout is consistently above-average in some regions and under-average in others. In the last two elections, we have seen the rise of new parties without any change in regional levels of turnout. Therefore, turnout cannot be regarded as an important factor in the present analysis.

11 The settlement and administrative structure of the Czech Republic is extremely fragmented, with a high number of small municipalities. At present, of the total of 6,253 municipalities, 4,829 (77.23%) have less than 1,000 inhabitants, but comprise only 17.64% of the population. Similarly, there are 1461 (22.36%) municipalities (23.36%) with less than 200 inhabitants whose population accounts for only 1.75% of the total (CSI 2012).
The results of the statistical analysis should be treated as valid merely for the given configuration of territorial units (see King 1996: 162-163; Wong 2009: 119-120).

Our primary indicator of the political preferences (dependent variable) is the percentage of votes achieved by the VV, ANO2011 and Dawn at the level of the Czech Republic’s 205 administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers and the capital city of Prague. These districts can be considered to be relatively natural regional units, enabling one to appropriately explore detailed geographic patterns of voting behaviour in the Czech Republic. This level of analysis was also chosen for its good explanatory ability in terms of territorial unit similarity, and for the relatively simple accessibility of secondary data. Raw electoral results were obtained from the Czech Statistical Office’s (ČSÚ) Election Server and matched to other independent variables selected in line with the theoretical framework of grievance mobilization models presented above.

The following independent variables were defined: unemployment (so-called registered unemployment rate) and self-employment (number of self-employed persons per 1,000 inhabitants) for the economic grievance mobilization model, immigration (share of foreigners with a long-stay visa in the population) and Roma (share of Roma living in residential ghettos in the population) for the immigration/ethnic grievance mobilization model. Additional independent variables were defined to assess the effects of a number of basic characteristics of social stratification identified by previous research as important predictors of electoral behaviour.

Czech politics exhibited a relatively smooth emergence of the left-right axis, which gradually (but much more rapidly than in other post-communist countries) took on a traditional socioeconomic form, and became the main structural cleavage of the Czech political spectrum (Vlachová – Matějů 1998; Hloušek – Kopeček 2008). Similarly, other studies proved that the political conflict in the Czech Republic is a class conflict and social classes voted for political parties that defended their class interests. At the same time, these studies showed that social class did not fully explain voting behaviour, and voters’ decisions are also determined by their social status (sector of occupation, religious affiliation, age, etc.) or by other factors such as unemployment and party identification that can substantially moderate the effects of social class (Matějů – Řeháková 1997; Lyons – Linek 2007; Vlachová – Řeháková 2007; Smith – Matějů 2011; Lyons 2012). Finally, other

---

12 Official census data could not be taken as a measure of the Roma population because a major part of that population arguably did not report Roma nationality. Instead, we chose to work with a dataset that originates from Ivan Gabal’s survey of “socially excluded localities” (GAC 2006). More specifically, we used the lower limits of Gabal’s interval estimates.
studies found certain independent effects of contextual variables with independent effects on voting decisions, namely two macroregions – the formerly German-inhabited Sudetenland and Moravia (Kouba 2007; Maškarinec 2013). In our study, education structure is measured by the variable of higher education (share of college graduates in the population aged 15+) and the effects of age are controlled using the retirement variable (share of persons aged 65+). The situation of regional populations is measured by three contextual variables, namely Sudetenland, Moravia and urbanization (share of people living in municipalities with a population of 5000+). The effects of the above indicators were analysed using the classic ordinary least squares method (multiple linear regression). The results of each regression model are indicated by two basic parameters, namely unstandardized regression coefficients (B; measuring the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable when controlled for all other variables, it tells us how much the dependent variable changes per unit change in the independent variable), standardized regression coefficients (Beta; measuring the weight of each independent variable in the model), and adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted $R^2$; measuring the overall performance of the model in explaining variance in the dependent variable). Model 1 tests the indicators of economic grievance mobilization, Model 2 tests the effects of immigration/ethnic grievance mobilization, and Model 5 combines the variables from both these models to test their results for robustness. For the same reason, Model 3 uses two indicators of social status (higher education, retirement) as control variables and Model 4 uses three contextual variables (Sudetenland, Moravia, urbanization). Finally, Model 6 verifies the robustness of the results of Models 1–4.

