The aim of the article is to present those elements in classical phenomenology which inspired Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1923 – 2014) to develop her own concept of the phenomenology of life and the creative human condition. Therefore, her philosophical position will not be presented with references to the key questions of transcendental phenomenology, since she never argued with Edmund Husserl. Tymieniecka clearly emphasized the fact that it was otherwise, claiming that she conducted a polemic on the ontological and metaphysical, and consequently also anthropological ground with Roman Ingarden (1893 – 1970) – her teacher and mentor from the time of philosophical studies at the Jagiellonian University in Poland in 1945 – 1947. And this philosopher’s thought was the main reason for the phenomenological path she chose.

**Keywords:** Phenomenology of life – Metaphysics – Cosmological perspective – Stratification – Work of art

1. **Introduction**

The concept of the phenomenology of life and the human creative condition began to germinate very early in the mind of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. This philosopher, who was born in 1923 in Poland and died in her country home in Pommes Frites in Vermont (USA) in 2014, referred to it as the *ontopoiesis* of life. Her intention was to emphasise the highest importance and status that creativity – understood as a dynamic and progressive construction – held in the vision of the formation of the world and human subjectivity that underlies this concept. The *ontopoiesis* of life is the constructive, creative and inventive, process of becoming and developing life: originally due to Nature (Logos of Life and *Imaginatio Creatrix*) and – after the evolutionary/natural appearance in the world of human beingness with its creative nature – also due to man’s creative acts (Tymieniecka 2011b, 239 – 242).
Tymieniecka was developing her phenomenological concept concurrently with her vision of the New Enlightenment, by which she meant the contemporary era for us, i.e. people living at the turn of the 20th century. This is an era of dynamic, so far unheard of cultural transformations as well as existential challenges. And, of course, this is determined mainly by the state of modern natural science which are at the forefront of scientific progress; they allow the contemporary human being to know a great deal both about the circumstances in which his or her life originated and about how life in general came into being (Tymieniecka 2006, XIII). And since being alive is the most primal human experience, the foundation and content of all kinds of human experience (Tymieniecka 2011b, 25 – 26; Smith 1990, 25) as well as the basis for interdisciplinary understanding, knowledge about the origins of life, becomes a priority (Tymieniecka 1995, 202). To be “alive” is to be “conscious”, and to be a “living human being” is to be “self-aware”.

Still, although today natural sciences are trying to help people attain this knowledge on the source of humanity, they do not provide the most important thing, namely a moral and ethical orientation in life, a moral measure. Whereas being fully self-aware requires such an orientation from the individual. Indeed, it seems to be a necessary condition for self-awareness. As the phenomenologist puts it, the human culture today is experiencing a time of especial “barbarism,” a time without a fixed point of reference for the direction in which the scientific development and the development of human life are heading (Tymieniecka 2011b, 12). In this unique, existential situation that contemporary people face, the question about the human nature and the meaning of human life, becomes even more urgent and crucial than just a matter of nature of human knowledge. Answering this question is almost impossible without building a coherent vision of the unity of the world and human being, the human condition within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive (Tymieniecka 2012, 57). Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life and the creative human condition was to be such a concept.

2. New metaphysics – towards self-interpretation in existence

Yet this unity requires that the human being not only does not lose his or her individuality, but also affirms it even more, becoming ever freer from the inherent determinants dictated by nature. The specific nature of this self-development, understood also as the self-individualization-in-existence, was described by Tymieniecka as human self-interpretation. In order to analyse it and understand what it means for man and the entire life-world, a cosmological research perspective seemed necessary (Tymieniecka 2011b, 19 – 20).
And this was the perspective Tymieniecka adopted. Therefore, we are dealing here with Logos of Life and the creative imagination (Tymieniecka 1987, 73). These are the two interacting life-giving forces of Nature, to which the whole universe owes its existence. Including man. And yet human life is so different from any other form of life that neither is it born as fully formed, nor does it achieve its full meaning on the vital level alone. Therefore, the human being does not discover the meaning of his/her life as if it were predetermined, but having at his/her disposal the “foundation of being” in the form of biological and cultural resources, he/she develops this ever-changing sense, the nature of life, in the individual and all-human effort of creating culture.

