DISCUSSION NOTE

Value and Freedom


Joanna Moncrieff*

1. What is morality

Like the other volumes in Peter Hacker’s impressive series on human nature, volume four offers his wisdom on many subjects and is full of insights and penetrating clarity. Along with an analysis of the nature of morality, he covers the subject of evil, freedom and determinism, the science of happiness and, not to be forgotten, the meaning of life! This review will focus on the most fundamental points: that value is inherent in the nature of life, and that morality is a corollary of human nature and the world we live in that presupposes freedom of action. There is much more that is interesting and enlightening in this volume, however, and I encourage readers to read it and see for themselves.

The mainstream view, according to Hacker, regards morality as a realm that is independent of the material world of facts, including empirical facts about human nature. For much of human history morality was believed to be derived from God, or the Gods, and more recently (and occasionally in the past) from abstract, universal moral laws or principles. As a consequence, many philosophers have been puzzled about the existence of ‘value
in a world of fact’ (p. 8), and have treated morality as something both detached and mysterious.

Hacker takes a different view. As he highlighted in the first volume of Human Nature, ideas of value arise in the context of the living world; the ‘notion of the good of a being is biologically rooted’ (p. 175) (Hacker 2010). Living creatures are different from inanimate objects by virtue of having a life cycle during which they grow and develop, reproduce and eventually decay and die. Our understanding of life is framed by the normal life cycle of the organism and the activities that are typical of its species at various points of this cycle. Living beings can flourish and prosper or decline and suffer illness, loss of powers and death. We judge whether situations are good or bad for an organism in terms of whether they enable it to survive, mature, reproduce and function in an optimal way. ‘All values arise from life’ as Hacker puts it (p. 7).

It is against the background of facts about the nature of human beings and of the environment we live in that we need to understand morality. Hacker points out how we have innate tendencies both to competitiveness and aggression, and to sympathy and cooperation. We experience sexual attraction and desire. We are born immature and need nurturing, and we are susceptible to illness, injury and death. We have the ability to emulate and to learn. We have the capacity for language and the ability to reason. We can follow rules and pursue goals. We have a range of emotions, both animal emotions (e.g. fear, affection and curiosity) and specifically human ones that depend on our mastery of language (e.g. pride and shame), which reflect that we care about things.

Human beings are also social creatures. We are dependent on each other for survival and for the realisation of many of our capacities, including our unique capacities for language and reasoning. Most humans also enjoy and seek relationships with others, as lovers or friends. Human morality is explicable with reference to these ‘powers and propensities’ that characterise human beings, including basic biological features and those that relate to our intelligence and social needs and inclinations. ‘There would be no morality without animality and likewise no morality without capacity-rationality’ (p. 23).
Hacker discusses Von Wright’s types of goodness in order to illustrate how ‘human nature is the source of many kinds of value’ (p. 15). Medical goodness is linked to the health and welfare of a living being, its organs and faculties. Technical goodness is the goodness of skills. Instrumental goodness is the goodness of instruments and implements. Beneficial goodness concerns what is good for a being and what does good to a being, and is essentially linked to welfare, prospering and flourishing. Hedonic goodness concerns the good of the pleasant and the pleasing, of the enjoyable and the delightful. Unlike Von Wright, Hacker argues that moral values are not secondary or derivative forms of goodness; but they relate to other forms of goodness and all forms of goodness contribute to the good of a person.

Hence there is nothing mysterious or meta-physical about morality, and our moral values are rooted in our nature and the nature of our world. Our ideas of what is good and what is bad arise from the facts that we are language-using, social beings with rational powers who find ourselves in a world where survival is a constant challenge. Morality is a predictable consequence of the sort of complex life that characterises human beings.

Acknowledging his debt to Aristotle, Hacker highlights how moral values are essentially social—they are about how we conduct ourselves in a group and how we behave towards other people. Hence moral values act as a ‘social glue,’ uniting a particular group or society around a consensus of right and proper behaviour, which in more developed societies is partially codified into a legal code that sets out proscribed behaviour and associated sanctions.

But Hacker also points out that there are periods in history in which the ‘traditional moral order’ is called into question. This occurred in ancient Greece as exemplified by the figure of Socrates and some of the Sophists, and again in the Enlightenment starting in Europe in the 17th century, which followed a thousand years of Christian hegemony. The Enlightenment creates new values and ideals—those of questioning and of tolerance. The ideal human changed from the dutiful and faithful Christian ‘servant’ of the middle-ages to the questioning, open-minded, autonomous individual that we aspire to in the modern age.

