

Contract Management and its Impact on Contracting Public Services: Slovak Republic¹

Beáta MIKUŠOVÁ MERIČKOVÁ* – Juraj NEMEC**

Abstract

Contracting out is the prevalent types of alternative service-delivery arrangements in public sector. The literature suggests that if the contracting is properly implemented, then it will improve cost-effectiveness, delivery quality, and expenditure control. Using new Slovak data, we explain why contracting does not always produce the expected positive results. We seek to determine the factors that account for success in contracting for public sector services, by testing for a link between contracting performance and quality of contract management. This study uses a quantitative approach to analyse our original survey data. The findings are not positive, because although competitive selection is the key factor determining success, non-competitive selection of suppliers prevails in Slovakia.

Keywords: *contracting, public sector, principal, agent, contract management, Slovak Republic*

JEL Classification: H41, H57

1. Introduction

Contracting out public services to private for-profit and non-profit firms is one of the most common types of alternative service-delivery arrangements. The relevant literature suggests that if, and only if the contracting is properly implemented, then it may, but need not improve individual choice, cost-effectiveness, delivery quality, equity, and expenditure control.

* Beata MIKUŠOVÁ MERIČKOVÁ, Matej Bel University Banská Bystrica, Faculty of Economics, Department of Public Economy and Regional Development, Tajovského 10, 975 90 Banská Bystrica, Slovakia; e-mail: beata.merickova@umb.sk

** Juraj NEMEC, Masaryk University Brno, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Lipová 41a, 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic; e-mail: juraj.nemec@umb.sk

¹ Our research is supported by the Czech Grant Agency GACR, under contract P403/10/1892 *Optimizing outsourcing in the public sector.*

This article uses Slovak data to explore why contracting does not produce the expected results and may even have perverse effects. We start with a brief summary of current knowledge about contracting in Slovakia.

At the core of our paper is an attempt to determine the factors that account for success in contracting for services in the public sector. This involves testing for a link between contracting performance and selected factors connected with contract management; such as competition, evaluation of bidders, contract monitoring, contract payment and sanctions. The key importance of the study is its originality in both Slovak and regional perspectives. We use a quantitative approach to investigate the research question and analyse original survey data generated by our own research undertaken in the Slovak Republic.

2. Contracting in Slovakia: A Brief Survey

There is a substantial body of published research about contracting in Slovakia. We may list our studies (see Meričková, Nemeč and Víték, 2005; Meričková and Nemeč, 2007; Meričková, Nemeč and Ochrana, 2008; Meričková, Nemeč and Šumpíková, 2010; Meričková et al., 2010) and the findings of other authors (especially Balážová, 2006; Čapková, 2010; Majlingová and Šagát, 2006; Pavel, 2007; Sičáková-Beblavá and Beblavý, 2007; Sičáková-Beblavá, 2009; Sičáková-Beblavá and Beblavý, 2009; Vozárová, 2012). The key common finding of these studies is that in Slovakia contracting has not delivered the expected results.

Below we summarise comparative data on the frequency of contracting (Table 1), and the efficiency of contracting (Table 2), for five important local services; maintenance of local communications, maintenance of public lighting infrastructure, management of cemeteries, waste collection and waste disposal and management of public parks and green areas. The following samples are used:

1. Our representative sample of 55 Slovak municipalities, of varying sizes, from 2001.
2. Our representative sample of 17 Slovak municipalities, of the same size, from 2005.
3. Data gathered by the 2006 research project (including our team) of Transparency International Slovakia; focusing on the relationship between the local public service delivery arrangements and the cost efficiency of service delivery. The sample covered 100 Slovak municipalities.
4. Our non-representative sample of 28 Slovak municipalities, of varying sizes, from 2008.
5. Our representative sample of 131 Slovak municipalities, of varying sizes, from 2009. Later in the paper this sample is used for our analysis of factors determining the success of contracting.

6. Our representative sample of 141 Slovak municipalities, of varying sizes, from 2010.

Table 1
Percentage of Contracted Local Public Services

| Service | 2001 | 2005 | 2006 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Waste | 49 | 64 | 69 | 80 | 69 | 80 |
| Cemeteries | 27 | 12 | 16 | 13 | 29 | 50 |
| Public green areas | 16 | 18 | 33 | 14 | 21 | 49 |
| Communications | 21 | 41 | 45 | 38 | 36 | 52 |
| Public lighting | 30 | 35 | 40 | 39 | 50 | 35 |

Source: The six studies cited above.