---

13 Dummy variable dividing the territory of the Czech Republic into units where German parties obtained more than 50% of votes (value 1) and those with less than 50% of votes (value 0) in the elections of 1935.
14 Dummy variable dividing the territory of the Czech Republic into Bohemia (value 0) and Moravia or Silesia (value 1), based on territorial jurisdiction of courts in pre-war Czechoslovakia.
15 The dataset was compiled from the following publicly available sources: the ČSÚ Public Database for unemployment, self-employment and urbanization, a publication on parliamentary elections 1920 – 2006 (ČSÚ 2009) for Sudetenland and Moravia, Gabal’s survey of socially excluded localities (GAC 2006) for ghettoized Roma, and the official census of 2011 for all other indicators (SLDB 2011).
16 The Enter method of linear regression was implemented using the SPSS statistical software. Tests of multicollinearity between independent variables was performed for each regression model. To avoid problems with multicollinearity, we excluded from the analysis variables with high levels of correlation (e.g., the Catholics variable measuring affiliation to the Roman Catholic Church was strongly associated with the Moravia variable). Subsequently, multicollinearity in the regression model was tested using the tolerance statistic and the variance inflation factor (VIF). Multicollinearity between independent variables was indicated by tolerance values of 0.2 or below or by VIF values of 5 or above.
17 The tables with regression model results do not indicate the values of standard error or statistical significance (p) because these measures are only relevant in the analysis of survey data. They are meaningless for the present analysis which works with the total population of all administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers (see Šokup - Rabušic 2007).
Analysis of results

Let us begin with the parliamentary elections of 2010 and the reasons of the electoral success of the VV. The results lend some support to the hypothesis of economic grievance mobilization (Model 1). VV’s vote share was positively associated with higher levels of unemployment and negatively with higher levels of self-employment. However, the model’s performance is low, as indicated by the value of adjusted R-squared. We rejected the hypothesis with extra certainty after including the indicators of ethnic grievance mobilization (Model 5) because the direction of the association between VV’s electoral support and the level of self-employment changed from negative to positive. With all variables included (Model 6), the results are in direct contradiction to the hypothesis, showing that VV’s support grows with higher self-employment and declines with lower unemployment.

With regard to ethnic grievance mobilization (Model 2), we confirmed the expected weak positive relationship between VV’s support and higher immigration. Strong positive effects on VV’s vote share were identified for the population of ghettoized Roma. On one hand, the model explained only 9% of inter-regional variance of electoral support for the VV. On the other hand, the effects were in the expected direction in the combined grievance model as well (Model 5). Now it remains to examine the results of Models 3 and 4. The performance of Model 3, which tested the effects of education structure and age structure, was again limited, with only 6% of total variance explained. Both variables were negatively associated with VV’s electoral gains, which were slightly lower in areas with more college graduates and even lower in areas with larger post-productive populations. Controlling for the effects of contextual variables, Model 4 explained the highest proportion of variance (14%). The Sudetenland variable was by far the strongest predictor of VV’s electoral success, both in Model 4 and overall (see below). The formerly German-inhabited areas granted the VV an average margin of 1.11% more votes than the rest of the country. The urbanization variable enhanced VV’s electoral gains in a similar way, with higher vote share in areas where the majority of population resides in larger municipalities. In contrast, the VV was less successful in Moravia, which granted it an average margin of 0.39% fewer votes than the rest of the country.

Finally, the results yielded by Model 6 with all variables were somewhat ambiguous. Of all the measures of grievances, only the effects of the Roma variable were in the expected direction. Compared to the rest of the country, the VV obtained more votes in Sudetenland (by a margin of 0.94%) and in areas with larger populations of ghettoized Roma, higher self-employment, and (to a lesser extent) higher urbanization. In contrast, the party’s electoral gains were
negatively associated with larger populations of the retired, unemployed and immigrants, and to a lesser extent, with larger populations of college graduates and the context of Moravia (yet the effect of the contextual variable was very weak, compared to Model 4).

Table 1: Effects on voting for the VV, OLS regression analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
<td>-0.244</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.207</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudetenland</td>
<td>1.108</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravia</td>
<td>-0.388</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ČSÚ – Veřejná databáze, GAC 2006, SLDB 2011; own calculations.
Note: B: unstandardized regression coefficients, Beta: standardized regression coefficients.

