

IRAQ FROM FAYŞAL'S ASCENDANCY TO THE THRONE TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE FIRST ANGLO-IRAQI TREATY, 1921 – 1924*

Karol SORBY Jr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
Hlboká 2, 833 36 Bratislava, Slovakia
karol.sorby@mzv.sk

Faced with strong nationalist agitation, the British government did not ask the League of Nations for the formal assignment of a mandate, but instead decided to exercise its control by means of a treaty with Iraq. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was concluded in October 1922. Together with four important subsidiary agreements, it confirmed British control of Iraq by giving Britain the right to (1) appoint advisers to the Iraqi government (2) assist the Iraqi army (3) protect foreigners (4) advise Iraq on fiscal matters, and (5) advise Iraq on matters of foreign relations. The treaty also provided for an open-door policy to be implemented by Britain, foresaw British financial assistance to Iraq, and guaranteed the non-alienation of Iraqi territory by Britain. It was to operate for twenty years, but by a protocol signed in 1923 its period was reduced to four years. In its really vital provisions, the treaty did not much differ from the draft mandate that had come up for consideration before the League of Nations in September 1921, but had never been formally adopted. King Fayşal I, of Iraq accepted the treaty with pragmatic calculation and weathered the subsequent political outcry, fully intending to continue to press for the independence the country demanded.

Key words: the British Middle Eastern policy after WWI, the Cairo Conference, the coronation of Fayşal, from mandate to treaty, political parties, the Constituent Assembly, the Electoral Law, ratification of the treaty

The First World War had demonstrated the necessity for far-reaching changes in the international order and gave an impetus to the change that was to reach a decisive stage from the middle of the century onwards. The US president Woodrow Wilson, with his emphasis on the necessity of permitting the self-

* This study is published within the grant project VEGA 2/0141/12.

determination of peoples, had made a deep impression and the resistance to imperialism had been strengthened. In this changed political atmosphere the mandate system was devised.¹ The system was based on the view that the peoples in a large proportion of Africa and a smaller proportion of Asia who had been in a dependent or colonial status were entitled to self-determination, but as yet were insufficiently developed in a material and educational sense to stand wholly by themselves in the modern world. A great power would therefore be given a mandate by the League of Nations over each of the territories brought within the system.

However, two leading questions with which the Allies were faced at the end of the war opened the way for an application of the system in framing the structure of the new world after the war. The first of these was the disposition of the German colonies in Africa and the second the establishment of new states in the Fertile Crescent after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. In both cases the rivalries of the great powers played a leading part. In the Fertile Crescent the adoption of the mandate system represented a radical change; as for the peoples concerned, it was a passage from loosely integrated territorial areas of administration, to separate political states with defined boundaries and more modern types of administration largely following Western lines.²

But the philosophy behind the mandate system was unfamiliar and extremely distasteful to the Arabs. There is no doubt that neither the idea of British rule, even for a limited period, nor the idea of a League of Nations mandate appealed to the Iraqi political leaders or to the Iraqi public. The peoples of Syria, Lebanon, and even Turkey had long been familiar with international intervention and regulation of special aspects of their political life. But the mountains of the north and the Great Syrian Desert on the east stood between these areas and Iraq.³ For centuries Mesopotamia had been divided into three separate Ottoman provinces Başra, Baghdad and Moşul, and their post-war amalgamation into a new kingdom was by no means a foregone conclusion. Over-all British Middle East policy was trashed out at the Cairo Conference convened by the new British colonial secretary Winston Churchill in March 1921. He and his colleagues, looking for a suitable monarch for Iraq, decided to compensate Prince Fayşal for

¹ The system was based on the view that the peoples in a large proportion of Africa and a smaller proportion of Asia who had been in a dependent or colonial status were entitled to self-determination, but as yet were insufficiently developed in a material and educational sense to stand wholly by themselves in the modern world. A great power would therefore be given a mandate by the League of Nations over each of the territories brought within the system.

² FROMKIN, D. *A Peace to End All Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 500 – 501.

³ PENROSE, E., PENROSE E. F. *Iraq. International Relations and National Development*, p. 47.

his loss of the Syrian kingdom by offering him the crown of the new kingdom of Iraq.⁴

An important decision taken by the Cairo Conference was to establish a native Iraqi army, soon to become one of the pillars of the new state. A military agreement accompanying the foreseen treaty stipulated that Iraq be responsible for internal and external defence in four years, although British assistance and advisors were to be provided, and Iraq could not disregard their advice without sanctions. By 1921, the recruitment of officers and men was in full swing.⁵ The lower ranks were drawn from tribal elements, often *shīcī*, but the officer corps could only come from the ranks of former Ottoman army officers. Inevitably, these officers were *sunnī*, perpetuating *sunnī* dominance of the officer corps. Officers with pro-Turkish sentiments were soon weeded out, making the army officer corps primarily Arab in composition and orientation. Some Kurdish officers were eventually brought in as well.⁶

The state of Iraq was created by Britain, to whom the mandate had been given, and it was therefore logical to expect that the nature of that state and of its system of government should be determined by the British government. Britain's interests in Iraq were strategic and economic. The three main strategic elements were communications, the British bases, and oil. Since Britain had acquired a dominant interest in India, one of the main reasons for her concern with the Middle East was it being the shortest route between Britain and her South Asian and Far Eastern possessions.⁷ However, Iraqi opposition, together with the restraints placed on "imperialism" as a result of changes in the international political atmosphere, which were powerfully reflected in official attitudes within Britain, effectively destroyed the possibility of an acceptable application of the principle of the mandate in Iraq.

Another major decision taken at the Cairo Conference concerned the treaty between Britain and Iraq. The British decided to express the mandatory relationship with a treaty in an effort to invest Iraq from the outset with the dignity of an independent treaty-making state and to neutralize Iraqi opposition.⁸

⁴ CATHERWOOD, C. *Winston's Folly. Imperialism and the Creation of Modern Iraq*, pp. 127 – 160; PERETZ, D. *The Middle East Today*, p. 114; KARSH, E., KARSH, I. *Empires of the Sand. The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789 – 1923*, pp. 308 – 311.

⁵ AL-KHATTĀB, Rajā' Husayn. *Ta'sīs al-jaysh al-^cirāqī wa taṭawwur dawrihi as-siyasī, 1921 – 1941*. [The Establishment of the Iraqi Army and the Development of its Political Role], pp. 30 – 31.

⁶ BARRĀK, Fāḍil. *Dawr al-jaysh al-^cirāqī fī ḥukūmat ad-difā^c al-waṭanī, wa al-ḥarb ma^ca Brīṭāniyā ^cām 1941*. [The Role of the Iraqi Army in the Government of National Defence and the War with Britain in the Year 1941], p. 62.

⁷ TARBUSH, M. A. *The Role of the Military in Politics. A Case Study of Iraq to 1941*, p. 31.

⁸ MARR, P. *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 38.

