

Pragmatization of Narrative in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: A Modern Perspective


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Abstract: The main views on the nature of narrative in Wittgenstein's later philosophy are analyzed. It is shown how, realizing the research narrative, he paid attention to the linguistic means of expression of our thoughts, reference to the actual reality, the logical component of argumentation. It is shown that in order to place worldview accents more clearly and strengthen the expressive effect of thought, Wittgenstein pragmatized the narrative, in particular, used metaphors, images of learning, took into account the historico-cultural context. It is important for him to show that the form of the narrative influences what meanings the interlocutor will comprehend. Through a system of micro- and macro-narratives, Wittgenstein intended to express his opinion as clearly as possible, although he made the reader an active participant in the narrative. The thinker did not deviate from the analytico-scientific standards of philosophizing, although he showed that the relevant analysis of the narrative is significantly complicated by the ambiguities of its interpretation, the uniqueness of human experience and the identity of each narrator's value system. It is argued that a pragmatic approach to narrative analysis significantly expands the research methodology of the analytic thinker and, accordingly, makes it possible to deepen our understanding of reality

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and human existence, as well as more clearly define the specifics of their knowledge.

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1. Introduction

Research methodology in different philosophical traditions significantly influences the way of knowledge representation. This is especially noticeable in analytic philosophy. The emphasis on the analysis of language, the intention not to start research without clarifying the meaning of key terms, special interest in arguments, refusal to use intuitive, metaphysical or non-empirical experience—these are the important points that determined the narrative of analytic thinkers. In the beginning, this state of affairs significantly limited their ways of presenting arguments. As a result, socio-political issues remained out of their attention for some time. Narratives that appealed not to emotions but to reason could appear to be a sophistication of language, a set of unsubstantial and uninteresting propositions (cf. Unger 2014).

However, already in Wittgenstein's later philosophy there was an attempt to significantly modify the analytic methodology and in some way (in a way to pragmatize research narratives) to solve the challenges it faced. To demonstrate how this happened, it is appropriate to consider Wittgenstein's later work and analyze his narratives, which, under the influence of interest in the pragmatics of language, increasingly acquired plot completeness and originality. It is important to show that chosen by him pragmatic way of interpreting the narrative (which, in the end, was not always developed in analytic philosophy) makes it possible to successfully avoid such accusations as those mentioned above.

2. Theoretico-methodological foundations of narration

First of all, it is necessary to consider the fact that there was a so-called anthropological turn in Wittgenstein's later philosophy (Gebauer 2017) and

it is quite natural that in his researches various pragmatic (Boncompagni 2016; Garrison 2017), phenomenological (Kuusela, Ometiță and Uc, an 2020) and hermeneutic (Kačerauskas 1999) motives became more frequent. The study of mental, human behavior, experiences, peculiarities of information perception, spirituality and morality required qualitatively new approaches that would take into account the subjective component, which was neglected in the process of constructing formal ideal languages. The process of empirical research also seemed completely different, because the inner world of human, as well as historico-cultural or socio-political reality were difficult to analyze in such a way as to obtain holistic and sound theoretical results without relativistic or anti-realistic ideas, which became an integral part of formal analysis. An objective assessment of the real foundations of the world and the place of human in it, the correlation between facts and values, logical and ethical, subjective and objective, required a change in the terminology.

It will not be difficult to notice how the way of representing information in Austrian thinker's later works has changed in comparison with his earlier works. If in "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" Wittgenstein was for the most part aphoristic, laconic, and categorical in his statements, in "Philosophical Investigations" his reasoning became more expansive and less categorical; the thinker did not express ready-made solutions as much as he carried out research, the results of which were completely unknown to him. His later works lost their pronounced systemicity and integrity, but became more critical. As a result, various elements of the narrative became clearer in his texts. Wittgenstein constructed a plot (which sometimes took the form of an imaginary situation or a thought experiment), presented ideas in a characteristic narrative style, and gave simple examples that would be understandable to every reader. The thinker did not define his thoughts as absolute truth, although he suggested such a style of investigations that set certain cognitive standards (based on language analysis). Failure to comply with these standards would mean going beyond analytic philosophizing.