Table 2
Efficiency of Contracting Out Local Public Services

| Service | 2001 | 2005 | 2006 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Waste management | 94 | 94 | 125 | 184 | 100 | 138 |
| Cemeteries | 64 | 13 | 67 | 146 | 87 | 84 |
| Public green | 82 | 192 | 150 | 151 | 120 | 97 |
| Maintenance of local communications | 70 | 109 | 119 | 114 | 100 | 84 |
| Maintenance of local lighting | 100 | 138 | 128 | 156 | 104 | 103 |

Note: Efficiency is measured as the cost of outsourced services to the cost of internal delivery, expressed as an index number.

Source: The six studies cited above.

The data clearly shows that contracting out of local public services is very common in Slovakia. The results from contracting are contradictory, and there are several methodological problems, of which we are fully aware. The core problem is the reliability and complexity of the data provided by municipalities. In fact there is no full cost accounting at the local self-government level, and this devalues the cost data on internal service delivery. Some of the selected municipalities also use a mix of internal and external production for service delivery – in such cases we asked for data about the dominant delivery form.

Our own primary research indicates that contracting of public services in Slovakia delivers less positive outcomes than the existing literature suggests are attainable. To help explain why, we now focus on evaluating contract-management factors. For Slovakia this is a unique original analysis.

3. Contract Management Quality and its Impact on the Efficiency of Contracting out

The absence of systemic contract management is one of the core reasons for contracting failures (Hodge, 2000; Sclar, 2000; Brudney et al., 2005; Kamerman and Kahn, 1989; Stejskal and Charbusky, 2004; Štrangfeldová and Hronec, 2008).

The literature suggests that the following factors determine the quality of contract management: the degree of competition in bidding for the contract (Savas, 1987; Kettl, 1993; Greene, 2002; Hodge, 2000; Pavel and Beblavá, 2008); the quality of the ex-ante evaluation of the contractor/agent (Rehfuss, 1989; Marlin, 1984; Romzek and Johnston, 2002); a clear definition of the contracted/outsourced service – contract specification (Rehfuss, 1989; Marlin, 1984); the quality of contract monitoring (Rehfuss, 1989; Marlin, 1984; Prager, 1994; Seidenstat, 1999; Brown and Potoski, 2003a; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; Šebová, 2007); sanctions (DeHoog, 1990; MacNeil, 1978); the experience of the public body/government/principal responsible for contracting/outsourcing with contract management (DeHoog, 1990; Rehfuss, 1989; Romzek and Johnston, 2002); and the technical knowledge of the contracted service (Kettl, 1993).

More recent approaches to contracting argue that relational contracting is a more flexible and cooperative approach to managing contractual relationships based on mutual trust, shared norms and values, and standards of behaviour. Such approaches also treat communication and joint problem solving between principal and agent as determinants of contracting performance (DeHoog, 1990; Sclar, 2000; MacNeil, 1978; Fantová Šumpíková, and Rousek, 2009; Vaňová, 1996).

4. Research Methodology and Results: Quality of Contract Management

Given this theoretical background, our application of the Delphi method (Vozarova, 2012) suggested that the following five factors might influence the quality of contract management.

- x_1 – level of competitiveness of the award
- x_2 – selection criteria
- x_3 – frequency of contract monitoring
- x_4 – sanctions
- x_5 – method of payment to supplier/agent.

All five factors have a qualitative character. Table 3 shows how we transformed them into quantitative data.

The analysis uses primary data from our 2009 research on a representative sample of 131 Slovak municipalities of varying sizes (see Tables 1 and 2).

The findings are set out in Table 4 and are not very positive. The average contract management score is about 60 (out of 100). Better results are normally received for soft indicators, where evaluation is based on the subjective opinion/response from the staff involved.