The proposal of the British government to express the Anglo-Iraqi relationship with a treaty, rather than with undisguised mandatory government, was approved by Prince Fayṣal before his arrival in Iraq, and seemed not to be initially opposed by nationalist spokesmen there.⁹ The mandate awarded to Britain by the League of Nations had specified that Iraq should be prepared for self-government under British tutelage but left the means and mode to the mandatory power. However, to the resentment of Iraqi patriots and the poisoning of Anglo-Iraq relations for the next ten years, the mandate itself remained and the “complete independence” claimed by the nationalists, seemed to be too far away. A view hostile to the mandate, and suspicious of a treaty which merely veiled it, was inevitably adopted by the Iraqi elites as well as the Iraqi people from the outset.¹⁰

The Iraqis felt they had been cheated and were full of resentment. Turkish suzerainty had been thrown off only to be replaced by the British. But it was not only among the Arabs that feeling against this kind of imperial suzerainty was growing. Self-determination for small nations, the growing socialist movement with its antipathy to any brand of colonialism and the League of Nations were all growing forces in the world. Therefore the aim of ultimate self-government had to be conceded as a specific purpose, whatever form the British sphere of influence might take. After lengthy debates the British government came to the conclusion that there would be a period of tutelage during which British advisers and officials would help to establish the Middle East states so that they could stand on their own feet, combining their independence with a treaty relationship which would protect them and safeguard British strategic interests. The period of tutelage was in essence temporary, however, the Iraqis pressed hard for its early termination with all means at their disposal, including demonstrations, riots and insurrection.¹¹

After the coronation of Fayṣal ibn al-Ḥusayn as King of Iraq came the establishment of a new structure of government under the mandate.¹² It appears that legal forms and administrative organization were much less corrupt than they had been in the Ottoman Empire and that British models had improved the structure and functioning of the courts. Under the ministries during the period of the mandate the British advisers performed functions that in practice went beyond mere advice. The system of British advisers, who were for the most part

⁹ PENROSE, E., PENROSE E. F. *Iraq. International Relations and National Development*, p. 47.

¹⁰ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 139.

¹¹ SORBY, K. R. *Arabský východ, 1945 – 1958*. [The Arab East, 1945 – 1958], p. 25.

¹² The first Iraqi Cabinet under the mandate was formed on 12 September 1921 with as-Sayyid ʿAbdarrahmān al-Kaylānī (*naqīb al-ashrāf* of Baghdad) as prime minister. In AL-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-ʿirāqīya*. Vol. I. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets], p. 14.

experienced political officers, was extended to the provinces (liwā') with varying degrees of acceptability and success. Such an arrangement could not last long; dual responsibility, differential salaries and administrative costs, most of which had to be borne locally, rendered it unpopular both in Iraq and with the British public, which were more concerned with economic conditions at home than in Iraq.¹³

King Fayṣal had few illusions about the precariousness of his position or about the problems of trying to give some semblance of coherence to the state over which he now ruled. His reign was marked by his attempt to give some strength to an office characterized chiefly by its weakness. He was sovereign of a state that was itself not sovereign. He was regarded with suspicion by most of the leading sectors of Iraq's heterogeneous society for what he was, for his association with the British and for his patronage of the small circles of *ex-sharīfian* officers.¹⁴ This gave him certain room for manoeuvre which he used to the full, both to carve out for himself a position of personal authority unforeseen at the outset and to advance his own ideas of the kind of state Iraq should be. He strived for the gradual achievement of real independence from British control and the integration of the existing communities of Iraq into a unitary structure in which they could feel that their identities and interests were fully respected.¹⁵

With Fayṣal's accession, the Iraqi nationalists who had served with him in the war and who had formed the backbone of his short-lived government in Syria returned to Iraq. Staunchly loyal to Fayṣal, Arab nationalist in outlook, yet willing to work within the limits of the British mandate, these repatriated Iraqis rapidly filled the high military as well as civilian offices of state, giving Fayṣal the support he lacked elsewhere in the country.¹⁶ The intrusion of these men into the administration at all levels marked a critical step in the Arabization of the regime, a process intensified by the shift from Turkish to Arabic in the administration and the school system. English became the second language. Although the Ottoman civil code was retained and formed the basis of its curriculum, the institution responsible for training most bureaucrats, the Law College, was also put under Arab administration. As a result of his efforts,

¹³ PENROSE, E., PENROSE, E. F. *Iraq. International Relations and National Development*, p. 52.

¹⁴ Officers who defected from the Ottoman army and who joined the rebellious troops of *sharīf Ḥusayn* of al-Ḥijāz in 1916 and have fought under Fayṣal ibn Ḥusayn on the Allied side against the Turks.

¹⁵ Al-ADHAMĪ, Muḥammad Muẓaffar. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal. Dirāsāt wathā'iqīya fī ḥayātīhi as-siyāsīya wa zurūf mamātīhi al-ghāmiḍa*. [King Fayṣal I. Documentary Studies of his Political Life and Obscure Circumstances of his Death], p. 73.

¹⁶ Men like Nūrī as-Sa'īd, Ja'far al-Askarī or Yāsīn al-Hāshimī. In GOMBÁR, E. *Kmeny a klany v arabské politice*. [Tribes and Clans in Arab Politics], p. 169.

education in Iraq emphasized the Arabic language and Arab history with an underlying thrust toward secularism.¹⁷

Baghdad became the centre of gravity for all aspirants to power. Exclusion from this world, for reasons of socio-economic status or provincial location, meant political marginalization. All those at the upper end of the social scale who wished to end their splendid isolation and consequent marginalization hurried to the capital. For individuals who found themselves well placed in the state it constituted not only a route to self-enrichment, but also a potent means of creating the following needed to establish a man's weight and credibility in the narrow circles of the political world.¹⁸ The Electoral Law and the constitution would decide the formal allocation of power in the state, thereby affecting the relative strengths of those who could rely on significant societal support and those who would look to the state machinery for their strength. Tribal shaykhs, Kurdish chieftains, notables of the other major cities of Iraq and representatives of diverse communities from the south to the north either congregated in Baghdad or ensured that they had agents in place to look after their interests when major decisions were taken.¹⁹

One of the first moves of Britain, therefore, was to fulfil its promise and establish treaty relationships with Iraq. This "fulfilment" took the form of a proposed twenty-year treaty which effectively incorporated in a different form the terms of the mandate, but with no mention in it of the mandate. Fayṣal complained "This is not the kind of treaty which Mr. Churchill promised me in London".²⁰ Treaty negotiations with the Iraqis were begun shortly after Fayṣal was installed as king, and by February 1922 a treaty approved by the British Colonial Office was placed before the Iraqi Council of Ministers for discussion. It was debated, often bitterly, for eight months. Various modifications were suggested, but the main Iraqi objection was that the treaty did not abrogate the mandate.²¹

As treaty discussions in the Iraqi cabinet proceeded early in 1922, the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the *shī'ī* 'ulamā'²² and leading supporters and even intimates of the king, cried out against mandated "slavery" and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction

¹⁷ CLEVELAND, W. L. *The Making of an Arab Nationalist. Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sāṭi' al-Huṣrī*, pp. 72 – 75.

¹⁸ SLUGLETT, P. *Britain in Iraq, 1914 – 1932*, p. 75.

¹⁹ McDOWAL, D. *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 168 – 169.

²⁰ Cit. in KHADDURI, Majid. *Independent Iraq. A Study in Iraqi Politics from 1932 to 1958*, p. 5.

²¹ MARR, P. *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 38.

