

DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS: KOREA AND AFRICA IN THE COLD WAR CONTEXT

<https://doi.org/10.31577/aassav.2024.33.2.05>

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This article examines the diplomatic strategies of South and North Korea in Africa during the Cold War, focusing on the ideological stances of African countries and economic diplomacy. Using official documents from South Korean ministries and North Korean publications, the research analyses diplomatic ties and economic support to African countries. In the early 1960s, the political orientations of newly independent African nations heavily influenced diplomatic relations with both Koreas. In the 1970s, African countries shifted to prioritising a third world identity, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, over ideology. Both Koreas used economic diplomacy, offering financial and material support. However, in the mid-1970s, North Korea gained an advantage by joining the Non-Aligned Movement. South Korea lagged behind North Korea until the 1970s, but in the 1980s, its growing economy helped it catch up in diplomatic relations. This research contributes to an understanding of the evolving diplomatic orientations of the two Koreas and African countries by analysing the role of economic diplomacy.

Key words: diplomatic competition, Africa, ideology, economic diplomacy, Korea

Introduction

Diplomatic competition between South Korea (the Republic of Korea) and North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) was evident during the Cold War era. With the end of the Cold War, both Koreas decided to join the United Nations (UN) in 1991 (UN, 1991, p. 12). This was a critical turning point as both governments up until then desired to be sovereign powers on the Korean peninsula. Prior to 1991, South Korea and North Korea competed for

international recognition, each working diplomatically to prevent the other from gaining influence within the UN.

The diplomatic competition between the two Koreas has mainly focused on their relationships and policies with the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), amid changes in the international situation. Analysis during the Cold War of the diplomatic competition on the Korean peninsula focused on relationships with allies and other bilateral considerations such as ideology (Ahn, 1983; Chae, 2015; Yoon, 2011). However, the bilateral efforts of both Koreas in response to political changes within Africa during the Cold War period utilised both economic diplomacy and ideology in pursuit of international recognition. Nevertheless, the details of these efforts remain largely unexamined and thus ambiguous.

Indeed, this period was marked not only by the reactions of both Koreas but also by significant changes within Africa itself. During this period, changes on the African side were also notable. Many African countries gained their independence in the 1960s. Whereas some of these newly independent African nations were ideologically closer to either the US or the USSR in the very early 1960s, the mid-1960s to the 1970s was the period of a mainstreaming Non-Aligned Movement in Africa (Mathews, 1987, pp. 48-49). This led to a significant number of African countries adopting a politically neutral stance. As a result, the efforts of both Koreas to gain international recognition among these countries took on a different character in the 1970s compared to the early 1960s. The changing political landscape in Africa necessitated adjustments in the diplomatic strategies of both Koreas.

This article aims to clarify the diplomatic competition between South Korea and North Korea during the Cold War by examining how both Koreas sought international recognition through ideology and by leveraging financial and material support for economic diplomacy. The focus will be on Africa, where this diplomatic battle was particularly intense from the 1960s to the 1970s. The methodology employed primarily attempts to utilise and interpret data from South Korean government documents, newspaper articles, statistics from South Korea and UN, and the yearbook of North Korea (*Joseonjung-angnyeongam*) published by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA, 1975;1978), North Korea's state media.

The Literature Review: Diplomatic Competition, Economic Diplomacy, and Ideology in Africa

Diplomatic competition in pursuit of legitimacy existed in many forms after World War II. There were cases of divided countries such as Germany, Vietnam, China, and Korea. In the case of the Korean peninsula, the divided North and South Korea competed since their declaration of state establishment. In the Cold War era, the communist bloc and the capitalist bloc used aid as a diplomatic tool. It reflected the ideological stance of each participant. The communist bloc's economic assistance gave more importance to the construction of means of production than that of the capitalist bloc (Guan-Fu, 1983). In addition, the proportion of military aid was also high in USSR aid (Cooper & Fogarty, 2017; Guan-Fu, 1983). On the other hand, the aid of the capitalist bloc was earmarked for economic development and social welfare in developing countries as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2008; 2022). However, aid from the capitalist bloc was also indirectly used for military purposes in many cases (Lumsdaine, 1993). The characteristics of assistance among developing countries are diverse, encompassing security, economic cooperation, and the enhancement of diplomatic and military influence, among others. (Henderson & Reilly, 2003; Mawdsley, 2012). These aims are similar to the motivations for aid by the advanced world (Lumsdaine, 1993; Mawdsley, 2012; Morgenthau, 1962).

