

The Awakening of the Soul and the Sleep of the Spirit: Hegel's Philosophy of Dreams

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In his *Anthropology*, Hegel uses two apparently contradictory terms to refer to the soul: one is the “awakening of the soul” (*Erwachen der Seele*), and the other is the “sleeping of the spirit” (*Schlafen des Geistes*). In this paper, I will discuss how the soul awakens and, at the same time, remains a sleeping of the spirit. In this context, the problem of the distinction between waking and sleeping, or even dreaming, arises. We argue that in order to explain the non-contradiction between the awakening of the soul and the sleeping of the spirit, it is necessary to pay attention to the differences that Hegel establishes between wakefulness and sleeping or dreaming. I further argue that it is the intermediate position of the soul, between nature and spirit, that makes it possible for it to be both an awakening and a sleeping at the same time.

Keywords: awaking – dreaming – nature – sleeping – soul

Introduction

The distinction between sleeping and wakefulness has always been one of the classical themes of philosophy. Aristotle already used the examples of the sleeping man and the waking man in various parts of his philosophical writings. This problem was inherited by the Aristotelian tradition throughout the Middle Ages (Gregoric – Fink, 2022). The distinction between sleeping and wakefulness became especially important with modern philosophy. Descartes, considered the father of modern philosophy, used the so-called “Dream Argument.” It plays an important role throughout his philosophy, especially in his *Meditations* (Withers 2008). The “Dream Argument” indicates that dreaming shows us that the senses we rely on to

distinguish reality from fiction are, in fact, unreliable. Consequently, any state that depends on the senses must be examined to see if it actually refers to something real (Humber 1989).

This argument also appears as a philosophical problem in Hegel's philosophy. He emphasizes himself: "The difference between sleeping and waking tends to be one of the conundrums, as one might call them, of philosophy" (Hegel 1992, § 398 A).¹ It is a very complex problem. Hegel will offer an original solution, which will later be linked to two key notions in his philosophy. These are the "awakening of the soul" (*Erwachen der Seele*) and the "sleeping of the spirit" (*Schlafen des Geistes*). When the soul emerges, the human being is no longer mere nature. However, it is not yet a fully developed spirit. To properly understand these two expressions of Hegel, one must grasp the difference between wakefulness and sleeping to understand why there is wakefulness in the soul, and, at the same time, sleeping in the spirit.

Hegel's interest in the topic of dreams can be traced back to a very early age. In 1794, he wrote the famous *Manuskript zur Psychologie und Transzendentalphilosophie*, which was part of a lecture series in Tübingen at the *Abel'schen Kreis*. Thanks to the testimony provided by Betzendörfer, another student of the Tübingen seminary, the editor suggested that the manuscript might contain the lectures of a course given by J. F. Flatt. They appear to be notes from the lessons on *Empirica Psychologia*, which Flatt taught between 1789 and 1790. Hegel never parted with this manuscript. On the contrary, as Reid (2013, 43) has shown, he used it for inspiration in his mature work, especially in the *Encyclopaedia* (§§ 403 – 408) on the dreaming soul.² In this text, the subject of sleeping is discussed in connection with sleepwalking from a physiological perspective (Maurer 2021, 248 – 249).

However, Hegel did not confront the "argument from the dream" until the *Encyclopaedia*. He seeks to overcome the problem at the pre-conscious level. It is for this reason that he deals with it in the Anthropology, which is the first moment of the philosophy of subjective spirit. This is divided into three parts: Anthropology, which includes the pre-conscious and unconscious levels; Phenomenology, which deals with the study of consciousness; and,

¹ All translations are the author's unless stated otherwise.

² "Dreaming Soul" is the title of that section in the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia* (*Enz. B*); in the third edition (*Enz. C*), it changes to "Feeling Soul." For more information on this change, see Reid (2013).

finally, Psychology, which refers to the study of the highest level, that is, self-consciousness (Padial 2019, 32 – 33).

