

## The Emergence of Multilevel Governance. The Case of the Biodiversity in the Enlarged European Union<sup>1</sup>

Tatiana KLUVÁNKOVÁ-ORAVSKÁ – Veronika CHOBOTOVÁ\*

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### Abstract

*This paper addresses the problems of institutional changes in governance and the framing of biodiversity conservation policy at the level of the enlarged European Union. The theoretical basis of the paper is institutional rebuilding in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the emerging multilevel environmental governance of the EU. The data were collected from desk study research and interviews from five Central and Eastern European countries. The results show that the emergence of multilevel governance with multiple actors' participation is prone to create tensions, but evidence from the countries studied indicates that this is not necessarily a disadvantage.*

**Keywords:** *multilevel governance, institutional rebuilding, Central and Eastern Europe, EU enlargement, biodiversity*

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### Introduction

The ongoing processes of globalization and European integration have shifted authority from national states up to the European level and down to sub-national levels, with an increasing role for non-state actors. Governance becomes organized

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\* Tatiana KLUVÁNKOVÁ-ORAVSKÁ – Veronika CHOBOTOVÁ, Centre for Transdisciplinary Studies of Institutions Evolution and Policies CETIP, Institute of Forecasting, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Šancová 56, 811 05 Bratislava 1, Slovak Republic; e-mail: Tatiana.Kluvankova-Oravska@savba.sk; Veronika.Chobotova@savba.sk

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through multiple jurisdictions and can no longer be understood as a central state monopoly (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). This is posing a challenging question how traditional institutional systems concentrated around the central state can adapt to new roles where direct control over decision-making is reducing but demand for coordination is expanding. Key issues are the shifting of power and responsibilities and addressing new types of legitimacy for democratic decision-making in the process of transformation of traditional governments to governance.

The focus of this paper is on the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, where institutional changes undertaken in the late 1980s reflected a massive political, economic and social transformation of former socialist systems and economic institutions in which the property rights to means of production were predominantly held by state agencies. To facilitate top-down control, many internal institutions of civil society were replaced with externally designed, predominantly prescriptive institutions, and central planning substituted for the spontaneous coordination of markets (Kasper and Streit, 1998).

Main objective of the paper is to analyse evolution of environmental multilevel governance. In particular how institutional restructuring in postsocialistic countries in Central and Eastern Europe affect Europeanization of environmental governance and what coordination problems and novelties evolves from adaptation processes. The paper argues that socialist regimes in the Central and Eastern European countries seriously affected the ability of the new democratic regimes to develop appropriate institutions for interactions among actors at multiple levels. Secondly, that new governance frameworks introduced by EU enlargement are in interaction with institutions of existing post-socialist regimes, often leading to numerous cross-scale coordination and information problems but also novelties, depending on whether interactions of old and new institutions are producing new institutions. The paper traces institutions governing natural resources and biodiversity.

Empirical evidence was collected in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, three new EU member states where EU legislation has already been implemented, as well as countries characterized by different socialist regimes and transition histories, such as Potential Candidate Country (Serbia) and Near Neighbours (Belarus). The analysis primarily covers the period from 1990 to the present. Within the *European Marie Curie Research Training Network Multi-level Governance of Natural Resources: Tools and Processes for Water and Biodiversity Governance in Europe*, GoverNat ([www.governat.eu](http://www.governat.eu)) data were collected using a desk study approach involving the use of secondary data such as books, governmental and non-governmental reports, reports of international programs and organizations, press releases, etc. Personal consultations in the form of semi-structured interviews with key biodiversity governance representatives at

national, regional and local levels were conducted where data were unclear or missing. The data collection process was aimed at analyzing the determinants, effects and processes of institutional change in these countries and their impacts on biodiversity governance.