Table 3
Conversion to Quantitative Data

| Factor | Description | Points |
|--|--|--------|
| X ₁ – Level of competitiveness of the award | Open tender | 100 |
| | Restricted procedure | 70 |
| | Negotiated procedure | 50 |
| | Price quotation | 30 |
| | Direct award | 0 |
| X ₂ – Selection criteria | Best bid | 100 |
| | Lowest price | 50 |
| X ₃ – Frequency of monitoring | Regular | 100 |
| | Irregular | 50 |
| | No monitoring | 0 |
| X ₄ – Contract sanctions | Cancellation of the contract | 100 |
| | Financial sanctions | 70 |
| | Right to request improvements | 30 |
| | Other | 0 |
| X ₅ – Method of payment to supplier | Performance payment | 100 |
| | Mixed performance and lump-sum payment | 50 |
| | Lump-sum payment | 0 |

Source: Own research.

Table 4
Quality of Contract Management for Contracting Local Public Services

| Service | Competitiveness | Ex-ante evaluation | Monitoring | Sanctions | Payment conditions |
|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------|------------|-----------|--------------------|
| Waste | 42.84 | 67.12 | 70.32 | 42.08 | 65.65 |
| Public lighting | 47.11 | 72.73 | 65.26 | 45.20 | 63.72 |
| Local communications | 50.12 | 64.40 | 64.13 | 43.50 | 74.15 |
| Public green | 58.89 | 66.39 | 54.72 | 46.81 | 75.90 |
| Cemeteries | 29.43 | 68.27 | 64.29 | 45.18 | 45.79 |
| Average | 45.68 | 67.78 | 63.74 | 44.55 | 65.04 |

Source: Own research.

5. Research Methodology and Research Results: Factors Determining the Success of Contract Management

The theoretical background described above suggests that there should be some relationship between the quality of contract management and the contracting performance. We tested the existence of this relationship for Slovakia by calculating Spearman's correlation coefficient, where the dependent variable is the efficiency of contracting (Table 2, 2009 data) and the independent variables are the factors determining the contracting efficiency ($x_1 - x_5$). The assumed null and alternative hypotheses were:

H₀ : $\rho_s = 0$ (no statistically significant correlation)

H₁ : $\rho_s \neq 0$ (statistically significant correlation exists) (1)

The level of significance for the hypothesis test was $\alpha = 0.1$ (2)

With SPSS Data Editor we calculated the value sig. (2-tailed) for statistically significant correlations between the dependent and independent variables (Table 6). If there is statistically significant correlation Sig. (2-tailed) < α we will reject the null hypothesis. In such a situation we calculate the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient ρ as a nonparametric measure of statistical dependence between contracting out efficiency and the factors related to contract management ($x_1 - x_5$):

$$\rho = 1 - \frac{6 \sum_i (p_i - q_i)^2}{n(n^2 - 1)} \quad (3)$$

We interpret the results as:

- ρ value is close to -1 : negative correlation,
- ρ value is close to 1 : positive correlation

Table 5 shows the values of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient ρ for these factors related to contract management, where the values Sig. (2-tailed) is less the α : that is factors for which the hypothesis H1 is confirmed.

Table 5
Correlations for Contracting Local Services

| Service | Contract management factor | Sig. (2-tailed) value | Spearman's rank correlation coefficient | Correlation |
|----------------------|---|-----------------------|---|-------------|
| Waste | x_1 – Level of competitiveness of the award | 0.000 | 0.333 | Positive |
| | x_3 – Frequency of monitoring | 0.031 | 0.209 | Positive |
| Public lighting | x_1 – Level of competitiveness of the award | 0.000 | 0.579 | Positive |
| Local communications | x_1 – Level of competitiveness of the award | 0.000 | 0.666 | Positive |
| Public green | x_1 – Level of competitiveness of the award | 0.000 | 0.804 | Positive |
| | x_5 – Method of payment to supplier | 0.083 | 0.361 | Positive |
| Cemeteries | x_1 – Level of competitiveness of the award | 0.001 | 0.731 | Positive |

Source: Own research.

Similarly to other studies, we found that the frequency of monitoring of the services and the method of payment to the supplier are positively significantly correlated with contracting efficiency. The data clearly indicate that the level of competitiveness of the award is the key contract management factor influencing the efficiency of contracting.

