Messy utopianism and the question of war: What does "staying with the trouble" mean in relation to war?

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Donna Haraway. P. M. Utopianism. Speculative utopia. Dualism. Anarchism. War.

Donna Haraway's formula "staying with the trouble" frequently appears in discourses concerned with ecological catastrophe. Despite their ostentatious rejection of utopian thinking, Haraway and like-minded thinkers tend to consider messiness, tension or even conflict as antithetical to their ideal state of (no longer only human) society. A cultivation of a specific life-promoting and enabling messiness and ambiguity, however, is essential for nourishing new forms of a minoritarian, "messy" utopianism. This article reflects on contemporary utopianism's relation to war: do contemporary utopias address war explicitly or implicitly? In this context, *bolo'bolo* (1983), written by sci-fi author and anarchist P. M. (a pseudonym of Hans Widmer), can serve as a helpful reference. This speculative utopia sketches out a different relation to conflict and its underlying presumptions of stately order, property, control and subjective self-determination. It proposes to conceive of violence as something *not* akin to war and thus offers a welcome alternative to simplistic notions of a "natural state", in which humans are determined either by a bellicose or a peaceful inclination. This approach fills important gaps in the discussion of no-longer-modern utopianisms.

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Donna Haraway's seminal monograph *Staying with the Trouble* (2016) ends with the fictional chapter "The Camille Stories: Children of Compost" (134–168), outlining a no-longer-modern utopianism that breaks with contemporary readers' commonsensical associations regarding the utopian imagination. Whereas most modern concepts of utopia, from Thomas More to Immanuel Kant through to Le Corbusier, see the world as dominated by rectangular order, transparency, liberal self-determination and peace, things are not so clear with the formula "staying with the trouble", from which the book also takes its title. Proposing a "messy utopianism" (Jörg and Weber 2023) that builds on inspirations from micro-biology, quantum physics and chaos theory, Haraway and like-minded thinkers are much closer to an idea of utopia that does not see mess, tension or even conflict as antithetical to an ideal state of a society that extends beyond the exclusively human realm. As interconnectedness and entanglement have become the focus of attention for ecologically-minded thinkers, the ideal of clear-cut separations and of orderliness at large appear no longer as desirable, but rather as part of a mindset that caused the ecologically precarious situation we find ourselves in. The cultivation of a specific vitally nourishing and enabling messiness inspires new forms of – as yet minoritarian – utopianism. One of Haraway's central points is her rejection of dualisms, arguing that this type of world-making has "finally become unavailable to think with, [it is] truly no longer thinkable" (2016, 5). Significantly, Haraway rejects dualisms not on moral or political, but on ontological grounds.

In this article, I reflect on this messy utopianism's relation to war. Does a messy utopia cling to an idea of Eternal Peace that is reminiscent of modern visions such as Kant's? Do contemporary utopias address war explicitly or implicitly? Since Haraway's own sources, such as the "The Camille Stories" or the work of Ursula K. Le Guin, contain rather little on the subject, I will draw from the 1983 anarchist utopia *bolo'bolo*, written by sci-fi author and anarchist P. M. (the pseudonym of Hans Widmer). As I will show, this speculative utopia is congenial to Haraway by offering a "posthumanism" avant la lettre and has the advantage of sketching out a different relation to conflict and its underlying presumptions of stately order, property, control and subjective self-determination. *bolo'bolo* proposes to conceive of violence as something *not* akin to war and thus offers a welcome alternative to simplistic notions of a "natural state", in which humans are determined either by a bellicose or a peaceful inclination. This approach helps to address the blind spots of many no-longer-modern utopianisms. Inspired by P. M.'s genre mix between underground novel and political treatise, the current article critically questions the modern dualism of war and peace as well as its regulative ideal of Eternal Peace. The central question is if the dichotomy between Eternal Peace and war-like normality reproduces a modern dualism that is analogous to dichotomies such as *mind/body* or *male/female*, which were already subjected to critical evaluation in the past. In contemporary progressive

discourses such as posthumanism, new materialism, and speculative ecosophy, as well as queer and postcolonial discourses, it is common currency to reject dualisms such as *nature/culture*, *body/mind* and *woman/man*. Does this also apply to the hierarchical dualism of *peace* and *war*? Would we feel equally comfortable with dethroning *peace* as opposed to *war*, as we are with dethroning the prevalence of *culture* over *nature*, the *mind* over the *body*, the *male* over the *female*? To connect this question to Haraway's formula, this article wants to ask: what does "staying with the trouble" mean in relation to war?