The paper is structured into eight sections, including this introduction. The theoretical concept of institutional change, in particular co-evolution of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe with relation to multilevel governance in the EU, is discussed in the next session. It is followed by specific examples of horizontal and vertical coordination problems and novelties, in particular the participation of non-state actors, emergence of new networks and mechanisms, the powers and changing roles of the state and accountability of new actors. Finally, the eighth section concludes this paper.<sup>2</sup>

### **Transplantation or Institutional Rebuild?**

The Central and Eastern European region is understood as a cultural, historical and political platform where institutional changes are characterized by similarities. The overexploitation of natural resources and the lack of environmental awareness of state officials were the most serious environmental protection problems under socialism. In the majority of the socialist regimes, environmental objectives were strongly supported only in legal regulations and environmental protection was primarily shaped by an ideological legacy, rooted in Marxist value theory, which aimed to manifest the principles of socialism. Marxist value theory considered labour (power) to be the source of all value, and the environment, therefore, had no intrinsic value aside from the serving of human needs. As an 'unproductive and inefficient' activity, environmental protection had a low priority even within protected areas. Very often, environmental protection institutions existed only formally and the absence of the market allowed states to be the only regulatory body, often resulting in open access resource regimes (Klůvanková-Oravská et al., 2009; Pavel, Sláviková and Jílková, 2009). In most CEE countries, land was nationalized shortly after the introduction of socialist regimes and private property did not exist. All protected areas were owned and regulated by the state with some limited resource use for citizens. Exception was Poland and to some extent also Serbia (former Yugoslavia), where small-scale private property rights and market were respected and no massive land nationalization occurred. Intense economic activities such as tourism, timber and agriculture expanded in protected areas under state management (see Mirek, 1996;

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<sup>2</sup> The paper reflect the reserasch recently published in a book: From Government to Governance? New Governance for Water and Biodiversity in an Enlarged Europe (Klůvankova-Oravska et al., 2010).

Kasprzak and Skoczylas, 1993; Kluvánková-Oravská and Chobotová, 2006). For example, the protected primeval forest of Belavezhskaya Pushcha in Belarus was transformed into a game preserve in 1957 and used on an illegal basis by top party officials (Luckov et al., 1997).

The transition initiated in the early 1990s can be characterized by changing the main direction of both economic and political systems, no violence or occupation by foreign military forces, and finally, fast progress (Kornai, Matyas and Roland, 2008, p. 223). Transformation and EU accession were the two most important institutional changes in CEE countries. These countries started the transformation process from very different points of development, having experienced different socialist regimes and degrees of socialist control (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009). For example the level of industrialisation and centralisation varies. In Poland small market and certain redistribution of political power remained over the socialism in the public governance but also in economy while in Czechoslovakia economic assets were fully nationalised and decision making centralised. Czech Republic was highly industrialised compared to Slovakia. Belarus as a part of Soviet Union was fully centralised and directed economy (Kluvánková-Oravská, 2010).

Differences can also be seen in the evolution of civic societies. While in Czech Republic civic movement originates in pre-socialistic times demographic structure of the settlement (cities) in Slovakia civic movement was rare as of rural character. The development in Belarus and Serbia was rather backward. In general transition concentrates on economic restructuring and countries are politically less stable. These countries experienced high turnover rates of governments, lower public acceptance of change, weak commitment of governments to political and economic reforms reflecting continuing strength of communists successors parties (Baker, 2006). The transition was interrupted by the emergence of authoritarian leaders and, in Serbia, also by war. This had serious implications for environmental protection. In Belarus, for example, the interruption of land reform after the election of Alexander Lukashenko as president in 1994 and the subsequent subordination of national park administration, together with all other national estates, under the presidential administration resulted in massive overexploitation of forest, land and minerals, with a serious impact on biodiversity. In Serbia, difficulties with the identification of land parcels and the absence of suitable proofs of pre-communist ownership caused land reform to be delayed until 2006. Particular to Serbia is that natural resource governance is decentralized among various types of organizations, usually public enterprises (Todic, 2005). These factors contribute considerably to the different course of transition process between Balkan and post Soviet countries and rest of Central and Eastern Europe.