One important aspect to consider is that both Koreas actively participated in economic diplomacy in Africa during the Cold War. This approach is often referred to as “checkbook diplomacy”, where countries offer economic assistance to others in order to further their own goals (Blackwill & Harris, 2016). The most frequently cited example of diplomatic competition in economic diplomacy is the rivalry between China (the People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (the Republic of China) (Atkinson, 2010; Erikson & Chen, 2007; Rich, 2009; Shattuck, 2020; Van Fossen, 2007). The competition between the two Chinas for international diplomatic relations has garnered ongoing attention due to China's significant global presence. Taiwan sought to establish diplomatic ties with small Pacific Island nations, and since each country has one vote in the UN, economic support for these relations became a crucial strategy for gaining national recognition and backing (Henderson & Reilly, 2003; Shattuck, 2020).

On the other hand, African countries became independent mainly during the 1960s to the 1970s. Newly independent countries in Africa became influential as the African countries account for more than 50 votes in the UN. For the two Koreas, both of which found it difficult to gain United Nations membership while divided, the growing number of African nations became a reason to actively

establish relationships with these newly independent African countries. In this regard, Lee (2020) pointed out the importance of relations with African countries in the Cold War (p. 79). Making more diplomatic relations was an important task for the diplomats dispatched to Africa.

In the case of the Korean peninsula, many studies have addressed the issue of how diplomatic relations as regards ideology and international relations affected the diplomacy of both Koreas (Ahn, 1983; Chae, 2015; Yoon, 2011). The ideological war between the US and USSR made both Koreas important for political decisions (Gills, 2005; Kim, 2013; Lee, 2020). However, there were bilateral efforts by both Koreas especially for increasing diplomatic ties. This article focuses on the efforts by both Koreas to create bilateral relations for diplomatic relations. It may not have been considered seriously as ‘economic diplomacy’, but in fact, for both Koreas, which were not advanced nations at the time, significant diplomatic efforts and funds were expended on building relationships with African countries. Thus, it is important to focus on the bilateral efforts of both Koreas to build relationships in Africa, highlighting how they actively utilised economic diplomacy, particularly in response to the shifts in the ideological landscape of African nations since the 1960s.


Context

The Importance of Africa in Korean Diplomatic Competition

The Korean peninsula became symbolic of an ideologically divided nation in the Cold War era. After the establishment of the Korean governments in 1948, the South Korean government applied for membership of the UN (United Nations Commission on Korea, 1949, p. 57). Two thirds of the votes in the UN were needed to support the joining of a new member state, so both Koreas tried to make as many relations as possible to aid in their quest to join the UN and also to prevent the other’s accession. Since then, Western countries led by the US, continued to pursue the attempt to join by proposing resolutions for South Korea’s accession to the UN, but the USSR continuously opposed it (C. Y. Park, 2021).

During the Cold War, the most important region for diplomatic competition between South and North Korea was Africa. The number of countries that had diplomatic relations with South Korea and North Korea in each region reveals that African countries could possibly be key votes in inter-Korean relations as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. Number of countries with diplomatic relations with South and North Korea



Source: MOFA (2024) and Statistics Korea (n.d.)

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (2024) and Statistics Korea (n.d.), in 1950, North Korea had developed twice as many diplomatic relations as South Korea. However, the number of South Korean diplomatic relations began to increase globally in the 1960s. As a result, by 1970, the number of diplomatic relations with South Korea greatly surpassed those of North Korea. This growth continued until 1990. South Korea has been in a superior position since 1960 in the total number of diplomatic relations. However, in Africa, North Korea dramatically increased its influence in the mid-1970s. The number of the newly independent African countries increased in the UN, and North Korea made efforts to have diplomatic ties with as many countries as possible (Young, 2015, pp. 99-101). The number of African countries that had diplomatic relations with North Korea rose from ten in 1970 to thirty-nine in 1980.