There are two types of narratives used by Wittgenstein: micro-narrative and macro-narrative. Micro-narratives are usually limited to one paragraph. For example, in § 1, Wittgenstein described a language-game with a very primitive plot: someone was sent to the shopkeeper with a card that read

«five red apples» (Wittgenstein 1968, § 1). In response, the shopkeeper gave him five red apples. The peculiarity of the situation is that the reader should have question: how does the shopkeeper understand the meaning of the words «apple», «red» and «five»?

According to a similar scheme (the speech act of one person—the reaction of another person) is the story of the builder A and his assistant B (Wittgenstein 1968, § 2). The language they use contains only 4 words: «block», «pillar», «slab» and «beam». Everything that happens in this situation comes down to the fact that A exclaims one of these words, for example, «Slab!», and B in return brings the appropriate thing (in our case, the slab). B learned to bring this thing in response to the appropriate exclamation of A. That's the whole micro-narrative: again, a minimum of people, dialogues, actions.

In this way, Wittgenstein built step by step certain stories that were needed only to become the object of analysis. Thomas D. Eisele calls Wittgenstein's characteristic way of presenting thought “instructive narratives” (Eisele, 1990, p. 77) and argues that “a central part of Wittgenstein's teaching is his use of stories, or narrative” (Eisele, 1990, p. 78). However, to my mind, it should be noted that in the case of Wittgenstein's analysis of a particular situation, the analysis itself is not a storytelling. Stories are an element of analysis. Each of them can be complicated. For example, you can increase the number of words in dialogues: add numerals or adjectives and so on. However, even if we reach the complex grammar of natural language, in fact, within the corresponding language-game (according to the scheme *request—reaction*) nothing will change. Wittgenstein pointed out that a change in the actions of communicants will take place depending on the intonation with which a word is uttered, depending on who says it and the context in which it is said. If this context is clear, the action will be performed correctly, otherwise the development of events will not take place in the way that one of the communicators expects. The more events in the activities of communicators will be described, the more the narrative about them will acquire integrity.

The examples given by Wittgenstein are only isolated situations: they can be considered in themselves (as micro-narratives), and they can be inscribed in a more complex plot line (macro-narrative) that will contain new

meanings. These meanings will make it possible to understand why a certain story was actually told. In broader contexts, each story acquires a new practical purpose. In Wittgenstein, such a macro-narrative is determined by the critique of the Augustinian theory of meaning: particular stories (about buying apples and the builder and his assistant) are only a means to critique this theory. Gradually, a certain story is supplemented by the author's current reflections on a particular aspect of the philosophical question. The opinion expressed in one paragraph often develops in the following, while the author highlights a new aspect of the research question (for example, draws attention to the meaning of a word or phrase, models a new situation or considers a new context of the research problem). In this way, micro-narratives grow into a macro-narrative that contains a description and analysis of more fundamental philosophical issues. For instance, there are several of them in the "Philosophical Investigations": in addition to the critique of the Augustinian theory of meaning, it is also the rule-following, private language, linguistic means of expressing mental states, seeing aspects, and so on. To investigate them, Wittgenstein criticized the language. This approach allows not only to identify shortcomings in the reasoning of other thinkers (St. Augustine, Kant, William James, etc.), but also to point to the grain of truth in their works. However it should be noted that Wittgenstein paid very little attention to the historico-philosophical component of the question: he constructed a research narrative in such a way so as by appealing to the ideas of others to confirm the correctness of his own position.

For Wittgenstein, narrative is not a self-sufficient and self-valuable phenomenon. What is important is not the form of information, but its content. As an analytic thinker, he minimized narrative characteristics such as symbolism, polysemy, and subjectivity. It is important for him to pay attention first of all to the reality asserted in the proposition, the linguistic means used for communication and the context of the narrative, which became not a goal but only a means of constituting the individual through language. In general, Wittgenstein researched and expressed the narrative in terms of its historical, literary and scientific characteristics. This distinctive interpretation of analytic narratives differs from that proposed by Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry

R. Weingast (2020), because it allows us to analyze each of them separately, rather than combine into one.

The reality of the historical narrative is determined by what happened in the past. This is the basic difference that distinguishes this narrative from the literary one. The latter does not necessarily have a reference to real events. However, artistic means (by which it is possible to create certain images and express the author's attitude to the sense of propositions) sometimes become the most effective means of formulating an opinion by the narrator. It is no coincidence, therefore, that these means are characteristic of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, in which the narrative unfolds directly in the text itself. It is noteworthy that the end of the narrative is often not known to the author himself, because the study is not yet complete. Although it is clear that his narrative does not go beyond the rational paradigm of philosophizing, because such a way out will only distance the thinker from the truth, but will not make him closer to it.

