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Resilience as a Methodological Challenge for Axel Honneth's Critical Theory

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The objective of the study is to examine the methodological challenges that the concept of resilience presents to Axel Honneth's social theory as a representative of contemporary Critical Theory. The study concentrates on the concept of "immanent transcendence" as a pivotal methodological framework and examines its connections to resilience theory. In this context, initially based on social-ecological analyses, resilience becomes a more critical tool for understanding and managing (coping with) the uncertainties and complexities that characterize our era of polycrisis. The study posits that the cognitive turn associated with resilience theory can enrich the methodology of Critical Theory (in the formulation of Axel Honneth's social theory), allowing for a deeper reflection on the limitations of our knowledge and the inevitability of uncertainty.

Keywords: Axel Honneth – bounded rationality – complexity – Critical Theory – immanent transcendence – polycrisis – resilience – uncertainty

Introduction

From its inception, Critical Theory (aka the Frankfurt School), has engaged in a rigorous critique of problematic phenomena in human society. Influential figures within this movement, drawing inspiration from Karl Marx (one of the main predecessors to Critical Theory) and pragmatism, have explored the various ways in which social and economic inequality shape development and history. Thus, the overarching aim of Critical Theory has been to evaluate history with an eye toward the possibilities for the free and equitable development of society as a whole. Since its establishment in 1923, Critical Theory has significantly influenced other social sciences and humanities, in

terms of both specific research and methodology. Given the dynamic development of the world in recent decades, a pressing question is how Critical Theory has responded and can continue to respond to contemporary socially shared challenges in the situation of "polycrisis."[1] To do so, it must be equipped to navigate the inherent uncertainty, indeterminacy,[2] risk, and insecurity that define this complex environment.

Over the past few decades, the concept of resilience has gained prominence in the social sciences and humanities, and its usage has become increasingly prevalent in political practice and the public sphere. Within these contexts, the term "resilience" appears with various meanings, making it a prime example of an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1956). These different meanings arise not only from the various scientific disciplines in which the term is employed but also from the political implications of its use. Beyond its scientific origins, the concept of resilience has also found application in the political realm, with historical roots traceable to World War II, when resilience was recognized as a significant factor. Organizations such as the United Nations and other globally relevant political actors, including the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), have adopted resilience as a guiding principle in their sustainability policies (IPCC 2022; UN 2012). In this text, I will focus primarily on a conception of resilience that genealogically stems from socio-ecological analyses. This conceptualization can be provisionally defined as signaling a departure from modernist ontology and epistemology – which could be described as a cognitive turn or shift – in that it accepts the uncertain nature of the world and, consequently, the uncertainty inherent in its research (i.e., indeterminacy).

I find the socio-ecological approach to resilience thinking to be the most inspiring from both an ontological and methodological perspective for Critical Theory, as it offers a potential reinterpretation of the foundational premises of social and political theory. On the other hand, the aim of this text is not to provide a comprehensive account of the genealogy of the concept of resilience.

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[1] These challenges encompass the diverse manifestations of the crises currently threatening contemporary societies, which can collectively be described as manifestations of polycrisis (e.g. climate crisis, the political instability of democracy, or geopolitical rivalries).

[2] The concept of indeterminacy has a lengthy history in the field of philosophy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive account of this tradition. In this instance, I am employing the term in a more general sense, whereby it is defined in the Cambridge Dictionary as "the quality of being indeterminate; want of determinateness or definiteness" (Oxford English Dictionary 2023).

Instead, the goal of this study is to explore the potential impact of the cognitive turn associated with a particular interpretation of resilience on the methodology of Critical Theory. Given the potential scope of the study, this paper will concentrate on one contemporary approach: the critical social theory developed by Axel Honneth. In the first part of the text, I will focus on the key concept within Critical Theory that is crucial for its methodological delineation: the concept of immanent transcendence. I will explain the main aspects of this concept and its implications for the critical-theoretical understanding of social thought mainly in the context of Axel Honneth's critical social theory. The second part of the study examines the concept of resilience, particularly in an interpretation that seems to hold the greatest theoretical promise for social and political theory. This promise lies in the socio-ecological origins of the term "resilience," whose meaning directly addresses the multiplicity of problematic phenomena characteristic of the current situation of interlinked crises. The final part of the study offers a synthesizing perspective on resilience and its implications for Critical Theory.