South Korea's aid since the 1990s to now has been mainly concentrated in Asia (Song & Kim, 2022, pp. 89-90). However, South Korea's assistance to Africa from 1977 to 1992 accounted for 38.6% of the total assistance to other

countries, which was the highest percentage in the regional category; the second largest region was Latin America and the Caribbean which accounted for 28.5% (Chi, 1993, p. 48). Both Koreas expanded their assistance to other countries as part of their economic diplomacy, especially from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s.

Economic Diplomacy

In many cases, economic diplomacy was tied to diplomatic recognition for African states by both Koreas. As a result, both Koreas provided economic assistance to African countries while seeking their recognition. However, North Korea was more active using economic assistance to make diplomatic relations as North Korea was lagging behind in the number of countries that it had diplomatic relations as whole, despite making more diplomatic ties in Africa in the 1970s (Bukgoe gongse, 1975).

The main form of South Korea's economic assistance was inviting trainees from developing countries and sending experts to developing countries (ANSP 1997; Chi 1993). There were other forms of economic assistance such as a few instances of setting up farms and schools but the main form apart from finance and materials was the exchanging and developing of human resources (ANSP 1997). Because of the special political and military aspects of South Korea's relationship with the US, it was difficult to find any independent military diplomacy in inter-Korean diplomatic competition. Until the mid-1970s, South Korea's economic assistance was mainly provided with funding from USAID and UN agencies, but the demand for assistance from developing countries increased every year, and the amount of aid provided by the South Korean government gradually expanded as the economy grew (MOST, 1977, p. 75). Supplies such as military uniforms and boots were part of South Korea's support but there was no support for actual weapons or military training (ANSP, 1997).

For North Korea, the main form of economic assistance can be divided into categories such as finance, equipment provision, construction, support for human resources, and military support (ANSP, 1997). In comparison to South Korea, the most distinctive feature is military support. The military support included material support, the construction of weapons factories, and the invitation of trainees, and sending military experts to developing countries (ANSP, 1997). In addition, North Korea made many statues of leaders in African countries (Wango, 2021). In addition, North Korea also provided guns, ammunition, and missiles, in some cases by grants and in other cases by loans (ANSP, 1997). North Korea was a recipient of weapons from the USSR and China, but it also exported or provided military weapons to third world

countries as a gesture of fraternal relations (H. S. Park, 1987, p. 35). Military training was also included in support projects by accepting trainees and dispatching experts. However, North Korea's assistance was similar to that of the communist bloc, in that the support was characterised by the construction of production facilities and military assistance.

This military assistance became the background to tragic events in some cases. One of the most tragic instances was the Gukurahundi killings in Zimbabwe. North Korea and Zimbabwe entered into diplomatic relations in April 1980. North Korea and Zimbabwe also agreed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and General Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical and Cultural Cooperation in October 1980 (ANSP, 1997, pp. 434-438). After then, North Korea offered military training to Zimbabwe's Fifth Brigade which perpetrated the Gukurahundi genocide, resulting in an estimated 20,000 civilian deaths (Maedza, 2019, p. 1).

Koreas' Diplomatic Competitions during the Cold War

The 1960s: Importance of Ideology

As South Korea had a mutual defence treaty with the US in 1953 and the North Korea had a treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with the USSR and China in 1961, international relations affected the diplomacy of both Koreas. When South Korea and North Korea made diplomatic ties with African countries, the ideology of African countries was the salient factor especially, in the early 1960s. South Korea started to make diplomatic relations with countries which were perceived pro-Western, whereas North Korea began with the opposite side.

In the 1960s, many African states became independent. There had been debates about taking an ideological stance towards the capitalist bloc and communist bloc, but Pan-Africanism stressed African unity and independence, though there were divergences (Nkrumah, 1963). In the early 1960s, these ideological divisions in Africa arose with groups such as the Brazzaville and Casablanca Groups (Ifidon, 2011). The members of the Brazzaville Group consisted of French-speaking countries and most of them were French colonies which were considered ideologically pro-Western whereas the Casablanca Group which were closer to the Communist ideology and emphasised the importance of an independent Africa (Pick, 1961, pp. 76-78). There was another group, the

Morovia Group that encompassed the Brazzaville Group but was more focused on African unity than the Brazzaville Group.¹

Soon after, the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 is viewed as the resolution of these conflicts, acting as a middle ground between radical and conservative factions (Ifidon, 2011, p. 15). It became as a symbol of African unity and ideological frictions within Africa decreased even though the OAU exercised limited power (Ifidon, 2011, p. 15). Nevertheless, ideology remained an important political factor in the early 1960s, until the establishment of the OAU, when both Koreas began in earnest to establish diplomatic relations in Africa.