3. Narrative: from the historical past to the actual reality

Despite the fact that Wittgenstein was mostly interested in the present, the events that preceded it, of course, also had some significance for him. Study of them, based on the analysis of historical narratives, makes it possible to better understand the specifics of the state of affairs that is characteristic of today's world. Wittgenstein, following the methodology of neo-realism, considered the historical process as unambiguous, although he understood that interpretations of any event are far from unambiguity. He pointed out that the confidence in the truth of certain propositions about past events is not the same. We can easily check them by referring to a specific source, which may be our memory, perceptions, memories of other people, certain records, and so on. Historical facts are scientific because we know how they can be refuted. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarked: "I am e. g. quite sure of the date of a battle, but if I should find a different date in a recognized work of history, I should alter my opinion..." (Wittgenstein 1969, § 66). In other words, the scholar will always be limited by the information that has been captured in some way. Of course, since the scientist independently determines the source reliability, it is possible that an

error may occur. However, they have no other tools to study the original sources. All that remains for the researcher, as Arthur Danto later similarly reasoned, is “analysis of historical thought and language, presented as a systematic network of arguments and clarifications, the conclusions of which compose a descriptive metaphysic of historical existence” (Danto 1965, VII).

As we can see, under the influence of new facts, according to Wittgenstein, the historian offers a new interpretation of history. In the process of creating a narrative, they are somewhat like a writer who can re-evaluate the meanings of certain events and begin in a completely different way to explain the causes of previous events. However, everything depends not on their imagination, but on the facts. This is one of the fundamental differences between narrative in history and narrative in literature. Having received new facts, the historian must in some way combine them with existing ones, that is, offer a holistic picture of what happened. Under such conditions—when when some facts conform with others—a certain subjectivity may arise, because not all causal connections between the facts can be established with certainty. Therefore, sometimes for the sake of narrative integrity it is necessary to choose the most probable of the hypotheses to explain a certain sequence of events. In this case, the degree of subjectivism will be the smaller, the less event evaluation will differ from what took place in reality.

Wittgenstein realized that in principle we can doubt the truth of certain historical evidence, and in many cases all we can do is believe that it is true. Similarly, we believe the physical, geographical, and astronomical facts taken from books. Doubt about these facts seem pointless, because there are so many things to do with them (Wittgenstein 1969, § 312). For the construction of a historical narrative, as for any other human knowledge, it is important to be convinced of the truth of certain propositions that would not be in doubt. These are peculiar propositions—hinges—all other knowledge is based on them. Explaining this view, Wittgenstein wrote: “It strikes me as if someone who doubts the existence of the earth at that time is impugning the nature of all historical evidence” (Wittgenstein 1969, § 188). We cannot say that historical evidence is definitely correct, but it is not appropriate to deny the truth of those facts without which history itself would not be possible. In this regard, the Austrian philosopher

clarified: “What we call historical evidence points to the existence of the earth a long time before my birth;—the opposite hypothesis has nothing on its side” (Wittgenstein 1969, § 188). The difficulty is to draw the line between what is certain and what can be doubted. It seems to be the optimal way to determine such a distinction in a pragmatic way, i. e. taking into account the practical consequences that a certain interpretation could lead to.