I. Immanent Transcendence as a Basis for Critical Theory with Emphasis on Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition

Critical Theory, particularly as developed by Max Horkheimer, can be considered the intellectual dimension of the historical process of human emancipation (Habermas 1968; Horkheimer 1970). This emancipatory interest refers to the pursuit of a better world (or society) in which conditions are established to allow all people to achieve the free (self-)realization of their freely recognized potentials. Such self-realization then becomes the concern of specific individuals as concrete historical subjects. The emancipatory interest is grounded in a fundamental existential judgment "that human life is worth living, or rather can be and ought to be made worth living" (Marcuse 2007, XLI). For Critical Theory, this judgment represents the a priori foundation of social, political, or cultural theory. This definition of the basic vector of theoretical inquiry, which underlies the moral goals of critical-theoretical intellectual activity, can be regarded as an expression of the sphere of normativity. However, Critical Theory is not limited to a normative ideal of a better world. Unanchored normativity might devolve into a set of claims detached from reality, making them impractical for assessing social development due to their dependence on chance. Therefore, Critical Theory is also a materialist theory, grounded in empirical research conducted in a critical manner and guided by normative assumptions.

According to the founders of Critical Theory, traditional social theory shares a key characteristic with the natural sciences: the separation of its development from moral norms, adhering instead to a purely immanent scientific rationality that, in relation to other socially conditioned rationalities, can transform into irrationality (Habermas 1968; Horkheimer 1970). The first and second generations of Critical Theory sought to weaken this aspect. As a result, Critical Theory openly commits to evaluating social reality, integrating moral and normative considerations into its analysis. However, the main objective of this section is to examine the overlapping methodological foundations of contemporary Critical Theory, especially Axel Honneth's theory of recognition. I agree with Piet Strydom that the overlapping methodological concept of Critical Theory aligns with the concept of immanent transcendence (Strydom 2011). Therefore, I will analyze this concept and explore its implications for contemporary Critical Theory, with an emphasis on Honneth's social theory of recognition.

The fundamental tenet of Critical Theory is the ontological assumption that social reality is constituted through a continuous process of constitution, organization, transformation, and evolution, shaped by and shaping sociocultural forms. However, humans, as practical material beings, experience the world through their senses and represent it through cognition. Reality, being material, exerts a significant external influence on humans. The potential for humans to alter reality – essentially, to create the world – is then governed by the regulative or transcendental ideas of (their) reason. This is the concept of transcendence as defined in this context. It should be noted, however, that the transcendental ideas, which can serve as regulative ideas, are not in fact absolutely transcendent. Such concepts are invariably situated within specific historical and social contexts, thereby rendering them inherently constrained and limited. The question thus arises: how can these ideas be identified?

According to Axel Honneth's social theory (Honneth 1995, 2003a, 2003b), the identification of emancipatory interest within society can be reinforced by recognizing various forms of socially shared discontent (such as increases in depression, social movement activity, or the emergence of a new actor) or socially pathological phenomena. These issues are not always perceived or articulated by the actors or individuals concerned. Social pathologies can therefore be understood as manifestations of inherent relational tensions or contradictions between a given state of the world or phenomenon (i.e., immanence) and the possibility of overcoming it (i.e., transcendence), as viewed through the lens of reason. As previously stated, Honneth's work specifically addresses social pathologies, including those inherent to capitalism which he often analyzes also

as a form of social paradoxes (Hartmann – Honneth 2006). However, other authors have identified analogous key spaces of tension or strain, including the sphere of labor (Marx) or communication (Habermas). Immanent transcendence points to a more profound reality underlying empirical phenomena. The question thus arises: what does the dynamic of immanent transcendence actually entail?

According to the model of immanent transcendence, the world experienced by humans corresponds to a socio-historical situation characterized by three key levels. From the methodological perspective, the first level corresponds to socially shared normativity. By this, I refer to the level where immanently present conceptual postulates (presuppositions) are transformed into idealized forms of socially discursive constructions. In other words, this is the level where counterfactual models of societal organization are formed in the context of social life. These models manifest as cognitive cultural models, ideas of reason, regulatory ideas, counterfactuals, or various forms of the good. This transformation corresponds to the transition from socially shared normativity to the sphere of action, as these notions are subsequently structured into practices or social interactions. Ultimately, these social practices are crucial for the practical realization of the ideas of reason, influencing the organization of society, problem resolution, and the creation of the world.