This outcome fully supports assumptions that contracting is expected to produce major efficiency gains because of competition in the service delivery market. But all the Slovak studies already noted above indicate that this potential is insufficiently exploited, for two key reasons. First, in many areas there are few potential private suppliers. Second, even though competitive selection is mandated by the procurement law, it often does not happen. The data we collected on the modes of awarding contracts confirms this result (Table 6). If such poor practices continue in Slovakia, then contracting of public services will not deliver positive results. But as Beblavý and Sičáková-Beblavá (2006) state, there are also important inefficiencies with in-house production.

Table 6
Methods of Selecting External Suppliers (%)

| Procurement method used | 2001 | 2005 | 2006 | 2008 | 2009 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|
| Open procedure | 16 | 17 | 27 | 32 | 17 |
| Restricted procedure | 5 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 14 |
| Negotiated procedure | 0 | 13 | 30 | 0 | 7 |
| Price bid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 4 |
| Direct purchase | 31 | 17 | 38 | 30 | 11 |
| Municipality was not willing to provide information | 48 | 55 | – | 25 | 66 |

Source: The six studies cited above.

Conclusions

The theory of contracting suggests that it has the potential to improve efficiency, given certain conditions. Because several socio-economic preconditions for successful contracting are at present insufficiently developed in Slovakia, contracting delivers less positive outcomes than might be expected.

Contracting out is a very common solution in municipal practice: for example dominating the delivery of waste management services. But its efficiency is limited, and internal production seems to deliver better results.

The core part of our paper tests the above conjectures using Slovak data. We measure the impact of qualitative contract management factors, selected by the Delphi method, on determining contracting efficiency. The results indicate that there are several important factors limiting success, by far the most important being the degree of competition for the contract. Too few contracts involve a competitive bidding process between would-be suppliers. Our data covers more than a decade, and it is clear that this problem is not improving. To change this situation accountability needs to become a real value in our public-administration systems, and intervention has to focus not only on processes but also on results.

References

- ARROW, K. J. (1986): *The Economics of Agency*. In: PRATT, J. W. and ZECKHAUSER, J.: *Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, pp. 37 – 51. ISBN 978-0071033084.
- BAILEY, S. J. (1999): *Public Sector Economics*. London: Macmillan. ISBN 80-85963-85-X.
- BALÁŽOVÁ, E. (2006): *Benchmarking služieb miestnej samosprávy na Slovensku*. Transparency International Slovensko. Bratislava: Adin. ISBN 80-89244-09-2.
- BEBLAVÝ, M. – SIČÁKOVÁ-BEBLAVÁ, E. (2006): *Inštitucionálne dilemy pri zabezpečovaní verejných služieb*. Transparency International Slovensko. Prešov: Adin. ISBN 80 89244 10 6.
- BEL, G. – COSTAS, A. (2006): *Do Public Sector Reforms Get Rusty? An Empirical Analysis on Privatization of Solid Waste Collection*. *The Journal of Policy Reform*, 9, No. 1, pp. 1 – 24.
- BROWN, T. L. – POTOSKI, M. (2003a): *Managing Contract Performance: A Transaction Costs Approach*. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 22, No. 2, pp. 275 – 297.
- BROWN, T. L. – POTOSKI, M. (2003b): *Contract-Management Capacity in Municipal and County Governments*. *Public Administration Review*, 63, No. 2, pp. 153 – 164.
- BRUDNEY, J. L. – FERNANDEZ, S. – RYU, J. E. – WRIGHT, D. S. (2005): *Exploring and Explaining Contracting Out: Patterns Among the American States*. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 15, No. 2, pp. 393 – 419.
- ČAPKOVÁ, S. (2010): *Slovakia: Local Government: Establishing Democracy at the Grassroots*. In: LOUGHLIN, J., HENDRIKS, F. and LIDSTRÖM, A. (eds): *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 552 – 576. ISBN 978-0-19-956297-8.
- COOPER, P. J. (2003): *Governing by Contract*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. ISBN 1-56802-620-X.
- DeHOOG, R. H. (1990): *Competition, Negotiation, or Cooperation: Three Models for Service Contracting*. *Administration and Society*, 22, No. 3, pp. 317 – 40.
- ENGELBECK, R. M. (2004): *Using Metrics to Manage Contractor Performance*. Monterey: Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. Available at: <<http://www.acquisitionresearch.org/>>. Cit. 12. 3. 2012.
- EPSTEIN, P. D. (1984): *Using Performance Measurement in Local Government*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Inc. ISBN 0442216033.
- FANTOVÁ ŠUMPÍKOVÁ, M. – ROUSEK, P. (2009): *Přístupy ke kvalitě služeb v ČR*. In: *Bílé místa a černé díry reform veřejného sektoru*. [Proceedings.] Brno: Ekonomicko-správní fakulta MU. ISBN 978-80-7399-657-4.
- FERRIS, J. – GRADDY, E. (1991): *Production Costs, Transaction Costs, and Local Government Contractor Choice*. *Economic Inquiry*, 25, No. 6, pp. 541 – 554.
- GREEN, J. D. (2002): *Cities and Privatization: Prospects for the New Century*. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. ISBN 013029442X.
- HEFETZ, A. – WARNER, M. (2004): *Privatization and its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the Government Contracting Process*. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 14, No. 2, pp. 171 – 190.
- HIRSCH, W. Z. (1991): *Privatizing Government Services: An Economic Analysis of Contracting by Local Governments*. Los Angeles: University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations, Publications Centre.
- HODGE, G. A. (2000): *Privatization: International Review of Performance*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. ISBN 0-7326-0663-2.
- CHAMBERLIN, J. R. – JACKSON, J. E. (1987): *Privatization as Institutional Choice*. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 6, No. 4, pp. 586 – 604.
- KAMERMAN, S. B. – KAHN, A. J. (1989): *Privatization and the Welfare State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691023076.
- KETTL, D. F. (1993): *Sharing Power – Public Governance and Private Markets*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. ISBN 0-8157-4906-6.