In order to clarify the line between accurate and inaccurate knowledge, it is not superfluous to pay attention to such things as linguistic means of representation of thinking, logical component of methodology, as well as to compare languages of history, ontology and epistemology. But in any case, the researcher will analyze the propositions about the actual world. Therefore, relativism as a methodological principle of the study of history will be inappropriate. On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein, it could hardly be said that the historical narrative appeals to some substantiality. In this case, the narrative should be subject to certain laws. However, Wittgenstein is known to be very skeptical about the possibility of predicting future events based on knowledge of certain laws: “A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist” (Wittgenstein 1922, § 6.37). We can only make certain assumptions and formulate certain laws that are consistent with our experience. Having discovered new facts, these laws can be revised, because they have not so much logical as psychological (obtained by induction) basis. Therefore, it is inappropriate to find certain analogies between events of different epochs or cultures in order to predict, because the context of each of them will be unique. In addition, we cannot know the opinions of other people who influence the course of history.

However, any historical assessments expressed in narratives must be based on certain ontology. Of course, this does not justify the truth of the substantive philosophy of history. On the contrary, the belief that history is a certain substance leads to the recognition of certain laws that can be obtained deductively, and therefore, in this case it will be possible to extend the experience of the past to the present and future. It follows that events could be described before they occur. The fallacy of this view is due to the fact that the opinions of other people who influence the course

of history are unknown. In this regard, any predictions cannot be considered reliable.

When describing a certain event (past or present), it is important for the scientist to leave everything as it is, and not to try to identify certain patterns by manipulating the facts. Another thing is that the process of description can take place with the help of different types of language-games (such as eyewitness accounts, statistical analysis, logical conclusions, etc.), which will be about people, events, processes, and so on. In any case, when the propositions describe a specific historical reality, it is doubtful that they can be considered in themselves. These propositions form a narrative that will be intertwined with other narratives in different ways. For example, they may contain concepts that are derived from the generalization of various facts into a whole (the same concept of "history" is a kind of generalization, or, for example, the concept of a particular historical period, phenomenon, process). The same people or events may be present in other narratives. Under such conditions, it is important that different narratives do not contradict each other, because historical reality is one.

4. Literary component of narrative description and its historico-cultural context

The description of any event, phenomenon or process is often not devoid of various literary techniques, such as metaphors, which give greater expressiveness to thoughts. It can hardly be argued that developing a pragmatic-analytic approach in epistemology, Wittgenstein would criticize metaphors by means of linguistic analysis, just as it could be done by means of logical analysis. Moreover, in the late period of his work, Wittgenstein himself often used metaphors. At first glance, usage of metaphors was clearly inconsistent with the methodological requirement of logical accuracy in analytic philosophy. For example, in his philosophy there are metaphors such as a beetle in a box (to denote a situation where we do not know what meanings other people attribute to words) (Wittgenstein 1968, § 293), or a fly looking for a way out of a fly-bottle (similarly, scientists on the basis of language analysis seek a way to solve philosophical problems) (Wittgenstein

1968, § 309). It is clear that the definition of philosophical issues or aim in philosophy in this way does not come close to a true understanding of the essence of things. They have a different purpose (pedagogical and pragmatic) and are designed to excite the imagination of the reader in order to stimulate their reasoning about the nature of philosophy and its objectives (Burbules 2017; Synytsia 2020). In addition, Wittgenstein's philosophical reflections are full of numerous images of learning, with which he illustrated various theoretical aspects of the issues under study—for example, the head of a duck-rabbit or a double cross (to describe a situation whose meaning may vary depending on the aspect-seeing), a schematic triangle (to demonstrate the fact that, if you do not give syntactic means clearly defined semantics, they can take on any meaning and for each of them there is a justification) (Wittgenstein 1968, ch. XI). Wittgenstein's usage of various literary techniques stemmed from the need to analyze ordinary language, as it became clear that meanings function within the language itself, rather than being derived empirically from a study of the current state of affairs.

From a pragmatic point of view, it is important that literary means make it possible to better place worldview accents and enhance the expressive effect of thought. At the same time, they inform us about the historico-cultural aspects of the narrator's life. Based on the analysis of the text, we learn about the author's intentions, his/her beliefs, interests, character, and the state of contemporary science and culture, the popularity of certain ideas, concepts or thinkers. For example, analyzing his later works, it will not be difficult to notice how he was interested in psychology (albeit in anti-psychological interpretations), as well as the actual importance of the study of consciousness as a precondition for language (see: Wittgenstein, 1968, ch. XII). He understood that the reasons for the formation of concepts can be sought not only on the basis of language analysis, but also in another way (by analyzing what is in their nature), although he added that "we are not doing natural science" (Wittgenstein 1968, ch. XII). That is, on the one hand, Wittgenstein adhered to the scientific requirements for philosophizing, and on the other hand, given the unsatisfactory state of contemporary neuroscience, he realized that some approaches to the study of consciousness are not yet available to scientists. In view of this, the research narrative of

the analytic philosopher contained only those arguments that were substantiated and confirmed by the science of the time.

