

Towards a Phenomenology of Rupture

MICHAL LIPTÁK, Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, v.v.i., Bratislava, Slovak Republic

LIPTÁK, M.: Towards a Phenomenology of Rupture
FILOZOFIA, 80, 2025, No 5, pp. 682 – 696

What makes phenomena such as birth, death, creation or fate specifically “limit phenomena” within Husserl’s phenomenology is not simply their difficulty, but also that they seem to threaten phenomenology as a transcendentalist project. As a transcendentalist project, phenomenology tries to overcome contingency by seeking the apodictic and necessary, leading Husserl to focus on normal, optimal, typical phenomena. It is at the margins that phenomenology is threatened by collapsing back into contingency. In my paper, I propose the concept of “rupture” as that which best expresses the limit-character of limit phenomena. The rupture in the normal course of experience calls for re-configuration that introduces novelty. I suggest that a systematic investigation into phenomenology of rupture may help phenomenology to address the problem of novelty.

Keywords: Husserl – Merleau-Ponty – rupture – phenomenology – sleep – intersubjectivity – aesthetics – revolution

The publication of *Husserliana XLII* in 2013 intensified the interest in limit phenomena [*Grenzprobleme*] among the phenomenologists. In my article, I propose a novel way to conceptualize what constitutes, so to speak, the liminality of the limit phenomena for phenomenology. In the first part of the article, I briefly describe why limit phenomena present a peculiar challenge to phenomenology as a transcendentalist project. In the second part, I propose the notion of “rupture” as a way to conceptualize the liminality of the limit phenomena in such a way that what makes them challenging is preserved. I present several examples of phenomenological investigations of a rupture. The phenomena of sleep and aesthetic perception are derived from Husserl’s writings, while the phenomenon of political revolution as a rupture is proposed

as a development of the framework of rupture. In the conclusion, I argue that the phenomenology of rupture can revitalize phenomenological investigations.¹

I. The Problem of Limit Phenomena

As Steinbock puts it, “limit-phenomena pose challenges to phenomenology and to phenomenologists for the following reasons: If the things that we normally take for granted in our everyday lives are only given at the limits of our experience, it is not at all clear how they could be given and described phenomenologically rather than asserted metaphysically or argued for analytically” (Steinbock 2017, 5). What makes limit phenomena precisely *limit* phenomena is not just the fact that they are difficult phenomena to investigate, but that the very ambition of Husserl’s phenomenology to ensure the possibility of apodictically and universally valid statements is endangered by them. Phenomenology tries to find necessity in contingency without relapsing to metaphysical hypostases but also without resorting to mere induction, where any statement is mere probable generalization from ultimately contingent observations. Already in the “Prolegomena” to *Logical Investigations*, it is announced that “*even in the field of empirical thinking, in the sphere of probabilities, there must be ideal elements and laws in which the possibility of empirical science in general, of the probable knowledge of the real, is a priori grounded*” (Husserl 1975, 258, emphasis in original).

It is in the cases of the limit phenomena that this ambition runs into the greatest problems. In *Husserliana XLII*, the limit phenomena include the phenomena of death, natality, sleep, instinct, but also intersubjectivity and the experience of the Other. Steinbock correctly lists the phenomena of home and alien, of *Heimwelt* and *Fremdwelt*, as limit phenomena, too (Steinbock 2017, 14 – 16).²

To see how limit phenomena problematize the ambitions of phenomenology, let us consider phenomenology as a reflective method. In *Formal and*

¹ An early version of this paper was presented at the conference *Phenomenology and the Limits of Experience*, organized in Bucharest by University of Bucharest and The Romanian Society for Phenomenology from 21.09.2023 to 23.09.2023. I thank the organizers for the possibility to present the paper, and I thank the participants for suggestions which improved the paper. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

² Steinbock elaborates on this greatly in *Home and Beyond*. “By liminal I mean not merely that home and alien are formed by positing limits, but that they are *mutually delimited* as home and as alien, as norm and as abnormal. For this reason, they are *co-relative* and *co-constitutive*” (Steinbock 1995, 178).

Transcendental Logic, Husserl's term for such reflection is *Besinnung*, which could be also translated as "consideration of sense" or "investigation of sense."