THE SEDUCTIVE IDOL OF ETERNAL PEACE

Peace has always been a central part of modern utopianism. In the European context, this ideal was canonized by humanist Enlightenment philosophers prior to the French Revolution, then popularized by Kant's famous essay *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (1795; Eng. trans. "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", 2006). As Bernd Hüppauf points out, this concept is rooted in the unflinching analysis of Thomas Hobbes's "war of all against all" as a natural state that needs to be reined in by larger stately entities, the legitimate, "civilized" agents of war (2013, 115.). Eternal Peace is the logical conclusion of a very modern desire for stately order that can only be attained by the prevalence of *culture* and *reason*. This modern pacifism is closely linked to the dualism of *nature/culture*, as war is associated with the base, lowly and "natural" elements of humanity, and considered as driven by brutal and primitive desires that can only be put in check by the development of culture and civilization (120–122). According to this modern mindset, "the ideal state would, of course, be a community of humans who have subjected their instincts to the dictatorship of reason" as in Sigmund Freud's condensed description of utopian pacifism in his 1932 letter to Albert Einstein, "Why War?" (Einstein and Freud 2005, 43).[2] Freud further specifies that "everything that promotes the development of culture is also working against war" (47).[3] *Culture* needs to prevail over *nature*, *reason* over the instincts and drives of lower human desire to give way to Eternal Peace – this is the central argument of modern utopian pacifism.

Arguably, this type of pacifism also has a dark side to it. While Eternal Peace represents an ideal that every sane, civilized and cultured person aspires to, it is premised on a dualism that can only see peace as a process of *culture* as opposed to *nature*. Consequently, we must first bring the values of *culture* (read: *our culture*) to lesser developed political entities that are perceived as threatening our civilized political order. There is a quite violent imperial logic woven into modern utopian pacifism that is hardly ever explicitly stated, but which periodically resurfaces when war efforts are legitimized by "maintaining the balance of power" and keeping "terrorist states", "dictatorships" or the "axis of evil" in check, to just name a few of the pejorative terms that are mobilized in this modern framework. Indeed, Freud's analysis of the psychological drives of war acknowledges this aspect by stating that "as paradoxical as it sounds, one has to admit that war might be an apt means to produce the longed for 'eternal' peace, because war is capable to bring forth those large entities within which a strong central power can make further wars impossible" (33).[4] Ac-

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cording to this paradigmatic defense of modern utopian pacifism, "the sound pre-vention of wars is only possible if humans agree on the installment of a central power, to which the judgement in all conflicts of interest is transferred"[5] (33). Following this logic, a plurality of cultures, peoples and types of government must submit to the rule of law by a strong central power or *Zentralgewalt*.[6] This is in order to tame and check the Hobbesian "war of all against all", which Freud also identifies as the natural state of humanity, moreover stating that not all human cultures are equally fit to advance such Eternal Peace. He embraces a tellingly Eurocentric perspective by stating that "the Mongols and Turks have only wrought disaster" by installing centralized power structures (33).[7] Meanwhile, Roman and French imperialism are considered para-gons of a humanist venture for Eternal Peace. The fact that both have created war machines that outmatch their Eastern equivalents does not seem to worry Freud. This is reminiscent of how today's US-American imperialism draws much less scru-tiny than Russia's or China's, especially in Western media outlets or in supranational institutions such as the UN or the EU.