In the 1960s, the competition for nuclear weapons development between the US and the USSR intensified. On the Korean peninsula, Kim Il-sung came to power in North Korea and Park Chung-hee became president of South Korea as a result of a military coup in the early 1960s and continued to the end of the 1970s. As figure 1 shows, South Korea expanded its diplomatic ties in the early 1960s. On the other hand, in the early 1970s North Korea's diplomatic relationship with African countries increased rapidly. Therefore, the early 1960s and the early 1970s are the period to focus on to show how both Koreas tried to build up relations with African countries. Hence, the analysis of the diplomatic competition between both Korea is focused on the period from 1960 to 1965 and from 1970 to 1975, when both Koreas rapidly made many ties with African countries.

Since 1963, Park Chung-hee had actively pursued the Hallstein doctrine, the principle that West Germany did not have diplomatic relations with countries that had diplomatic relations with East Germany. South Korea decided not to have diplomatic relations with countries that had diplomatic relations with North Korea (Gills, 2005, p. 100). Ideology was one of the points which South Korea took into consideration when making diplomatic ties, but the countries that stayed neutral were also the targets, along with countries that had close ties to Western countries. Still, the critical factor for South Korea which even broke off diplomatic ties was diplomatic relations with North Korea (Kim, 2023). On the other hand, North Korea had emphasised its diplomatic 'independence' and built alliances not only with socialist countries but also with developing countries in the third world for security (Wertz, Oh, & Insung, 2016, pp.1-4).

¹ The members of Monrovia group were Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, as well as Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Senegal, Upper Volta, and Niger, the members of Brazzaville group. (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000, p. 4).

Table 1. The countries that had new diplomatic relations with South Korea and North Korea from 1960 to 1965

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
South Korea	0	6	5	6	2	2
		Niger (Brazzaville Group) Dahomey (Brazzaville Group) Chad (Brazzaville Group) Cameroon (Brazzaville Group) Ivory Coast (Brazzaville Group) Congo (Brazzaville Group)	Gabon (Brazzaville Group) Madagascar (Brazzaville Group) Upper Volta (Brazzaville Group) Senegal (Brazzaville Group) Sierra Leone (Brazzaville Group)	Rwanda Ethiopia (Monrovia group) Uganda Central African Republic (Brazzaville Group) Democratic Republic of the Congo Togo Mauritania (Brazzaville Group)	Kenya Liberia	Gambia Malawi
North Korea	1	0	0	1	3	1
	Mali (Casa-blanca Group)			United Arab Republic (Casablanca Group)	Congo (Casablanca Group) Ghana (Casablanca Group) Mauritania (Brazzaville Group)	Tanzania

Sources: ANSP (1997), KCNA (1978), MOFA (1961a), Muyangwa & Vogt (2000), Pick (1961). Mauritania is located on the African continent, but as their relations were handled by the Middle East Division in the MOFA of South Korea, so it is not counted as part of the Africa.

Both countries tried to expand their diplomatic relations in the early 1960s with newly independent African countries. South Korea sent a series of delegations to Africa in the early 1960s. In 1961, there were two visits from South

Korea to African countries. The members of the Brazzaville group were considered ideologically pro-Western (Pick, 1961, pp. 76-78), which gave South Korea an initial advantage in establishing relations with these countries compared to North Korea. From 18th February to 7th March, a South Korean delegation led by Lim Chang-young, ambassador to the UN, made a tour of emerging countries in Africa (Congo, Cameroon, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Senegal) to appeal for support for South Korea at the UN General Assembly (MOFA, 1961a). Soon after the first visit, there was a military coup on the 16th May, 1961 by Park Chung-hee. His government planned to send delegations to all over the world including Africa (MOFA, 1961b). The second visit to Africa (Senegal, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Chad, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, South Africa, and Madagascar) was from the 13th July to the 31st August. The head of the group was Baek Seon-yeop, ambassador to France.

