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RESEARCH ARTICLE

On Everything Is Necessarily What It Is

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Abstract: It is argued that if everything is necessarily what it is, then given the equivalence ‘p≡[a= (ιx)(x=a&p)]’, it follows that whatever happens or is the case, had to happen or had to be the case.

Keywords: Fatalism; Identity; Necessity; The sole object; (x) (□ x=x)

If we grant the equivalence

(1) $p \equiv [a = (\iota x)(x = a \& p)]$,

that every sentence is equivalent to an identity sentence[1], and grant that (2) if a sentence is (necessarily) true then what it says is (necessarily) the case; then unless fatalism is true (3) the thesis of the necessity of identity,[2] is false, and thus so is the thesis that (4) everything is necessarily what it is[3].

[1] Commonly assumed in one form or another by Church, Davidson, Gödel and Quine. See Yaroslav Shranko and Heinrich Wansing (2020). See Neale (2001: esp. 170-171).

[2] See, Kripke (1971,136).

[3] The argument for the thesis of the necessity of identity rests on the formula ‘(x) (□ x=x)’. See Wiggins (1965:41) and Kripke (1971, 136). And is in fact equivalent

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Suppose

(1) $p \equiv [a = (\iota x)(x{=}a\&p)]$

is logically true, then given (2), so is,

(2’) p is the case if and only $a = (\iota x)(x = a\&p)$

Hence given the necessity of identity, it follows that

(5) p is the case if and only if necessarily $[a = (\iota x)(x = a\&p)]$[4].

And thus,

(6) if p is the case, then necessarily $[a = (\iota x)(x = a\&p)]$.

But if

(7) necessarily $[a = (\iota x)(x = a\&p)]$ then,

(8) necessarily p.

And thus,

(9) If p then necessarily p.

Hence, given that (1) is a logical truth and (2) is analytic, the thesis of the necessity of identity or the thesis that everything is necessarily what it is, implies fatalism.[5]

to it (Blum:x). We rendition the reflexivity of identity as ‘everything is what it is’. See Leibniz (1996, 362).

[4] The argument for the necessity of identity is immune to whether the terms in an identity are expressed as ‘a’ or as ‘$(\iota x)(x{=}a\&p)$’. Thus the argument will go through for:

$a{=}(\iota x)(x{=}a\&p) \supset [Fa \supset F(\iota x)(x{=}a\&p)]$. Let ‘F’= ‘$\Box a{=}$’.

We then have:

$a{=}(\iota x)(x{=}a\&p) \supset [\Box a = a \supset \Box a{=} (\iota x)(x = a\&p)]$.

And thus:

$a = (\iota x)(x = a\&p) \supset \Box a = (\iota x)(x = a\&p)$.

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