Thus, the core concept of modern utopian pacifism – Eternal Peace – is not only premised on difficult ontological presumptions such as the *nature/culture*-dualism, but it is a problematic idol in itself. Its vision of total global peace entails the kind of homogenization that subjects the planet to one common law and norm. As his-tory has shown time and time again (for example in British, American, German, or Japanese imperialism), to insist on one true principle leads to a proliferation of war rather than Eternal Peace. Every culture champions this ideal, but every culture also wants to be the central agent that enacts said peace, thereby representing the peak of so called "civilized" humanity. As a consequence, the elusive ideal leads to ever more conflicts between blocks of states that see themselves as chosen civilizations to bring Eternal Peace to the world. I thus argue that the idol of Eternal Peace is in-trinsically *seductive*: it lures us with an idea that is almost impossible to reject. For who would seriously claim that Eternal Peace is the wrong aim to pursue? Yet its modern ontological footings and presuppositions entail the proliferation of war and armed conflict. It is not far-fetched to claim that Kant's secular concept of Eternal Peace shares many traits of Christianity's transcendent heaven, in which the supreme power of God assures Eternal Peace. Countless wars have been fought in the name of both ideas.

"STAYING WITH THE TROUBLE" – WITH PEACEFUL INTENT

The concept of Eternal Peace comes with political as well as ontological signif-icance. Haraway's rejection of dualisms is inspired by multi-disciplinary sources, ranging from Lynn Margulis's "microbial turn" (1999) to Karen Barad's philosophi-cal analysis of Bohrian quantum physics (2007) through to Isabelle Stengers's refor-mulation (1995; 1996; 2004) of what can be called a "new materialist" philosophy of science in a Whiteheadian tradition. Moreover, her skepticism also tunes in with Bruno Latour's description of scientific and technological research (Latour 2002; 2004). They all share an awareness of the lacking adaptability of modern dualisms to current scientific world views. These dualisms are not wrong in the strict sense,

but simply cannot address the true complexity of the material and social world in the 21st century. According to Alfred North Whitehead, whose early pragmatist ventures matter deeply for the abovementioned authors, dualisms are simplifying abstractions: "In one sense the abstraction has been a happy one, in that it has allowed the simplest things to be considered first, for about ten generations" (2010, 154). But in what has been sometimes called the "Anthropocene", these abstractions lack the exactitude and detail required for a truly planetary and more than human society.

This pragmatist view of modern dualisms is helpful in dispensing with the excessively simplistic mode of moralistic condemnation ("you are wrong – in the moral sense – to use dualisms") to a more nuanced and affirmative position of complexity as in: "I understand why you use these dualisms but I think you are not helping yourself in sticking with them and their abstractions to really attain the goal you profess to want to attain (e.g. understanding, clarity, …)". To this end, Haraway found a very useful slogan to encourage thinking actively and engaged in times of catastrophe: "staying with the trouble". To neatly separate the world into one sphere of *nature* and one of *culture*, into *mind* and *body*, *male* and *female* etc. not only has a certain allure (due to its conceptual clarity), but can also advance understanding to a certain degree. However, for a deeper and more ecological understanding of how thinking and acting emerges out of specific environmental situations, it becomes an obstacle that can do more harm than good.

My reading and critiquing of modern utopian pacifism should be understood in this vein: by highlighting the imperialist and exclusivist innuendo of Eternal Peace, I do not want to condemn anybody who would cling to its ideal of pacifism. Much rather, the idea is to point out that – as much as I understand and share the desire it is motivated by – the tools and ontological presuppositions of modern utopian pacifism are simply not refined and well-tailored enough to achieve a more peaceful, friendlier, and more open world (or worlds). Indeed, to go one step further, I propose that an ethics of "staying with the trouble" can shape a pacifism to come that is less burdened by the modern tradition – most significantly, its tendency to enforce a Zentralgewalt to quell any trouble for all time – and thereby prolonging a Eurocentric logic of dualistic rationalism, suppression and block-building.