Even though the transition history varies in each CEE country, the transition can generally be understood as interaction of new political and economic institutions of EU, also called fast-moving with historical and cultural institutions of post-socialist states called slow-moving (Roland, 2003). The process of institutional change in CEE from command and control to democracy and market can be seen as institutional rebuilding not on the ruins but with the ruins of socialism (Stark, 1996). However, the Western model of privatization was implemented instantly, ignoring the interplay of old and new institutions with the belief that capitalism would appear magically from the morning mist if only the heavy hand of government would get out of the way (Bromley, 2000) or imposing of uniform institutional blueprints based on idealized versions of Western institutions called “institutional monocropping” (Evans, 2004). This oversimplified view that transition involves the unproblematic imposition of a Western blueprint is contested, being shaped by existing informal institutions and social conflicts (Gowan, 1995; Smith and Pickles, 1998) and by the persistence of routines and practices enduring from the socialist period. Thus, it is argued that it is necessary to change the habits of thought and behaviour in order to increase the durability and stability of newly imposed institutions (Chobotová, 2007).

The transformation processes, such as decentralization and structural changes in property rights, had a diversifying effect on biodiversity governance in CEE countries. In Poland, restrictions on property rights could only be introduced based on legal agreements, which entailed compensation programmes for landowners. After the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, biodiversity governance in the Czech Republic is still centralized in park administration as most land in national parks remains in state hands. However, in the Slovak Republic, land privatization was fully implemented but with the absence of appropriate institutions for market operation. Thus, protected areas with diversified ownership structures lack appropriate incentives to encourage sustainable behaviour of non-state owners. Multiple ownership conditions also have a significant effect on the decision-making within the parks. The biodiversity governance in Slovakia is subordinated to regional administrations and state nature conservancy, who lack adequate coordination of competencies and tasks (Klúvanková-Oravská et al., 2009).

To sum up, the decentralization of previously hierarchical and centralized governance in CEE can be seen as a predominantly top-down process, in most cases heavily influenced by external political forces and factors. The time given to rebuild institutions from the socialist period or to build new institutions has not been adequate.

The transformation from government to governance in the European context is seen as a more state-centric process with intergovernmental hierarchies and

does not properly take into account the existence of horizontal actors that do not operate within hierarchical structures (Bache and Flinders, 2004). In the following text, we will concentrate on the existence of coordination problems and novelties related to the emergence of multilevel governance in CEE countries; in particular, the position of new actors in multilevel governance, multilevel dynamics with the emergence of new mechanisms for coordination, the role of the state, and accountability of new governance as described in Bache and Flinders (2004).

### **Non-state Actors: Challenge or Opportunity?**

The Habitats and Birds Directives are the primary legal framework for the present biodiversity policy at the EU level that provides for the creation of a European network of special areas of conservation with European priority habitat types and species, known as NATURA 2000.

Their implementation has been connected with various problems and conflicts in both old and new member states (see for example Alphantery and Fortier, 2001; Gibbs, While and Jonas, 2007; Hiedanpää, 2002; Krott et al., 2000; Paavola, 2004; Rauschmayer et al., 2009; Stoll-Kleemann, 2001), which are also well documented by Paavola, Gouldson and Kluvánková-Oravská (2009).

In the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU in 2004 and 2006, the Habitats and Birds directives has been an examples of an entirely new institution placed in post-socialist governance structures. The major problem seems to be the cooperation and participation of various actors. As the Habitats and Birds Directives leave the public consultation up to each member state, this allows country-specific solutions to be implemented depending on the particular country's practices and the state of its democratic decision-making. In most new Member States, the critical factors influencing implementation were a weak history of participatory governance, including the absence of collective choice and conflict resolution mechanisms and a lack of responsibility for the coordination of resources under the common regime. In some cases, non-state actors became part of governance consultation, for example, the NGOs in the High Tatras National Park (Slovakia) and the Sumava National Park (Czech Republic), but not of decision-making. The institutional mismatch between post-socialist and new institutions is still prevalent, resulting in coordination problems between actors such as exclusion from public dialogue. In most of the new member states, local governments were also fully excluded from consultations on NATURA 2000 designation (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009). Very specific is the situation in the Slovak Republic, where the park administration is only an advisory body to the respective authority and has no actual power. The lack of