Now, Hegel deals with the problem of the distinction between dreaming and waking at both the pre-conscious and the unconscious levels. This differentiates his proposal from that of previous philosophers. He approaches it from the point of view of self-feeling (*Selbstgefühl*), the ability to feel ourselves before the development of consciousness.

Self-feeling is a notion that was relatively new in Hegel's time. The first academic treatment of this notion was by Michael Ignaz Schmidt (1772). In that year, Schmidt published *Die Geschichte des Selbstgefühls*, where self-feeling is defined as follows: "Man first feels that he is" (Schmidt 1772, 3). This book is the first monograph on self-feeling that ever existed. In it, Schmidt considered self-feeling to be the primitive stage of human sensations and thoughts. This means that we first feel ourselves and then, from how we feel ourselves, thoughts and sensations arise. However, the concept of self-feeling underwent significant evolution, especially after the mid-19th century.³ In this paper, I will focus on self-feeling according to Hegel.

Hegel answers the problem of the distinction between wakefulness and sleeping through the *Selbstgefühl*. This differentiation is important to understand why Hegel, in the Anthropology, deals with the awakening of the soul at the same time as the sleeping of the spirit. This paper focuses on showing how the distinction between sleeping and wakefulness helps to clarify the notions of awakening of the soul and sleeping of the spirit.

By doing this, the problem that Hegel detects about the distinction between sleeping and wakefulness is first elucidated. In a following section Hegel's solution is explained, that is, it is shown how self-feeling can be an answer to the problem of distinguishing between sleeping and wakefulness. In the fourth section the relation of sleeping and wakefulness to the awakening of the soul and the sleeping of the spirit is discussed. Finally, in the fifth section, the teleological meaning of the awakening of the soul and the sleeping of the spirit is explained in the light of the results obtained in the fourth section.

I. The Question about Sleeping and Wakefulness

The transition between sleeping and waking is a natural change for Hegel. At its core, it is the awakening of the soul (*Erwachen der Seele*), a moment in which the individual conceives himself as "being for himself" (*für sich seiend*). This

³ On this, see Drüe (1994).

für sich means here “independently” (Inwood 2001, 322). It therefore goes beyond merely “being” (Hegel 1992, § 398).

“To be merely ‘being’ (*seiend*)” means “not having attained ‘being-for-itself’ yet.” When the soul is merely “being,” it is trapped in the natural life. The spirit has not yet awakened. The soul is then one with nature. This is why Hegel says that it is “life enclosed in itself” (Hegel 1992, § 398); that is to say, it is sunk in its natural determinations. The human being has then not yet emerged as spirit from nature. This is why the waking and sleeping states appear as two contradictory positions that occur on a pre-conscious level (Hegel 1992, § 398). They are pre-spiritual, linked to our more natural dimension.

In human life, however, we find that one can sleep at any time of the day, or that one might be unable to sleep at night. Why does Hegel consider the alternation of sleeping and wakefulness to be a fundamental aspect of our connection to nature? It is because of the natural cycle. Sleeping is associated with the night in the pre-conscious state of human nature, and wakefulness is associated with the day (Hegel 2011, 637).⁴ Hence, Hegel includes both as part of the natural changes,⁵ still linking the human being with nature. It is worth asking then: what are sleeping and waking.

In the natural soul, both in sleeping and in wakefulness, sensations are given with immediacy (*unmittelbar*). This represents the most extreme form of the natural soul, where it is impossible to distinguish waking experience from sleeping or even dreaming experience (Mowad 2019, 117). However, with the advancement of biopsychological development, human beings will develop consciousness, which enables us to know through mediation. Hence, we can distinguish waking at the conscious level from dreaming at the unconscious level. As Stekeler puts it, “the common reference to the world is quite sufficient to determine the difference between the merely privately accessible ideas in dreams and a consciousness of objective things” (Stekeler 2023, 540). What then is dreaming when human consciousness has developed? It is the loss of the distinction between interiority and exteriority (Mowad 2019, 121). As Fetscher (1970, 49) points out, this represents a return to an original state prior to consciousness. It is almost a return to nature (Khurana 2020). However,

⁴ I use Stolzenberg’s notes which, unfortunately, have not yet been translated into English. Therefore, I quote only the work in its original version.