As previously mentioned, representatives of Critical Theory often tailor this unified explanatory framework to a specific class of phenomena, identifying the key sphere where this dynamic is most evident. For Honneth, this is the domain of deeply rooted assumptions about social relations in the anthropologically rooted structural conditions of recognition. The main basis of Honneth's theory of society is the analysis of social movements' struggles and, at the same time, the concrete manifestations of social pathology. Therefore, his focus extends beyond the articulated forms of struggles to include forms of social suffering that may not yet be experienced by the actors themselves. As Honneth states:

> Social suffering and discontent possess a normative core. It is a matter of the disappointment or violation of normative expectations of society considered justified by those concerned. Thus, such feelings of discontent and suffering, insofar as they are designated as "social," coincide with the experience that society is doing something unjust, something unjustifiable.…Thus, when it comes to understanding the experience of social injustice categorially, the material horizons of expectation that make up the "material" of all public processes of justification must also be taken into account. For an institutional rule or measure that, in light

> of generally accepted grounds, violates deep-seated claims on the social order, is experienced as social injustice (Honneth 2003a, 129 – 130).

At the core of such experiences, then, is whether subjects feel validated in their personhood. In this way, Honneth grounds all potential forms of social suffering in the core of personhood by identifying as a starting point the very internalized normative order of society. This normative order serves as a subjective normative measure by which individuals assess the adequacy of actual institutional arrangements within society.

The indicated conceptual space of the principle, which fundamentally conditions social interactions (and thereby underpins society), can now be clearly identified as the principle of recognition. From the most banal forms of interaction to the most complex social institutions, the characteristics of social recognition are determined by the forms of mutual intersubjective relations. These relations consist of two key elements: the normative determinations of the expected reactions of individuals in certain situations and normative presuppositions of the actions of institutions. Failure to meet these expectations can then be described as a violation of the socially legitimate expectations associated with social interaction, i.e., misrecognition. Misrecognition serves as a fundamental motivating factor in social struggles within society. The experience of recognition is a fundamental aspect of social reality, and it is reasonable to attribute a certain degree of normative overlap to it. In this sense, recognition represents a form of transcendence within the immanent order. Honneth describes transcendence as "a normative potential that reemerges in every new social reality because it is so tightly fused to the structure of human interests" (Honneth 2003b, 244).

The recognition of legitimately expected forms of intersubjective interaction is the essence of Honneth's anthropology. Such recognition, at certain levels, provides a person with differentiated forms of self-relation. While Honneth singles out three forms of recognition in contemporary society (love, law, and achievement),[3] this does not mean that these forms fully encompass the entirety of social reality. It is clear that there are a plethora of different forms of normative expectations regarding subjective interaction, and

[3] Originally, Honneth considered solidarity to be the last sphere of recognition, but now, he works with the concept of achievement. The sociological and historical reasons for this shift are not uninteresting, but I do not have the space to address that issue here. Please see Honneth (1995, 92 – 130) and Honneth (2003a, 138 – 150).

even more forms of the experience of selfhood. Honneth attempts here to capture those forms of recognition that he considers crucial for our times.

II. Theory of Resilience as an Emerging Paradigm?

As I indicated in the introduction, the concept of resilience has multiple sources, both conceptual and historical, allowing for several different definitions.

> Resilience is a descriptive concept, and a boundary object, and an ideology, and a discourse, and a metaphor, and a governmental rationality, and a regime of truth, and an idiom, and… and… Resilience is all of these and more precisely because it is an abstract relation between humans, environments, and technologies that has been mobilized in specific contexts and debates to produce effects that we then attribute to a descriptive concept, or a boundary object, or an ideology, or a discourse, or a metaphor, or so forth (Grove 2018, 20 – 21).

In his work on the genealogy of resilience, Philippe Bourbeau demonstrates that understanding the concept's rising prominence requires an analysis of its nonlinear history (Bourbeau 2018). Within this framework, four primary sources of the term "resilience" stand out, corresponding to the scientific disciplines in which the concept has been utilized. These include psychology, social work, engineering, and notably also ecology or socio-ecological thinking. The objective of this text is to focus on the aforementioned genealogical trajectory of resilience as it pertains to socio-ecological thinking. Nevertheless, my approach to conceptualizing resilience entails a serious engagement with the subject matter rather than treating it as a mere ideological pretext for neoliberal practices (Folke 2016; Grove 2018; Walker – Salt 2006).