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legal authority for park administration to monitor and sanction activities within the parks sometimes leads to tourists' and local inhabitants' illegal behaviour as well as ignorance of the rules.

Socialist influences still persist in the exclusion of non-state actors from decision-making, environmental NGOs are often perceived in a negative way and excluded from consultations or in actual decision-making (Okraska and Szymczuk, 2004).

The exclusion of non-state actors from biodiversity governance is particularly significant in Near Neighbouring Countries. In Belarus, there are no formal communication or cooperation channels between national park authorities and environmental NGOs. Additionally, the state controls the civic sector via flagship NGOs. Such a concentration of power by the Presidential Department Administration has led to inefficient conservation prioritizing economic interests of power groups legitimated by annual business plans (Banaszak et al., 2008).

Despite the serious difficulties with NATURA 2000 implementation, several positive aspects can be mentioned. The Habitats Directive provides incentives for new Member States for the integration of consultations with non-state actors in the decision-making process. Similarly, EU monitoring of compliance is seen as an incentive for the evolution of internal monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.

In Poland, elements of multi-actor interaction are derived from a long tradition of market structures that, on a small scale, remained even during the socialist period. Such a situation can be observed in the Barycz Valley Network. The inhabitants recognized and utilized the benefits of the NATURA 2000 network, such as wide-scale free promotion of the region, development of environment friendly tourism and agri-tourism, and development of a label for local products (Antoniewicz, 2006).

In summary, EU integration has created many challenges and opportunities in the new member states. Particularly the implementation of NATURA 2000 has been found to have a positive effect on the stimulation of multi-actor interactions, monitoring and sanctioning, improved access to information and encouraged public participation, particularly at the local level. The lesson learned from the conflicting implementation of NATURA 2000 created incentive for institutional innovations such as new mechanism or networks. These are seen as effective drivers of institutional consolidation and are describe in next session.

In Belarus and Serbia, the effect of the EU has been mediated through external financial schemes such TACIS and INTERREG. Monitoring and sanctions applied under these programs provide certain incentives to follow rules. Nevertheless, most international programmes are time-specific and the EU therefore has very little influence on institutional changes in the countries' jurisdictions

and informal institutions. They are seen as external to existing governance structures, thus cannot trigger change in behaviour and jurisdictions of hierarchical governance systems (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009).

### **Multilevel Dynamics and New Mechanisms**

Multilevel governance of complex networks of different actors operating at different levels who both govern and are governed indicates that, even under a narrow definition, governance must be a complex, multi-actor, multi-level process (Paavola, 2007; Paavola, Gouldson and Kluvánková-Oravská, 2009). Traditional mechanisms for effective communication and interaction between actors from various decision-making levels do not fully exist in CEE countries, as democratization and decentralization are new processes.

However, a new institution for actors' horizontal coordination has appeared in new EU member states, mainly in Polish and Czech biodiversity governance. Those institutions enable economic and civic actors to engage in new forms of activities related to biodiversity (Birner and Wittmer, 2004). The National Park Councils<sup>3</sup> act as an advisory body to the park administration for all important management processes (especially zoning, management planning, visiting rules, forest management, land-use plans, etc). The membership of the national park scientific councils aims to achieve representation of non-state actors, such as scientists, environmental organizations and local government representatives in decision-making process (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009). The Councils are not enforced by legal obligations and thus EU enlargement and an overall increase in democracy and subsidiarity can be considered as the main triggers for a behavioural change.