- LANE, J. E. (2000): *New Public Management*. London: Routledge Taylor Francis Group. ISBN 0-19-834825-X.
- LOWERY, D. (1998): Consumer Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 8, No. 2, pp. 137 – 172.
- MacNEIL, I. R. (1978): Contracts: Adjustments of Long-term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law. *Northwestern University Law Review*, 72, No. 6, pp. 855 – 905.
- MAJLINGOVÁ, L. – ŠAGÁT, V. (2006): Zabezpečovanie služieb miestnou samosprávou. *Acta Aerarii Publici*, 3, No. 2, pp. 34 – 41.
- MARLIN, J. T. (1984): *Contracting Municipal Services: A Guide for Purchase from the Private Sector*. New York: Wiley. ISBN-10: 0471878545.
- MARTIN, L. L. (1999): *Contracting for Service Delivery: Local Government Choices*. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association. ISBN 0873268458.
- MERIČKOVÁ, B. – NEMEC, J. – VÍTEK, L. (2005): Contracting-out at Local Government Level: Theory and Selected Evidence from Czech and Slovak Republics. *Public Management Review*, 7, No. 4, pp. 638 – 647.
- MERIČKOVÁ, B. – NEMEC, J. (2007): Contracting-out Local Public Services – Situation and Trends in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In: *Lessons and Recommendations for Improvement. Central and Eastern European Public Administration and Public Policy*. [NISPAcee Yearbook.] Bratislava: NISPAcee, pp. 191 – 204. ISBN 978-80-89013-31-9.
- MERIČKOVÁ, B. – NEMEC, J. – OCHRANA, F. (2008): Introducing Benchmarking in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Processes, Problems and Lessons. *Public Management Review*, 10, No. 5, pp. 673 – 684.
- MERIČKOVÁ, B. – NEMEC, J. – ŠUMPÍKOVÁ, M. (2010): Is the Estonian Municipal Benchmarking Really Better? The Impacts of Research Methodology on Research Results. *Public Management Review*, 13, No. 4, pp. 539 – 550.
- MERIČKOVÁ, B. – NEMEC, J. – SIČÁKOVÁ BEBLAVÁ, E. – BEBLAVÝ, M. (2010): *Kontrahovanie služieb vo verejnom sektore*. Bratislava: Transparency International Slovensko. ISBN 978-80-89244-65-2.
- MORE, T. M. (1984): The New Economics of Organization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 4, No. 28, pp. 739 – 777.
- NEMEC, J. (2002): Zmluvné zabezpečovanie verejných služieb. *Ekonomický časopis/Journal of Economics*, 50, No. 6, pp. 9 – 11.
- ØVRETVEIT, J. (1995): *Purchasing for Health*. London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-7487-3293.
- OCHRANA, F. – NEKOLA, M. (2009): Economic Evaluation of Public Programs. *Ekonomický časopis/Journal of Economics*, 57, No. 5, pp. 458 – 74.
- PAVEL, J. (2007): Efektivnost obecních obchodních společností při poskytování služeb. *Politická ekonomie*, 55, No. 5, pp. 681 – 693.
- PAVEL, J. – BEBLAVÁ, E. (2008): Transparentnosť trhu verejného obstarávania. *Ekonomický časopis/Journal of Economics*, 56, No. 2, pp. 168 – 181.
- POLLITT, CH. – BOUCKAERT, G. (2000): *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-829722-X.
- PRAGER, J. (1994): Contracting Out Government Services: Lessons from the Private Sector. *Public Administration Review*, 54, No. 2, pp. 176 – 184.
- PRATT, J. W. – ZECKHAUSER, R. J. (1986): Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 24, No. 4, pp. 1788 – 1789.
- REHFUSS, J. A. (1989): *Contracting Out in Government*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. ISBN 0124413528.
- ROMZEK, B. S. – JOHNSTON, J. M. (2002): Effective Contract Implementation and Management: A Preliminary Model. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 12, No. 1, pp. 423 – 453.