The election campaign of ANO2011 and its mobilization appeal were much more moderate (less populist) in terms of grievances and protest. As mentioned above, they mainly focused on anti-corruption, criticized traditional political parties, and emphasized the professionalism and business success of ANO2011 leaders, especially of its chairman and one of the wealthiest Czech entrepreneurs, Andrej Babiš (Hloušek – Kaniok 2014: 7-8). This was reflected, as Model 1 indicates, in stronger electoral support in areas with higher levels of self-employment (the effects were not in the expected direction), but also in areas with higher unemployment (as expected). These two effects were in opposite directions in the case of VV in the previous elections, but for ANO2011, the same direction of relationship was identified in the combined grievance model (Model 5) and in Model 6 with all variables as well. In line with the hypothesis of ethnic grievance mobilization, the effects of independent variables in Model 2 were in the expected direction (as well as in Model 5 with both types of grievances). The movement’s vote share grew with higher
populations of immigrants, but especially with higher concentrations of ghettoized Roma; consistent direction of both effects was indicated by Model 6 with all variables. Similarly to the VV, none of the grievance mobilization models performed well for the ANO2011. Model 1 explained only 2% and Model 2 only 11% of the amount of inter-regional variance of its electoral support.

The electoral gains of ANO2011 increased with higher concentrations of college graduates and, even more strongly, with lower concentrations of retired persons. Similarly to the VV, Model 3 performed poorly in the case of ANO2011. In contrast, once again consistently with VV’s results, inter-regional variation of support for the ANO2011 was best explained by Model 4 which controlled for the effects of contextual variables (16%). Sudetenland granted the movement an average margin of 0.97% more votes than the remaining regions, and the effects of the other variable were even more pronounced – ANO2011’s vote share in Moravia fell behind by an average margin of 1.76%. There was a positive but weak relationship between the electoral gains of ANO2011 and municipality size.

The full Model 6 indicates that the inter-regional variation of ANO2011 support does not fully correspond with the assumptions of grievance mobilization theory. As hypothesized, the movement obtained more votes in regions struck by higher unemployment, with larger populations of ghettoized Roma, and with higher concentrations of immigrants; all these factors partially (not fully) overlapped with the contextual variable of Sudetenland (see map of ANO2011 electoral support in Annex 2), i.e. areas that are often affected by major structural disadvantages. The effects of self-employment were not in the expected direction. This is probably because the ANO2011 did not exclusively target protest voters affected by economic grievances, as also suggested by its stronger gains in areas with higher levels of education and urbanization as well as among younger voters. However, the contextual variables related to the two pairs of Czech macroregions were the strongest predictors of ANO2011’s vote share. Compared to Model 4, the full Model 6 indicates slightly weaker effects of these variables, but still, the movement obtained an average margin of 0.74% more votes in Sudetenland and 1.50% fewer votes in Moravia.

In the case of the Dawn, the economic grievance model once again performed poorly, with only 7% of explained variance in the dependent variable (Model 1), although its explanatory power was markedly higher than for the VV and ANO2011. Compared to these two parties, the success of the Dawn in areas with higher unemployment was much more outstanding. Self-employment also had a positive but very weak effect on support for the Dawn. Different results were yielded by Model 2 with regard to ethnic grievance mobilization. As expected, the Dawn was relatively more successful in areas
with higher populations of ghettoized Roma, yet in contrast, its electoral support declined with growing number of immigrants. The combined grievance model (Model 5) indicated the same direction of relationship for these variables, only with higher amounts of variance explained (12%).

Table 2: Effects on voting for the ANO2011, OLS regression analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>-0.318</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudetenland</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravia</td>
<td>-1.764</td>
<td>-0.338</td>
<td>-1.503</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>14.492</td>
<td>17.609</td>
<td>23.515</td>
<td>18.523</td>
<td>12.520</td>
<td>15.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ČSÚ – Veřejná databáze, GAC 2006, SLDB 2011; own calculations.
Note: B: unstandardized regression coefficients, Beta: standardized regression coefficients.

With regard to the other variables, the Dawn had strongly under-average electoral gains in areas with more college graduates and with more seniors, but the percentage of explained variance was again very low (Model 3). Similarly to the above parties, the contextual factors were the best predictors of electoral support for the Dawn, with 14% of total variance explained in Model 4 (only Model 6 with all variables performed even better). Voters in Sudetenland were more likely to vote for the Dawn (by an average margin of 0.96% more votes than the rest of the country). Moravia, where the above two parties had under-average gains, was the strongest predictor of electoral support for the Dawn, with Bohemia falling behind by an average margin of 1.14%. As indicated by the map of electoral support in Annex 3, the core of the Dawn’s constituency is found in the Zlín area, i.e. around the senatorial district carried in 2012 by Dawn’s chairman, Mr. Okamura. Other areas of high support are found in northern Moravia (between the Olomouc and Moravian-Silesian Regions) and, to a lesser extent, in north-eastern Bohemia (the Hradec Králové Region). The
effects of urbanization on support for the Dawn were positive but extremely weak.