Reflection [*Besinnung*] is nothing but the attempt to actually produce the sense [*der Sinn*] "itself" that is intended and presupposed in mere intending [*die bloße Meinung*]....We can also say that reflection [*Besinnung*], understood radically, is *the original explication of sense* [*ursprüngliche Sinnesauslegung*], which transforms, and initially strives to transform, the sense in the mode of unclear intending into the sense in the mode of full clarity or essential possibility (Husserl 1974, 13).

Later, the way in which phenomenology follows back in the footsteps of unclearly intended sense is sharpened in the notion of *Rückbesinnung* (Husserl 1976b, 50), and the phenomenological method is called "*Rückfrage*" (Husserl 1976b, 16), "questioning-back" (Steinbock 1995, 78). A phenomenologist thus repeatedly retraces her steps, delves into the depths of consciousness, following the phenomena to their source with the intention of radically clarifying their sense. Such an approach works well in the case of the consciousness which operates in "optimal" (Husserl 1966, 23f.; Husserl 1973a, 333 – 335, 358 – 362), "normal" (Husserl 1952, 59ff.; see also Steinbock 1995, 138 – 147), or "typical" (Husserl 1939, 124ff.) experiencing. But at certain points, such delving and retracing runs up against limits which cannot be overcome in reflection.

We cannot get before birth. We cannot get beyond death. In intersubjectivity, the Other is a monad (Husserl 1991, 102ff.), and we cannot ever directly approach her position in reflection. The problem is not just that we are confronted with phenomena where, sometimes, direct lived experience is *by definition* impossible, but that in the search for sources of these phenomena within reflection, their sources are beyond limits.

Husserl approaches the limit phenomena as transcendently necessary limits. As such, they do tell us something about the basic structure of the experience. According to Geniusas, the transcendental necessity of sleep lies in the fact that "without sleep, subjectivity would not be aware of the past and the future as autonomous domains of givenness" (Geniusas 2010, 76; emphasis removed).³ Pursuant to Dodd, Husserl's investigations of death from the

³ There is, of course, a much longer tradition in approaching the phenomenon of sleep as transcendently necessary phenomenon which discloses fundamental structures of consciousness. For example, Hegel, through "a quasi-phenomenological explanatory strategy" (Ortigosa 2024, 773), sees the sleep as disclosing self-feeling [*Selbstgefühl*], which is crucial notion for anthropologically distinguishing rational subjects.

position of time consciousness foreshadow the works of Sartre and Heidegger, for whom “death illuminates the fundamental *ecstatic* character of lived time” (Dodd 2010, 68). But Dodd’s final question – “what does death tell us about ourselves?” (Dodd 2010, 69) – drives the reflection further and elsewhere, beyond the transcendently necessary limit which in principle treats death as extreme case of deep sleep (Ferrer 2014, 84). An emphasis may “shift to the empathy with the dying Other and to a future rupture [*Bruch*] in a monadic community” (Ferrer 2014, 96), or even to the “*historicity* of pure I” (Rybák 2021, 264), but there it ultimately runs up against another transcendental limit phenomenon – that of the Other. As Geniusas puts it:

The thematization of birth, death, and sleep as limit-phenomena in fact calls for a complementary account that would disclose them as intersubjective phenomena....In this sense, the disclosure of birth, death, and sleep as limit-phenomena lacks the resources to clarify their *worldliness*. Yet the transcendental sense of birth, death and sleep consists in their *worldly* phenomenality. Thus the full-scale phenomenality of birth, death, and sleep escapes the phenomenal framework that guides the inquiry into limit-phenomena (Genusas 2010, 80f.)

Sciences in principle take note of the continuous interplay between the immanent pole of reflection (egology) and the transcendent pole of reflection (intersubjectivity) and challenge phenomenology at the extremes of those poles. In principle, their suggestion is that the worldliness of limit phenomena can be captured – and the transcendental limits can be overcome – by letting contingency or facticity back into play. For example, at an infinitely immanent pole, at the level of hyletic flow (Husserl 1976a, 191ff.; Husserl 2001, 274 – 288), a question arises concerning how this hyletic flow is formed, how does it connect us to the world. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the notion of $\vartheta\lambda\eta$ transcendently functions as a universal passive source which ultimately at the highest levels of predicative activity guides us towards universally valid judgments. For example, the law of excluded middle, addition, or the function of copula already have their source in pre-predicative passive syntheses (see, for example, Husserl 1966, 103, for excluded middle). But any question of the actual content of the $\vartheta\lambda\eta$ resummons the natural sciences. In the cognitive sciences, phenomenology is treated as a special, particular area of research (Dennett 1991, 72ff.). But ultimately it must be “naturalized,” “a continuous $\vartheta\lambda\eta$ ” must obtain “a value of fact” (Salanskis 1999, 504). Then such phenomenology helps neuroscience,