The main purpose of the second delegation was not only support for South Korea at the UN, but also explanations of the new regime following the coup and the establishing of diplomatic ties with South Korea (MOFA, 1961b). After the two visits to Africa, diplomatic ties between South Korea and African countries increased. The majority of countries visited by the two delegations in 1961 had diplomatic relations with South Korea. Especially the second visit by the delegation successfully led to diplomatic ties with fifteen countries among the seventeen countries as shown in table 1.

On the other hand, North Korea sought to establish ties with the Casablanca Group, whose members were more aligned with a Communist ideology (Pick, 1961, pp. 76-77). The group's members were Ghana, Morocco, Mali, United Arab Republic, Libya, Algeria, Guinea (Pick, 1961, p. 83). From June to July 1961, North Korea sent a delegation to Africa, visiting Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic, which were members of the Casablanca Group (Kim, 2020, pp. 141-142 as cited in Rodong Sinmun, 1961). After then, North Korea succeeded in making diplomatic ties with the United Arab Republic, Congo, and Ghana (KCNA, 1978).

In the 1960s, ideology was the most salient factor for South Korea, so that it would not have diplomatic relations with countries that had diplomatic ties with North Korea. Mauritania and the Republic of Congo are examples of countries with which South Korea broke off relations with. South Korea had diplomatic relations with Mauritania in 1963, but then severed diplomatic relations in 1964 as Mauritania also had diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1964. South Korea reestablished diplomatic ties with Mauritania in 1978 following withdrawal from the principles of the Hallstein Doctrine (MOFA, 2011, p. 813). The Republic of Congo was similar, except that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations took longer, not until 1990 (MOFA, 2011, p. 795).

The 1970s to Early 1980s: Ideology and the Strategic Use of Economic Diplomacy

From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, a series of dramatic changes in the international environment, such as the Nixon Doctrine, which declared that it would reduce US military intervention in Asia, the reconciliation between the US and China, and the defeat of the Vietnam War, raised the awareness of security vulnerability in South Korea. In response to these changes, South Korea diversified its security diplomacy and made efforts to improve relations with socialist nations (Ho & Seol, 2015, pp. 229-230). In 1973, the MOFA of South Korea announced that South Korea would not apply strictly the Hallstein Doctrine and would have dealings with countries with diplomatic relations with North Korea (Kim oemu hoegyeon, 1973).

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) began at the Belgrade Summit in 1961, building on a resolution adopted by newly independent countries that had participated in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955. The resolution emphasised anti-colonialism and non-alignment as their primary goals. The Non-Aligned Conference held in Lusaka, Zambia in 1970, also aroused international interest in the North-South axis in world politics and resource distribution. The NAM opposed the division into blocs not only in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America, emphasising ideological connections between third-world countries (Biney, 2012, p. 134).

South Korea tried join the NAM but met obstacles soon. NAM rejected South Korea's accession in 1975 as South Korea regarded as the parts of the capitalist bloc (MOFA, 2020, p. 608). South Korea had a close relationship with the US and Western countries. Furthermore, as one of allies of the US, South Korea dispatched troops to support South Vietnam for nine years from 1964 to 1973.

On the other hand, the 1970s were said to be the golden age of North Korean diplomacy. North Korea joined the World Health Organization in 1973 and established a UN representative in New York. As a result of its efforts to have ties with various countries regardless of ideology, North Korea's position in third-world international recognition was enhanced in the 1970s. North Korea was on the side of the Communist bloc, but it kept more distance from the USSR than the corresponding Korean-US relations, emphasising the idea of *Juche* (self-reliance) (Young, 2015). As a result, North Korea successfully became a member of the NAM at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of non-aligned countries in 1975 (NAM, 1975).

Between 1970 and 1975, South Korea established diplomatic relations with only one country in Africa, whereas North Korea significantly increased its diplomatic ties, setting up relations with twenty-seven countries (all of which had

joined the NAM), as shown in Table 2. South Korea lost the upper hand in the diplomatic competition in the African region in the mid-1970s as figure 1 shows. In the 1970s, South Korea established diplomatic relations with Mauritius, Seychelles, Ghana, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Comoros, while severing ties with Madagascar, Togo and Benin (ANSP, 1997; MOFA, 2024). As a result, the number of countries with which South Korea maintained diplomatic relations increased by four.