Model 6 with all variables explained the highest amount of variance, 31\%, compared to 20\% for the VV and 19\% for the ANO2011. Consistently with previous results (and indicating an even stronger effect), Model 6 identified the most favourable context of electoral support for the Dawn in Moravia, which granted it an average margin of 1.90\% more votes than Bohemia. Sudetenland, too, was a favourable context, but with a margin of “only” 0.57\% more votes than the rest of the country (compared to 0.96\% in Model 4). Higher populations of ghettoized Roma and self-employed persons along with urbanization were also positively associated with the Dawn’s electoral gains. In contrast, it was more difficult for the Dawn to win support in areas with more college graduates, immigrants and seniors and, perhaps surprisingly, also in those struck by higher unemployment.

Table 3: Effects on voting for the Dawn, OLS regression analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Model 2 B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Model 3 B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Model 4 B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Model 5 B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Model 6 B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>–0.088</td>
<td>–0.137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>–0.282</td>
<td>–0.317</td>
<td>–0.243</td>
<td>–0.274</td>
<td>–0.179</td>
<td>–0.201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>–0.137</td>
<td>–0.217</td>
<td>–0.334</td>
<td>–0.529</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>–0.078</td>
<td>–0.062</td>
<td>–0.132</td>
<td>–0.104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudetenland</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravia</td>
<td>1.142</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>1.903</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ČSÚ – Veřejná databáze, GAC 2006, SLDB 2011; own calculations.
Note: B: unstandardized regression coefficients, Beta: standardized regression coefficients.

Concluding remarks and discussion

A radical change in the party system of the Czech Republic occurred with the electoral success of a number of new parties at the turn of the first and second decades of the 21st century. The goal of this study was to explain their success in the framework of grievance theory. Having chosen the aggregate level of
In this analysis, we analyzed territorial variation in a set of independent variables derived from grievance, with expected relationships between citizens’ protest behavior (not necessarily protest voting) and the frustrations and grievances felt by them. Given the limited availability of aggregate-level data, we tested two grievance mobilization models, one focusing on economic changes and the other on immigration/ethnic conflict. The regression equations for these models were controlled for additional independent variables identified by previous studies as important determinants of electoral behavior in the Czech Republic.

All in all, the predictive performance of the two grievance mobilization models was very weak. The economic model performed rather poorly in the cases of the VV and the ANO2011, and somewhat better in the case of the Dawn when it explained 7% of variance. Voter support for all three parties grew with unemployment as expected, but lower support in areas with higher self-employment was confirmed for the VV only. Moreover, in the cases of VV and the Dawn, the models with additional variables identified effects in the other direction than expected. The performance of the ethnic grievance mobilization models was only slightly better, with the amount of explained variance ranging between 9% (VV, the Dawn) and 11% (ANO2011). All three parties were more successful in areas with larger populations of Roma living in residential ghettos. The electoral gains of the ANO2011 and the VV were also stronger in regions with larger populations of immigrants, while the Dawn obtained fewer votes in these regions (but so did the VV when controlling for additional influences).

The performance of the model controlling for the effects of education and age structure was, too, rather poor. Larger populations of seniors meant fewer votes for all three parties. In contrast, areas with more college graduates granted fewer votes to the VV and the Dawn but more votes to the ANO2011. The models with the dichotomous contextual variables performed relatively well, with 14–16% of total variance explained. Sudetenland granted large margins of additional votes to each of the three parties; Moravia granted fewer votes to the VV and much fewer to the ANO2011, while it provided a stronghold for the Dawn (its vote share in Moravia was even higher than in Sudetenland).