biology, and so on to come up with ultimate answers concerning the content of what phenomenology identifies as a hyletic flow.

At an infinitely transcendent pole phenomenology addresses the question of the Other. The Other is a monad and by definition she is not reachable in reflection. However, the Other is practically reached in social practice, in an actually existing intersubjective community. The crucial notions in a case of intersubjective formations are sedimentation and typifying apperception: we perceive the world in such and such way due to stable, but intersubjectively modifiable (Lohmar 2003, 116) and socially formed (Schutz 1959, 163) types that are sedimented in the social practices. The particular types, *Typik*, also constitute the particular understandings of *Heimwelt* and *Fremdwelt*. In *Husserliana XLII*, Husserl (2013, 224) ponders about the possibility of overcoming the distinction between home and alien as *Übernation* in which all subjects as monads are harmonized. The harmonization requires an overarching teleology, and Husserl indeed asks if it is “not so [that] through intersubjectivity in its generative connection...run necessary tendencies towards inner praxis which seeks to shape the very own and human existence teleologically, which is, correlatively, a *tendency towards ‘bliss’ [Seligkeit]?*” (Husserl 2013, 213). But if we are ever to provide any content to the notions of *Heimwelt* and *Fremdwelt* and to the possibilities of the overcoming of this distinction teleologically towards any kind of a universal humankind, if we are ever to use them as more than just functional terms, the research is basically handed over to sociology, historiography, and so on. Phenomenology then can be treated as a special method, for example within ethnography (Maso 2001, 144; cf. also Vydrová, 712f.), helping to provide valuable insights into first-person experience, but ultimately it appears that it is not transcendental philosophy which comes up with answers, but the inductive social sciences.

But handing the research over at the infinitely immanent and infinitely transparent pole of phenomenological reflection is something that Husserl (1987, 7) has always emphatically rejected under the rubrics of naturalism and historicism.

What Husserl does at these immanent end poles, most of the time, is that he constantly postpones addressing the potential breakdown, or at least insufficiency, of a phenomenological reflection. The reflection can always go on, move between these poles, and the sciences are thus left in the waiting room forever. The story Husserl always wants to tell is how our judgments and propositions, how our active syntheses, are grounded in the firm soil, *der Boden*, and how they can be traced to some source. Among the examples of such an

ascending story are the lectures on transcendental logic from 1920/1921 (cf. Husserl 2000, 66), or later in *Experience and Judgment*.⁴ Instead of the eternal beginnings, I propose a direct conceptualization of the breaks in reflection, through the notion of “*rupture*.” I will exemplify this notion through several examples: I will begin with the ruptures in the case of the limit phenomenon tackled by Husserl, then I will proceed to the phenomenon of aesthetic experience which was not treated as a limit phenomenon by Husserl, and finally I will show how we can find rupture in a phenomenon not tackled by Husserl, that is, political revolution.⁵

II. Approaching the Phenomenon of Rupture

Two German words used by Husserl in crucial moments can be associated with the notion of rupture – *der Bruch* and *die Kluft*. In the textual examples from Husserl that follow, both these German terms appear.

A common example of the rupture can be seen in the analysis of one limit phenomenon that Husserl tackles in *Husserliana XLII*, namely, sleep. Husserl analyzes how sleep comes, how the passive syntheses of waking consciousness and faint consciousness are connected and follow upon each other. He ponders how the syntheses of waking and sleeping consciousness link up, how the meanings that occur in sleep can be transferred to waking consciousness, or, even more radically, how dreamless sleep is experienced as a sort of gap. It all circles around the observation that sleep comes suddenly, that there is “a sharp

⁴ *Experience and Judgment* was edited by Landgrebe and published posthumously. However, as shown in the thorough analysis of the genesis of the book by Lohmar (1996, 33ff.), the outline and general argument of the book is that of Husserl. Only the Introduction (§§ 1 – 14), which Husserl in the final assessment disapproved of, is by Landgrebe.