Hacker does not develop these ideas further as he has so much else to cover, but there is a lot more to say about how defining features of modernity
such as science and capitalism have moulded our natures and changed what we value about ourselves and our lives. A recent analysis of Marxist ethics, for example, suggests that Enlightenment values inevitably remain limited in a capitalist society based on private property (Blackledge 2012). Several commentators, myself included, have described how neoliberal capitalism has helped to shape our ideas about what it is to lead a ‘healthy’ and fulfilling life, and how the neoliberal norm is used to define failure as mental disorder (J. Davies 2022; W. Davies 2011; Fisher 2009; Moncrieff 2022).

Hacker’s grounding of moral sensibility in the nature of biological life is what makes his account particularly interesting. Other modern philosophers have emphasised the social nature of morality, particularly those associated with virtue ethics, but Hacker shows how the concept of moral goodness relates to more general notions of good and bad that are an integral part of understanding the nature of living things. He highlights how inherent, biologically-based features of human nature and the nature of the world we live in make moral judgements a natural feature of human life. This is not the same as saying that morality follows nature—of justifying survival of the fittest or any other such crude notion. Hacker is certainly not an evolutionary determinist. What he is highlighting is that our moral inclinations arise from our biological nature, and also that our natural inclinations make a moral code a necessity for successful social cooperation. We have a biological predisposition for caring and sympathy with others. At its most basic level this is rooted in the instinct to care for our young, but given our social nature it extends far beyond our offspring or immediate family. We need to live in social groups both for our survival and for the development of our intellectual and physical capacities. But we also have instincts to compete and to survive. Our inclinations need to be balanced and regulated in order for humans to live together successfully.

2. What is the moral good?

In surveying previous moral theories, Hacker exposes false dichotomies. For him, virtue ethics and Kant’s deontological ethics are not alternative positions, but two aspects of a ‘complex whole’ (p. 34). Utilitarianism’s opposition of selfishness and altruism, and Kant’s contrast between free and
rational behaviour and that driven by desire are both misleading. Pursuing our own inclinations is only selfish if there is a moral demand upon us not to, and acting to satisfy a desire is not causally determined, except in some exceptional cases (see below).

Hacker’s fundamental point is that ‘Moral goodness is exhibited in one’s attitudes towards other people’ (p. 37). Serving the interests, welfare and well-being of others or of society as a whole is morally praiseworthy. This is constitutive of moral goodness in almost all cultures. Like Aristotle, Hacker describes how communities embody notions of goodness that determine the characteristics that make a good person; these are the virtues.

What Hacker shares with Kant is a belief that morality presupposes rationality— that is the ability to appraise the world in a sophisticated way and make decisions based on reasons. Our nature as practical animals that react to and act on the world also entails that we care about things. The fact that we are social animals demands that we care about each other. The capacity to care for other people is a presupposition of morality. We have instincts to care about others, such as maternal and paternal instincts to protect and nurture our young, and these are the primitive roots of our moral values, but we are also taught and learn to care.

A key development in our moral outlook that Hacker dates to the Enlightenment is what he calls ‘formal respect;’ that is the idea that every human being deserves respect and dignity (non humiliation) by virtue of being a human being—not just a member of a particular community or group. Although we now take this idea for granted, and it is enshrined in the concept of ‘human rights’ (which Hacker sees as a related but narrower concept due to its legal rather than philosophical foundations), formal respect is not only a relatively recent idea, it is also fragile. It was most obviously rejected by Nazism and apartheid South Africa but even today, discrimination against people on the basis of race, sex and sexuality across the globe can be seen as subverting the principle of ‘formal respect’.

Hacker credits Kant for establishing the principle of formal respect and although he disagrees with how Kant sets out the categorical imperative, he seems to me to align with Kant in basing the principle of respect on our shared rationality. The fact that human beings are rational agents who make free choices about how they act and are therefore responsible for what
they do makes every human being worthy of respect. Recognising the freedom of others entails respecting their autonomy.