Table 2. The countries listed below had diplomatic relations with South Korea and North Korea from 1970 to 1975

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
South Korea	0	1	0	0	0	0
		Mauritius (NAM)				
North Korea	0	1	7	4	5	10
		Sierra Leone (NAM)	Zaire (NAM) Cameroon (NAM) Senegal (NAM) Upper Volta (NAM) Madagascar (NAM) Rwanda (NAM) Uganda (NAM)	Togo (NAM) Benin (NAM) Mauritius (NAM) Gambia (NAM)	Botswana (NAM) Libya (NAM) Niger (NAM) Guinea-Bissau (NAM) Gabon (NAM)	Comoros (NAM) Kenya (NAM) Cape Verde (NAM) Ethiopia (NAM) Angola (NAM) São Tomé and Príncipe (NAM) Mozambique (NAM) Tunisia (NAM) Morocco (NAM) Liberia (NAM)

Sources: MOFA (2020), ANSP (1997), KCNA (1978), NAM (1976).

North Korea's diplomatic expansion in Africa and other regions in the 1970s made it more powerful than ever. At the 30th UN General Assembly held in 1975, a resolution urging the making of an agreement to guarantee lasting peace between both Koreas, proposed by the West, was adopted with 59 (10 votes from Africa) votes in favour, 51 against, and 29 abstentions (UN, 1975a). However, at the same time, a resolution urging the dissolution of the UN Command and the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, proposed by the communist bloc, was adopted with 54 (30 from African countries) votes in favour, 43 against, and 42 abstentions (UN, 1975b). This tense diplomatic battle underscores the importance of the vote of African countries.

After South Korea stopped applying the Hallstein Doctrine, ideological differences were no longer the main reason for cutting diplomatic ties. Instead, economic support became an important tool in the foreign policy of the two Koreas. Economic diplomacy was sometimes related to the severance of diplomatic relations and was an increasingly active aspect in the competition for diplomatic relations. The breaking off of diplomatic relations was determined by differences in political ideologies as well as the volume or amount offered for economic diplomacy in some cases. In Africa, three countries, namely Togo, Dahomey, Madagascar, broke off diplomatic relations with South Korea in the 1970s as shown in table 3. At the 30th UN General Assembly held in 1975, these countries voted in favour of a resolution proposed by the Communist bloc, and against the resolution by the West (UN, 1975b).

Ideology mattered but at the same time economic diplomacy as promised by North Korea could lead to breaking off diplomatic ties. For example, North Korea promised \$20 million to Togo on condition of breaking off diplomatic relations with South Korea. Togo accepted the suggestion and cut off diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1974 (ANSP, 1997, pp. 557-558). Until North Korea brought about the breaking off of the diplomatic relation of Togo with South Korea, South Korea had provided assistance such as medicines and related supplies to hospitals worth approximately \$69,000 in 1972 (ANSP, 1997, p. 560). Compared with the support which South Korea had provided until then, the \$20 million North Korea promised was huge. It was not the amount for one year but for long-term support as economic diplomacy. Following this North Korea provided a loan of approximately \$20 million to fund irrigation projects on agricultural land (ANSP, 1997, p. 563). Also, the assistance continued to the 1980s, such as support for the constructions of a training centre and sports complex in 1981 and 1982, providing farm equipment in 1982, and 1983. Sending of human resources was also actively undertaken, dispatching gymnastics athletes in 1975 and 1977, ten experts in the production of bronze statues in 1977, and five military personnel in 1975 (ANSP 1997, pp. 563-564). Exchange agreements were signed including an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation in 1974, a Cultural Agreement in 1975,

and a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement in 1981 (ANSP 1997, p. 564). President Eyadema of Togo visited North Korea in 1974. He had a summit meeting with Kim Il-sung and a joint communiqué was issued in Pyongyang on 12 September 1974 (KCNA, 1975, p. 651).

Table 3. African countries that broke off diplomatic relations with South Korea during the Cold War

	Diplomatic ties with North Korea	Breaking off of diplomatic relations with South Korea	Restoration of diplomatic relations with South Korea
Mauritania	1964	1964	1978
Congo (Republic of the Congo)	1964	1965	1990
Madagascar	1972	1972	1993
Togo	1973	1974	1991
Benin	1973	1975	1990
Seychelles	1976	1980	1995
Guinea	1958	1980	2006
Lesotho	1980	1983	1986

Source: ANSP (1997).