⁵ In 1919, Arnold Metzger wrote a straightforwardly titled book *Phänomenologie der Revolution*. The book was published posthumously in 1979, but already in 1919 Metzger sent the manuscript to Husserl. While critical of certain aspects, Husserl encouraged Metzger and confirmed the existence of an affinity between the practice of phenomenological philosophy and revolutionary political practice. Metzger’s book, however, was not really a phenomenological analysis of revolution, but rather a phenomenologically-inspired utopian musing about a sort of Christian socialism, the quasi-religious idea of a “loving community” [*die liebende Gemeinschaft*] (Metzger 1979, 53) that is to be brought about by the revolutionary overcoming of the materialist, capitalist world bereft of interest in ideas. In that sense, Husserl agreed that, for phenomenology, “the mortal enemy is all capitalism” (Husserl 1994, 407), and he also used the notion of *Liebesgemeinschaft* soon after exchanging letters with Metzger (e.g., in 1921, cf. Husserl 1973b, 175). However, none of this amounted to a phenomenological investigation of revolutionary practice as lived experience, which is what will interest me in this text.

break [*Bruch*] in continuity" (Husserl 2013, 27). Geniusas calls these breaks "experiential breaches [*Erfahrungsglücken*]" (Genusas 2010, 77), whereby Dodd uses the term "rupture" (Dodd 2010, 64).

A more radical example of rupture is birth. The phenomenological notions of sedimentation, typifying apperception and horizon are crucial when disclosing the functioning of the transcendental ego, but these are not so clearly available to a new-born:

What is a subject at the beginning of development? The knowing subject is in the middle of its development and refers back to previous developments. It has a horizon of the past. An ego without a horizon of the past? Without development? And what does it mean that "subjects even begin"? (Husserl 2013, 18).

As Gérard puts it, "birth is the degree zero of meaning" (Gérard 2020, 149). Geniusas notes the links with sleep, drawing an analogy between birth and awakening (Genusas 2010, 75), while birth is analogous to an extreme case of the latter.

Husserl also stumbled upon the phenomenon of rupture in the case of a phenomenon he analyzed thoroughly but did not consider a limit phenomenon – the aesthetic experience.

Husserl (1976a, 266; 1980, 540) defines aesthetic consciousness as a neutralized consciousness – consciousness operating within a neutrality modification. Neutrality modification is defined as

a modification which, in a certain way, completely annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related – but it is a modification in a totally different sense than that of negation which, moreover, has its positive effect in the negatum: a non-being which is itself again a being (Husserl 1976a, 247f.).

The opposite of a neutrality modification is a positionality modification. When discussing the relationship between neutrality and positionality consciousness in *Ideen I* in these passages, Husserl points to an abyss or gap [*eine Kluft*] which separates neutrality and positionality. In particular, he mentions it at the moment when he considers that phantasy within phantasy is iterable, but it is not possible to traverse "from *phantasy* to the corresponding perception. For spontaneity there is an abyss [*eine Kluft*] here which the pure ego can traverse only in the essentially new form of realizing action and creation" (Husserl

1976a, 253). This abyss, however, exists between a neutral positional attitude as such (cf. Brainard 2002, 167). This is apparent from other statements by Husserl.

Neutralized consciousness is always a hidden, shadowy possibility of positional consciousness. “*To every cogito there belongs a counterpart which precisely corresponds to it such that its noema has its precisely corresponding counter-noema in the parallel cogito*” (Husserl 1976a, 259; emphasis in original). We are therefore always in an either/or – either in a neutral, or in a positional consciousness. The shift between the positional and the neutral attitude is a rupture.

When entering neutralized consciousness, aesthetic consciousness in particular, the horizon of practical action within positional consciousness is “cut off” [*abgeschnitten*] (Husserl 1980, 587). The severance of horizons of perception and action during the shift from the positional to the neutral attitude and *vice versa* is a rupture.

Fictions do not unite within the objective nexus of positional consciousness.