Tymieniecka proposed her own metaphysical conception. The metaphysics of our time grows out of an interdisciplinary dialogue in the broadest sense of the term, without closing itself off from any of the voices resounding in the human cultural space that discuss the meaning and purpose of human life. In the concept of the ontopoiesis of life, this vision appears as a picture of a dynamically developing and changing universe, whose only unchangeable principle is its changeability.

It is a vision that excludes the ossified, constituted structure of the universe, which the human mind could discover by means of some defined method. It is also a vision in which man's primary and fundamental relation to the world becomes, above all, a relation of constructing, creating, and than – cognitive. Finally, it is a vision in which imagination, not reason, takes the lead. The last one does not have absolute authority in the perspective of cosmological changeability.

The philosophy in the New Enlightenment is to subject human reason to new criticism and, in the light of research provided not only by the natural sciences, but also by man's artistic creativity, to show anew the possibilities and horizons of their account of the meaning and purpose of their own lives, and of human life in general. This perception is the experiencing of life – the intuitive, inner experiencing of the individual self as, above all, a living beingness in the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. It is the primordial experience, and in the phenomenological sense – the source experience.

And because of imagination, treated as a function of the human mind equivalent to reason, it is very important to speak of these possibilities and horizons in the plural. Because every human individual makes their account in a unique and unrepeatable way, and in the same way – rationalises reality. However, they do so in such a way that it is possible to categorise these accounts cross-culturally, thanks to which we speak of philosophical, artistic, scientific, and religious creativity, etc., which makes it possible to describe and convey their content in an interdisciplinary discussion.
Every manner of grasping and understanding the meaning of the world and life is founded on the creative act of man (Tymieniecka 1995, 197), which Tymieniecka described as follows:

The creative act of the human being, orchestrating in a unique way all the constructive functions of the vital powers and, at the same time, using them for a new function, namely the inventive one, constitutes the Archimedean point from which at once the human world, the perpetual making of life, as well as all the human reflective approaches to life can be unfolded. Phenomenological analysis of the human in his or her creative condition, as the study of the creative act of life, makes it possible to examine the entire spread of the ‘order of things’ – from the rationality of elementary, vital relationships, through the inventive rationality of the specifically human ways of life (Tymieniecka 1987, 77; author’s translation from Polish).

The creative act is a cultural act and an act of the human spirit. And the human spirit is a specifically human expression of life. In the course of its individual development the spirit reaches back with its roots to the natural beginnings of life itself in order to achieve an ever greater autonomy expressed in nothing else but creativity.

This creativity never merely consists in the creation of something outside the human spirit. Each and every time a human being undertakes a creative act, it is a self-development of their spirit and of the human spirit as a whole. And so, their creations are not only to carry aesthetic values, or – more importantly – purely cognitive values, but above all ethical values. On their foundations, humankind should formulate concrete moral solutions which respond to the needs of the times in which they currently live and which, after all, they themselves, although always assisted by the natural grounding of their existence, shape and put into practice.

Tymieniecka’s goal became a phenomenology of phenomenology – as a finding of the basis of all human experiences. The thinker pursued this objective while researching, and living, in the United States, where she moved in the 1950s, immediately after completing her doctoral dissertation, which she had prepared while studying at several European universities. She wrote:

Actually, this whole philosophy of mine is a critique of reason from the bottom up, and *ontopoiesis* is the basic point from which the unfolding of reason follows. […] I am strictly adhering to Husserl’s evidence principle and to his horizon-principle, to the many analyses of his genetic phenomenology, and so forth, which I do not repeat. I have myself
acknowledged them tacitly, without repeating them, considering them tacitly in scanning ontopoietic development [...] (Torjussen, Servan and Øyen 2008, 5).

When starting her analysis of the “subjective stream of life”, Tymieniecka wanted to assert Husserl’s “principle of all principles” as the postulate which guarantees access to experience and the postulate of the necessary, internal, rational coherence of experience as the one which ensures the second postulate, no less important and fundamental than the first one – the irreducible element in man (Tymieniecka 1976, 246).

