REVIEW ARTICLES

Sim, Stuart (ed.): *The Routledge Critical Dictionary of Postmodern Thought*. New York, NY, Routledge 1999. x+401 pp. ISBN 0-415-92353-0. Price 22.95 $.

What does the attribute ʹpostmodernʹ, daily used in very various contexts, actually mean? If a good deal of vagueness is obscuring the concept of ʹpostmodernityʹ, is at least that of ʹmodernityʹ endowed with more lucidity? Is there any recognizable dividing line between what is said to be ʹmodernʹ and what is perceived as ʹpostmodernʹ? To these and other related questions the *Routledge Critical Dictionary of Postmodern Thought* is designed to offer illuminative answers or neatly formulated sets of alternatives, sometimes even contradictory but still highly instructive responses and options.

In search for oneʹs way in the involved domain of scholarly products of most (or all?) *post*-labelled discourses, were they dealing with post-colonial/-feminist/-structural issues or with whatever else of this type, one might be faced with perplexing questions, too. This perplexity often transcends its intellectual frame and can be quantified by a variety of purely practical problems. In Toronto Chapters, or in Chicago Borders-type chains of bookstores you are certainly more likely to find your *post*-featured sought-for item under ʹliterary criticismʹ rather than on ʹphilosophyʹ- shelves. The perplexing question is still open: are we witnessing the birth of a fundamentally new type of *intertextuality,* touching the core of the subject-matter, or merely facing an attitudinal problem of revaluation and reclassification? The reader of Critical Dictionary will find expert answers even to these questions insofar as they can, in our days, be satisfactorily answered at all.

As can be deduced from the Editorʹs Introduction (vii-x), the title of the first, UK edition of 1998, still reflected its affiliation with the Icon Books editorial series: *The Icon Critical Dictionary of Postmodern Thought.*

The book is divided in two parts:

Part I: Postmodernism, its History and Cultural Context (1-173), by various authors: Postmodernism and Philosophy (Stuart Sim, 3-14); P. and Critical and Cultural Theory (Anthony Easthope, 15-27); P. and Politics (Iain Hamilton Grant, 28-40); P. and Feminism (Sue Thornham, 41-52); P. and Lifestyles (Nigel Watson, 53-64); P. and Science and Technology (Iain Hamilton Grant, 65-77); P. and Architecture (Diane Morgan, 78-88); P. and Art (Colin Trodd, 89-100); P. and the Cinema (Val Hill and Peter Every, 101-111); P. and Television (Marc OʹDay, 112-120); P. and Literature (Barry Lewis, 121-133); P. and Music

(Derek Scott, 134-146); P. and Popular Culture (John Storey, 147-157); Post-modernism, Modernity and the Tradition of Dissent (Lloyd Spencer, 158-69);

Select Bibliography (170-174).

Part II: Names and Terms (175-375), concept- and person-related key words in a highly transparent and easy-to-find A-Z arrangement, by Stuart Sim, the editor of the *Dictionary*.

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Nietzsche's entrance into the discourse of modernity was considered by many as a turning point in the transition to what is recently understood as post-modernity. Neither Hegel nor his direct followers ever called into question the achievements of modernity. Having failed to adapt the concept of reason to the program of Enlightenment, Nietzsche rejected the dialectic of Enlightenment altogether. The critique of the subject-centered reason and rejection of the dream of a definitive improvement of human society through knowledge and technology proceeded from Nietzsche to the present by two parallel channels: one running through Heidegger to Derrida, the other through Bataille to Foucault (McCarthy xi, in: Habermas 2000). In the former case, the critique of reason was primarily of an ontological nature: the Heideggerian philosophy of Being initiated the destruction of metaphysics and signalled the emergence of the post-modern deconstruction and related strategies (ibid.: xiii; Sim 276). In the latter case, the critique of metaphysics was dominated by Nietzsche's theory of power claiming 'that modern reason is nothing more than a perverted and disguised will to power'. This claim most vividly resonated in Bataille's writings and in Foucault's relationship between power and knowledge (McCarthy xiv). In the following comments, the most immediate attention will be paid to the former channel of transmission and quite particularly to Derrida's contribution to the debate.