This raises the question of how we should treat people who lack fully developed rational capacities, including small children, people with intellectual disabilities and those who have suffered brain damage or disease. Formal respect is not something that applies to individuals according to their capacities, it is a principle that applies to everyone by virtue of their membership of the human race. Yet this entails that what ‘formal respect’ means in practice can vary, depending on the capacities of the individual. We may respect the right to life and freedom from cruelty for all human beings, but children are not generally allowed the same freedom as adults, and those with limited intellectual capacities may not be granted the same rights and privileges as others.

Hacker points out the apparent contradiction that the ancient philosophers recognised the rationality of man but did not make the leap to formal respect because they lived in a slave owning society. The idea of formal respect was incompatible with the social structure of the ancient world, and there was no significant impetus for changing this structure.

Here, again, Hacker highlights how social and economic conditions influence our moral thought, which is reminiscent of Hegel and Marx (Hegel 1976; Marx 1993). It is only with the rise of commercial and later industrial capitalism that we get a fully-fledged notion of the individual (Blackledge 2012). There are many harbingers of individualism. The Reformation is often thought of as a significant step towards individualism, though whether it reflects the social and economic conditions of emerging capitalism in a Marxist sense, or creates them as Weber claimed (Weber 1958), is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, Enlightenment thought and the principle of formal respect that Kant articulates reflect the new social relations introduced by the fall of feudalism and the rise of capitalism, and particularly the emergence of a working class with the power to demand recognition.

3. Virtues

Hacker argues that the characteristics that are considered good or virtuous have changed little throughout human history, and that we tend to
overlook some of the constant features of our moral outlook until particular historical junctures bring them into view. Such is the ‘golden rule’ of treating others as you would be treated yourself. Hacker traces the articulation of this principle to the House of Hillel in the 1st century BC, although Christianity must be credited with popularising and disseminating it. The implication is that this principle of according other people the kindness you would wish for yourself is a deeply ingrained one that transcends historical epochs and geographical and cultural boundaries, even if it is only made explicit in certain conditions.

The continuity of valued characteristics such as kindness, generosity and trustworthiness that are oriented to the interests of others is readily apparent. However, one can stress the constancy of the virtues or their transmutability, and both positions seem correct and important. Although Hacker’s examples of how virtues change their importance is meant to illustrate the relative triviality of these changes against the constancy of the backdrop, again his analysis illuminates how our material conditions shape our values. Nietzsche complained about how Christianity had ousted the values of bravery, honour and courage that characterised the masters of warlike societies and made the slave values of weakness and submission into virtues. Hacker adds that the modern welfare state has made charity less important, improved medicine and pain relief have rendered fortitude and endurance less significant, and that the availability of effective birth control means chastity (a virtue that has mainly applied only to women, of course) is no longer highly prized. Although lust, as Hacker points out, is still technically a vice, it plays little role in contemporary moral tales. The Christian values of faith (which as Hacker points out is not a virtue if one doesn’t believe there is anything to be faithful to) and pity, do not match modern sensibilities, although mercy would surely still qualify.

Hacker has little time for Nietzsche although he welcomes his rejection of a religious foundation to morality and his challenging of medieval Christian ‘martyrology’ and 19th century hypocrisies. Hacker’s answer to the spectre of relativism raised by Nietzsche seems too brief, however, given how compelling this view has become and remains, and given that, as Hacker freely admits, many currently existing human societies do not share the Enlightenment values that Hacker advances. His argument is that these
values are the most conducive to the Good of Man and, if adopted by a society, give everyone the best chance to flourish— that is to fulfil their potential and lead a meaningful life. Moreover, living according to these values enables each of us to find our ‘own soul’ (p. 64) as Hacker puts it, so that it is not just that they are good for other people and the community in general, they are good for each of us in the sense that they enable us to live a good and meaningful life.

Again, this is similar to Marxist arguments that the highest moral values are those that enable the realization of each and every individual’s ‘species being,’ although Marxists would argue that this is only possible in a socialist system where significant material inequality is abolished (Blackledge 2012). The problem with this position is that much of the world is still not convinced of the superiority of the Enlightenment view, and it is not clear how it can be persuaded. Western values have increasingly become equated with colonialism and the oppression of indigenous cultures abroad, and at home are under attack from those who feel disorientated by freedom and desire a return to more traditional values (witness the recent overturning of the right to abortion in the United States). Hacker is aware of this and concerned about the fragility of the Enlightenment project. As Marxists suggest, if morality is ‘a constantly contested product of historical conditions’, then only political action can change moral outlooks, but increasingly there seems no guarantee that the progressive side will triumph (Moncrieff 2014) (p. 63).