²² 'Ālim, pl. 'ulamā' – in the *sunni* community, learned men in Islamic jurisprudence and theology. In the *shī'ī* community they are called mujtahids.

an “English” party of notables and shaykhs “favourable” to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the king personally shared, stood for abrogation of the mandate,²³ a friendly and equal treaty and continued British support.

During this period, as the new state gained definition, a major preoccupation of those Iraqis who had been placed at the summit of power was the question of the relationship with Great Britain. Because of general Iraqi opposition to the idea of a mandate, the British decided to organize their relations with Iraq by means of a treaty, giving the appearance of a normal relationship between two sovereign states.²⁴ The facts that one of the parties was overwhelmingly powerful was effectively in military occupation of the other and held the mandate of the League of Nations to rule the other pending true self-government could scarcely be disguised by this fiction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad and deputations waited upon the king. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922 with the resignation of five ministers.²⁵ The reconstructed Cabinet accepted the treaty late on 25 June 1922, but it added the proviso, resisted in vain by Sir Percy Cox, that it must be ratified, with the Organic Law (al-Qānūn al-asāsī) and the Electoral Law (Qānūn intikhāb al-majlis at-tashrīṭī), by the upcoming Constituent Assembly (al-Majlis at-ta'sīsī). This decision had the effect of linking the treaty with equally controversial debates about the constitutional framework of the new state. The *shī'ī* minister of trade, Ja'far abū at-Timman, resigned in protest.²⁶

Protest meetings were organized in the southern *shī'ī* cities and disturbances erupted in the mid-Euphrates region. These rallied anti-treaty opinion, but also highlighted the particular concern of the *Shī'ites* that the treaty and the institutional arrangements needed for its ratification would consolidate a state over which they had no control and which might habitually ignore their interests.²⁷ Cabinet approval of the treaty was followed by an initial beginning of electoral processes. Anti-treaty feeling continued to be excited, to the grave danger of public order by the irreconcilable *shī'ī* mujtahids, by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by a locally partisan administration.

²³ Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-°Irāq as-siyāsī al-ḥadīth*. [The Modern Political History of Iraq]. Vol. II, p. 16.

²⁴ BIRDWOOD, L. *Nuri as-Said. A Study in Arab Leadership*, pp. 142 – 143.

²⁵ They tendered their resignation on 30. March 1922. In Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-°irāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. Vol. I, p. 89.

²⁶ Ad-DARRĀJĪ, °Abdarrazzāq °Abd. *Ja'far abū at-Timman wa dawruhu fī al-ḥaraka al-waṭaniya fī al-°Irāq, 1908 – 1945*. [Ja'far abū at-Timman and his Role in the National Movement in Iraq, 1908 – 1945], p. 183.

²⁷ TRIPP, C. *A History of Iraq*, p. 52.

Conditions elsewhere in the provinces were uneasy or even threatening and violent trouble was expected.²⁸

Under a new Law of Associations, (Qānūn al-jamʿiyyāt) published in July 1922, two *shīʿī* political parties – the Iraqi National Party (al-Ḥizb al-waṭanī al-ʿirāqī) and the Party of Iraqi Awakening (Ḥizb an-nahḍa al-ʿirāqīya)²⁹ – were formed in the summer of that year by a number of prominent lay political elements, including Jaʿfar Abū at-Timman, who had been a member of the Council of Ministers until his resignation in protest over the treaty. Based principally in Baghdad and making the most of this new, concentrated site of political action, the parties organized demonstrations and published newspapers as part of a campaign against both the treaty and the forthcoming elections. These parties were matched by the *sunni* moderate Iraqi Liberal Party (Ḥizb al-Ḥurr al-ʿirāqī) of the *naqīb*'s eldest son, Sayyid Maḥmūd al-Kaylānī.³⁰ The new *shīʿī* parties and a press characterized more by violent rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded that the public reject the treaty and refuse to participate in elections. Realizing that the king was at least tolerating much of the anti-treaty opposition to themselves and their more moderate councils, the Cabinet, resigned in on 14 August.³¹

The following days were critical for the Iraqi monarchy. The king's attitude had become one of seeming identification with the elements most violently opposed to the treaty: a treaty which represented the policy not only of the British government but of the Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the high commissioner were rapidly worsening. Two days before the awaited first anniversary of coronation day celebrations, 23 August, the two *shīʿī* parties issued a violent manifesto,³² protested openly to the king against British influence, and demanded as prime minister a *shīʿī* leader, Sayyid Muḥammad aṣ-Ṣadr. Public order hung in the balance; no cabinet existed. At this moment King Fayṣal was prostrated by an acute attack of appendicitis and an urgently necessary operation was performed on 25 August.³³ Sir Percy Cox seized the moment to impose direct rule, suppressing the most radical parties and

²⁸ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 141.

²⁹ Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-ʿirāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. Vol. I, pp. 121 – 122.

³⁰ Ad-DARRĀJĪ, ʿAbdarrazzāq ʿAbd. *Jaʿfar abū at-Timman wa dawruhu fī al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīya fī al-ʿIrāq, 1908 – 1945*. [Jaʿfar abū at-Timman and his Role in the National Movement in Iraq, 1908 – 1945], p. 187.

³¹ Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-ʿIrāq as-siyāsī al-ḥadīth*. [The Modern Political History of Iraq]. Vol. II, pp. 20 – 21.

³² Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Al-ʿIrāq fī ḡill al-muʿāhadāt*. [Iraq in the Shadow of Treaties], p. 25.

³³ MUḤAMMAD, ʿAlā Jāsim. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal. Ḥayātuhu wa dawruhu as-siyāsī, 1883 – 1933*. [King Fayṣal I. His Life and Political Role, 1883 – 1933.], p. 172.

newspapers, banishing a number of opposition politicians and ordering the bombing of tribal insurgents in the mid-Euphrates. For the king and for others, there could be no clearer expression of British determination to see the treaty and their plans for the Iraqi state carried through. Thus, when King Fayṣal resumed his duties in September 1922, on 28 September he reinstated the *naqīb* (as-Sayyid °Abdarraḥmān al-Kaylānī) as prime minister and affirmed his support for the treaty which was signed in October.³⁴

The king on his complete recovery by 10 September publicly thanked the high commissioner for the measures taken; they had, in fact, saved the state from anarchy and himself, it is probable, from a second throneless exile. The *naqīb* was asked in the improved atmosphere to form another Cabinet.³⁵ The Ministry of Commerce was abolished. The cabinet, reassured at last by the argument that entry to the League of Nations – Iraq's next goal – would of itself end the unpopular mandate, reaffirmed its acceptance of the treaty, which was signed at last by the prime minister and Sir Percy Cox on 10 October 1922.³⁶ At the same time it insisted again that it be submitted to the constituent assembly for ratification – a step the British had tried to avoid. The military agreement provided that within four years Iraq should become entirely self-defending from both internal disorder and external assault. To this end the government would devote not less than a quarter of its revenue to defence. Under the financial agreement, the Kingdom of Iraq agreed to contract no external debts without the agreement of Great Britain. Materials for the British forces were exempted from customs duty and taxes.³⁷

Faced by continuing opposition in the *shīṭī* areas, as well as by demonstrations in Baghdad that gave substance to the new forms of politics which were so alien to him, the elderly and exhausted °Abdarraḥmān al-Kaylānī resigned the premiership on 16 November 1922.³⁸ °Abdalmuḥsin as-Sa'ūdūn, another *sunni* notable and landowner who was a member of the family of *sayyids* which had ruled the great Muntafiq confederation of tribes on the lower Euphrates

³⁴ Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sajjid °Abdarrazzāq. *Al-°Irāq fī dawray al-iḥtilāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, p. 15.