⁵ Mowad has also shown to that sleeping corresponds to femininity and wakefulness to masculinity (Mowad 2019, 116 – 122). However, exploring this interpretation would be beyond the scope of this paper.

the problem posed in the Anthropology is how to distinguish wakefulness from sleeping in the natural soul, i.e. before consciousness has emerged.

At the preconscious level, dreaming represents the relationship of the individual to himself (Hegel 2011, 638). This means that there is a minimal connection with exteriority. As Hegel points out, in dreaming, the connection with exteriority is through breathing. However, as far as the human psyche is concerned, it is a relation to itself. In dreaming, we produce the representations to which we relate (Hegel 2011, 638). As we are relating to ourselves, in dreaming, there is a strengthening (*Bekräftigung*), which occurs on all levels: physical, mental, and spiritual (Hegel 2011, 644). The fact that strengthening is necessary means that waking represents a weakening of the soul (Stederoth 2001, 160).

Thus, sleeping signifies not only passivity but also activity. Its activity lies in strengthening, making waking possible. Sleeping cannot be reduced merely to the absence of wakefulness (Mowad 2019, 119). Hegel does not view sleeping as inactivity; on the contrary, it has its own function as empowerment. This empowerment emerges in contrast to the waking world. While awake, both body and mind are active, leading to wear and tear that necessitates rest. Sleeping precisely provides this rest (Hegel 2011, 645). Therefore, sleeping occurs in response to the demands of wakefulness.

At the physical level, wakefulness wears out and sleeping repairs. Now, what happens at the mental level? In both cases, there are representations. To distinguish sleeping and wakefulness at a mental level, at a preconscious stage, is a complex task. A task that Hegel is going to take on. He says himself that this distinction is one of the most difficult problems in the history of philosophy (Hegel 1992, § 398 A).

II. Concrete Self-Feeling as a Response to the Problem

At the origin of the human psyche, before the emergence of self-feeling, representations, emotions, and sensations are mixed together. Dreaming consists in returning to this state. The dream world is the world of indeterminacy. As Mowad (2013, 94) has pointed out, it is no coincidence that Hegel deals with it in the Feeling Soul. The Feeling Soul, in this state, has no control over its own content. Its content are sensations, emotions, and representations. These appear buried in a totality where they cannot be differentiated from each other. It is to this moment of the soul that we return in dreaming.

Greene (1972, 78) showed that dreaming is a return to an undifferentiated substantial unity, from the point of view of Logic. However, he also posits that dreaming and waking are negatively related, where dreaming cancels waking and vice versa (Greene 1972, 78). While I agree with dreaming being a return to undifferentiated substantial unity, I do not concur that sleeping, or even dreaming, and waking is negatively related. As Failla has shown, “sleeping is not opposed to waking; it is not its mere negation, as in the natural alternation of day and night, birth and death, but it affirms the activity of waking” (Failla 2021, 105). Bonito Oliva also recognized this idea in subjective spirit. As the author points out, “dreaming is not...the negative moment of the soul’s activity; rather, sleeping is a return to the absence of subjectivity” (Bonito Oliva 1995, 117). This return is, then, to a primitive state, prior to human consciousness. First, one returns to that stage prior to the self-feeling, where the self-feeling is lost. Then, on awakening, the self-feeling can distinguish the waking state. Therefore, sleeping is an affirmation of wakefulness, and wakefulness, in turn, affirms sleeping (Failla 2021, 105). This is particularly important in the context of representations, as it is not possible to distinguish them from ourselves. I will go on to explain this idea.