4. Freedom

For Hacker, the fact that our actions are free is inherent in the idea of human action. Without it, we are dealing not with actions, but with reflex movements. As Hacker puts it: ‘we are free agents tracing a spacio-temporal path through the world in accordance with our inclinations, preferences, choices, intentions and decisions and in pursuit of our goals, subject to chance and fortune’ (p. 161).

We are not bundles of particles whose trajectory is determined at the atomic or subatomic level. All complex biological beings are highly structured and subject to ‘top-down’ control. Any form of reductionism that
seeks to explain the behaviour of living beings in terms of their atomic make-up, their chemical composition or the structure of their nervous system, for example, ignores all explanations that are distinctive of biological creatures. Reductionist explanations cannot account for the propensities of living things because these can only be understood at the level of the organism (notwithstanding Dawkins attempts to ascribe them to genes). Neither can they even account for the workings of bodily organs, which also have to be understood in a functional sense, as serving the organism as a whole. And most importantly, reductionist explanations cannot account for the individual actions of living creatures, because these cannot be predicted in a mechanical manner. As biologist Steven Rose pointed out, the future of living beings is inherently indeterminate (Rose 1997).

Purposiveness and rationality render actions meaningful. In other words, we can understand actions in terms of how they help or hinder an individual’s aims and intentions. We explain actions in this way by giving reasons, which answer the question as to why someone did what they did. Nothing that has meaning can be explained by a mechanistic account of how it came to be. ‘An essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world’ (p. 177) as Neitzsche put it in the Gay Science (quoted by Hacker).

It is curious that determinism exerts so much appeal to philosophers and scientists, since, as Hacker points out, no one behaves as if it were true—indeed, it is doubtful that anyone even could act as if it were true. We respond to each other and to animals as beings that make free choices, and it is difficult to imagine how we could behave otherwise. Maybe the appeal of determinism reflects the existential crisis produced by the decline of religion. As Hacker pointed out in the first volume of his series on human nature, The Categorial Framework, religious design brought teleology in general into disrepute, and for many thinkers, ideas about purpose conjure only religious meanings (Hacker 2010). Perhaps, it takes an outlook that is not reacting against a religious worldview to see purpose and meaning in other ways.

Hacker helpfully distinguishes determinism in its modern form from the much older idea of Fate and fatalism, common to many ancient cultures. Fatalism is not the idea that our actions are pre-determined by antecedent conditions, such as the state of our brains, but that life is subject to chance,
and that our abilities to influence and control our environment are necessarily limited. The ancient idea of Fate is a personification of all that is beyond the sway of human beings. Earlier cultures recognised that it is necessary to accept this fact to face life with equanimity ‘for to rail against fortune is futile, and to resent it is to undermine one’s ability to live wisely within its constraints’ (p. 166). But in the modern world where we exert so much more control over many aspects of our environment, we find this difficult. We may, for example, have unrealistic expectations about medicine’s ability to conquer and cure all forms of disease. We certainly have unrealistic aspirations that we can eliminate sadness, depression and less pleasant emotions in general, a situation that is suggested to be partly responsible for our modern epidemic of mental health problems (Timimi 2021).

5. Neuroscientific determinism

Hacker is one of the most articulate critics of neuroscientific determinism and devotes a chapter to the subject and its ramifications, based on his previous books and papers on the subject (Bennett & Hacker 2003; Nachev & Hacker 2014).

Neuroscientific determinism involves the idea that we can predict certain forms of behaviour from the state of the brain, but for Hacker the idea that we might be able to read our thoughts and behaviour off the brain is nonsensical. What we say and do can only be made sense of in the context of the human world, it cannot be explained by talking about brain events or states. We might sensibly say that there are correlations between certain neural activity and muscular contractions, but not with ‘agential actions as opposed to mere movements, let along moves in a language game of a human community at a given stage in human history’ (p. 181). The fact that we can discover certain functions of the brain through studying the deficits produced by various diseases has enticed us into the belief that we can understand normal human behaviour (that is behaviour that is not driven by a disease process) through the workings of the normal brain, but as Hacker suggests, such beliefs are rooted more in science fiction than science.
There are many explanations for our actions and behaviour, Hacker reminds us (he covered this ground in volume 1, The Categorial Framework). Mechanistic, causal explanations are one very specific type of explanation that apply in certain narrow circumstances. Even then, they are rarely related to neurological factors, and more usually involve environmental conditions, such as when one slips on the apocryphal banana skin. There is a small collection of behaviours which we attribute to neurological diseases in a classical causal sense. Yet most human behaviour requires explanation in terms of reasons and motives. If someone is writing a letter, a neurological explanation can, at most, explain the nature of the movements involved. It will not explain the nature of the activity, nor why it was undertaken.