In Slovakia, the Associations of Municipalities operating in some parks can be considered to be a new institution for multilevel biodiversity governance. For example, in the Slovensky raj NP, such an association is called the 'Microregion' and includes the voluntary membership of municipalities around the park. The Microregion supports nature conservation, cultural activities and traditional crafts, and cooperates in the provision of tourist services. Any decision made within the Microregion is based on a consensus among all the members. The park administration is also a member and can interact with non-state actors and be better informed about the activities planned within the national park. This assures at least informal cooperation in the decision-making process and biodiversity governance (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009).

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<sup>3</sup> In Poland, National Park Councils also functioned before the transformation, but primarily for scientific reasons only.



Similarly, the existence of networks of actors (NGOs, interest groups etc.) and various consultation mechanisms for non-state actors, such as state and NGO partnerships, in the Czech Republic are due to the effect of historically determined informal civic movements. The most visible example was the Bohemian Switzerland National Park, where the national park administration initiated the foundation of a non-profit organization intended for cooperation and communication with municipalities, NGOs and other non-state actors.

However, as was stressed by Bache and Flinders (2004), a distinction must be drawn between multilevel governance and multilevel participation, where the latter notion signals greater involvement without effective influence for at least some types of new actors.

### **The Shift in the Role of the State from a Regulator to a Coordinator**

The institutional mismatch in the existing management regimes and emerging EU frameworks such as the Habitats Directive have resulted in numerous coordination problems and conflicts by state agencies.

The implementation of the Habitats Directive is an example of a vertical coordination problem. Designed to integrate economic, social and environmental dimensions, the EU delegated promulgating procedures for designating sites for the NATURA 2000 network to the member states. Member states followed mainly the environmental orientation of the Directive and designated sites on the basis of scientific criteria (Paavola, Gouldson and Kluvánková-Oravská, 2009). The designation of NATURA 2000 sites upon scientific criteria increased the overall frustration of non-state land owners in the new member states, as their aversion to follow biodiversity protection stemmed from the absence of proper market incentives to do so. Compensation schemes and their monitoring require cooperation between many government units and interest groups, which have not yet evolved in the new member states; consequently, NATURA 2000 was very often understood as a restrictive measure for nature conservation. The designation process was thus contentious (Young et al., 2007) and resulted in the preparation of 'shadow lists' by NGOs in most new member states. The immediate reason for these conflicts was the top-down and non-inclusive site designation process.

The conflict over the division of competencies between state actors and intensity of forest use is an illustrative example of a horizontal coordination problem. In the Czech Sumava National Park, the administration has a competence over both biodiversity protection and forest management (Správa NP a CHKO Šumava, 2006), resulting in a conflict of interest between protection and economic use.

Another example is the conflict of authorities in the High Tatras National Park in the Slovak Republic. The former park authority was divided between the state forests, managed by the Ministry of Agriculture of the Slovak Republic, and biodiversity management, which is controlled by the Slovak Ministry of the Environment of the Slovak Republic. As the division of competences between these two governmental bodies has never been decided, a constant tension exists between them and has been increasing. A catastrophic windstorm in 2004, which affected a large part of the forest ecosystem, resulted in an enormous pressure to reconsider the size of the core zone and the implementation of intensive forestry practices by State Forests in two nature reserves designated as NATURA 2000 sites. The main argument for this change was that there was a considerable risk of bark beetle outbreak, which could potentially damage neighbouring forests that were not under the full protection regime as well. As a result, the EU launched infringement proceedings against the Slovak government for potential violation of the Habitats Directive and reconsideration of the park's NP status according to IUCN standards (Klůvánková-Oravská et al., 2009).