It can be argued that in various narratives—not only in philosophical works, but also in religious, legal, literary ones, the narrator expresses certain linguistic and psychological structures, verbalizing their own intentions, thoughts and experiences. Narrative does not exist in itself, but is an element of a system of discursive contexts. Therefore, the narrative—individual or collective—manifests the discourse as a narrator's way of thinking and acting. The method of analysis in itself does not always make it possible to see a certain integrity of the text, the affinity of some considerations with others. However, by making research more pragmatic, Wittgenstein significantly expands the possibilities of analytic methodology, which also begins to perform synthetic, constructive tasks and through the study of various forms of narrative deepens our understanding of cultural and historical discourses of certain times.

Forms of narrative (a kind of grammar of language in Wittgenstein's interpretation) represent our ways of perception and determine certain ontology. Narrative becomes a set of prescriptive norms that reconcile and fit individual statements into a much broader historico-cultural context. Different people fill this context with their own local meanings, so they may perceive and express the same narrative differently. This is well illustrated by the example of primitive communities. Investigating the ways in which information is interpreted in these communities and its symbolic forms of expression, Wittgenstein, as Gunter Gebauer notes, clearly realized that "signs derive their meaning from shared human practices" (Gebauer 2017, 75). Thus, by examining these practices, it would be possible to better understand the nature of meanings and in general the narratives in which they are represented (Wittgenstein 1993). Wittgenstein did not evaluate the practices of primitive people as erroneous or unwise. It is unlikely that people could not notice that natural phenomena occur without their magical actions. Their actions and narratives are always full of symbolism. It is not good to explain ritual actions from the point of view of science, because they appeal to other worldview. Such practices are important because they are significant to individual communities. These practices are original, they are not developed in the same way as science (progressively). Religious and

scientific ontological hypotheses, which state the order and homogeneity of phenomena in reality, coincide. Therefore, according to the logic of Wittgenstein, one worldview is not worse than another. Various magical practices are a specific form of life that allows people to organize their activities. They capture human cognitive experience in specific narratives and can be interpreted as socio-cultural practices that do not require scientific-theoretical explanations and generalizations. Therefore, it is not advisable to evaluate them as true or false. Human activity in primitive society is one of the language-games, a form of life that is full of its own meanings and intentions. The analysis of early human practices from the standpoint of modern European civilization will be too biased. We have completely different requirements for the ways of expressing opinions and their justification.

In general, the way in which the narrative is expressed affects the perception of listeners. By mastering various language-games, a person learns to express their own thoughts in narratives, the structure of which is flexible and open to change. Narratives become certain cognitive models of reality, which is formed in certain contexts and makes it possible to manifest human rationality as a characteristic feature of public (collective) discourses. For its part, collective discourse becomes manifested as a language-game. The very process of communication, which is the primary reality for the human person, is always social in nature. It is manifested not only through verbal means, but also non-verbally. However, this interpretation of the narrative through the prism of discourse seems to be ambiguous. Narratives have authors, while discourse is impersonal. The closer the concepts of discourse and narrative converge at the substantive level, the more it will become impossible to apply a formal analytic methodology for their study. Moreover, in the case of some narratives that are based on historical facts, their partial verification will be possible, and in the case of other, fictional narratives, such a procedure will be impossible.

From the form of narrative presentation of information depends on what meanings the listener will extract from it. The very morphology of the story and the vector of unfolding of the plot lines are constituted by its end, which is known only to the narrator. In Wittgenstein, the narrative is very often with an open end and not completely clear plot. The form of

presentation of the opinion he chose does not determine the content (it is determined by the facts) of the text, although it forms the reader's view of things, sets the direction of their interpretation of proposition. Sometimes such an interpretation is based on the author's explanation, which develops the idea mostly deductively and associatively, but not intuitively or arbitrarily. In reality, events develop independently, even if no one influences them.