Explanation, as Hacker reminds us, involves making something understandable. Neurological descriptions do not make human behaviour understandable except in a few very specific situations where a brain disease or injury has caused an alteration in someone’s behaviour.

Hacker reiterates his previous response to the famous Libet experiment that appeared to show that neural activity precedes the decision to act (Nachev & Hacker 2014). His criticisms derive from his understanding of human capacities as being dependent on the good functioning of the brain, but not inherent in the brain. In Hackers view, which seems compelling, the action potential that can be detected in the brain that precedes the conscious decision (the latter indicated by the action of pressing a button), indicates that a state of neural readiness is necessary for action to take place. Neural activity makes it possible for us to act, but does not make it necessary.

The misinterpretation of the Libet experiment as indicating that our decisions are determined by our brains is due to the common mistake of seeing intentions and thoughts as events in the brain that act as mechanical causes of action. But they are neither of these. Decisions are not always concurrent with the actions they relate to—one can decide in advance that one wants to do something, and one can decide that one does not want to do something, but it makes no sense to think of the causes of non-actions.

Mental capacities are properties of persons not brains, although they depend, of course, upon having a well-functioning brain. Decisions and intentions are made by persons, for example, not brains. Knowing and
remembering are also capacities of persons. Knowledge is not stored in the brain as memories. Instead, memory consists of knowing now things one previously came to know or apprehend. It is the power to retain previous knowledge and abilities.

Character traits are also not located in the brain. They are ‘tendencies and pronenesses’ of persons (191), that manifest themselves in repeated patterns of behaviour whose interpretation crucially depends on its particular context. Being a shy person is characterised by relative timidity of behaviour in certain social situations compared to other people in the same situation. But in other circumstances, such timidity might be what is normally expected, and hence the same behaviour would not count as shyness. The anxiety that someone might feel in a social situation is not shyness either, although it is part of it—but if it is not manifested in behaviour in any way we would not normally consider the person to be shy.

6. Responsibility

By virtue of our capacity to reason, to reflect on our circumstances and weigh up our options, we are responsible for what we do, and we are unique among animals in this respect. However, Hacker makes the important point that ‘the concept of responsibility is neither clear-cut nor distinct’. He also highlights how the concept of responsibility rests upon the notion of a human being with normal capacities for rational deliberation and action. People can be held responsible for their actions in so far as they know what they are doing, understand their situation, are capable of reflection and forming intentions and can exert control over their actions—but these criteria are not necessarily straight-forward.

Various circumstances can interfere with the capacities we need to be considered responsible for our actions. In the United Kingdom in 1843, the McNaughton rules excluded someone who had a ‘defect of reason, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong’ from criminal liability for murder – sometimes referred to as the insanity defence. The issue was the individual’s ability to reason and to have knowledge of his or her situation specifically, and of moral norms in general. In other countries,
Hacker tells us, the same sort of legislation was broader and encompassed those who had a ‘defect of will’ or an inability to control their emotions as well as a defect of reasoning power. Although England introduced something similar in the Homicide Act of 1957, it appears that different legal jurisdictions interpret the criteria for responsibility differently.

At issue is whether a loss of self-control or generally poor self-control can be considered to excuse responsibility. This is relative to circumstance, and as Hacker suggests most of us would excuse the victim of torture who spills the beans on his comrades, even if we might admire the individual who managed not to. But what of the man who kills his wife in a fit of rage or the women who kills her husband after years of abuse and humiliation? Do we excuse the alcoholic who leaves his family destitute? These are less clear-cut.