³⁵ In the Cabinet he included: °Abdalmuḥsin as-Sa'ūdūn at Interior, Tawfīq al-Khālīdī at Justice, Sāsūn Ḥasqayl at Finance, Ja'far al-°Askarī at Defence, Muḥammad °Alī Fāḍīl at Waqfs, Ṣabīḥ Nasha't at Works and Communication, and al-Ḥājj °Abdalmuḥsin Chalabī Āl Shallāsh at Education. In Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-°irāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. Vol. I, p. 133.

³⁶ Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-°Irāq as-siyāsī al-ḥadīth*. [The Modern Political History of Iraq]. Vol. II, p. 28.

³⁷ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 143.

³⁸ AHMAD, Ibrāhīm Khalīl, ḤUMAJDĪ, Ja'far °Abbās. *Tārīkh al-°Irāq al-mu'āṣir*. [Contemporary History of Iraq], p. 38.

succeeded him as prime minister and formed a cabinet on 18 November 1922.³⁹ The new government was committed to acceptance of the treaty, to the convening of the Constituent Assembly and to the defence of Iraq's integrity against the Turkish claims now clamorously asserted.

The field thus clear, the election machinery could start to operate. Uneasiness among the Kurds and Turkomans of Kirkuk and Irbīl at the prospect of an "Arab government" was calmed by the high commissioner. Some ambiguity in the legal provisions for tribal representation was cleared up; tribesmen, it was ruled by the Ministry of Justice, could register as ordinary voters in addition to enjoying their specific representation by twenty deputies. However, this concession to the tribes was disagreeable to the conservatives of Sayyid Maḥmūd al-Kaylānī's Iraqī Liberal Party. By mid-March of that year the procedure of primary and secondary election to the Constituent Assembly was complete.⁴⁰

The treaty reproduced the tutelary aspects of the mandate in a new form. It provided that the king would heed Britain's advice on all matters affecting British interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq was in debt to Britain. A subsequent financial agreement required Iraq to pay half the costs of the residency and other costs, which not only placed Iraq in a state of economic dependence on Britain but helped retard its development. The treaty also required Iraq to appoint British officials to specified posts in eighteen departments to act as advisors and inspectors.⁴¹ The advisory system was the basis of Britain's indirect rule, yet the advisors were never very numerous: in 1923 they numbered only 569, and by 1931 they totalled 260.⁴² The system allowed for – in fact depended upon – a high degree of Iraqī participation, but behind every Iraqī in a responsible position was a British advisor with ultimate control. It was with this network of intelligence and influence, supported by the provisions of the treaty and the option of military sanctions that the British

³⁹ It retained Sāsūn Ḥasqayl, brought Nājī as-Suwaydī to Interior and °Abdallaḥīf al-Mandīl to Waqfs, found room for the usual single *shīʿī* in the person of al-Ḥājj °Abdalmuḥsin Chalabī at the Ministry of Education, and gave the portfolios of Works and Defence respectively to the outstanding ex-generals, Yāsīn al-Ḥāshimī and Nūrī as-Saʿīd. A few days later Nājī as-Suwaydī moved to Justice, and the premier abandoned that portfolio in favour of that of the Interior. In Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-ʿirāqīya*. [The History of Iraqī Cabinets]. Vol. I, p. 153.

⁴⁰ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 149.

⁴¹ Treaty of Alliance: Great Britain and Iraq, 10 October 1922. In HUREWITZ, J. C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record. Vol. II, 1914 – 1956*, pp. 111 – 114; The text in Arabic, In Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-ʿirāqīya*. [The History of Iraqī Cabinets]. Vol. I, pp. 142 – 146.

⁴² Great Britain, Colonial Office. *Special Report on the Progress of Iraq, 1920 – 1931*, pp. 289 – 292. Cit. by MARR, P. *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 38.

governed during the mandate. In return, Britain promised to provide Iraq with various kinds of aid, including military aid, and to propose Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment. The duration of the treaty was to be twenty years.⁴³

The signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary agreements and, months before they were ready, by the acceptance of a protocol to the treaty itself.⁴⁴ The protocol resulted in part from the increased British realization of Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government – and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming prime minister – to diminish British expenditure and commitments in Iraq.⁴⁵ It was brought back to Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and ʿAbdalmuḥsin as-Saʿdūn on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail in getting a warm reception by king and politicians alike: only the pro-British elites, still distrustful of the young government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signing of the protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the state.⁴⁶ The post of high commissioner was assumed by a no less worthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to Iraq as Sir Percy's counsellor.

The question of Moṣul and the future of northern Iraq placed many of those who were calling for Iraq's complete and immediate independence in a difficult position. They recognized that Iraq needed British support and protection if Moṣul was to be retained, but they resented the price Great Britain wanted to exact in exchange. The king and those who looked to him for advancement were doubly aware of the need for British help in sustaining their own positions and the integrity of the state. Furthermore, it was clear to them that should the province of Moṣul be lost, or even if substantial sections of it were separated from the Iraqi state, the existing *shīʿī* majority would become overwhelming, making even more precarious political domination by members of the *sunnī*

⁴³ Article XVIII of the Treaty. In HUREWITZ, J. C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record. Vol. II, 1914 – 1956*, p. 113.

⁴⁴ AL-ḤASANĪ, as-Sajjid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Al-ʿIrāq fī dawray al-iḥtilāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, pp. 33 – 38.

⁴⁵ CATHERWOOD, C. *Winston's Folly. Imperialism and the Creation of Modern Iraq*, p. 212.

⁴⁶ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 148.

minority.⁴⁷ The British recognized this dilemma and exploited it to the full by agreeing with the prime minister in April 1923 that the proposed treaty would remain in force not for the twenty years originally specified but for a mere four years after the signature of a peace treaty with Turkey. By this time the British also wanted to reduce their responsibilities in Iraq as well as the cost of their involvement.⁴⁸

Closely intertwined with the treaty was the Organic Law or constitution. The constitution was meant not only to give the king and the high commissioner sufficient executive power to govern effectively and to uphold the necessary provisions of the treaty, but also to provide for the political representation of various elements of the population. Negotiations on the constitution proceeded simultaneously with the treaty negotiations. From the outset, the critical issue at stake between the British and the Iraqis revolved around the powers of the king,⁴⁹ whom the British hoped to make their instrument, and of parliament, which the Iraqi nationalists hoped to dominate. In the constitution that emerged, parliament was given sufficient power to bring down Cabinet, but this was counterbalanced by granting the king the right to confirm all laws, to call for general elections, and to prorogue parliament. Most important of all, he was permitted to issue ordinances for the fulfilment of treaty obligations without parliamentary sanctions. Ministers were responsible not to parliament but to the king, though they had to be members of one of the two chambers.⁵⁰

The Electoral Law provided for a two-step indirect election and divided the country into three large electoral districts.⁵¹ Primary electors (male taxpayers 21 years of age and older) elected secondary electors (1 for every 250 primary voters), who had to reside in one of the three large electoral districts. Secondary electors then assembled in their district headquarters and voted for the deputies. Both the large districts and the two-step process allowed for considerable government intervention in the election process, which successive governments

⁴⁷ TRIPP, C. *A History of Iraq*, p. 55.