Finally, the model with all variables distinguished between the parties analyzed on the basis of two criteria. Proximity between the VV and the Dawn was identified with regard to the effects of composite factors, and proximity between the VV and ANO2011 with regard to contextual factors. Both the VV and the Dawn obtained more votes in regions with higher self-employment and lower unemployment (both in contradiction to the economic grievance mobilization theory), larger Roma populations (especially the VV) but lower populations of immigrants, seniors and college graduates (especially the
Both parties enjoyed slightly higher electoral support in areas with higher levels of urbanization. The context of Sudetenland was strongly positively associated with electoral support for the VV (as the best single predictor of VV support). The VV was relatively unsuccessful in Moravia, while the Dawn won the highest margin of additional votes in that macroregion. There was a similarity between VV and ANO2011’s electorates in terms of higher support in Sudetenland and lower support in Moravia. In contrast, the electoral gains of ANO2011 grew both with higher self-employment and with higher unemployment, with larger populations of immigrants and ghettoized Roma, but also with larger populations of college graduates and smaller populations of seniors. The margin of extra votes obtained by the ANO2011 in Sudetenland was similar to that of the VV. In contrast, the margin of loss in Moravia was relatively high for the ANO2011 and rather small for the VV.

It must be noted that even in the best-performing models the amount of explained variance ranged only between 19% or 20% (ANO2011, VV) and 31% (the Dawn). Consequently, it is necessary to identify additional factors that explain the rise of these parties. The mostly ambiguous results of the economic grievance mobilization model suggest that such additional factors might include the structural characteristics that underlie the left-right cleavage in the Czech political system; here, aggregate-level analysis will be difficult given the traditionally socioeconomic nature of these characteristics. Therefore, future research might benefit from applying the theoretical framework of grievance mobilization on individual-level survey data. At the individual level of analysis, one might also test the dimension of political grievances, which is extremely difficult or simply impossible to operationalize at the aggregate level. For example, individual-level analysis by Linek identified the key motive behind voting for the VV in 2010 in voters’ trust and positive affects for its leader, Radek John; and these attitudes were closely associated with their political frustration, alienation from traditional political parties and perceptions of corruption as the most important social problem (cf. Linek 2012: 178-183). One can reasonably expect similar motives behind voting for the Dawn (led by Tomio Okamura) or ANO2011 (led by Andrej Babiš).

Thus, it is precisely the failure to identify adequate structural factors behind voting for the VV, the ANO2011 and the Dawn that may have caused the relatively poor performance of the grievance mobilization models. In addition, the inter-regional variation of support for all three parties ranks among the lowest of all Czech parties (this is especially the case of the VV and the ANO2011, and much less of the Dawn; see Annex 4). This lends additional support to the assumption of weaker effects of structural factors on these parties’ electoral support in inter-regional comparison. Recall that the Czech
Republic has a relatively small immigrant population and, thus far, none of the major parties has devoted any substantial effort to politicizing immigration issues. This deficit of anti-immigrant sentiment has been somewhat “compensated” by their anti-Gypsy rhetoric (with the exception of the ANO2011), which is reflected in the results of the regression models. Indeed, the Dawn’s campaign before the 2014 European elections was the very first instance of open mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, its electoral failure suggests (with some uncertainty due to the extremely low voter turnout of 18.20%) that the mobilization potential of immigration issues for Czech voters is not strong enough to guarantee electoral success to a party that plays the anti-immigrant card to define an important part of its identity.

As another interesting avenue of future research, we recommend increased emphasis on the effects of the spatial context in which voting decisions are made. These effects may become more important at times of weakening party identification, increasing volatility and, as demonstrated by our study, relatively weak effects of structural factors on support for the new parties.\(^{18}\) These factors may give them an initial advantage in voter mobilization but, as the fate of the VV informs us, they may also pose a threat to their long-term sustainability. Thorough examination of the spatial context would require a rather different set of methods. As we are reminded by Bernard and Kostelecký, aggregate-level analysis cannot tell us if the spatial variation in electoral behaviour is merely a composite effect of individual-level context factors, or if it is, when controlling for individual-level characteristics, also shaped by the social characteristics of geographical units. Regression analysis as a probabilistic method aims to identify causal effects of isolated independent variables that help explain variation in the dependent variable. As such, it remains mostly unable to analyse causal chains that mediate the effects of spatial differentiation of context on individual voter behaviour (Bernard – Kostelecký 2014: 21-22).\(^{19}\) There are other methods that appear more suitable for the analysis of contextual effects. Mostly qualitative in nature, these methods assess the contexts in which the causal chains are at play in each unique case. Configurative analysis methods such as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) or its more recent version, fuzzy sets QCA (fs/QCA) help us reveal configurations (combinations) of causes (independent variables) that represent either sufficient or necessary

---

\(^{18}\) Whereas electoral volatility had been decreasing since the middle of the 90's, the 2010 and 2013 elections marked a significant increase in electoral volatility stemming from support for new parties and party switching within the blocks of left-wing and non-left-wing parties (Linek 2014).