The narrative developed by Wittgenstein takes the form of research. According to his theoretico-methodological approach, the best way to start a narrative is to ask questions. In "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein asked questions more than a thousand times. Another thing is that he left most of them unanswered. However, even if he offered an answer, it did not always seem quite right to him. Thus, formulating the question, at first glance it may seem that Wittgenstein himself did not know where this or that line of reasoning would lead him. This manner of constructing a narrative can be explained by the influence of his school practices. In formulating his opinion, Wittgenstein seems to have a dialogue with the students. Interestingly, sometimes he did just that—dictated philosophy (Gibson, and O'Mahony eds. 2020). Even the examples that Wittgenstein gives to explain his opinion are very often related to school (e. g., series of numbers, grammar exercises, graphical images, and basic information on geography, history, literature, etc.). It is important for him not just to find something himself, but to do everything to encourage students or readers to search independently. He said about his teaching method: "In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way..." (Gasking and Jackson 1967, 52). Thus, the addressees of his messages were given an active role in the creation of the narrative, which was by no means limited to the form of presentation. Wittgenstein set only those rational limits within which readers should move on their own. In this regard, he noted: "Anything your reader can do, leave to him" (Wittgenstein 2006, 77e). The narrative can be fully understood only when, figuratively speaking, to act as its co-creator. Consequently, finding all the meanings that are represented in the narrative can only be the result of a detailed and meticulous analysis, that is, when you begin to understand the very idea of the speaker.

5. Narrative in science and narrative of science

Since the narrative is a relatively independent phenomenon, the question of its scientific research arises. In particular, Wittgenstein drew attention to the fact that the narrative itself has an impact on the human mind. In § 524 of the “Philosophical Investigations”, he noted: “Don’t take it as a matter of course, but as a remarkable fact, that pictures and fictitious narratives give us pleasure, occupy our minds” (Wittgenstein 1968, § 524). This means that narratives are one of those things that can amaze. They make you think and evoke emotions. Narratives affect human behavior. Therefore, in order to influence a person, it is important to choose the right communication strategy and build the narrative in such a way that it evokes certain mental states, especially thoughts or emotions. This already means that philosophy as a set of narratives cannot leave everything as it is. And what is important, these narratives are not only born of surprise, but are also capable of surprising (and by no means their formal presentation, but their imagery). For this purpose philosopher does not need to create imaginary worlds—he or she just needs to focus on the study of the actual world.

Thus, investigating the narrative, the analytic thinker begins to more thoroughly understand the specifics of cognitive practices. Through the prism of the study of narrative as a means of communication in society, the researcher gradually comes to the study of linguo-psychological aspects of the mind-body problem in general and the mental in particular. At the same time, it is clear that at the personal level, the mental has a socio-cultural basis—it is not appropriate to describe it exclusively as a set of neural processes in the brain. The fact is that we represent our lives by applying a certain narrative. Thus, our understanding will be determined by a narrative that will not only represent reality, but will also be a means of its social construction. However, from a psychological point of view, it is not entirely expedient to emphasize only the socio-cultural connotations of the narrative. Its more important characteristic will be the capture and expression of intentions to act in a certain way. Moreover, these intentions may be unconscious, which significantly complicates the process of their study. In order to correctly interpret different kinds of intentions, it is necessary to develop a correct methodology that would take into account that in the world

there are no stories, but certain events (cf: Bruner 2004, 691). We construct a narrative by which we describe various events in our lives. Narrative, if we interpret Wittgenstein, becomes the form through which we express our life and everything that happens in it.

Unfortunately, the correct scientific interpretation of the narrative will be complicated by the fact that our experience can be represented in the narrative in different ways, sometimes contradictory. The point is the facts that form the plot of the narrative are not always interconnected. Therefore, the meanings inspired by them will not always generate identical interpretations, and the narrative in empirical dimensions will become relative and uncertain. The fact that over time, past events will be interpreted differently does not mean that they will be falsified. With more attention to the facts, the interpretation of these events will become clearer. However, it is also possible to lose the connection between the images of memory and the impressions that caused them. Under such conditions, the narrative becomes closed to the essence of the events it describes and can be used in different cultural contexts to argue exactly those values that are characteristic of the community.