⁴⁸ Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Al-°Irāq fī ẓill al-mu°āhadāt*. [Iraq in the Shadow of Treaties], pp. 48 – 49; PENROSE, E., PENROSE, E. F. *Iraq. International Relations and National Development*, p. 47.

⁴⁹ At-TIKRĪTĪ, Abdalmajīd Kāmil. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal wa dawruhu fī ta°sīs ad-dawla al-°irāqīya al-ḥadītha*. [King Fayṣal I. and his Role in the Establishment of the Modern Iraqi State], p. 140; AḤMAD, Ibrāhīm Khalīl, ḤUMAJDĪ, Ja°far °Abbās. *Tārīkh al-°Irāq al-mu°āṣir*. [Contemporary History of Iraq], p. 39.

⁵⁰ Text of the Constitution in Arabic: Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Al-°Irāq fī dawray al-iḥtīlāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, pp. 92 – 112; Text of the Constitution in English IRELAND, P. W. *Iraq. A Study in Political Development*, pp. 382 – 388.

⁵¹ Text of the Electoral Law in Arabic: Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid °Abdarrazzāq. *Al-°Irāq fī dawray al-iḥtīlāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, pp. 116 – 124; Text of the Electoral Law in English: IRELAND, P. W. *Iraq. A Study in Political Development*, pp. 389 – 390.

were not slow to implement.⁵² For its part, the parliament was composed of a senate, appointed by the king, and an elected chamber of deputies. The latter were elected indirectly, with every 250 primary electors voting for one secondary elector who would then elect a deputy.⁵³

It was significant, therefore, that during this period, with the complicating issues of the future of Moṣul and of the Turkish threat looming large, opposition appeared once more in the *shīʿī* areas. Foremost amongst the critics of the Iraqi state were the *shīʿī* mujtahids, shaykhs Maḥdī al-Khālīṣī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn an-Nāʾinī and Abū-l-Ḥasan al-Mūsawī al-Iṣfahānī.⁵⁴ To many in Baghdad the *shīʿī* mujtahids appeared to be using the pretext of the generally unpopular treaty to organize opposition to the emerging Iraqi state, dominated as it was by a *sunni* elite. King Fayṣal had now accepted that the treaty was unavoidable if he wished to retain his throne and also if Iraq were to retain Moṣul, and the continued opposition of the mujtahids seemed intended to undermine the very order to which he himself was committed. Consequently, he authorized the arrest of Maḥdī al-Khālīṣī who was taken to Baṣra and sent on a pilgrimage to Mecca, returning eventually not to Iraq, but to Persia.⁵⁵

Although many shaykhs remained hostile to the British and to the *sunni* establishment in Baghdad, they found themselves courted by both: the British had ensured special representation for the tribal shaykhs in the Constituent Assembly, giving them roughly 40 per cent of the seats; the king granted them tax exemptions. Therefore, the exile of Maḥdī al-Khālīṣī evoked little response. The powerful seduction of the state, with its positions, patronage and resources, was beginning to exert its force on the tribal shaykhs, leaving the mujtahids, with their ideological and communal critique, bereft of the coercive social support which had hitherto made them so powerful an influence in southern Iraq.⁵⁶

For his part, the king tried to repair the damage caused by the detention of Maḥdī al-Khālīṣī. Ironically this contributed to the prime minister's decision to resign on 15 November 1923, as his cabinet had by November 1923 reached a

⁵² MARR, P. *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 39.

⁵³ NIʿMA, Kāzim. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal wa al-Inklīz wa al-istiqlāl*. [King Fayṣal I, the English and Independence], p. 155; Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sajjid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Al-ʿIrāq fī dawray al-iḥtilāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, pp. 115 – 124; Al-ADHAMĪ, Muḥammad Muḥaffar. *Al-majlis at-taʿsīs al-ʿirāqī. Dirāsa tārikhīya siyāsīya*. [The Iraqi Constituent Assembly. Historical, Political Study], pp. 258 – 265.

⁵⁴ Ad-DARRĀJĪ, ʿAbdarrazzāq ʿAbd. *Jaʿfar abū at-Timman wa dawruhu fī al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīya fī al-ʿIrāq, 1908 – 1945*. [Jaʿfar abū at-Timman and his Role in the National Movement in Iraq, 1908 – 1945.], p. 213.

⁵⁵ Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sajjid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Al-ʿIrāq fī dawray al-iḥtilāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, p. 31.

⁵⁶ TRIPP, C. *A History of Iraq*, p. 56.

stage of malaise which presaged the end. It was due to discord with the *shīʿī* element and to some disagreements with the king. Jaʿfar al-ʿAskarī, who had returned from Geneva to spend a few valuable days as *mutaṣarrif* of Moṣul, was invited by the king to form the cabinet which should face the Constituent Assembly.⁵⁷ He had to oversee the final stages of the electoral process and to ensure that someone who was unequivocally a “king’s man” was in office when the Constituent Assembly opened. Accepting the charge, he retained two *shīʿī* ministers, brought ʿAlī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī (a modern-minded ex-officer who had acted as *mutaṣarrif* of Ḥilla), and completed his team with Ṣabīḥ Nashʿat, Nūrī as-Saʿīd, and the eminent Moṣul and Baṣra notables, as-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Fakhrī and shaykh Ṣāliḥ Bāsh Aʿyān; the Jewish financier Sāsūn Ḥasqayl was omitted for the first time. The political change became the prelude to the return of many of the *shīʿī* mujtahids to Iraq and to an ostentatious state visit by the king to the greatest *shīʿī* shrines at Karbalā and an-Najaf in December 1923. The visit was an outstanding success.⁵⁸ The substitution in March 1924 of the name of King Ḥusayn, newly self-styled Caliph, for that of the Sultan of Turkey in the Friday prayer when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished, raised the prestige of the royal family, and was accepted with surprising willingness by *sunnī* and *shīʿī* alike.⁵⁹

Passed in all its essentials by the Constituent Assembly in 1924, this constitution became the law of the land and with a few modifications it provided the political and legal structure of the country under the monarchy until its end. It was a well-designed instrument to foster Britain’s indirect control. The monarch functioned partly as a symbol of unity, but mainly as a means by which the high commissioner could bring his influence to bear in cases of conflict. The Cabinet provided an avenue to experience for a handful of Iraqi politicians, but also kept the reins of power in the hands of those acceptable to Whitehall. Parliament provided a device by which pro-British groups could be used to neutralize the radical opposition. However, because the mandatory regime had such a tenuous grip on the sources of political authority, it was necessary to rely on informal methods of control as well, and particularly on the support of those

⁵⁷ The cabinet of Jaʿfar al-ʿAskarī was sworn in on 26 November 1923 with: ʿAlī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī at Interior, al-Ḥājj ʿAbdalmuḥsin Chalabī Āl Shallāsh at Finance, as-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Fakhrī at Justice, Ṣabīḥ Nashʿat at Works and Communication, Nūrī as-Saʿīd at Defence and shaykh Ṣāliḥ Bāsh Aʿyān at Waqfs (religious endowments). In AL-ḤASANĪ, as-Sajjid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Al-ʿIrāq fī dawray al-iḥtilāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, p. 37; MUḤAMMAD, ʿAlā Jāsim. *Jaʿfar al-ʿAskarī wa dawruhu as-siyāsī wa al-ʿaskarī fī tārikh al-ʿIrāq ḥattā ʿām 1936*. [Jaʿfar al-ʿAskarī and his Political and Military Role in Iraqi History until 1936], p. 87.