Apparently, it is not possible to distinguish sleeping from wakefulness through representations, as both sleeping, in dreaming, and waking continually involve representations. For this reason, representations cannot be a reference to delimit sleeping from wakefulness (Hegel 1992, § 398 A). In sleeping, the representations are mixed and produce the *Ideenassoziation* (Hegel 1992, § 398 A). The problem is that, if we cannot distinguish the representations, then we cannot distinguish what we think when we are awake from when we are asleep. This is why Hegel points out that “it is important to ask *how the representations of the waking state are distinguished from those of sleeping*” (Hegel 2011, 640).

When we are awake, our understanding organizes all the contents received from the intuition into a totality, where each part is related to another. However, this process of organization presupposes a central point: us. The external world is perceived in an orderly manner because we, serving as the central point, act as a reference for our understanding to structure reality. In this context, Hegel uses a quasi-phenomenological explanatory strategy in which the central point – ourselves – serves as a reference for the understanding to order reality. He writes:

I am the central point of this whole, and everything that is before me, which I perceive, is also an objective complex of determinations. These are

interconnected in us in a known and rational way. If something appears to me now in the waking state, I must assign it its specific place within this complex. This connection is rationality (Hegel 2011, 642).

The “I” has not yet emerged, so we are still at a pre-conscious level. If there is no consciousness yet, what exists is an intuition of myself. This is the self-feeling (*Selbstgefühl*). When consciousness emerges, rationality enables us to place the content to its specific place. However, precisely because of this, a central point that is unconscious must be presupposed. Thus, with consciousness, the self-feeling is eclipsed, almost unobservable to the naked eye. It is not rejected but remains a presupposition.⁶

By taking self-feeling into consideration, we can then distinguish between sleeping, even in dreaming, and waking. In sleeping there is not necessarily a self-feeling; for instance, one might dream of being a snake. In contrast, in wakefulness, self-feeling is always present. Therefore, there is a pre-conscious element that enables us to differentiate between dreaming and waking. Hegel himself notes, “it need not be clearly developed at all, but this all-embracing determinateness is contained and made present in the concrete self-feeling” (Hegel 1992, § 398 A). We do not need consciousness to have emerged to differentiate dreaming from waking; *das konkrete Selbstgefühl* suffices. It presents us to the external world as if we were the central point. Thus, we recognize ourselves as individuals unconsciously. Hegel gives the following example:

For example, now I am sitting here in this chair. This “now” is a certain result of a certain time. In the same way, the “here” is the result of a certain place. I do not have this whole present in a consciousness before me. However, I am the present feeling, the present unity of this whole” (Hegel 2011, 642).

Therefore, it is the concrete self-feeling that reveals our position as the center. The representations are arranged around us. When we establish connections with the representations by pre-consciously realizing that we are the center, then we realize that we are awake.

⁶ This thesis explored by Hegel had been previously expounded by Schmidt and, to some extent, by Johann Nicolas Tetens. The anthropologist described it as a “dark self-feeling” (*dunkles Selbstgefühl*). This is the feeling of being ourselves that accompanies us throughout our lives and becomes so familiar that we take it for granted (Tetens, 1777). For an exposition of the significance of *Selbstgefühl* in Tetens’ work, see Frank (2015, 199 – 206).

In dreams, on the other hand, there is no such concrete self-feeling. Hegel clarifies that “in dreams everything is omitted. The unity of the complex of representations is not present to me. Everything is mutually and arbitrarily detached. I am not the central point” (Hegel 2011, 643). Not being the central point means that there is no concrete self-feeling. This absence suggests we are dreaming. In this manner, dream offers a perception of reality distinct from waking, because “the dream world presents its connection, even if it is only a subjective one” (Bonito Oliva 1995, 119).