BOLO'BOLO – DARING TO SPECULATE ABOUT A PLANETARY UTOPIA WHILE REMAINING MESSY

In order to develop this positively "troublesome" politics of war, P. M.'s *bolo'bolo* can serve as an apt example to sketch utopian worlds that are freed from this fatal logic of modern utopian pacifism and its necessity for a Zentralgewalt. This pick may seem somewhat eclectic, as there exists a vast array of ecologically-minded utopias, starting with Ernest Callenbach's *Ecotopia* (1975) to today's sinister variants, for example Michelle O'Brian and Eman Abdelhadi's *Everything for Everyone: An Oral History of the New York Commune 2052–2072* (2022) or Peter Gelderloos's *The Solutions Are Already There* (2022). These all address the question of war in one way or the other. However, *bolo'bolo*'s weird hybrid style of political tractatus and sci-fi

utopia envisions a radically mutualist anarchist utopia that is particularly useful for the purpose of this article.

In the "messy utopia" of *bolo' bolo*, the planet is dotted with a myriad of little islands of autonomy that can develop according to their desires and needs. In this sketch of joyful life under conditions of a "messy utopia", central powers or larger political blocks have disappeared. Instead, so-called *bolos*, small scale social units, are home to 100 to 500 individuals, who the text refers to as *ibus*, another one of P. M.'s many neologisms.[8] Since "bolo' bolo is not a uniform system, but a patchwork of small worlds" (P. M. 2015, 66),[9] each *bolo*'s degree of individualism or collectivity is determined by its inhabitants and limited only by the need for self-sufficiency and hospitality: "Every ibu can find the bolo that suits them, transform it or start a new one" (79).[10] In this world of *bolo'bolo*, a community of car enthusiasts can coexist alongside organic farmers or yogis – every *bolo* can live and develop their own idea of a good culture or civilization without having to fear intervention from above, simply because there is no "above". All larger associations are voluntary, such as the organization of train lines, health care, the trade for specific local goods, committees for global understanding and communication, or solidarity aid in times of catastrophes. The main goal is

> the expression of typical productive passions of a *bolo*. Productive passions are in turn directly linked to a *bolo*'s cultural identity. There might be painter-*bolos*, shoemaker-*bolos*, guitar-*bo-los*, clothing-*bolos*, leather-*bolos*, electronics-*bolos*, dance-*bolos*, woodcutting-*bolos*, mechanics *bolos*, aeroplane-*bolos*, book-*bolos*, photography-*bolos*, etc. Certain *bolos* won't specialize and will do many different things, others would reduce the production and use of many things to a minimum (Tao-*bolo*). (2011, 96)

bolo'bolo reads like a planet Earth in which the community of biohackers mentioned in Haraway's "The Camille Stories" aside from millions of other bolos find their joyful and mutualistic co-existence without interference from others. This global frame of P. M.'s messy utopian sketch is helpful for a political philosophy of war because the "outside", the origin of warlike aggression, tends to be neglected in messy utopian stories. For example, "The Camille Stories" take place in a small, limited space of autonomy that is surrounded by a vague, presumably hostile or indifferent environment.[11] Although there is little mention of the state of the world at large, one might imagine this little biohacker bubble as embedded in a world comparable to the one in Octavia Butler's *Parable of the Sower* (1993), in which clans fight over the last resources and fertile lands of the planet.

In contrast to Haraway, *bolo' bolo* is a utopia that professes to work only when realized on a global scale: "Planetary substruction from the beginning is a precondition for the success of the strategy that leads to bolo'bolo. If bolo'bolo remains just the spleen of a single country or region, it's lost; it will become just another impulse for 'development'" (2011, 67). Since the current modern capitalist order "has a planetary character, a successful bolo'bolo strategy must also be planetary from the outset. Purely local, regional or even national [strategies] will never be sufficient to paralyze [it] as a whole" (65). However, since the world of *bolo' bolo* is a messy utopia nevertheless, it cannot provide a coherent master plan reminiscent of Leninist planning;

instead, the book consciously avoids specific information on how a worldwide community of *bolos* can be achieved: "Bolo'bolo is an attempt to formulate a planetary project in a few basic outlines. […] It is a snapshot of our (my?) current desires and today's assessment of the 'technical/biological' limits. In many respects the limits will be too narrow, in others the wishes too extravagant" (2015, 55).[12]