⁵⁸ AL-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Tārikh al-wizārāt al-ʿirāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. Vol. I, p. 196.

⁵⁹ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 150.

groups favourably disposed toward the British. To that end, Cabinets were generally dominated either by conservative elements or by young Iraqis willing to work with the British. Token representatives from among the *Shī'ites*, the Kurds, the Christians, and the Jews were included. Notably absent were the mid-Euphrates tribes, the younger elements of the Turkish-trained elite, and those, both *shī'ī* and *sunni*, who opposed the British.⁶⁰

As for the Constituent Assembly, it soon became a stronghold of the tribal leaders whom the British had done so much to protect and strengthen. The British insisted upon their representation in the legislative body, and all attempts by the urban nationalists to put obstacles in the way of the tribal leaders were systematically and successfully resisted. Despite these drawbacks, the constitution did bring various political and social groups into government for the first time, giving them some experience in cooperation with other communities.⁶¹ However, the constitution failed to take root, partly because Iraqis were never given real responsibility in the government and partly because they came to regard it as an instrument of foreign manipulation and control.

The Constituent Assembly was opened with due ceremonial by the king on 27 March 1924 and began its session in a somewhat irregular manner with immediately criticism of the treaty and much stormy opposition which dominated most of the proceedings.⁶² Under the presidency of ʿAbdalmuḥsin as-Saʿdūn it proceeded to its first task, ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and its protocol. A favourable majority seemed assured, and initially was in fact present but the atmosphere quickly changed. The “severity” of some of the treaty conditions, notably those of the Financial Agreement, was emphasized by opposition orators, and the whole force of anti-mandate sentiment was rapidly remobilized. Kurdish deputies for their own reasons withdrew from the proceedings; those of Moṣul could think of nothing but the danger threatening their *wilāya*. The tribal shaykhs, moving in a world wholly strange to them, saw and seized the chance of bargaining their support for the treaty issue for personal or tribal advantages.⁶³ The nationalist lawyer-politicians, who soon emerged as the most convinced and active element in the Assembly, launched a campaign first of insistence upon major or indeed basic changes in the treaty, then of vicious intimidation, and finally of actual violence: a number of pro-treaty

⁶⁰ MARR, P. *The Modern History of Iraq*, p. 39.

⁶¹ SLUGLETT, P. *Britain in Iraq, 1914 – 1932*, p. 86.

⁶² At-TIKRĪTĪ, Abdalmaqjīd Kāmīl. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal wa dawruhu fī ta'sīs ad-dawla al-irāqīya al-ḥadītha*. [King Fayṣal I. and his Role in the Establishment of the Modern Iraqi State], pp. 142 – 144.

⁶³ FARAJ, Luṭfī Jaʿfar. *ʿAbdalmuḥsin as-Saʿdūn wa dawruhu fī tārikh al-ʿIrāq as-siyāsī al-muʿāṣir*. [ʿAbdalmuḥsin as-Saʿdūn and his Role in the Contemporary Political History of Iraq], pp. 139 – 144; Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sajjīd ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Al-ʿIrāq fī dawray al-iḥtilāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate], pp. 33 – 35.

deputies were threatened with death. Deliberately fostered terrorism outside the assembly building itself reached proportions beyond police control, and necessitated the presence of troops to maintain order.

The constant efforts of the high commissioner were devoted, with little success, to exposition of the basic nature of the treaty and the facts of Iraq's situation. He pointed out Great Britain's accepted obligations to the League of Nations and gave assurances of later modification of the treaty in Iraq's favour. A score of interviews between the high commissioner, the king, the prime minister, and other high ranking politicians with opposition leaders produced no formula which could reconcile the nationalists to ratification.⁶⁴ Fearing its rejection, Sir Henry Dobbs finally issued an ultimatum stating that, if the treaty were not ratified by 10 June, Great Britain would with all regret report this to the League Council at its forthcoming meeting and would seek means other than a friendly and generous treaty to fulfil its mandatory functions. Sir Henry was immovable; he refused to bargain or to consider amendments and categorically refused a twenty-four hour postponement. This threat led to the ratification of the treaty at the last moment and by the narrowest of margins, clearing the way for the passage of the Organic Law (embodying the constitution) and the Electoral Law soon afterwards. Before midnight the prime minister succeeded in convening 69 out of the 100 delegates in the Assembly Hall. Thirty-seven votes for the unamended treaty were in the end obtained, with 24 in opposition and 8 abstentions.⁶⁵

Acceptance of the treaty, even ratified in this sadly abnormal manner, was hedged with conditions which the prime minister found necessary to specify – that the British government should honour its reassurances by amending the financial agreement in Iraq's favour, that the king of Iraq should hasten to negotiate with the British government to this end: and that the whole treaty should be null and void “if the British government fail to safeguard the rights of Iraq in the Mosul *wilāya* in its entirety”.⁶⁶ The Constituent Assembly was thereupon dissolved and Ja^cfar al-^cAskarī handed in his resignation as prime minister. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly gave Ja^cfar al-^cAskarī the opportunity which he had been seeking, to resign from the premiership.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ AHMAD, Ibrāhīm Khalīl, ḤUMAJD, Ja^cfar ^cAbbās Ī. *Tārīkh al-^cIrāq al-^cmu^cāṣir*. [Contemporary History of Iraq], p. 41.

⁶⁵ AI-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ^cAbdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-^cirāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. Vol. I, pp. 233 – 234; LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 151.

⁶⁶ AI-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ^cAbdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-^cIrāq as-siyāsī al-ḥadīth*. [The Modern Political History of Iraq]. Vol. II, pp. 72 – 81; LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 151.

⁶⁷ TRIPP, C. *A History of Iraq*, p. 57.

The stormy days and nights of treaty ratification were followed in Iraq at large by a period of relative peace: a peace in which every anti-treaty or anti-British element remained dormant but alive.