- SAVAS, E. S. (1987): *Privatisation: The Key to Government*. New York: Chatman House. ISBN 0-385-460821-X.
- SCLAR, E. D. (2000): *You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN: 978-0-8014-8762-0.
- SEIDENSTAT, P. (1999): *Contracting Out Government Services*. Westport: Praeger. ISBN 1 85449 394 9.
- SHETTERLY, D. R. (1998): The Influence of Contract Designs No Contractor Performance. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 24, No. 1, pp. 53 – 68.
- SICÁKOVÁ BEBLAVÁ, E. – BEBLAVÝ, M. (2007): Faktory ovplyvňujúce rozhodovanie o spôsobe zabezpečovania služieb vo veľkých slovenských mestách. *Politická ekonomie*, 55, No. 2, pp. 245 – 261.
- SICÁKOVÁ BEBLAVÁ, E.: (2009): Methods of Services Provision in Slovak Towns. *Central European Journal of Public Policy*, 3, No. 1, pp. 4 – 16.
- SICÁKOVÁ BEBLAVÁ, E. – BEBLAVÝ, M.: (2009): Rozhodovanie slovenských miest o postupoch obstarávania verejných služieb. *Ekonomický časopis/Journal of Economics*, 57, No. 7, pp. 667 – 681.
- STEJSKAL, J. – CHARBUSKY, M. (2004): Modely řízení a hodnocení kvality veřejných služeb. *E+M Ekonomie a manažment*, 7, No. 4, pp. 53 – 57.
- ŠEBOVÁ, L. (2007): Predpoklady uplatňovania finančného kontroingu v hoteli. *E+M Ekonomie a Management*, 10, No. 3, pp. 122 – 131.
- ŠTRANGFELDOVÁ, J. – HRONEC, Š. (2008): Metódy a spôsoby transferu výsledkov vedy a výskumu do praxe. *Academia*, 19, No. 1, pp. 16 – 26.
- URAMOVÁ, M. – PISÁR, P. – ŠIPIKAL, M. (2010): Support of inovation at regional level. *E+M Ekonomie a manažment*, 13, No. 4, pp. 74 – 85.
- VANOVÁ, A. (1996): Marketing územia ako súčasť municipálnej a regionálnej politiky. *Ekonomický časopis/Journal of Economics*, 44, No. 7 – 8, pp. 529 – 543.
- VOZÁROVÁ, Z. (2012): *Kontrahovanie služieb vo verejnom sektore*. [Dissertation] Banská Bystrica: Ekonomická fakulta UMB.
- WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1986): *Economic Organization: Firms, Markets, and Policy Control*. New York: New York University Press. ISBN 0-7450-0015-0.