However, we are not awake during sleep. So, what happens if we are awake and lose the reference to the self-feeling? According to Hegel, this is possible. To lose the reference of self-feeling while awake is “madness” (*Verrücktheit*). As Kirk Pillow (1997) has shown, there is a conflict between the waking and the sleeping parts of the soul. Each wants to take possession of the self (*Selbst*). Insanity is a state where the mental state of sleeping falls into wakefulness due to the loss of a self-feeling reference. It is akin to dreaming with one’s eyes open. Thus, Pillow believes that madness is not a contradiction between the soul and consciousness,⁷ but rather between the waking and the sleeping aspects (Pillow 1997, 191).⁸

Beyond madness, which I will not address here due to length constraints, it can be observed that, according to Hegel, it is self-feeling that differentiates between the fiction of dreaming and the reality of waking (Stekeler 2023, 543). Therefore, it is self-feeling that establishes the difference between the real world and the dream world.

Although the distinction between wakefulness and sleeping is resolved through self-feeling, Hegel also associates both the awakening of the soul and the sleeping of the spirit with self-feeling. Now, if there is self-feeling in waking, while in sleeping there is a loss of self-feeling, how is it possible that both the *awakening of the soul* and the *sleeping of the spirit* occur at the same time?

III. The Dreaming of the Spirit and the Awakening of the Soul

The self-feeling marks the beginning of the awakening of the soul. The awakening of the soul occurs when it begins to intuit itself (being-for-itself) and, in addition, intuits that there is a reality outside itself (Failla 2021, 104). It intuits itself because, in having a self-feeling, there is a self (*Selbst*) at a preconscious level. At the same time, the awakening of the soul means that the spirit pre-consciously recognizes the world as opposed to itself (Bonito

⁷ This vision has been presented in Maurer (2018).

⁸ This idea has also been advocated by Failla (2019).

Oliva 1995, 118). There is a difference at the pre-conscious level between exteriority and interiority, that is, the distinction between the soul's merely "being" and its "being-for-itself." In nature, self-feeling does not exist; it arises only with the soul. Therefore, as soon as we acquire it at the pre-conscious level, we can differentiate between merely being and being-for-itself.

It then makes sense that Hegel, in associating waking with self-feeling, also connects self-feeling to the soul's "awakening," where sleeping signifies the loss of self-feeling. Now, if sleeping represents the loss of self-feeling, why is it also considered the sleeping of the spirit? Is the awakening of the soul the same as the sleeping of the spirit?⁹

Hegel clearly says, "the soul is only the *sleeping* of the spirit," which he equates with Aristotle's concept of the "*passive* nus, which is *potentially* everything" (Hegel 1992, § 389). Let us analyze this proposition by Hegel to understand the relationship between the sleeping of the spirit and the awakening of the soul.

Aristotle's *nous pathetikos* (νοῦς παθητικός) refers to the intellect that receives. On the other hand, the *nous poietikos* (νοῦς ποιητικός) is the one that illuminates, thereby making reality intelligible. If Hegel relates the dream of the spirit to the *nous pathetikos*, then there must be a relation between these two. According to Alfredo Ferrarin (2001, 265), the soul serves as a material power for the spirit, just as the *nous pathetikos* serves as a power for thought, that is, the relationship between the dreaming of the spirit and the *nous pathetikos* is an analogical one.

However, I will argue that this is not a mere analogy but rather an identity. The spirit, from its first moment as soul, has the capacity to idealize.¹⁰ By idealizing, the exteriority is reflected in the interiority, that is, it is understood from a central point, in this case, the spirit. This argument I will now explain is based on the distinction between dreaming and waking.

In the dream, there was a dispersion of representations because there was no central point (the loss of self-feeling). Although there is also dispersion in nature, the spirit can, through idealization or sublimation (*Aufhebung*), avoid it. In the idealization, each moment overcomes the other, and they are preserved (Ferrer 2015, 99 – 103). Here, spirit overcomes nature. This means that nature

⁹ In this paper I focus on Hegel's interpretation of the sleeping of the spirit in the second and third editions of his *Encyclopaedia*, which differs from the interpretation he presents in the first edition. On this, see Padial (2022).