\(^{19}\) On the other hand, some Czech studies demonstrated the fact that regional effects on electoral behaviour are very weak and unstable in time, when controlled for individual-level variables (Smith – Matějů 2011). Similarly, Gary King argued that the identified contextual effects are merely a function of poorly defined structural variables, and spatial variance in parameters might largely disappear after including additional variables (King 1996).
conditions for explaining the existence or absence of a given effect (dependent variable). This empirical approach treats individual causes (independent variables) as necessary but insufficient conditions, and combinations thereof as not necessary but sufficient conditions for the effect explained to occur. Both QCA and fs/QCA rely on the same causality assumptions as most other qualitative methods, in particular path dependence, effects of interactions or diffusion between cases, strategic interaction, asymmetrical causality, equifinality (different combinations of causes lead to the same result), or multifinality (the same cause leads to different results) (cf. Kouba 2011).

In the next step of any such qualitative study based on configurative analysis, one could make complementary use of a set of novel statistical methods referred to as exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA). The strength of ESDA lies in local exploration for the purposes of assessing the mutual relationship between election outcomes and any independent variables of interest. It shows us, for example, whether the expected relationships are identical for all parts of the territory – a question which cannot be answered through standard statistical methods. Here, one can use innovative techniques such as geographically weighted regression (GWR) to control for spatial interaction, i.e., the spatial relationships between the variables (cf., e.g., Shin – Agnew 2011 or, for the Czech context, Maškarinec 2014).

Our study has demonstrated that the effects of selected independent variables on electoral support for the new parties are not always in the expected direction, compared to traditional Czech parties. To simplify the argument, every traditional party has its constituencies both in Bohemia and in Moravia, while the spatial patterns of support for the new parties can be expected to differ substantially between the two macroregions. Future research thus should build on, e.g., Lyons and Linek (2010) who identified four local political cultures which go across the borders Bohemia and Moravia, and try to produce an accurate socio-political map of the Czech Republic taking into account the transformation of voter behaviour after the two ‘electoral earthquakes’ which took place in the last two parliamentary elections.

Pavel Maškarinec is assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem. He specializes on electoral geography, spatial analysis of elections, quantitative research of electoral behaviour and electoral systems,

---

20 In a pioneering application of fs/QCA on electoral behaviour in the Czech Republic, Kouba demonstrated the importance of contextual differences for better understanding the spatial patterns of high electoral support for the KSČM (cf. Kouba 2008: 15-21).
and he also studies the ways party systems are shaped by these phenomena, especially in countries of Central Europe, Scandinavia and Asia.

Petr Bláha is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Civil Society Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Charles University in Prague. His research interests include social movements, subcultures, political extremism and protest, as well as their intersections with electoral studies.

REFERENCES


CARTER, E., 2005: The extreme right in Western Europe: Success or failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press.


CVVM, 2005: Náš vztah k jiným národům a národnostem. Praha: Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Sociologický ústav AV ČR.


KOUBA, K., 2007: Prostorová analýza českého stranického systému. Institucionalizace a prostorové režimy. Sociologický časopis 43, č. 5, s. 1017-1037.

LINEK, L., 2010: Zrazení snu? Struktura a dynamika postojů k politickému režimu a jeho institucím a jejich důsledky. Praha: SLON.


Annexes

Annex 1: **Electoral support for the VV – Chamber of Deputies, 2010** (vote share in per cent, quartiles)

Sources: ČSÚ – Veřejná databáze, own map.

Annex 2: **Electoral support for the ANO2011 – Chamber of Deputies, 2013** (vote share in per cent, quartiles)

Sources: ČSÚ – Veřejná databáze, own map.
(vote share in per cent, quartiles)

Sources: ČSÚ – Veřejná databáze, own map.

Annex 4: Regional variation of electoral support – Chamber of Deputies,
2006 – 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ČSSD</td>
<td>32.32</td>
<td>12.85</td>
<td>22.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>35.38</td>
<td>18.42</td>
<td>20.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSČM</td>
<td>12.81</td>
<td>22.80</td>
<td>11.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU-ČSL</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>53.54</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>24.93</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOP09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANO2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ČSÚ – Veřejná databáze, own calculations.
Note: CV: coefficient of variation (%).