While all perceptions with regard to the objects intended in them are joined together in a unity and have reference to the unity of a single world, the objectivities of imagination fall outside this unity; they do not join together in the same way with the objectivities of perception in the unity of a world intended as such (Husserl 1939, 195).

Aesthetic consciousness turns everything it perceives into a “consciousness of the as-if [*Als-ob*]” (Husserl 1980, 513) and cuts it out of the unity of the single world. This is a rupture.

Aesthetic consciousness is therefore a rupture in our everyday, common lived experience. It cuts off the horizon of positional lived experience, it interrupts the objective nexus, it brackets the world as existing. It makes us “switch” into another type of consciousness, and it is difficult to link these stances, since an “abyss” separates them.⁶

To put it otherwise: an encounter with an aesthetic object, most often an artwork, causes a rupture in our life. We have great difficulty with translating our aesthetic experience into everyday terms, and to do it completely is impossible. We value the aesthetic experience, but it is impossible to completely justify our valuations, since aesthetic experience is not available to us when we

⁶ For an elaboration of all these features of Husserl’s aesthetics, see Lipták (2024, 109 – 123). See also Lipták (2013, 786ff.) for preliminary explanations of the consequences of these features of Husserl’s aesthetics in particular for Husserlian phenomenology.

justify our valuations. Works of art can be life-changing for us,⁷ but we cannot define why they change our lives; we can only note that they changed our life, but motivational causality breaks down at the limit, the rupture, separating the aesthetic and the practical everyday attitude. Especially such life-changing works show a necessary presence of a certain surplus of meaning in aesthetic experience. And when aesthetic experience is available, we just perceive aesthetically and let ourselves be affected by the aesthetic object.

I finally want to look at the phenomenon of political revolution to show that the phenomenon of rupture can be discovered even in phenomena which Husserl did not analyze. A phenomenological analysis of revolution would be one that looks at the first-person experience of the revolutionary agents (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 470).

The first thing to notice in the revolutionary experience is that the onset of the revolution feels sudden. Within what Beissinger terms fourth-generation revolution studies, the suddenness is sometimes translated into the thesis that revolutions are “fundamentally unpredictable” and always unexpected (Beissinger 2022, 36). Beissinger proceeds to develop a probabilistic model of the onset of revolutions, while acknowledging that there is an irreducible degree of indeterminacy and revolutions fundamentally come as surprises. Merleau-Ponty in his political philosophy, developed at the intersections of phenomenology and Marxism, made similar points. He criticized a kind of mechanistic Marxism that claimed that revolutions naturally and necessarily follow after specific developments in the economic sphere and that revolutions follow a prepared theory. Revolutions cannot be “mechanically deduced from theory” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 165). Moreover, Merleau-Ponty emphasized the spontaneity and unexpected novelty of the revolutions (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 362).

Revolutions arise after the accumulation of grievances which are complex and multifaceted, and while many grievances are concrete, together they can be summarized only in vague terms. Moreover, there is a feeling that grievances cannot be addressed through reforms and partial changes, but that they, in a sense, make the whole existing system rotten and indefensible. And,

⁷ Prášek (2024, 449), basing his analyses on Maldiney, draws once again on the analogy with awakening and captures the correlative relationship between transcendent and immanent pole in the aesthetic experience as follows: “Each sensation (and art captures a cluster or a compound thereof) brings about a slightly different world and a newly awakened subjectivity.” For relationship between later French phenomenology and Husserl, see, for example Šedo (2024, 989f.).

actually, the more vague and the more multifaceted the grievances are, the more difficult it is to address them through reforms. In Merleau-Ponty's words, revolutions come about with a vague sense that "things must change" [*il faut que ça change*] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 470). The word that revolutions often employ is "dignity," and revolutionary action addresses the lack of dignity.

Revolutions likewise require an accumulation of agents, where the mass action of revolution differentiates them from the dissident outside a revolutionary situation. The dissident is expunged from the society, isolated, rejected – but in revolutionary mass action, the situation is reversed, and the existing system is rejected as a whole. It is beyond any salvation.