The Organic Law, a reasonably adequate result of repeated redrafting, endowed Iraq with a semi-rigid constitution which, proclaiming it “a sovereign state, independent and free” with a constitutional hereditary monarchy and a representative government, set forth the rights of the people and the crown, the legislature and the ministers, established the courts, and regulated financial and administrative responsibilities.⁶⁸ The constitution was the outcome of a compromise between the British desire for effective executive power, exercised by the king, and their recognition of the need to give powerful sections of the emerging Iraqi political society some stake in the new order. Thus the king was granted, through the exercise of the *Irāda* (royal decree) the powers to prorogue and to dissolve parliament, to select the prime minister and to appoint the other ministers on the latter's recommendation. In addition, his assent was necessary to confirm all laws and, although he was required to explain any refusal to do so, there was no mechanism for obliging him to assent to any given draft law. Furthermore, he had wide powers to issue ordinances when parliament was not sitting, relating to issues of security, finance and execution of the terms of the treaty.⁶⁹

The Cabinet was responsible to the chamber of deputies and the chamber could force the government's resignation by a simple majority vote on a motion of no confidence. Any deputy could propose legislation, provided he had the support of ten others and provided that the legislation did not concern financial matters, which were still reserved to British control under the terms of the treaty.⁷⁰ The Electoral Law enfranchised every adult male tax-paying Iraqi, and provided for a procedure or primary and secondary election, whereby the secondary electors, one for every 250 primary electors, elected a deputy to represent every 20,000 voters. The deputy had to belong to the same electoral circle, consisting of a group of provinces (*liwā'*), as the voter. Separate representation was enjoyed by tribesmen and by the Christian and Jewish minority communities of the provinces of Baghdad, Baṣra, and Moṣul.⁷¹ A new Cabinet was formed on 2 August 1924 under Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, to be confronted by pressing questions of the northern frontier and of financial stringency.⁷²

⁶⁸ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 151.

⁶⁹ IRELAND, P. W. *Iraq. A Study in Political Development*, p. 385.

⁷⁰ TRIPP, C. *A History of Iraq*, p. 58.

⁷¹ AL-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid ʿAbdarrazzāq. *Al-ʿIrāq fī dawray al-iḥtīlāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II, pp. 116 – 124.

⁷² ʿAbdalmuḥsin al-Fahd as-Saʿdūn was called to the Ministry of the Interior, Sāsūn Ḥasqayl to Finance. To the Ministry of Justice came a young and clever, but unstable and hasty lawyer from good family, Rashīd ʿĀlī al-Kaylānī; to Communications and

The British government submitted to the Council of the League on 17 July an Instrument embodying the terms of all the documents now ratified as between itself and Iraq. This was adopted on 27 September 1924, in terms which provided for the submission of an annual report by Great Britain to the council on its Iraq trusteeship: for the assumption by His Majesty's Government of full responsibility for the carrying out of the treaty: and for abstention from all modification of it by the British or by Iraq without League of Nations consent. The treaty was ratified by King George on 10 November, and by King Fayṣal on 12 December 1924.⁷³

According to George Lenczowski, for the British, the treaty of 1922 was just another form of control, but properly sugar-coated for Iraqi tastes. In fact, H.A.L. Fisher, the British delegate at Geneva, had made it clear during the session of the Council in November 1921 that his government considered it advantageous to exercise the mandate by means of a treaty. This, however, was not the Iraqi view. Iraqis viewed the treaty as a definite rejection of the mandatory status and as the first step toward full independence. Much as the treaty was preferred to a mandate, many nationalists agitated against its terms.⁷⁴

REFERENCES

- AL-ADHAMĪ, Muḥammad Muẓaffar. *Al-majlis at-ta'sīsī al-irāqī. Dirāsa tārikhīya siyāsīya*. [The Iraqi Constituent Assembly. Historical, Political Study]. Baghdad: Matba'at as-Sa'dūn, 1976.
- AL-ADHAMĪ, Muḥammad Muẓaffar. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal. Dirāsāt wathā'iqīya fī ḥayātīhi as-siyāsīya wa ẓarūf mamātīhi al-ghāmiḍa*. [King Fayṣal I. Documentary Studies of his Political Life and the Obscure Circumstances of his Death]. Baghdad: Dār ash-shu'ūn ath-thaqāfīya al-amma, 1991.
- AḤMAD, Ibrāhīm Khalīl, ḤUMAJDĪ, Ja'far 'Abbās. *Tārikh al-irāq al-mu'āṣir*. [Contemporary History of Iraq]. Mosul: University Press, 1989.
- AL-'AKKĀM, 'Abdalāmīr. *Al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīya fī al-irāq, 1921 – 1932*. [The National Movement in Iraq, 1921 – 1932.]. An-Najaf, 1975.

Works went an imposing and not incompetent Muzāḥim al-Amīn al-Pāchachī. Education was entrusted to a learned *shī'ī* politician, Muḥammad Riḍā ash-Shabībī, and Waqfs to a venerable ex-shaykh al-Islām recently returned from Istanbul, Ibrāhīm al-Ḥaydarī. The prime minister held the portfolio of Defence, and with it that of a new ministry which he created as a timely gesture, that of Foreign Affairs. Nūrī as-Sa'īd became deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of which the king was titular head. In AL-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid 'Abdarrazzāq. *Tārikh al-wizārāt al-irāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. Vol. I, p. 245.

⁷³ LONGRIGG, S. H. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*, p. 152.

⁷⁴ LENCZOWSKI, G. *The Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 241.

- BARRĀK, Fāḍil. *Dawr al-jaysh al-[°]irāqī fī ḥukūmat ad-difā[°] al-waṭanī, wa al-ḥarb ma[°]a Brīṭāniyā[°] 1941*. [The Role of the Iraqi Army in the Government of National Defence and the War with Britain in the Year 1941]. Baghdad: ad-Dār al-[°]arabīya, 1987.
- BIRDWOOD, Lord. *Nuri as-Said. A Study in Arab Leadership*. London: Cassell, 1959.
- CATHERWOOD, Christopher. *Winston's Folly. Imperialism and the Creation of Modern Iraq*. London: Constable, 2004.
- CLEVELAND, William L. *The Making of an Arab Nationalist. Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sāḥ[°] al-Ḥuṣrī*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Ad-DARRĀJĪ, [°]Abdarrazzāq [°]Abd. *Ja[°]far abū at-Timman wa dawruhu fī al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīya fī al-Irāq, 1908 – 1945*. [Ja[°]far abū at-Timman and his Role in the National Movement in Iraq, 1908 – 1945.]. Baghdad: Dār al-ḥurrīya li-ṭ-ṭibā[°]a, 1978.
- DAWISHA, Adeed. *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
- McDOWAL, David. *A Modern History of the Kurds*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996.
- EDMONDS, Cecil John. *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
- EPPEL, Michael. *The Palestine Conflict and the History of Modern Iraq*. London: Frank Cass, 1994.
- FARAJ, Luṭfī Ja[°]far. *Abdalmuḥsin as-Sa[°]dūn wa dawruhu fī tārikh al-[°]Irāq as-siyāsī al-mu[°]āṣir*. [Abdalmuḥsin as-Sa[°]dūn and his Role in the Contemporary Political History of Iraq]. Baghdad: Dār al-ḥurrīya li-ṭ-ṭibā[°]a, 1980.
- FROMKIN, David. *A Peace to End All Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. London: Phoenix Press, 1989.
- GOMBĀR, Eduard. *Kmeny a klany v arabské politice*. [Tribes and Clans in Arab Politics]. Praha: Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2004.
- Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sajjid [°]Abdarrazzāq. *Al-[°]Irāq fī dawray al-iḥṭilāl wa al-intidāb*. [Iraq in the Two Eras of Occupation and Mandate]. Vol. II. Ṣajdā (Sidon): Maṭba[°]at al-[°]irfān, 1938.
- Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid [°]Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-[°]irāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. 7th edition. Vol. I. Baghdad: Dār ash-shu'ūn ath-thaqāfiya al-[°]amma, 1988.
- Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid [°]Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-[°]irāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. 7th edition. Vol. II. Baghdad: Dār ash-shu'ūn ath-thaqāfiya al-[°]amma, 1988.
- Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid [°]Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-wizārāt al-[°]irāqīya*. [The History of Iraqi Cabinets]. 7th edition. Vol. III. Baghdad: Dār ash-shu'ūn ath-thaqāfiya al-[°]amma, 1988.
- Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid [°]Abdarrazzāq. *Tārīkh al-[°]Irāq as-siyāsī al-ḥadīth*. [The Modern Political History of Iraq]. Vol. II. Ṣaydā (Sidon): Maṭba[°]at al-[°]irfān, 1976.
- Al-ḤASANĪ, as-Sayyid [°]Abdarrazzāq. *Al-[°]Irāq fī ḡill al-mu[°]āhadāt*. [Iraq in the Shadow of Treaties]. Beirut: Maṭba[°]at dār al-kutub, 1983.
- Al-HĀSHIMĪ, Ṭāhā. *Mudhakkirāt Ṭāhā al-Hāshimī, 1919 – 1943*. [Memoirs of Ṭāhā al-Hāshimī, 1919 – 1943]. Beirut: Dār aṭ-ṭalī[°]a, 1967.