On the other hand, South Korea experienced a crisis in its diplomatic relations in Africa as North Korea's active economic diplomacy has worked in some African countries, especially in the 1970s. This included military support such as training, as well as personal lobbying directed at leaders (Young, 2015). Still, until the early 1980s, the competition between the two Koreas was in a state of tension. In particular, the 1983 Myanmar Rangoon bombing assassination attempt and the Korean Air Flight 007 incident the same year increased the prospect of confrontation between the two Koreas. The case of the Comoros is an example of how ideology and economic diplomacy were jointly used as diplomatic tools. The Comoros established diplomatic ties with North Korea in 1975. However, after criticizing North Korea for the Rangoon Incident in 1983,


these ties were broken. They were only restored in 1989. There was a request from South Korea relating to breaking ties with North Korea in 1983 (MOFA, 1983). With the establishment of diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1972, the country firmly supported South Korea on the international stage by adopting a pro-Western stance. South Korea provided assistance mainly through financial and material aid. In 1980, cars and pick-up trucks (\$50,000), and in 1982 medicines and sports equipment (\$37,000) were provided (ANSP, 1997, pp. 493-494). More importantly, the year that Comoros severed diplomatic relations with North Korea, South Korea handed over \$110,000 in cash to the Comoros (ANSP, 1997, pp. 493-494). And the next year, South Korea sent cash, and cars and sports goods worth \$265,000 in total (ANSP, 1997, pp. 493-494). This was the largest amount of support to the Comoros in the 1980s, and even bigger than the support for Ghana. Considering the country's population and volume, it was huge as it was the reward for the break with North Korea (MOFA, 1985).²

The mid-1980s to the Early 1990s: South Korea's Rise among the Newly Industrialised Economies

By the mid-1980s South Korea outpaced North Korea economically. As a result, since the 1980s, the importance of African states in diplomatic relations for South Korea began to decrease. There was not much difference in the economies between South Korea and North Korea until the mid-1970s; in fact, North Korea was even richer than South Korea until the 1960s and early 1970s.

South Korea grew as an emerging industrialised country that surpassed North Korea economically in the late 1970s. As North Korea does not submit statistics by the official method of international organisations, it is difficult to quantify the economic situation of North Korea, but what limited figures are available can be compared with statistics by the UN. According to UN statistics in Figure 2, South Korea's per capita GDP was \$301 in 1971, and North Korea's was \$415. This difference reversed to \$560 for South Korea and \$518 for North Korea in 1974 and widened to \$1,774 for South Korea and \$638 for North Korea in 1980. Due to South Korea's rapid growth as an emerging industrialized country, it became economically dominant in the 1980s, though North Korea maintained its diplomatic influence until the early 1980s.

² According to the World Bank, in 1983, Ghana's population was 12.98 million, which is approximately 37 times the size of Comoros' population of 350,000 (World Bank, n.d.).

Figure 2. Gross domestic product (GDP)

Sources : UN (n.d.). (US dollars, years).

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, South Korea officially established diplomatic ties with the USSR and other Communist countries. Moreover, in this period, six African countries that had broken off ties with South Korea mainly in the 1970s restored relations, as table 3 shows. South Korea started to extend support for economic diplomacy again to these countries though it was not huge. For example, Togo which had broken off relations with South Korea, restored the ties in 1991, and South Korea restarted its support to Togo from the following year. Materials such as cars, computers and copy machines worth approximately \$65,000 were sent from Korea to Togo in 1992 and 1993 (ANSP, 1997, p. 560). As a result of the end of the Cold War and the decline in the influence of NAM, the number of countries establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea increased not only in Africa but also in other regions (see figure 1). In 1976, South Korea had diplomatic relations with ninety-six countries, and North Korea with ninety-one. But by 1990, these numbers had significantly diverged, with South Korea having one hundred and forty-four and North Korea one hundred and five as figure 1 shows. Consequently, the number of countries recognizing diplomatic relations with both Koreas grew significantly

in Africa and other regions, leading to a relative decline in the importance of Africa in the diplomatic competition between North and South Korea.