The situation in near EU neighbours is rather different. In Serbia, for example, biodiversity governance is subject to state-public partnerships; however, post-socialist influences and lack of democracy result in an institutional mismatch. The structure in place is largely based on slow-moving post-socialist informal institutions and therefore the influence of powerful groups with links to former and present political elites is felt. An alarming example is the large-scale skiing resort developed by the Serbian government with the support of international funds in the Stara Planina Mountains, which violated six national acts and affected the largest protected area in Serbia with potential biodiversity effects on the entire Balkan Peninsula. The biodiversity of the Stara Planina is represented by a number of ecosystems and species under international protection, e.g., a Ramsar site of peat meadows, nine species on the World and 42 on the European Red List of Endangered Species, and a total of more than 100 species protected by various national regulations (Klůvánková-Oravská et al., 2009).

### **Accountability of New Actors**

In a complex multi-governance situation, effective accountability arrangements can be particularly challenging to put in place. In such a complex environment, it is necessary that the responsibilities and authorities are clearly defined. In complex systems, responsibilities may become blurred, and powerful players may take advantage of the situation (Flinders, 2001; Pearce, Ayres and Tricker, 2005). The proliferation of actors does not equate to power and does not

necessarily enhance the position of weaker social groups. Quite to the contrary, it may concentrate more power in the hands of those groups and actors with the necessary resources to operate most effectively in the context of the complexity (Bache and Flinders, 2004). The emergence of opportunistic and strategic behaviour such as corruption or shirking is also possible (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994). The emergence of multilevel governance in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated the absence of a new accountability mechanism, particularly for non-representative participants, such as that of non-state actors as documented by Kluvánková-Oravská et al. (2009). Authoritative decision-making is historically determined in Central Europe, a region with a traditional culture and rural character (Kluvánková-Oravská and Chobotová, 2006). The dominance of authorities in decision-making has accelerated under socialism, where formal institutions as well as informal institutions of civic society were replaced with externally designed, predominantly prescriptive institutions of central planning.

In Slovakia, for example, biodiversity governance is decentralized to regional and local self-governments divided into multiple administrative units in each park. Specific competencies are still wielded by several state organizations, such as the water management, fire and forest authorities. The national park administrations have the main responsibility for nature protection, preserving biodiversity and national park conservation and management, but they have no legal accountability for performing those responsibilities. They play only an advisory role to the hierarchical authority, which formally makes the decisions (State Nature Conservancy and regional administrative units). The shift of powers to multiple authorities has the potential of increasing the role of actors from outside the formal decision-making boundaries and therefore greater participation in the governance process (Kluvánková-Oravská and Chobotová, 2006). However, such multiple decision-making structures and territorial diversity have a significant effect on the co-ordination of responsibilities. Several legal provisions contradict one another, especially those falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Slovak Republic and particularly with respect to the forestry management.<sup>4</sup> This makes the management structure of Slovak nature conservation very complicated. The diffusion of competences and changing patterns in participation demand additional mechanisms for accountability. The regulatory setting which enables weaker actors to define a legal basis for their actions (Bache and Flinders, 2004) and regular monitoring of the fulfilment of

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<sup>4</sup> For example, the Nature Conservation Act (543/2002) declares the protection of nature as a fundamental priority within protected areas; however, the Forests Act (61/1977) allows timber production within areas of nature conservation, even providing subsidies for activities in areas with extreme climatic conditions (Kluvánková-Oravská and Chobotová, 2006).

any objective is the first step towards guaranteeing a better understanding of each actor's responsibilities. Due to the deformation of institutions by socialism, the civic sector is often underdeveloped in CEE countries or largely controlled by a few actors (Klůvanková-Oravská and Chobotová, 2006).

## **Conclusions**

Multilevel governance in CEE countries can be characterized by a prevailing hierarchical structure arising from a limited tradition of decentralization and self-government, rapidly affected by transformation and integration processes. The situation varies from country to country, depending on historical determinants such as the role of property regimes prior to or during socialism, level of industrialisation or centralisation. These aspects determine success of institutional changes undertaken to transform post-socialist governance structures into the hybrid systems that are common in European democracies.