The situation of polycrisis vividly illustrates the profound complexity of the modern world. The transition from traditional society to modern society during the 19th and 20th centuries gradually revealed this complexity. While life in traditional societies, with its relative stability and constancy, led people to perceive the world as fundamentally slow-changing, the process of modernization dramatically accelerated this development. The history of sociological thought can be understood as an effort to comprehend this accelerated dynamic. By the last quarter of the 20th century, theories emerged that explicitly addressed uncertainty and risk (Beck 1992; Beck 1999; Beck – Giddens – Lash 2007). In his seminal work, *The Risk Society* (1992), Ulrich Beck showed the social manifestations of the unintended consequences of industrialization during the process of modernization. In his analysis, he posits that this period marked a shift in the nature of the

challenges threatening our societies. In contrast to concerns about scarcity and the fair distribution of wealth, the industrial nature of production gave rise to issues related to anxieties surrounding technological developments. In order to encapsulate this phenomenon, he initiated the utilization of the concept of risk. For example, these risks included the potential destruction of life due to the use of nuclear weapons and pollution as a side effect of industrialization. Consequently, risk became a pivotal concept, which significantly altered society's fundamental structure during the latter half of the 20th century. In addition to uncertainty, it can be argued that social risk is the second – and measurable – manifestation of indeterminacy, as Jacqueline Best (2008, 358 – 360) shows following Frank H. Knight and others.

History itself, therefore, has highlighted that the world is far less certain than previously assumed, characterized significantly by indeterminacy. The concept of resilience is rooted in fundamental experiences and offers insight into navigating crises and managing existing risks in this context. Given the inherent uncertainty of life and the tenuous nature of the relationships between individuals, communities or societies, and their environments, resilience can provide a set of tools for coping with crises. Relatedly, from a psychological perspective, resilience encompasses the capacity not only to endure but also to flourish in the aftermath of trauma (to "bounce back"). For these reasons, over the past two decades, resilience and resilience theory have permeated various fields, offering guidance for navigating situations characterized by uncertainty. Indeed, resilience conceptualizes these phenomena in an interconnected and complex manner, reframing the contemporary notion of progress within a more malleable framework that can accommodate uncertain future developments.

At this point, I build on David Chandler's distinction of knowledge (*epistemé*), which differentiates between three types: modernist or liberal, neoliberal, and a third type grounded in a more open interactive ontology of resilience (Chandler 2014, 48 – 51). The first of these, simply put, is based on the typically modern notion of the accumulation of knowledge. By contrast, in the neoliberal mode of knowledge, processes of determination that remain unknown are significant. The truly revolutionary mode, however, is the last one. Here, the crucial factor is that we cannot know all aspects of what is being studied, and moreover, we do not even know precisely what we do not know. According to Chandler, resilience theory attempts to address this reality by creating a new approach to understanding the complexity of the world.

The genealogy of this strand of resilience theory can be traced back to ecological studies, particularly the work of Canadian environmental scientist

C. S. Holling, who was one of the first to recognize that modern scientific models cannot always adequately answer research questions. Since the 1970s, Holling has pointed out that the world is so complex that it cannot be fully described.[4] He was concerned with linking systems theory and ecology, drawing attention to nonlinear dynamics in the evolution of relationships in systems. In 1973, he published a seminal study on resilience, showing that ecological systems can exist in multiple states of equilibrium. This work highlighted the shortcomings of linear thinking and worldviews (Holling 1973). In addition, systems have the ability to self-correct.

This fundamental and revolutionary reorientation of the scientific worldview echoes the work of American political theorist and cyberneticist Herbert Simon. Particularly significant in this context is his concept of bounded rationality, which is based on the assumption that the complexity of the world cannot be fully known. Simon critiques neoclassical economics and its assumptions about human beings and human action (Simon 1955, 1956). The main aspects of this possible cognitive or gnoseological turn involve a fundamental and deep acceptance of the world's complexity and intricacy or indeterminacy. The concept of bounded rationality is pivotal to understanding the limitations of our knowledge of the world. The fundamental aspect of the world is its inherent complexity. With this concept, Simon tried

> to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist (Simon 1955, 99).