Moreover, South Korea started to transfer the origin of the relations with third world countries from the friendship to the economic cooperation for overseas expansions of Korean private companies as it had emerged as one of the NIEs. South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan visited four African countries, Kenya, Nigeria, Gabon, and Senegal in 16th-27th August 1982 (Dagaon sin daeyulig, 1982). The countries already had fair diplomatic relations with South Korea, and the main topic of the visit was economic cooperation. The Korean government tried to make an economic bond which included the overseas expansion of Korean companies to the countries visited. The issue had become not only that of providing cash or materials to African countries for UN votes but ensuring the expansion of private companies (Han·A gongyeonggwa, 1982).

In addition to this, the pressures for burden sharing, which means taking responsibility for global issues together with developed countries, had been actively discussed since the mid-1980s for emerging industrialized countries and region. A post-meeting statement of the G6 Finance Ministers' Meeting in Paris in February 1987 referred to burden sharing as the influence of emerging industrialised countries and regions increased in the global economy (G6, 1987). Burden sharing was taken up at the G7 Summit and the OECD Ministerial Meeting. In 1989, the four emerging economies including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore participated in a closed-door meeting of the OECD (Economic Planning Board, 1991, pp. 357-358). At this meeting, burden sharing from developed countries to emerging countries was required, and cooperation between OECD member countries and emerging countries was discussed. South Korea hosted international events such as the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympic Games in 1988. In particular, in the late 1980s, the USSR, China, and other Communist countries participated in the 1988 Olympic Games held in Seoul, which was positively evaluated thanks to its declared stance to refrain from confrontational diplomacy between the two Koreas.

With the end of the Cold War, the proposal for both Koreas to simultaneously join the UN was again discussed at the UN General Assembly in 1990, but North Korea continued to insist on a single seat for the Korean peninsula. In 1991, the international situation rapidly changed with the dissolution of the USSR, and South Korea asked USSR and China to persuade North Korea to accept the joint accession to the UN of both Koreas (see MOFA, 1991). As a result, North Korea submitted its application to join the UN in May 1991, and South Korea submitted its application soon after in August of the same year. The UN Security Council review committee treated the North and the South as a single proposal and unanimously adopted a recommendation for membership in September (UN 1991). At the UN General Assembly held in September 1991, the membership of

North and of South Korea in the UN was approved, and the diplomatic confrontation for legitimacy in the Cold War on the Korean peninsula came to an end.

Conclusion

This paper has analysed ideological factors and economic diplomacy in the diplomatic competition between South Korea and North Korea during the Cold War period, focusing especially on Africa. Unlike existing studies that focused on international diplomatic relations, this paper focuses on the ideological characteristics of African countries, the development of the NAM, and the efforts of both Koreas to establish diplomatic relations under these circumstances. It has argued that diplomatic relations with the African continent were strategically critical to both Koreas, as the newly independent states in Africa were valuable votes in the UN. South Korea and North Korea made great efforts to develop ties with African countries, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the early 1960s, the importance of forming diplomatic ties with newly independent African countries was particularly centred around ideology. In this period, South Korea forged diplomatic relations mainly with countries that had a close relationship with the capitalist bloc while North Korea approached the countries close to the Communist bloc. However, in the diplomatic competition of the 1970s, the rise of the NAM led many countries to pursue economic benefits beyond ideological reasoning in their diplomatic relations. South Korea and North Korea each sought to expand diplomatic recognition by offering various resources and financial assistance to African nations. North Korea was the more successful in making diplomatic relations with African countries in the 1970s. After North Korea's successful accession to the NAM, economic diplomacy was an important aspect in making relations as it offered tangible results to appeal to a friendly bilateral relationship with African countries. Even though sometimes the scale of the support for economic diplomacy was not immense in real terms, it was nonetheless an important weapon of diplomacy for both Koreas during the Cold War.

South Korea emerged as one of the NIEs in the late 1980s and was even asked for burden sharing by the developed nations. Additionally, the number of South Korea's diplomatic relations with other regions also significantly increased, leading to a decline in Africa's diplomatic importance by the 1980s. The diplomatic competition for joining the UN ended in effect with the termination of the Cold War and so both Koreas joined the UN simultaneously in 1991.

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