In presenting key-terms of the postmodern discourse the reader of *The Routledge Critical Dictionary* is offered reliable explanations in a relatively concise and easy-to-grasp styling (the latter feature is not currently met with in post-modern and postmodern-related writings). Nevertheless, a number of highly relevant concepts, constantly recurring in postmodern discourse and in the present volume, too, are either unrecorded in the otherwise excellent and reliable Index (387-401) or are only retrievable through related items that happen to be represented therein.

Derrida's attitude towards *reality*, for instance, may certainly assume many guises that may be viewed from very various angles. One of them, as a casual example, is presented in its relation to *text* from which *reality* cannot clearly be separated. The reader is guided to this *text*-oriented affiliation of *reality* through *text* (Index: 26), not *reality* itself (Index: Ø). The same one-sided indexing may be found with Baudrillard's *reality* (Ø) coalescing with *simulation* (11). The same holds for the concept of *writing*, no doubt, one of the postmodern basics, that may only be found in the Index by way of a detour, as well: e.g. under *sup-*

plement (368-369), and in a number of other entries. The unindexed concept of *sexuality* is dispersed across several entries, too: *desire, desiring-machine, Freud, Foucault, libidinal economy, Oedipus,* and others.

Some other recurrent terms, no matter whether used as operative tools in the debate or as phenomena analyzed to demonstrate certain postmodern strategies, are missing in the Index altogether and follow the fate of *writing* or *sexuality*: *autoritarianism, liberalism, metaphor, phonocentrism, politics,* etc.

Plato's term *pharmakon,* displaying two senses: (i) 'poison' and (ii) 'remedy'or 'cure', that can never come together in any single context, would have certainly deserved its place in the Index, since it plainly illustrates some very basic concepts exploited in postmodernists' strategies and manoeuvres (e.g. *erasure, différance*). Since, according to Derrida, we must stress, these two antithetical senses are everywhere co-present in Plato's text (*Phaedrus*) in spite of all attempts of the interested philologists and translators to choose one or the other according to the context. *Pharmakon* occurs at exactly that part of Plato's text where writing is discussed. Writing is both *poison,* as a threat to the living presence of the spoken language, and *cure,* as an indispensable means for recording and transmitting that presence (Norris 1987: 37-38).

The central Derridean concept of *writing* seems to be endowed with even still higher explicative power in this respect. In the entry *Supplement* (see above) two modes of reading of *writing* are presented as follows:

(Rousseau's logocentric): ". . . writing is a supplement to speech, is inessential and therefore inferior . . . writing adds nothing affirmative to speech and is in itself unnatural, creating . . . a distance between those in communication, and distorting intention and meaning."

(Derrida's deconstructed): ". . . speech and writing exist as *binary oppositions* in a 'violent' hierarchy, in which positive value is always accorded to the first term. In the endless process of deconstructive reading, the instability of the *sign* ensures that as the newly inverted hierarchy begins to take shape it too is subverted by the supplement."

(commentator's /Stuart Sim/ point of view): "The *supplement* appears as a replacement and/or addition for the terms that the deconstructionist herself has 'violently' reversed."

The account of Norris (1987: 66 ff.)[1] may certainly add to the plasticity of the *speech—writing* relationship in postmodern discourse. "The relation (i.e., between speech and writing) would continue undisturbed if writing was the kind of *mere* supplement or optional feature that may or may not be added as required . . . But a 'supplement' is also that which is required to *complete* or *fill up* some existing lack, some hiatus in the present order of things. And in this

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[1] Christopher Norris (1947-), one of the most serious critics of the postmodern canon:

1990: *What's Wrong With Postmodernism;*

1992: *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War;*

1993: *The Truth About Postmodernism.*

case writing would no longer be a strictly dispensable or ancillary technique. On the contrary, it would have to be treated as a precondition of language in general, a necessary supplement in the absence of which speech itself could scarcely be conceived. What Derrida calls the 'logic of supplementarity' is precisely this strange reversal of values whereby an apparently derivative or secondary term takes on the crucial role in determining an entire structure of assumptions."

The privileged position of *writing* within the *speech-writing* relationship reappears in Derrida's attempt to mark out the field of grammatology: "Science of 'the arbitrariness of the sign', science of the immotivation of the trace, science of writing before speech and in speech, grammatology would thus cover a vast field within which linguistics would, by abstraction, delineate its own area, with the limits that Saussure prescribes to its internal system and which must be carefully reexamined in each speech/writing system in the world and history" (1997: 51).