- HUREWITZ, Jacob Coleman. (Ed.) *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record. Vol. II, 1914 – 1956*. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956.
- AL-ḤUṢRĪ, Sāṭi^c, Abū Chaldūn. *Mudakkirātī fī al-^cIrāq*. [My Memoirs in Iraq]. Vol. II (1927 – 1941). Beirut: Dār aṭ-ṭalī^ca, 1968.
- IRELAND, Philip Willard. *Iraq. A Study in Political Development*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1937.
- KARSH, Efraim, KARSH, Inari. *Empires of the Sand. The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789 – 1923*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- KHADDURI, Majid. *Independent Iraq. A Study in Iraqi Politics from 1932 to 1958*. London, New York, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- AL-KHAṬṬĀB, Rajā^c Ḥusayn. *Ta^csis al-jaysh al-^cirāqī wa taṭawwur dawrihi as-siyāsī, 1921 – 1941*. [The Establishment of the Iraqi Army and the Development of its Political Role, 1921 – 1941]. Baghdad: Baghdad University Press, 1979.
- LENCZOWSKI, George. *The Middle East in World Affairs*. New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957.
- LONGRIGG, Stephen Hemsley. *Oil in the Middle East. Its Discovery and Development*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- LONGRIGG, Stephen Hemsley. *Iraq, 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*. London: Oxford University Press, and Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 1968.
- MARR, Phebe. *The Modern History of Iraq*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.
- MUḤAMMAD, ^cAlā Jāsim. *Ja^cfar al-^cAskarī wa dawruhu as-siyāsī wa al-^caskarī fī tārikh al-^cIrāq ḥattā ^cām 1936*. [Ja^cfar al-^cAskarī and his Political and Military Role in Iraqi History until 1936]. Baghdad: Maktabat al-yaqza al-^carabīya, 1987.
- MUḤAMMAD, ^cAlā Jāsim. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal. Ḥayātuhi wa dawruhu as-siyāsī, 1883 – 1933*. [King Fayṣal I. His Life and Political Role, 1883 – 1933.]. Baghdad: Maktabat al-yaqza al-^carabīya, 1990.
- NAKASH, Yitzhak. *The Shiis of Iraq*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003.
- NI^cMA, Kāẓim. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal wa al-Inklīz wa al-istiqlāl*. [King Fayṣal I, the English and Independence]. Baghdad: Ad-dār al-^carabīya li-l-mawsū^cāt, 1988.
- An-NUṢAYRĪ, ^cAbdarrazzāq Aḥmad. *Nūrī as-Sa^cīd wa dawruhu fī as-siyāsa al-^cirāqīya ḥattā ^cām 1932*. [Nūrī as-Sa^cīd and his Role in Iraqi Politics until 1932]. Baghdad: Maktabat al-yaqza al-^carabīya, 1988.
- PENROSE, Edith, PENROSE, Ernest Francis. *Iraq. International Relations and National Development*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.
- PERETZ, Don. *The Middle East Today*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963.
- PŘEBINDA, Petr. *Cesta k soudobému Iráku. Nūrī as-Sa^cīd a dějiny irácké monarchie (1920 – 1958)*. [The Road to Contemporary Iraq. Nūrī as-Sa^cīd and the History of the Iraqi Monarchy (1920 – 1958)]. Ostrava: Montanex, 2005.
- ṢAFWAT, Najda Faṭḥī. *Al-^cIrāq fī mudhakkirāt ad-dīblūmāsīyīn al-aĵānīb*. [Iraq in the Reports of Foreign Diplomats]. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-waṭaniya, Maṭba^cat Munīr, 1984.

- SHABĪB, Maḥmūd. *Asrār ʿirāqīya fī wathāʾiq inkilzīya wa ʿarabīya wa almānīya, 1918 – 1941*. [Iraqi Secrets in English, Arab and German Documents, 1918 – 1941.]. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-waṭaniya, 1977.
- SHWADRAN, Benjamin. *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers*. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959.
- SLUGLETT, Peter. *Britain in Iraq, 1914 – 1932*. London: Ithaca Press, 1976.
- SORBY, Karol R. *Arabský východ, 1945 – 1958*. [The Arab East, 1945 – 1958]. Bratislava: Slovak Academic Press, 2005.
- SORBY, Karol R. *Blízky východ v medzinárodnej politike, 1918 – 1945*. [The Near East in International Politics, 1918 – 1945.]. Bratislava: Ekonóm Publishing House, 2009.
- STAFFORD, Ronald Sempill. *The Tragedy of the Assyrians*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935.
- SULAYMĀN, Ḥikmat Sāmī. *Naft al-ʿIrāq. Dirāsa iqtisādīya siyāsīya*. [The Oil of Iraq. A Political Economic Study]. Baghdad: Dār ar-Rashīd li-n-nashr, 1979.
- As-SUWAYDĪ, Tawfīq. *Mudhakkirātī. Niṣf qarn min tāriḫ al-ʿIrāq wa al-qaḏīya al-ʿirāqīya*. [My Memories. A Half-Century in the History of Iraq and the Iraqi Question]. Beirut: Dār al-Kātib al-ʿarabī, 1969.
- TARBUSH, Mohammad A. *The Role of the Military in Politics. A Case Study of Iraq to 1941*. London: KPI Limited, 1985.
- At-TIKRĪTĪ, Abdalmajīd Kāmil. *Al-malik Fayṣal al-awwal wa dawruhu fī taʾsīs ad-dawla al-ʿirāqīya al-ḥadītha*. [King Fayṣal I. and his Role in the Establishment of the Modern Iraqi State]. Baghdad: Dār ash-shuʾūn ath-thaqāfīya al-ʿamma, 1991.
- TRIPP, Charles. *A History of Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.