The original thesis of bounded rationality is therefore rooted in an economic conception of human decision-making, which recognizes that humans do not and cannot have access to complete knowledge of all relevant information in their decision-making processes. Furthermore, people are often unaware of the precise extent and limitations of their knowledge. This thesis is prominent in economic thought, with extensive literature documenting its evolution (Klaes – Sent 2005; Sent 2018). Its primary implications for the general possibility of cognition are twofold: first, the world cannot be fully known, and second, knowledge is inherently limited. This disconcerting complexity arises from the

[4] Similarly, the genealogy of resilience is defined by Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper, who assert that this source of resilience is the most authentic. Please see Walker – Cooper (2011).

interconnected and ever-evolving nature of phenomena that constitute life and the world. Consequently, the truth is constrained by the action of bounded rationality and is connected to other similarly limited forms of knowledge.

Theory of resilience fundamentally respects the multiplicity of human experience and the diversity of world knowledge. This cognitive or gnoseological turn, which I believe is underway, carries far-reaching ethical and political implications. At the very least, it calls into question the organization of the human world based on sharply horizontal models of hierarchy or an excessive reliance on the state (or other robust institutional entities) as the primary or sole instrument of social organization. It turns out that resilient systems are those that are generally more likely to draw upon a multiplicity of experiences and diverse cognitive approaches. Consequently, the concept of resilience, which underpins a specific theory or mode of thinking about resilience itself, may offer a more nuanced understanding of reality that aligns better with the nature of reality than has been the case with modern notions based on the search for certainty and universal validity. Indeed, the polycrisis situation underscores that notions of an entirely predictable world, where errors in estimation are explained only by the absence of complete information, are no longer tenable.

Shortly, resilience serves as a framework for understanding and managing the inherent complexity and uncertainty of the world. It challenges traditional linear models of knowledge and underscores the importance of adaptability. The complexity of the world necessitates new approaches to knowledge, moving away from certainty towards a more dynamic, resilience-based understanding.

III. Some Remarks on the Consequences of Resilience for Critical Theory

As I showed in the first section of this text, the concept of immanent transcendence suggests that social reality is continuously shaped and reshaped by cultural forms, though these transformations are inherently limited by their historical and social contexts. Axel Honneth's theory of recognition illustrates this by emphasizing the role of socially shared discontent and social pathologies as indicators of underlying tensions between current societal states and the potential for their transcendence. Recognition, a central theme in Honneth's work, operates as a form of transcendence within the immanent order, driving social struggles and the realization of justice. Recognition is essential for validating personhood, forming the basis for social interactions and critical analysis in contemporary society.

If we seriously consider the fundamental aspects of the cognitive shift that emerges from resilience thinking, particularly as its elements can be identified in socio-ecological approaches, it may seem that the classical, modern definition of science is not fully prepared for the uncertainty and indeterminacy typical of the world. Indeed, the need to introduce the concept of resilience to social or ecological systems arises precisely from the need to distinguish between a system's ability to withstand crisis or change in an uncertain world (which, from a cognitive viewpoint, suffers from uncertainty and indeterminacy) and the mere concept of stability as the persistence of the system.

Nevertheless, it appears that Critical Theory diverges from the conventional characteristics of modern social science in this regard. By employing the concept of immanent transcendence, which is pivotal to its methodology, critical theorists acknowledge a certain degree of uncertainty. The social order is shaped by a complex web of underlying social norms and mechanisms that are often difficult to discern. These structures and mechanisms can be identified and understood in retrospect, but not with certainty in advance. The concept of immanent transcendence enables Critical Theory to grasp this reality provisionally as a type of bounded rationality. This is exemplified by Honneth's theory, where social injustice and suffering are identified even before they are fully articulated.

A somewhat distinct issue is that of uncertainty. This is particularly relevant when we extend its scope from the characterization of the world (ontological moment) to its cognition (epistemology). In this context, the application of resilient thinking – developed within the conceptual framework of social-ecological thinking or its impact on the methodology of social sciences – can facilitate Critical Theory in terms of self-reflection and the limitations of its own knowledge. This connection is closely linked to the concept of immanent transcendence. Notably, Critical Theory is inherently linked to the sphere of praxis. Scholars or scientists working within this tradition are not merely concerned with questions related to social reality; they naturally focus on problematic phenomena, such as social pathologies. The objective is not merely the acquisition of knowledge in and of itself, but rather the provision of knowledge that can offer the relevant actors or groups not only a diagnosis of their situation but also the illumination of a solution. As previously demonstrated, immanent transcendence, particularly Honneth's dynamics of intersubjective relations of recognition and disavowal, draws upon profound socially shared concepts regarding the organization of the world. Such considerations are not always explicitly articulated. Identifying these socially

shared patterns is sometimes a crucial part of cognition. A key objective of Honneth's social theory is to identify and analyze social pathologies.