The relativity of the narrative is generated not only by the requirements for its construction, but also by the language itself, which reflects our inherent way of life. The human worldview is so unique that it does not allow us to understand other species. It is no coincidence that Wittgenstein stated the following: "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (Wittgenstein 1968, ch. XI). Of course, this assumption cannot be taken literally, because at the narrative level, each conversation has a certain logic (causation, connotations, reference, etc.), without which language would not be a means of communication. It is rather about the possibility of a clear understanding of all the meanings that are embedded in the language. The structure of language (regardless of the correlation between real objects) has its own ontology, defined by the way of human life. Therefore, even if we knew a language unknown to us, but the traditions followed by its speakers would be foreign to us, we would still not be able to understand them. The fact is that we would first have to adapt to their way of life, ignoring our own previous experience.

Such Wittgenstein's skepticism about the possibility of a reliable narrative reconstruction of events can be considered more broadly, in the context of the problem of language comprehension. Indeed, we can consider any expression of language as metaphors. The language of science is no exception. The basis of understanding between people who speak different languages is most likely trust, not a certain explication. Empirical experience can be expressed within various theories (conceptual schemes). This state of affairs indicates that the language of science becomes a kind of narrative, and every scientific fact, in addition to certain information about reality, also informs about certain cultural values of the intellectual community. Such pluralism, which provides grounds for competition between scientific programs as certain types of theoretico-methodological narratives in order to be recognized more precise in explaining the ontological and epistemological foundations of reality, agrees well with pragmatic methodology, because when the scientific community prefers a scientific program, it is important to consider those practical consequences which are a defining argument for substantiation of theoretical positions. If the scientific program cannot be verified empirically, we will have to appeal to all sorts of abstract (metaphysical) concepts or thought experiments. The pragmatic conclusion would be that if metaphysical knowledge is useful for scientific theory, it is impractical to neglect it while constructing the narrative of science. For its part, thought experiments can be the only means of at least partially clarifying the situation referred to in the narrative, in cases where empirical experiments are not possible.

In the light of this kind of perspective of philosophical research, the question of truth has arisen in a new way. Analyzing linguistic expressions, Wittgenstein remarked that quite often it may seem that "the feeling gave the words *truth*" (Wittgenstein 1968, § 544). In other words, the meaning of words will depend on what we experience and feel when we make certain statements. The defined boundaries of truth become somewhat blurred. As Richard Rorty noted, truth can become dependent on the human mind and on the way how we describe the world around us (Rorty 1989, 5). The dependence of truth on the narrative makes it a kind of phantom "grand narrative", which breaks down into many truths of each individual. Under such conditions, the narrative itself, rather than objective reality, sets the

meaning of truths. If this were the case, it would mean the complete dependence of truth on the language of scientific theory, its to some extent personification and relativity, as well as the possibility of permanent creation of new meanings in new contexts and, in general, pluralism of interpretations of intricate narrative. However, Wittgenstein did not seem to deviate from the principles of objectivist methodology, and therefore argued quite pragmatically that: "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria" (Wittgenstein 1968, § 580). If certain feelings arise, they become conditioned by some external situation. The researcher's attention should be focused on the knowledge of external realities in order to get closer to understanding the nature of things, even though, by perceiving or analyzing the narrative, we can involuntarily influence its results. In any case, by clarifying the pragmatic aspects of the narrative, one can much more clearly investigate the specifics of intersubjective communication and more thoroughly understand the peculiarities of perception of reality.