With revolutionary mass action a space is established where dignity is realized. People work together, overcome their differences, and the most proximate goal of revolutionary action is the continuation of revolutionary action. It is a goal of revolutionary action to achieve dignity, but at the same time, dignity is already realized in revolutionary mass action. Even if a revolution succeeds in overthrowing the regime, the revolutionary experience cannot be translated into a particular political program, for it always feels like step back, implying that there was something more in a revolutionary experience. It always feels like betrayal. Again, as eloquently put by Merleau-Ponty:

It is no accident that all known revolutions have degenerated: it is because as established regimes they can never be what they were as movements; precisely because it succeeded and ended up as an institution, the historical movement is no longer itself: it "betrays" and "disfigures" itself in accomplishing itself. Revolutions are true as movements and false as regimes (Merleau-Ponty 1973, 207).

From the vantage point of revolutionary lived experience, revolution presents a rupture in everyday normal experience, in the normal course of events. Its onset is sudden, rooted in particular grievances, but it is always difficult to trace how particular grievances translate into a revolutionary action. Phenomenologically speaking, within revolutionary action, a new horizon is suddenly opened, disconnected from what happened before. The horizon of normal practical action is completely disconnected, cut off, and a new horizon of revolutionary action is opened where the relations between people are already completely transformed. The world of our practical action is bracketed, and a new world of revolutionary action is self-sufficient and holistic. When the horizon of practical action is reconnected and the revolution is translated into particular political program, there remains a sense of a surplus of meaning

in the revolutionary experience, and there is a sense that the revolutionary experience can be the source of something absolutely new.

For the social sciences, a phenomenological analysis of revolution can disclose the meaning of the revolutionary experience that goes beyond economic or sociological determination, beyond preestablished theories; for phenomenology itself, the focus on the phenomenon of revolutionary experience is at the same time another example of the phenomenon of rupture.

Tentatively generalizing the features of the experience of rupture pursuant to these phenomenological investigations, we can say: (1) The rupture cuts off the horizon of everyday experience and opens up a new horizon, a new self-enclosed world which can never coincide with the horizon and the world of everyday experience. (2) The rupture is a gap in motivational connections, a gap already in the passive syntheses, a gap which cannot be traversed in reflection; rupture therefore introduces a cut in motivation. (3) The experience of rupture presupposes tensions between irreconcilables, so that if the experience can be seamlessly, without remaining “surpluses,” incorporated into the course of lived experience, it is not a phenomenon of rupture. (4) Rupture is the source of the new, a surplus of meaning which can never be incorporated wholly into our everyday, normal lived experience.

III. Conclusion

The limit phenomena, themselves uncovered within phenomenological reflection, force phenomenology to focus on the issue of rupture that has already been pervasive in phenomenological investigations. The framework of rupture can help phenomenology to broaden its scope, as I tried to briefly show in the case of revolutionary consciousness. The lesson is that there are moments when life begins anew, where history begins anew, and the phenomenological notions of sedimentation and reactivation, or renewal [*Erneuerung*] (Husserl 1989, 1 – 94) are not that helpful. Phenomenology must seek out such experiences, such ruptures and not try to reduce them – despite the famous name of the phenomenological method – to the eternal return of the same. Phenomenology sometimes appears as operating with the adage from Ecclesiastes 3:15: “That which hath been is now; and that which is to be hath already been.” The phenomena of rupture remind phenomenology that it must be capable, when addressing them, of looking at what is absolutely new in them, unheard of, creative – rather than disclosing how they are variants on the eternally known. To present a contrary example, so much time in political phenomenology is invested into disclosing how the political issues we face today are in some ways already rooted in the Greek *polis* where something

like politics actually arose (see, for example, Patočka 1990, 142f.; Held 2012, 458f.). Thinking in terms of ruptures orients us rather towards the fact that contemporary politics may be, in principle, incomparable with what came before, and even point to the fact that there is not even something like an origin of politics.

Adorno criticized Husserl for being “concerned only with the justification of *vérités éternelles*” (Adorno 1940, 6f.). Elsewhere, he argued that Husserl’s “conception of truth is traditional, i.e., static and timeless” (Adorno 2013, 48). This is, obviously, a gross misrepresentation of Husserlian phenomenology, but it is a productive criticism insofar it addresses one of the tendencies in phenomenology, which may lead it to a dead end.