This is why *bolo'bolo* is written in a hybrid form of speculation and political treatise. Its daring move to speculate about the whole planet under the condition of a messy, unimposing utopia comes at the price of concrete information on how such a state can be achieved. But this ambiguity contrasts positively with Haraway's "Camillie Stories" by moving beyond the confined space of utopian islands to formulate a vision of complex peace in no-longer-modern terms. This utopia is thus true to its etymology of being a "non-place": it can be read as a "regulative idea" for political thinking today that can inspire philosophical reformulations of what the political means. According to, such politics will also help the global peace movement "simply because they're not primarily interested in 'peace', but because they've got a common, positive project" (2011, 69) of different world-building and -inhabiting.

YAKA & IBU – LETTING THE TROUBLE FLOW FREE FROM NECESSITY

Evidently, the world of *bolo'bolo* is neither trouble-free nor void of conflict. There is even a joking reference about a hypothetical bolo in which psychopaths come together to build an atomic bomb to annihilate the world (199). In a world without central power or justice apparatus, nobody would be able to stop them. Yet there is the argument that the development of such a highly complex technological object – alongside nuclear plants, massive damns etc. – is unlikely in such a joyfully fragmented world. After all, only the centralized power of the state can enforce the necessary concentration of work, capital, focus and resources for such large-scale infrastructural projects.

This special kind of "laissez faire"-attitude is characteristic of *bolo'bolo* and its underlying ontology of a sympoetic planet that is not hostile and warlike, but brings forth a myriad of colorful life-worlds. Hereby, P. M.'s vision offers an original "posthumanist" critique of the "state of nature" avant la lettre and reframes the question of war in a more nuanced way. Contrary to mutualist anarchist predecessors, such as Pyotr Alexeyevich Kropotkin (1976), this vision takes a planetary perspective while refusing to subscribe to the simplistic idea that humans are peaceful and harmonious "by nature". In *bolo'bolo*, there is plenty of room for conflict, for example when armed battles result in an activity that could indeed be called "war". P. M. devotes an entire chapter to so-called *yaka* (2015, 173), in which he offers a critique of humanism in a true posthumanist fashion. He criticizes the central modern notion of "the human" in such a fundamental way that its overcoming is presented as one of the necessary preconditions for the prevention of full-scale war. P. M. replaces the fraught term "the human" by addressing the individual as *ibus*:

> Since the ibu has emerged, we've gotten rid of "the human", and, luckily, gotten rid
> at the same time of all those questions like: is "the human" violent or non-violent, is he

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"good" or "bad" by "nature" (we've gotten rid of "nature" too). All these definitions of that strange being called "the human" – particularly the humanist, positive ones – have always had catastrophic consequences. Someone always didn't fit into these well-intentioned definitions and had to be collected in camps for the purpose of re-education, correction, and so on. (2015, 197)[13]

P. M. rejects the notion of a natural state of both the world and humans, identifying it as a source of conflict, exploitation, eradication, normalization and large scale wars. Like many contemporary posthumanists (Cavazza 2014; Debaise 2017; Morton 2009; Latour 2004; Stengers 1995), he rejects *nature* – or Nature with a capital N – to liberate our political thinking from the preconception that the desire for violence and destruction ("Gewaltlust") is the source of war that requires suppression by reason, culture state and a central power. To the contrary, Widmer affirms that this violent desire exists in every *ibu*:

> It is unfair when this lust for violence is decried as the seed of war. War is much more likely to arise from mass suppression of violence. As a bureaucratic, faceless nuclear disinfection (neutron bomb), war has absolutely nothing to do with violence and hatred. Feelings would only hinder the technicians and officials of modern war in their work. War does not result from a logic of violence, but from the logic of the state and the economy. (P. M. 2015, 197–198)[14]