Hacker wants to include defects of will in those situations in which we excuse people from responsibility for their actions. He notes that fellow philosopher Anthony Kenny objects to this on the grounds that there is no way of distinguishing an irresistible impulse from an unresisted impulse. In other words, we cannot know how much someone may have tried to resist an impulse that they eventually give in to, or indeed whether they tried to resist it at all. Moreover, our judgements are always relative. We generally excuse people if most people fail to control their urges in similar situations (e.g. submitting to torture) but not if we think most reasonable people would resist (e.g. rape, although our attitudes are culturally sensitive).

Hacker feels that situations in which the will is impaired—either through the extreme nature of the circumstances or through an addiction such as alcoholism— are only partly voluntary. The nature of the situation or the addictive impulse over-rides the ability to make fully autonomous, free choices. He believes this should be recognised legally – that impairment of the will should excuse legal responsibility and that this should apply to cases of addiction.

I do not fully agree with Hacker here. I do agree that failing to control one’s impulses and emotions is a common phenomenon. Our ability to do this is not only determined by immediate circumstance, it is also shaped by our personal history, including the luck of our birth and upbringing. And
for this reason we should extend our understanding and have sympathy for many of those who find it difficult to resist certain forms of behaviour.

We do not always need to punish people for their misbehaviour, but should we excuse them of responsibility? Bringing one’s behaviour into line with social norms and expectations is a moral obligation, as Hacker points out. He also points out how mental states and inclinations are not mechanical causes of behaviour. Indeed, he admits that acting on impulse is ‘not to be caused to act by a mysterious mental cause denominated an impulse’ or, we could add, ‘addiction.’ Therefore, the behaviour remains the behaviour of the individual—that is behaviour that is freely initiated by them. Of course, all our actions are limited by circumstance, and conditioned by the person we are and have become, with all the developmental history that goes into making each one of us who we are. But absent a neurological condition, the behaviour remains the behaviour of the individual.

This also applies to ‘defects of reason’ when these occur in the context of a mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, rather than a neurological one. When people lose their ability to reason by becoming immersed in a fantasy world, or by withdrawing from the shared, social world what they do is still attributable to them.

We should also look at the other side of the coin. If we excuse someone of responsibility for their actions, we also deny that those actions are fully autonomous. This may not matter if the action is a one off, but if it is something someone does recurrently, part of a pattern of behaviour, this becomes a denial of the individual’s autonomy per se. It is tantamount to saying that this person does not count as a full person, and that they need to be treated as a child or as someone who is mentally impaired. When we do this in today’s society, it entails the right to do various things to people against their will—such as incarcerating them or forcing them to take mind-changing drugs. It has been used as a reason not to extend people the right of ‘formal respect,’ as the Nazis did when they exterminated the mentally ill, and many western countries did with the sterilisation of the mentally ill in the early 20th century. The cancelling of responsibility does not come for free.

Where I agree with Hacker is that we should extend sympathy to people on the basis that struggling to control one’s impulses and emotions is
a universal human experience, and that the circumstances of people’s lives, coupled with natural variation in tastes and inclinations, will make this more difficult for some than for others. Being held responsible need not be linked to punishment, and as we already do, extenuating circumstances can be taken into account when considering how to ‘dispose’ of people who have done wrong.

7. Conclusion

Hackers anthropological account of morality peels away the mystery and embeds moral values in the nature of biological life in general, and the features of human life in particular. This does not do away with the problems posed by relativism, but it does provide a sound starting point that highlights the important constants in human values, against which we can judge the way these have also been shaped by particular social conditions.

Moral values are inherently social; they involve ways that we behave towards other individuals and our community in general. Hacker’s analysis, like others’, highlights how moral values change in response to changes in the organisation and economic basis of society, and how some periods of history witness epochal changes in the nature of these values. The Enlightenment represents the most recent such change, ushering in new values of tolerance and respect for all human beings for the fact that they are human beings, regardless of race, sex, status or creed. Modern Enlightenment morality can be judged to be superior to other moral codes in that it better enables the flourishing of all human beings, and through this the flourishing of the human community as a whole.

Hacker’s book underlines how morality also necessarily implies that human beings are free—free to make choices within the restrictions of history and circumstance—for good or for ill. Determinism and morality are conceptually contradictory and the fact that we have moral propensities and moral language is one reason among many to conclude that determinism cannot be correct. The richness of human life, including our inclination to distinguish good from bad and right from wrong cannot be reduced to brain activity, although our biological nature, including our large brains, are what
make this possible. ‘Men (and women) make their own history’, as somebody once said (Marx, 1852).

References