However, Critical Theory may encounter difficulties at this juncture, as the endeavor to present a comprehensive phenomenology of coherent socially shared normative ideas (transcendence) may lead to uncertainty and indeterminacy. It is possible that an interpretation – even a comprehensive one – of a significant number of phenomena may ultimately prove to be erroneous, highlighting a potential pitfall of bounded rationality within the methodology of Critical Theory. One particularly illustrative example is the manner in which shared normativity operated within the context of communist ideology in the former Soviet Union. The regime demonstrably relied on a set of values based on consistent respect for equality, but this very reliance contributed to the rapid emergence of significant economic inequality in Russia following the USSR's collapse in the 1990s,[5] as insightfully observed by historian Walter Scheidel (2017, 213 – 231). It is evident that the identification of equality as a pivotal tenet of the Soviet system must have been superseded at some point, as it ultimately failed to exert a foundational influence on the societal world (agency and/or structure). A more general example may be the phenomena that sociology refers to as manifestations of unintended or unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. These forms of action include various situations where actors act according to their assessment of specific situations, which may not correspond to reality. This leads to the results of actors' actions that appear paradoxical or irrational (Merton 1936).

In essence, the objective is to propose that the gnoseological turn or shift associated with resilience thinking could serve as a further element for Critical Theory to incorporate into its methodology. How might this be the case? Resilience theory is characterized by a heightened sensitivity to the inherent uncertainty of knowledge and the unpredictability of societal, group, or individual developments. Such sensitivity can also be applied to analyses that employ empirical reflections of socially shared cultural patterns or norms.

Conclusion

The theory of resilience, derived from ecology and socio-ecological research, poses a significant challenge to the methodology of Axel Honneth's social

[5] As evidenced by the findings of the Credit Suisse Research Institute, the disparity in wealth distribution in Russia remains the most pronounced in the global context (Shorrocks – Davies – Lluberas 2021, 24).

theory, which is an example of contemporary Critical Theory (and social critique in general). The focus on examining the world, always inherently limited, diverges from the confident notion of what is or should be. Ideological representations of understanding the world and proposed solutions must be continually tested, with conclusions understood for their inherent limitations and contingencies. The danger that unintended or unexpected outcomes might arise during the realization of immanently shared ideas (in the transcendence of the actual) is far from negligible – quite the opposite. The uncertainty and indeterminacy of the world is a reality that traditional and modern conceptions of the world and knowledge have not adequately accounted for. At least in this sense, resilience thinking provides some improvements to this approach to social critique. A more detailed analysis of the individual components of the system (as a whole) necessitates a comprehensive yet nuanced critique that, in certain instances, may demand the abandonment of clear-cut and seemingly obvious answers. It is incumbent upon social science and social philosophy to prepare themselves to study phenomena that are paradoxical or seemingly improbable. Resilience theory already integrates a range of initially improbable or indeterminate conditions into the methodology of social, cultural, and political research.

The concretization of this corrective may take the form of an epistemological or methodological operation that safeguards the whole as a fundamental starting point. Socially shared forms of immanence (understood in various ways, such as social norms, ethos, or spirit) always operate within a specific framework. Criticizing this broadest framework may indeed offer a sense of certainty (and fulfillment from the act of social critique), but this certainty sacrifices future possibilities for some form of continuation, for any possible future realization of immanence. However, resilience thinking, with its sensitivity to uncertainty, can enhance Critical Theory's methodology, particularly in analyzing socially shared cultural norms. I emphasized the need for nuanced critique in studying paradoxical or implausible phenomena, suggesting that resilience thinking can help critical theory address the limitations of its own knowledge. Conversely, resilience theory was not the first and is not the only framework to highlight the uncertainties inherent in the contemporary world of polycrisis and indeterminacy, which is a necessary limit to our knowledge.

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