Tymieniecka, however, did not remain faithful to all the precepts of Husserl’s phenomenology, and her departure from the classical phenomenological path that he had laid out ultimately proved to be significant. What she accomplished with regard to the German philosopher’s transcendentalism she described as its “overturning” (Tymieniecka 2011a, 3 – 10). It was Ingarden, in her opinion, who brought phenomenology into a new, second, after the transcendental, phase of development. “It seems” – wrote the phenomenologist – “that while Husserl’s transcendental inquiries reduced the universe of discourse to a transcendental monistic position, Ingarden’s ontological investigations restored the proper status of each type of object in metaphysical pluralism” (Tymieniecka 1976, 245).

3. Tymieniecka’s interpretation of Ingarden’s ontology

3.1. Idealism. An empirical perspective is needed

In the 4th volume of Analecta Husserliana1, entitled: Ingardeniana and devoted entirely to the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden, Tymieniecka writes:

From the groundwork of ontological analysis, Husserl is led to the dimension of human consciousness in its subjective constitutive function. But could we really stop having in front of us merely the ontological substructure of the universe, in its pure possibilities on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the universe of man’s consciousness in its universal constitutive progress explicating the specifically human life-world? (Tymieniecka 1976, 244)

Author’s answer is negative. We cannot stop there without asking about the nature of preconscious life and the nature of the existing universe in which human subjectivity is rooted. In her view, this is a fact with which there is no point in arguing

1 A.-T. Tymieniecka founded this publishing series in 1968.
today: human life grows out of nature and is therefore also evolutionarily linked to its prebiotic elements. It is them that initiate life, which is synonymous with consciousness. Thanks to this, human consciousness appears as the highest level of organisation of life – its self-organisation. Phenomenology can not lose sight of the empirical.

In Volume I of the 1971 *Analecta Husserliana*, the phenomenologist wrote: “He [Roman Ingarden] took up the first Husserl’s project of phenomenology, which as a *scientia universalis* should for its start repose upon the eidetic reduction alone, and elaborated an *a priori* ontological foundation for this reduction” (Tymieniecka1971, VI). Tymieniecka had no doubt that Ingarden deepened the research of groundbreaking importance for philosophy, originally undertaken by Husserl. Generally speaking, their aim was to legitimise science and philosophy by reaching their source, the absolute source, as the beginning of direct, necessary, and certain, ideal, knowledge. The method of eidetic reduction was to serve this purpose.

Ingarden, according to his student, attempted to extract from such a project the basis of this reduction, which is necessary for the conclusiveness of phenomenology. This gave philosophy, in general, a more precisely defined research tool. Moreover, Ingarden’s analyses have shown that phenomenology not only does not require the fact of the world’s existence to be side-lined, or the empirical to be removed from the field of consideration of *scientia universalis, mathesis universalis*, but the empirical is needed in order to undertake the epistemological task of understanding the origins of the universe.

The relation between metaphysics and ontology in Ingarden’s thought – as it is the key issue here – was already elaborated on in the young philosopher’s dissertation, which she defended in 1952. Her topic was: *Essence et existence. Étude à propos de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden et Nicolai Hartmann*, published in 1957. In her opinion, the dispute between idealism and realism constituted the main axis of the project of *philosophia prima* from Antiquity to the present day. But it was Ingarden who was to be the philosopher who dealt with this matter most profoundly (Tymieniecka1957, 97), showing the possibility of developing it further, which was later taken up and carried out by her – his student.

In the aforementioned dissertation Tymieniecka refers to the issue undertaken by Ingarden, points out the difference between metaphysics itself and ontology. Both metaphysics and ontology are interested in the essence of things or states of things. Whereas metaphysics asks about the relation of facts, states of affairs, to their essence, inquiring into their ultimate causes, ontology is not concerned with facts because it is interested in pure possibilities and pure relations of necessity (Tymieniecka 1957, 97 – 98). In its concern with analysing pure qualities and pure possibilities, ontology, as
it were, prepares the ground for metaphysics, which refers to the same objects to which the detailed sciences refer. In other words, metaphysics “goes beyond the exact sciences, proposing to grasp objects in their essence” (Tymieniecka 1957, 98; author’s translation from French).