It is useful to conclude with reference to Derrida, who is, in a certain sense, a consequential Husserlian who recognized the importance of ruptures. What Derrida attacks in Husserlian phenomenology in his commentary on Husserl’s *Origin of Geometry* and also in *Voice and Phenomenon* (Derrida 2011, 71f.), is, after all, the notion of source – the very idea that we can even in principle trace the ways we think to any origin, to any *Ursprung*. When Derrida says that we only encounter traces, never the givens, that origin is “the forever nocturnal source of the light itself” (Derrida 1989, 137), what he actually does is that he absolutizes the rupture (cf. Kuchtová 2024, 259) – for Derrida, consciousness is ruptured through and through, a series of discontinuities (and this is actually similar to Merleau-Ponty’s (1968, 191) notion of consciousness as “*l’écart*”). Derrida then ponders how we may think when nothing is ever truly given, when there is never really a source – this is actually a phenomenology that is maximally alert to the possibility of its failure and to its inherent dangers. But by absolutizing the rupture, Derrida also diminishes it – if everything is ruptured, then also nothing is. The possibility offered by Husserlian phenomenology is something in between – it offers us the possibility to work with normal, optimal consciousness that is actively and passively synthesizing, sedimenting, reactivating, renewing, until the moment of a rupture when it suddenly no longer is. And then such phenomenology should show how to work with surpluses of meaning that the rupture leaves behind, how we are optimizing only until the moments when we are completely derailed. Its focus at those moments of rupture shall be on the particulars. At those moments, phenomenology should get critical and engaged. It should not try to explain away the ruptures, but by its very own philosophical work it should keep them open. A phenomenology of rupture would ultimately not be just descriptive, but also creative; it would indeed describe the ruptures, the particular ways in which this or that rupture appears, but the descriptions thereby created

would themselves carry on the function of ruptures being described. Such phenomenology no longer soothes but rather puts things off balance.

Bibliography

- ADORNO, T. W. (1940): Husserl and the Problem of Idealism. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 37 (1), 5 – 18.
- ADORNO, T. W. (2013): *Against Epistemology: A Metacritique*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- BEISSINGER, M. R. (2022): *The Revolutionary City*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2175r9q>
- BOWER, M. (2015): Husserl's Concept of the *Vorwelt* and the Possible Annihilation of the World. *Research in Phenomenology*, 45, 108 – 126. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341304>
- BRAINARD, M. (2002): *Belief and its Neutralization: Husserl's System of Phenomenology in Ideas I*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- DENNETT, D. C. (1991): *Consciousness Explained*. New York, Boston, and London: Back Bay Books.
- DERRIDA, J. (1989): *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*. Lincoln, Nebraska and London: University of Nebraska Press.
- DERRIDA, J. (2011): *Voice and Phenomenon*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- DODD, J. (2010): Death and Time in Husserl's C-Manuscripts. In: Lohmar, D. – Yamagouchi, I. (eds.): *On Time: New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time*. Dordrecht: Springer, 51 – 70. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8766-9_3
- FERRER, G. (2014): Monadologie, kritische Philosophie und Phänomenologie des unsterblichen Ich (Leibniz, Kant und Husserl). *Horizon*, 3 (2), 81 – 98.
- GENIUSAS, S. (2010): On Birth, Death and Sleep in Husserl's Late Manuscripts on Time. In: Lohmar, D. – Yamagouchi, I. (eds.): *On Time: New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time*. Dordrecht: Springer, 71 – 88. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8766-9_4
- GÉRARD, V. (2020): "The Ego beside Itself." In: Apostolescu, I. – Serban, C.: *Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 143 – 162. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110564280-008>
- HELD, K. (2012): Towards a Phenomenology of the Political World. In: Zahavi, D. (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 442 – 459. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.013.0022>
- HUSSERL, E. (1939): *Erfahrung und Urteil*. Prague: Academia.
- HUSSERL, E. (1952): *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* IV).
- HUSSERL, E. (1966): *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* XI).
- HUSSERL, E. (1973a): *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* XVI).
- HUSSERL, E. (1973b): *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* XIV).
- HUSSERL, E. (1974): *Formale und transzendente Logik*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* XVII).