6. Narrative: openness to discussion

Wittgenstein's analysis of narratives encounters a number of difficulties that need to be analyzed. In particular, it is about the correlation between language-game and narrative. It seems that not every language-game is a narrative, however, it can be reformulated into a narrative. To do this, we need to consider the language game more broadly—given the speech context. In other words, the situation of retelling a language-game becomes a narrative that has the characters, a story line, and so on. The end of such a narrative depends on the extent to which the requirements for language communication have been met. In addition to the meanings, it is also important who were the speaker and the listener, what were their intentions and beliefs, under what circumstances the communication took place—all these components are important for the development of the plot. According to Wittgenstein, language-game is «the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven» (Wittgenstein, 1968, § 7). Given the possibility to use action to influence what is really happening, language-game becomes a way of life. Moreover, with its help it is possible not only to influence, but also to describe the reality and the changes that take place

in it. In this case, the language game acquires certain elements of the narrative, which is characterized by an expressive function of influence. And where there is the influence of one on the other, there is an opportunity to develop a story line, that is, to construct the development of events. They are suggested by the narrator, but the reader still needs to make an effort to correctly interpret the proposed story.

If the story begins with a question, it is not clear whether its end may be unknown to the narrator? In the case of Wittgenstein, things are not so clear. It is clear that the text presented by him was already well thought out from the very beginning. Wittgenstein only suggested that readers find this logic themselves, and not come up with their own interpretation of the arguments. However, this applied only to the logical component of the narrative. In addition, each narrative has aesthetic and emotional components. The latter two can be interpreted differently by researchers. After all, those associations that are evoked by the narrative can differ significantly from one reader to another. Differences in interpretations of the narrative are due to life experience, beliefs and interests, as well as cultural and historical background.

In this case, Wittgenstein's analysis of the narrative cannot be considered outside the context of cultural studies (McDonald, 2001). Moreover, as Jens Brockmier and Rom Harre argue, studying its narrative, its discursive embeddedness cannot be neglected (Brockmier & Harre, 1997, p. 264). Such embeddedness is manifested through the prism of cultural and historical landmarks for the development of thought. However, how can we talk about the discursive embeddedness of Wittgenstein's narratives? He sought to build a narrative that would be as general and understandable as possible to a wide range of readers. In this way, the cultural and historical preconditions of the story seem to be eliminated. The way of presenting an opinion becomes close to scientific, but scientific texts are still not devoid of narrative structures. It becomes unclear where the line is between the description of reality and the process of its construction.

7. Conclusions

In general, it can be argued that Wittgenstein in the late period increasingly paid attention to the pragmatic aspects of expression, in particular, creating a narrative. The micro- and macro-narratives present in his works are important elements of the analysis of language from the pragmatics standpoint. Wittgenstein focused the reader's attention on a particular story, but did not always draw clear conclusions from it. Stories became the beginning of philosophizing. In general, in his philosophical studies can be distinguished analysis of aspects of historical, literary and scientific narrative. Each of these narratives acquires its own characteristics. This approach complicates the analysis of the narrative, but makes it more thorough, holistic and logically thought out, that is, one that would correspond to the current state of affairs in reality. It is no coincidence that Wittgenstein avoided relativization and subjectivity in interpreting the events of the past, although he understood that historical statements could change under the influence of new facts. Wittgenstein was well aware that the way people interpreted an events would be influenced by historico-cultural context and human experiences. Despite the fact that narratives have their own logic of presentation, it is not advisable to look for any patterns in the development of history, as the future is uncertain. From a pragmatic point of view, narratives cannot be analyzed as true or false because they are not devoid of metaphors. However, this does not mean that the author has the right to interpret events at his own discretion—it is important to describe them as clearly as possible. Metaphors are needed to make the ideas clearer, not less true. It is important for Wittgenstein to be as clear as possible, not to confuse the reader. Imagery is important for this, but first of all the depth of thought must be a decisive argument. From a pragmatico-analytic perspective, in the process of researching the narrative, it is important to capture the meanings that are hidden in speech, rather than invent new ones. Also, capturing the intentions and beliefs of the author, the researcher must take into account that they are inseparable from the discourse of a certain time. Their narratives must be consistent with standards of analytic precision. Similarly, the narrative itself can be studied from the standpoint of science. At the same time, it must be realized that a reliable

reproduction of all the objective realities which determine the narrative is hardly possible. However, as Wittgenstein has shown, a pragmatic approach to analysis allows us to deepen our understanding of the nature of reality and human existence, the knowledge of which we express in narratives, and thus to influence ourselves through the process of narration.

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