Based on empirical evidence from studied countries and presented in Table 1, we might conclude that the mismatch between the old hierarchical institutions developed under socialism and the new institutions introduced during the transition process still persists and is visible, as illustrated in our example of forest management conflicts between state actors in Slovakia and the Czech Republic or by the exclusion of non-state actors from public consultations and decision-making.

EU integration has been found to be a key driving force for changes and synchronization in the governance of natural resources. In Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the implementation of NATURA 2000 brought some changes, especially in that the management of sites must be negotiated with non-state owners and that compliance is driven by EU monitoring. In Belarus and Serbia, the effect of the EU is seen rather as external to existing governance regimes. In both countries, state executives remain pivotal actors as authoritarian regimes prevent institutional reform, especially the re-distribution of power to supra- and sub-national actors.

Decentralization, together with the increasing role of non-state actors, results in cross-scale coordination and information management problems in most of the countries. This was especially seen during the designation of NATURA 2000 sites, which resulted in the preparation of 'shadow lists' by NGOs in most new member states. The immediate reason for these conflicts was the state-centred top-down and non-inclusive site designation process.

Table 1

**Emergence of Multilevel Governance – Cross Country Comparison**

	<b>Poland</b>	<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>Belarus</b>	<b>Serbia</b>
<b>Socialism</b>					
Centralisation prior 1989	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate
Industrialisation prior 1989	Moderate	High	Low	Low	Moderate
Property regimes prior 1989	Small private owners	State	State	State	Small private owners
Pre-existed market and network institutions	Small market	Civic movement	None	None	Small market, decentralised governance
<b>Institutional Change</b>					
Transition	Economic and political	Economic and political	Economic and political	Economic	Economic
EU integration	Since 2004	Since 2004	Since 2004	Observer: Near neighbour	Observer: EU associate
<b>Governance</b>					
New actors	Actors of multilevel governance but vertical coordination problems	Actors of multilevel governance but vertical coordination problems	Actors of multilevel governance but vertical coordination problems	Political and economic elites	Primary economic actors often elites
New mechanisms	Market and public-private partnerships EU compliance institutions	Civic-state partnerships EU compliance institutions	Municipal networks EU compliance institutions	None	None
New authorities	Non-state actors expanding but conflicting interest and horizontal coordination problems	Non-state actors expanding but conflicting interest and horizontal coordination problems	Non-state actors expanding but conflicting interest and horizontal coordination problems	Still hierarchical and political elites	Still hierarchical and economic elites
New accountability	Slowly emerging via EU institutions	Slowly emerging via EU institutions	Slowly emerging via EU institutions	Non-state actors illegitimate	Dominance of elites

Source: Own analyses.

The emergence of new mechanisms for coordination of the effective communication and interaction between actors from various decision-making levels has appeared recently in several study countries. Although mostly in the informal way, the National Park Councils in Poland or the Associations of Municipalities in Slovakia aims to achieve the representation of non-state actors in the decision-making process and multilevel biodiversity governance.

Emergence of multilevel governance poses the need to revisit the role of the state. Particularly at the vertical level, the need is to re-scale the state power as a response to sub-national and supranational pressures in order to increase state capacity, as documented in our chapter by the case of forestry and biodiversity conflicts in the High Tatras or Sumava NPs. The role of the state in horizontal co-ordination is seen in providing ground rules for strategic planning, in particular for coordinating economic interests and maintaining control over the market and environmental objectives of state environmental policies.

The emergence of multilevel governance in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated the absence of any accountability mechanisms, particularly for non-representative participants, such as non-state actors. In Slovakia, for example, biodiversity governance is decentralized to regional and local self-governments. Multiple decision-making structures and territorial diversity have a significant effect on the co-ordination of responsibilities as the diffusion of competences to new actors would demand additional mechanisms for accountability. The appearance of new institutions operating at multiple levels and involving a multitude of groups of actors, is prone to create tensions, but evidence from the countries studied indicates that this is not necessarily a disadvantage.

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