This passage is central, for it moves our reasoning on war to a completely different plane: in contrast to modern utopian pacifism, according to which the state is the necessary precondition to tame the dormant violence of human animals, *bolo'bolo* considers the state's taming of violence as the cause of war. In short, violence is integral to the human, its suppression leads to war. In this anthropology, the human animal is violent, though "perhaps not by 'nature', but simply because it likes it. It can find pleasure in personal, painful, direct contact" (197–198).[15] There is no clean utopian state that is free of violence, neither in primordial nature nor in a political order. Violence and conflict can and will occur – *trouble will remain*.

P. M. considers the state and the capitalist lifestyle as the main cause that, after subjecting individuals to alienation, frustration, anger and conflict, can lead to catastrophic war. But in doing away with this toxic lifestyle in a utopian framework, *bolo'bolo* doesn't go as far to take the easy and trouble-free way of avoiding or eradicating the question of violence and war altogether. In the utopia of *bolo'bolo*, negative feelings will remain. But they will not escalate into catastrophic war because *yaka* provides socially framed and controlled outlets for the desire for violence that will prevent the alienation endemic to excessively rigid structures. By affirming violence and trouble as something that can happen, war will become less and less a necessary outlet for repressed drives and can escape the catastrophic logic of modern utopian pacifism.

CONCLUSION

A political position that applies the principle of "staying with the trouble" to war theory must abandon monocausal attributions of war to isolated factors, such as the state, patriarchy, violence, evil desires or instincts. Widmer somewhat provocatively writes: "if war is understood as a collective, direct act of violence, then yaka

only makes it possible again. Possible because it is unnecessary and therefore cannot become catastrophic"[16] (198). Since the trouble that leads to war cannot be eradicated, my approach understands war as a political result that does not primary emerge from any so called "natural" desires (which have always been a mere speculation and projection of the current state of affairs onto an imagined past). Rather, the connotation of "war" as a catastrophic evil is rooted in the logics of state-thinking, turning necessary conflicts into cold and deadly wars. In *bolo'bolo*, the Zentralgewalt, the ultimate panacea of modern utopian pacifism, is named as the main cause of conflicts turning into catastrophic full-scale wars. By centralizing and monopolizing violence, the Zentralgewalt requires the suppression of all other violent competitive desires in *ibus*, animals and humans, thereby inhibiting their free expression in forms that in fact contribute to colorful life-worlds and the flourishing of human culture and creativity. The neo-pacifist stance of "staying with the trouble" could thus be described as being based on a recognition of the existence of trouble and conflict in any state of affairs (natural, utopian, self-governed, stately, national, confederal) which tries to cultivate creative ways to transform troublesome desires into liberating outputs that prevent full-scale war.

In my view, the negation of monocausal necessity can pave the way to a new pacifism for our troublesome times. Simply by arguing for an abstract state of Eternal Peace will not help because it reproduces propositions that are part of a suppression of trouble that make the outburst of trouble catastrophically necessary. No matter how suppressed by central powers, trouble will always find ways to resurface. A philosophy of "staying with the trouble" in times of war affirms the courage not to reject conflict and violence universally, but places the focus on small scale solutions to political situations that escape overly broad and abstract concepts. If we understand war as an outlet for the more troublesome aspects of life, perhaps it will never end. This said, to dispense with simplistic positions is the precondition of reining in the Zentralgewalt that launches catastrophic wars – rather than encouraging *yaka*'s liberating force.

NOTES

[1] "It is nasty to decry violent desires as the root cause behind war." Unless otherwise stated, all translations by K. J.

[2] "Der ideale Zustand wäre natürlich eine Gemeinschaft von Menschen, die ihr Triebleben der Diktatur der Vernunft unterworfen haben."

[3] "Alles, was die Kulturentwicklung fördert, arbeitet auch gegen den Krieg."