**How did Tymieniecka feel about this?**

For Ingarden, the question of the aforementioned distinction in the dispute between idealism and realism was connected with the need to confront the realism of his own position with the postulate put forward by Husserl “[... ] about the existence of ideas which, while not being real, nevertheless have the reality of a certain order, and about the relation that exists between ideas and concrete individual entities” (Tymieniecka 1957, 99; author’s translation from French). Tymieniecka’s understanding of metaphysics was different from Ingarden’s. This is best expressed in her own words:

> In reference to them both [Husserl and Ingarden], my attempt to go beyond the limitations of, on the one hand, a transcendental constitution and, on the other, a purely ideal and structural apriorism, is: 1) a new approach to the world, not as a realm of objects in the structural and eidetic sense, but as an individual object in the context of a world conceived in process, 2) a reference to ideal structures, but a) with a modified notion of the idea [as realised in the process of construction rather than already constituted] and b) a transition from the tautology of intentional analysis to an inference based on it (Tymieniecka 1987, 71; author’s translation from Polish).

Thus, in her opinion, Ingarden, despite his detailed analyses of the ways in which the world exists, was ultimately unable to go beyond the dispute between realism and idealism. He failed to notice several important issues, without the consideration of which the eternal riddles of the universe and man have no chance of divulging even a shred of their mystery. Like Husserl, Ingarden indicated the legitimation of the source of knowledge about the world and life in terms of scientific accuracy as the most important task for philosophy, but he did not focus enough on showing the internal unity of this world in which human life plays a part as its constituent.

**3.2. Intentionality. A new concept of primary spontaneity is needed**

Although Tymieniecka ultimately acknowledged the need to take a step further in her phenomenological analyses than Ingarden had done and to demonstrate the possibility of this unity, she still believed that the analyses conducted by her master, especially
those concerning the stratification structure of a literary work, in *The Literary Work of Art*, pointed in the right direction for the step to be taken. She wrote:

In both classical phases of phenomenology, the transcendental phase advanced by Husserl and the ontological phase developed by Ingarden, the main issue is the same: the status of the real world in relation to pure consciousness. […] But Ingarden also grounds phenomenology in a new way, and consequently follows the whole course of investigation from scratch. He does this insofar as he rejects the transcendental limitations of the phenomenological method and continues on the purely ontological ground from which his inquiry begins and on which it rests (Tymieniecka 1987, 245-247; author’s translation from Polish).

Husserl separated the existential aspect from the essential one by the use of *epoché*. As a consequence, the problem of analysing of existence did not appear in his thought after he carried out the transcendental reduction of empirical conscious acts to their pure intentional nature. Intentional acts reveal themselves as the source of contingent objects of our, human cognition, the acquisition of knowledge regarding the pure consciousness. And this dynamic flow of the stream of consciousness was for Husserl identical with the dynamic development of the human world as the world experienced by man, which from the beginning of his or her life is progressively developed by him or her into ever more complex forms. In doing so, Husserl made it possible to grasp and analyse “the modes in which the forms of life and the world are constituted in series of intentional acts” (Tymieniecka 1976, 248 – 249); still, he only addressed the problem of essence.

The spontaneity to which Husserl referred with regard to acts of pure consciousness was not, for Tymieniecka, what she believed spontaneity should be. Also in Ingarden’s approach to this topic spontaneity appeared to be a development taking place in accordance with a universal line of development. And she considered this way of presenting it to be the opposite of spontaneity manifesting itself in the development of the world of living beings consciousness). Tymieniecka wrote:

Thus, the constitutive analysis has to follow the ‘logic’ of this genesis in retrospect, backwards. Its main objective is to uncover the structures and concatenations of the intentional system from its most complex forms of

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2 *The Literary Work of Art* by Roman Ingarden was first published in 1931 as: *Das literarische Kunstwerk.*
the cultural world down to the original forms of the fundamental, basic human experience (Tymieniecka 1976, 249).

What we are dealing with here is an understanding of the intentionality of acts of consciousness that provides only a theoretical foundation for phenomenology, without the possibility of its practical application. Thus, in order for phenomenological reduction to reach the level of self-evident cognition, a definite, transcendental, nature of consciousness must be presupposed, with the result, in this particular case, that critical and theoretical analyses enter a vicious circle, from which there is no way out and from which no conclusions can be drawn (Tymieniecka 2011b, 61–63).