- HUSSERL, E. (1975): *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* XVIII).
- HUSSERL, E. (1976a): *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* III/1).
- HUSSERL, E. (1976b): *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* VI).
- HUSSERL, E. (1980). *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* XXIII).
- HUSSERL, E. (1987): *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911-1921*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (*Husserliana* XXV).
- HUSSERL, E. (1989): *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1922-1937*. Dordrecht: Kluwer (*Husserliana* XXVII).
- HUSSERL, E. (1991): *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*. Dordrecht: Springer (*Husserliana* I).
- HUSSERL, E. (1994): *Briefwechsel. Band IV: Die Freiburger Schüler*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- HUSSERL, E. (2000): *Aktive Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung "Transzendente Logik" 1920/21*. Dordrecht: Springer (*Husserliana* XXXI). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4170-3>
- HUSSERL, E. (2001): *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein*. Dordrecht: Springer (*Husserliana* XXXIII). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0716-0>
- HUSSERL, E. (2013): *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik*. Dordrecht: Springer (*Husserliana* XLII). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6801-7>
- KUCHTOVÁ, A. (2024): *The Ungraspable as a Philosophical Problem: The Stubborn Persistence of Humanism in Contemporary Phenomenology*. Leiden and Boston: Brill. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004701465>
- LIPTÁK, M. (2013): *Transcendentálna funkcia umenia v husserlovskej fenomenológii*. *Filozofia*, 68 (9), 779 – 789.
- LIPTÁK, M. (2024): Husserl and the Radical Individuality of the Aesthetic Object. *Husserl Studies*, 40 (2), 107 – 128. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09340-w>
- LOHMAR, D. (1996): *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk „Erfahrung und Urteil“*. *Husserl Studies* 13 (1), 31 – 71. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00117142>
- LOHMAR, D. (2003): *Husserl's Type and Kant's Schemata: Systematic Reasons for Their Correlation or Identity*. In: Welton, D. (ed.): *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*. Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 93 – 124.
- MASO, I. (2001): *Phenomenology and Ethnography*. In: Atkinson, P. – Coffey, A. – Delamont, S. – Lofland, J. – Lofland, L. (eds.): *Handbook of Ethnography*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 136 – 144. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781848608337.n9>
- MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1964): *Sense and Non-Sense*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1968): *The Visible and the Invisible*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1973). *Adventures of the Dialectic*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

- MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (2012): *Phenomenology of Perception*. London and New York: Routledge.
- METZGER, A. (1979): *Phänomenologie der Revolution*. Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat.
- ORTIGOSA, A. (2024): The Awakening of the Soul and the Sleep of the Spirit: Hegel's Philosophy of Dreams. *Filozofia*, 79 (7), 768 – 782. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.7.5>
- PATOČKA, J. (1990): *Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin*. Prague: Academia.
- PRÁŠEK, P. (2024): In What Sense Can Art Be Ecological? Art as an Event Flash of Nature According to Henri Maldiney. *Filozofia*, 79 (4), 442 – 456. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.4.7>
- RYBÁK, D. (2021): Problém života čistého Já v Husserlových *L-Manuskriptech*. *Filozofia*, 76 (4), 252 – 266. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.4.2>
- SALANSKIS, J.-M. (1999): Sense and Continuum in Husserl. In: Petitot, J. – Varela, F. J. – Pachoud, B. – Roy, J.-M. (eds.): *Naturalizing Phenomenology*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 490 – 507.
- SCHUTZ, A. (1959): Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 20 (2), 147 – 165.
- STEINBOCK, A. J. (1995): *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- STEINBOCK, A. J. (2017): *Limit-Phenomena and Phenomenology in Husserl*. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- ŠEDO, M. (2024): Komplikovaný vzťah filozofie Clauda Romana a Martina Heideggera. *Filozofia*, 79 (9), 985 – 999. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.9.3>
- VYDROVÁ, J. (2022): Aplikácia fenomenológie v antropologickom a etnografickom výskume: východiská a perspektívy. *Filozofia*, 77 (9), 711 – 722. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.9.4>

This work was produced at the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, v.v.i. It was supported by the Agency APVV under the project “Symbolic Structures in the Tension between Authenticity and Tradition,” APVV-24-0145.

Michal Lipták
Institute of Philosophy
Slovak Academy of Sciences, v.v.i.
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava
Slovak Republic
e-mail: michal.liptak@savba.sk
ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4333-6108>