¹⁰ Idealizing represents the second form of "negation" (*Aufhebung*), signifying a type of assumption. On these meanings of negation, see Yirmibes (2023, 67 – 70).

is not annulled, but preserved in a new stage. Nature as a dispersion is sublimated by spirit, which brings the end of dispersion, that is, the spirit discovers the meaning of all external reality. There is no dispersion now because the spirit is the beginning of knowledge. In this way, all natural reality becomes spiritualized. For spirit, nature is meaningful, that is, it is nature assumed *by* the spirit. The spirit assumes nature from this first moment, from the soul: “the soul is where the dispersion of nature has merged into the simple” (Hegel 2011, 25). This means that the soul succeeds in reuniting nature. It annuls the dispersion of nature because the soul is now its central point. In the same way, wakefulness cancels the dispersion of representations through the concrete self-feeling by giving it a central point. This central point brings order to the whole of reality.

According to Hegel, the sleeping of the spirit “is potentially everything” (Hegel 1992 § 389). It is everything because all external reality (nature) becomes internalized and idealized by the spirit. Thus, the spirit spiritualizes nature. Or in other words: the spirit is the focal point of nature.

Similarly, Aristotle (*De Anima* III, 5 430a 10 – 15) points out that the *nous pathetikos* has the potential to “become everything.” However, the spirit has not yet properly emerged, as it still remains as soul. This is partly why it is a dream: in the dream, everything is dispersed, the point of reference, i.e. the central point, is missing. Thus, the soul begins to be the central point with respect to nature, but the spirit will be the central point with respect to the soul. The soul is then at an intermediate level between nature and spirit. The soul is an “awakening” because it serves as the central point of nature, similar to how self-feeling organizes representations. It orders what is dispersed. However, at the same time, the soul is a “dream” of the spirit because the spirit will be able to order the soul, to be its central point. Or, in other words, the true sense of nature is the soul, and the true sense of the soul is the spirit (Inwood 2001, 322).

It is not merely a rhetorical strategy nor an analogy when Hegel equates the dream of the spirit with the *nous pathetikos*. Rather, what he means is that nature can be ordered from the spirit as the central point. However, there is still the soul, which is a first order that is not as high as the spirit, that is, the order that the soul imprints on nature is at a pre-conscious level. Hegel calls the soul then the “dark region” (*dunkle Region*) (Hegel 1980, 197). The soul is thus no longer only nature; nevertheless, it is not yet spirit but in the process of becoming fully spirit (Failla 2021, 103 – 104). In short, we can affirm with Failla that the “awakening of the soul” means that it is “no longer” nature,

with the phrase “the sleeping of the spirit” referring to the fact that it is “not yet” fully spirit (Failla 2021, 104). This is what allows it to be both “awakening” and “sleeping”: awakening of the soul as well as sleeping of the spirit.

IV. The Activity of the Soul: The Teleological Sense

The Aristotelian *nous pathetikos* is, in part, passive. However, it also possesses an active aspect, which consists in receiving the external and assimilating it into its interiority. In the same way, the dream of the spirit is not pure passivity. It is also, in a certain sense, active. Padial says this very clearly:

The spirit is active, never merely passive, but active even in its passivity and receptivity. And this implies that, in the spirit, the essence is indistinguishable from its appearing, its manifestation. The spirit is as it appears and appears as it is. However, this can only be so because the spirit is not a thing, not something in-itself, but activity, ἐνέργεια, *Tätigkeit*, *Aktuosität* (Padial 2017, 81).

That the spirit is active and never merely passive means that there is also some activity in the soul. Ultimately, the spirit is not a thing, but activity. That it is activity means that it is *energeia*. Its generative activity is precisely that of spiritualizing the dispersed. The relationship between nature and the human being then becomes clear: there is a central point (the human being) that gathers the dispersed (nature).