[4] "so paradox es klingt, man muss doch zugestehen, der Krieg wäre kein ungeeignetes Mittel zur Herstellung des ersehnten 'ewigen' Friedens, weil er im Stande ist, jene großen Einheiten zu schaffen, innerhalb deren eine starke Zentralgewalt weitere Kriege unmöglich macht."

[5] "eine sichere Verhütung der Kriege ist nur möglich, wenn sich die Menschen zur Einsetzung einer Zentralgewalt einigen, welcher der Richterspruch in allen Interessenskonflikten übertragen wird."

[6] I am using the German original term here to emphasize the homonym "Gewalt", which signifies authority *and* violence.

[7] "Mongolen und Türken haben nur Unheil gebracht."

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8 Alongside "bolo" and "ibu", other neologisms include "yaka", "taku", "kana", "nima", "kodu" and "sibi". P. M. argues that in the world of *bolo'bolo*, the homogenization of languages, customs and life-forms will give way to a "pluralistic Totalitarianism" (2015, 184), allowing languages to branch off into uncountable dialects and sub-idioms. The basic names/concepts are considered the product of a basic linguistic set that can aid global understanding even in times of radical semantic and lingual pluralization.

9 "Bolo'bolo ist also kein einheitliches System, sondern ein Flickenteppich kleiner Welten". Please note that I am quoting from two different versions of *bolo'bolo*: from the original German text (using the 2015 edition), which I translate into English, and from the 2011 English translation. When the latter does not convey the original tone adequately, I offer my own original translation.

10 "Der Grad von Individualismus oder Kollektivität wird in jedem bolo von seinen Bewohnern selbst bestimmt und ist nur durch die Notwendigkeit der Selbstversorgung und die Gastfreundschaft beschränkt. […] Jedes ibu kann das für es passende bolo finden, umwandeln oder neu gründen".

11 This aspect leads Alf Hornborg (2017) to critique the complete absence of the material conditions of the bio-technological community in "The Camille Stories", a telling example for the lack of reflection on the role of capitalist techno-industry for this little utopian island. Accordingly, Haraway's vision features a dangerous myopia for global structures of exploitation and inequality. See also Jörg 2023.

12 "Es ist eine Momentaufnahme unserer (meiner?) augenblicklichen Wünsche und der heutigen Einschätzung der 'technisch/biologischen' Grenzen. in vielen Punkten werden die Grenzen zu eng gesteckt sein, in anderen die Wünsche zu extravagant. Bolo'bolo ist der Versuch, ein planetares Projekt in einigen Grundzügen zu formulieren.")

13 "Seit dem Auftauchen des ibu sind wir zum Glück auch den ‚Menschen' los und die Frage, ob dieser nun gut (= friedfertig) oder böse (= gewalttätig) von «Natur» (die ist auch nicht vorgesehen) aus ist. Die Definitionen des Menschen – vor allem die humanistischen – hatten nämlich bisher immer höchst katastrophale Folgen. Irgend jemand passte immer nicht in diese so gut gemeinten Definitionen und musste dann zwecks Umerziehung, Besserung usw. in Lagern gesammelt werden."

14 "Gemein ist es, wenn diese Gewaltlust als Keim des Krieges verschrien wird. Krieg entsteht viel eher aus massenhafter Gewaltunterdrückung. Er hat als bürokratische, gesichtslose nukleare Desinfektion (Neutronenbombe) mit Gewalt und Hass rein gar nichts mehr zu tun. Gefühle würden die Techniker und Beamten des modernen Krieges bei ihrer Arbeit nur behindern. Krieg ergibt sich nicht aus einer Gewaltlogik, sondern aus der Staats- und Wirtschaftslogik."

15 "vielleicht nicht von 'Natur' aus, aber einfach, weil es ihm gefällt. Es kann Lust an persönlicher, schmerzlicher, direkter Berührung finden."

16 "Wenn aber Kriege als eine kollektive, direkte Gewaltaktion verstanden wird, dann macht ihn yaka erst wieder möglich macht. Möglich, weil er unnötig ist und daher nicht katastrophal werden kann."

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