It was only Ingarden, who makes a renewed effort to look at the foundations of the world and the ways in which it manifests itself (Tymieniecka 1976, 250). Tymieniecka acknowledged that the Polish phenomenologist did an ontological analysis of the main elements in the idealism-realism problem, which provided the opportunity to reconstruct it philosophically and to propose a radically divergent vision of the universe and man from that presented by Husserl’s metaphysical monism based on the one and unique principle of transcendental consciousness. According to Tymieniecka, Ingarden unquestionably contributed to the restoration of ontological existential ties and to the establishment of the intentional-empirical monad, concrete consciousness, as the starting point of phenomenological analyses.

With regard to the problems concerning the modes of the world’s existence, forms of being, analysed by her Cracovian teacher, i.e. real, related to individual and autonomous objects which last in time, events and processes, ideal, absolute and intentional, Tymieniecka paid particular attention to the last category. Already in her above-mentioned doctoral dissertation she wrote about the significance of issues concerning the intentional mode of being for phenomenology, philosophy, as outlined by Ingarden.

While transcendentalism identified intentionality with idealism and the absoluteness of existence, this is not the case in Ingarden’s ontology. An intentional object does not exist in an ideal manner here. The idea is always general and unique. It is a being that exists by itself and that is founded in itself. Intentionality, in the Polish phenomenologist’s view, defines such a mode of the existence of an object, being, which, admittedly, does not imply its autonomy, an intentional object has no basis of being in itself and is, therefore, a heteronomous being, but allows for its further existence independent of the source which initiated it. Its beginning constitutes a conscious act of the subject, without which it would not exist. Once it has come into being, it can exist independently of it (Tymieniecka 1957, 97–112). This is the case with a work of literary art, although it seems that we can simply speak of a work of art here.
However, the autonomy of the existence of intentional being is not identical not only with the general autonomy of ideal being, but also with the individual autonomy of real being. There is, however, a certain connection, even a certain dependence, between it and the latter. Ingarden’s phenomenological research contained in *The Literary Work of Art*, which creates the concept of the stratified structure of a literary work, specifies the nature of this relationship. The author’s student notes that his analyses are valuable not only from the point of view of literary studies or even other fields of human artistic creation, but are an important contribution to the development of phenomenology in general, since phenomenology is the foundation of every field of science (Tymieniecka 1962, 3 – 17).

According to Tymieniecka, such a prominent role of classical phenomenology, but in Ingarden’s and not Husserl’s interpretation, results from his demonstration of the stratification structure of a work of art as corresponding to the complex and existentially differentiated structure of the (omni)world. In this perspective, the meaning stratum takes on a special meaning.

A work of (literary) art has the foundation of being in real being. As is well known, its nature can be considered in terms of both object and subject. After all, man – the subject: the creator and recipient of a work of art – also belongs to the real world. However, a work of literary art itself does not belong to this world, even though it is related to it, just as its existential foundation does not constitute this work.

On the one hand, intentional being, unlike individual real being, is ‘unfinished’. A real object has a well-defined structure which makes it what it is and nothing else. An intentional object, on the other hand, contains certain undeterminable, empty *loci* (Tymieniecka 1976, 275 – 276). It is constantly becoming. First, it becomes in general and in specific content when it is initiated by its creator, by the artist, and then it becomes anew each time it is perceived by a conscious act of someone else. And although the same, this object is ‘other’ each time. It contains an irreducible *novum* that expands its meaning, but it does not thereby lose its identity.

The change in meaning results in a work of art receiving concretion, individuality, and gaining a new content that complements its sense. “In the work of art itself,” wrote Tymieniecka, “objects are given only schematically, fragmentarily, in perspectives purposely chosen by the artist. It is up to the individual, subjective experience of the reader or spectator, creator or performer to make them complete in the form of concretion” (Tymieniecka 1962, 29).

The meaning becomes transcendental to the act of consciousness that produced it and does not disappear with the disappearance of this act, while it may simultaneously recur in various other acts of consciousness. In a way it begins to ‘live its own life’. On the other hand, when the recipient of a work of art perceives and contemplates it,
internal, spiritual, content-related, changes take place in him or her, the recipient. These too have the character of an irreducible *novum*. Thus, ultimately, meaning is transcendent of the act and does not disappear with its disappearance; it has the potential to be repeated in different acts of consciousness (Tymieniecka 1962, 24 – 27).