As the spirit advances, subjectivity will develop. As it advances, it will internalize nature. This will lead to the ultimate activity of the spirit being freedom.¹¹ The human being is then the freedom that emerges from nature. In this sense, Rosella Bonito Oliva (2008, 59) has referred to the human being as the “biological exception” in nature. Freedom will mark the culmination of the spirit’s development. Hence, there is a struggle for liberation (*Befreiungskampf*) in the emergence of the spirit. However, this would take us too far. Let it suffice to note this here, providing an opportunity for other researchers to continue from this point.

¹¹ I mention here this idea, although it cannot be fully addressed in this paper due to constraints of length. A sense of freedom then, in the objective spirit, is mutual recognition. This will be central to the legal and historical development of human rights in later years. On this, see Stewart (2019) and Nelson (2023).

V. Conclusions

In this paper, the Hegelian distinction between wakefulness and sleeping has been examined in order to explain its relation to the topic on the awakening of the soul and the sleeping of the spirit. To do so, it has first been explained that Hegel assumes the distinction between sleeping and wakefulness as one of the great problems in the history of philosophy. As we have seen, the problem of distinguishing between sleeping and wakefulness arises from trying to do so by means of representations. For representations appear both when we are awake and when we are asleep. Thus, trying to differentiate between wakefulness and sleeping through representations is impossible. Hegel, however, offers another answer. According to him, the difference between sleeping and wakefulness appears at the pre-conscious level before consciousness or self-consciousness have developed in the human psyche. That is why he deals with this subject in Anthropology.

Hegel's response consists in situating self-feeling as the delimiting criterion between dreaming and waking. Based on what has been presented in this paper, it can be affirmed that self-feeling is (i.) pre-conscious, as it is the intuition of feeling ourselves; (ii.) it marks a central point of reference; and (iii.) it helps to distinguish between interiority and exteriority at a pre-conscious level. Being the central point of reference, the self-feeling enables us to distinguish dreaming from waking because in dreams the self-feeling is suspended, as if omitted. In wakefulness, however, the self-feeling is always present. Therefore, one of the functions of self-feeling consists in differentiating waking from sleeping. Later, with the development of consciousness and self-awareness, the self-feeling will be a presupposition.

This differentiation between wakefulness and sleeping through the self-feeling has been crucial to understanding how the soul can "wake up" and, at the same time, be "asleep." As has been explained, one cannot be awake and asleep at the same time without falling into madness. However, Hegel's two expressions become clear if we think about the difference between wakefulness and sleeping.

On the one hand, the awakening of the soul means that the soul is the first moment of the spirit. It is no longer only nature, but it is also not yet a fully developed spirit. This "awakening" means that nature begins to take a central point, which is the soul. It is the soul that begins to give meaning to nature through idealization, i.e. the soul initiates the process of spiritualizing nature. Spiritualizing nature means that the spirit takes on nature and gives it

meaning, the spirit then (central point) being the truth of nature. Thus, with the soul, the process by which the dispersion of nature is unified begins.

On the other hand, the sleeping of the spirit was identified with Aristotle's passive *nous*. The sleeping of the spirit could "be everything." This means that it is not yet determined but it is potentially. The soul is thus not yet spirit. Or it can also be said that the soul is potentially spirit. Now, "to be potentially" is not the same as "to be actually." Spirit is thus the truth of the soul. Therefore, just as the soul is the truth of nature, the spirit is the truth of the soul. This truth means that it is its central point, i.e. that which gives meaning to the rest. It can also be said: the soul gives meaning to nature and the spirit gives meaning to the soul. As already argued, because the soul is in a middle position between nature and spirit, it is, at the same time, "awakening" (an "awakening" of the soul with respect to nature) and "sleeping" (a "sleeping" of the spirit with respect to the soul). Finally, a last section has been devoted to arguing for the necessity of considering a teleological sense in Hegel. The activity of the soul, by which it spiritualizes nature, has its meaning in a final *telos*, which will be the spirit. That is why the soul is not a thing, nor an object, but an activity. It is activity insofar as it represents the intermediate stage of a process: it is no longer nature, yet not yet spirit.

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