This stratum of meanings opens up a space of ‘un-determinability’ in intentional being. It constitutes the nucleus of the incessant changes to which a work of (literature) art is subjected, but also the focus of influence on the changes occurring in the conscious experience of the subject. The subject, man, is not an inalterable, absolute – in the sense of pure – consciousness from which everything emerges, but to which nothing penetrates. He or she, like his or her creation, is a unity of changeability and changeability in unity. Tymieniecka wrote:

> Only because [the intentional mode of being] is simultaneously created by experience, yet irreducible to it – modifiable by experience and yet separable in its own right with respect to experience – can it mediate not only between various acts of consciousness (for example, as a condition of memory), but also serve as a foundation for intersubjective communication (Tymieniecka 1962, 27 – 28).

However, even without further interpretative scrutiny of Ingarden’s concept of the stratification in the construction of a literary work from the perspective of his Cracovian student, the stratum of sound and the stratum of objects represented, and relying mainly on the characteristics of the stratum of meanings, it is possible to see from what point of view Tymieniecka was interested in the issue of stratification in Ingarden’s thought. Namely, the perception of an intentional being as a complex structure, not an absolute monolith, draws attention to the creative act of man, which Tymieniecka “replaces” with a purely intentional act, and to the subject of this act, who is not pure consciousness, but a living being.

That is the perspective that Ingarden had showed, however he had not departed from the main, *de facto* idealistic, current of his teacher’s thought, making the so-called “pure possibilities” the cognitive object of fundamental ontology. Rationalists’ focusing all their research attention on the discovery of the method of cognition is tantamount to their unquestioning acceptance of the existence of a specific object of cognition – an ossified, unchanging, *de facto* ideal structure on which the whole reality, including human life, is founded. With his ontology, Ingarden did not, and did not intend to, avoid this kind of attitude (Tymieniecka 1987, 70).

Moreover, rationalists declared the self-governing reason to be the authority on the legitimacy of knowledge. The Polish phenomenologist, according to his student,
showed the perspective of constructing the metaphysics. He did so precisely thanks to
the concept of stratification, which introduced polymorphism, transcendence and
changeability of entities in the life-world into phenomenology as a consequence of
the possibility of combining various spheres, which had been hitherto perceived in the
philosophical tradition as totally different (Tymieniecka 1962, 31 – 32).

Ingarden showed the potential for unity of multiplicity and multiplicity in unity
(Tymieniecka 1957, 97 – 99), but he failed to break out of the “vicious circle” of
classical phenomenology. Tymieniecka accomplished this perspective by referring to
the creative act of a human being (Smith 1990, 27), which is not the same as the act
of consciousness, and this way she “embodied” human creativity in the real world. In
her opinion, Ingarden has not sufficiently analyzed the relationship between pure
consciousness and the individual (Hanneborg, 1990, 39).

4. Conclusion
I believe it should be acknowledged that the concept of phenomenology of life and
the human creative condition draws most of its inspiration from the phenomenology
of Ingarden. But also, it was him, who exhausted all possibilities of “the second phase”
of phenomenology (Tymieniecka 1967). According to Tymieniecka, there was another
reason why Ingarden did not build a metaphysics. This was due to a lack of demon-
stration of a smooth transition of one sphere of being into another so that the resulting
whole would be homogeneous, while at the same time these spheres would retain their
specificity when considered individually. She wrote to Ingarden as follows:

My approach does not correspond with your ontology, but rather your
metaphysics. Only that: 1) I provide a different formulation to what you
would call metaphysics, 2) Your perspective stems from ontology – mine
from cosmology. As a result, your object structures can solve the problems
of motion (in the form of causal relations) at this level of the constituted
world, but they are completely helpless against what I myself consider the
starting point: this basic pre-constitutive dynamic spontaneity (Tymieniec-
ka 1967; author’s translation from Polish).

It is the source of the human nature. According to Tymieniecka, all structures of
the life-world are inherently inseparable. They transform seamlessly into one another,
and the ways of these transformations are so varied that the human intellect will never
be able to discover them all. And with reference to the two fundamental points which
Tymieniecka indicates as the difference between her and Ingarden’s phenomenology,
one obtains a rather concise, but substantial sketch delineating the concept of pheno-
menology of life and the human creative condition as a postulate of a new critique of
reason on the grounds of the metaphysics in the New Enlightenment (Tymieniecka 2011, 7 – 13).

Bibliography


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