Derrida is frequently accused that he aims at reducing philosophy by his misleading argumentation to a sort of rhetorical play. Arguing that philosophy tends to repress its own written nature, in his influential work *Of grammatology* he analyzes the manifestations of this repression on a large historical scale with the aim "not simply to rehabilitate writing as against the superior truth-claims of speech, but also – through a deconstructive logic of reversal – to insist that all thinking about language, philosophy and culture must henceforth be conceived within the context of a massively extended writing" (Norris 1987: 20-21).

Text, in the postmodern lexicon, is perhaps the most widely conceived concept, encompassing virtually everything the world is constituted of. With Derrida's famous claim that 'there is no outside-text'/ 'il n'a pas de hors-texte' (Derrida 1997), quoted in Part ii under the heading of 'Grammatology' (Sim 261), it would have been very enlightening to advance right away Dominick La Capra's acute remark from his *Soundings in Critical Theory* (1989) that this famous dictum – if Derrida is read carefully – amounts to saying 'that there is no inside-the-text either' (Easthope in: Sim 26). Derrida's claim that 'there is nothing outside the text' has been misunderstood in the USA (Yale School) as 'a call for a kind of super-formalism' (Sim 370). Derrida's writings, as well as his visiting professorship at various US universities (Johns Hopkins, Yale and the University of California) found favorable acceptance in the USA and largely contributed to the formation of a brand of American deconstruction as an influential strategy in literary criticism (Cf. ibid. 271).

Derridean 'text' is perhaps most truthfully characterized in Spivak's Preface to the English translation of *Of Grammatology* (Derrida 1997: lvii): "For Derrida, however, a text, as we recall, whether 'literary', 'psychic', 'anthropological', or otherwise, is a play of presence and absence, a place of the effaced trace . . . And textuality is not only true of the 'object'of study but also true of the 'subject' that studies. It effaces the neat distinction between subject and object."

The constant play of *presence* and *absence,* is what really matters and what has perhaps the highest chance to let the reader digest a Derridean or, more gen-

erally, postmodern text with a cautious feeling of understanding. Nevertheless, a similar interpretation of 'text' is totally incompatible with Saussurean structuralism (as also with any other doctrine derived from the 'logocentricity' of Western culture).

From the very beginning, the postmodern thought is inextricably intertwined with language and the 20th century linguistic doctrines. The intellectual background of the postmodernists' hostile attitude towards the once stimulative Saussurean structuralism and rejection of most of its fundamental tenets is incredibly complex and the argumentation around it is rather oversophisticated.

The concise definition of 'structuralism', as given in its Part ii entry (Sim 365), is a truly masterful summary of all basics of the theory, its impact on poststructuralists of both the classical (Saussurean) and postmodern brands and, finally, its challenged position in the postmodern discourse. The same may be said about the related entry of poststructuralism (341-342), both an immediate starting point and constitutive part of postmodernism. Some additions that follow in our notes are mostly nothing more than rephrased key words of these two major entries from the point of view of some fellow thinkers.

Structuralism strives for objective description as its ultimate end. Structuralist statements are based on the distinction between subject and object: "The goal of all structuralist activity, whether reflexive or poetic, is to reconstruct (*reconstituer*) an 'object' in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of its functioning . . . Structure is therefore actually a *simulacrum* of the object, but a directed *interested* simulacrum, since the imitated object makes something appear which remained invisible or, . . . unintelligible in the natural object . . . the simulacrum is intellect added to object, and this addition has an anthropological value, in that it is man himself, his history" (Barthes 1972: 214-15, in: Spivak 1997: lvii).

On the other hand, the grammatological structure as a tool of description never answers the basic question of objective description "what is . . . ?" (Spivak lvii; for Derrida's 'text' and 'textuality' see above).

The Part-ii entry *Simulacra, Simulation* offers a highly interesting account of Baudrillard's theories of *simulation*, as well as his history of production of *simulacra.* The concept of *simulacrum,* as used by Barthes' in *Critical Essays* (see above) would have perhaps deserved a brief mention too.

Derrida's deconstructive tool of 'putting (to-be-deconstructed items) under enclosure / sous rature' was met with a hostile, patently ironic and thoroughly devastating critique from the side of Michel Foucault: " Today Derrida is the most decisive representative of a /classical/ system in its final glory; the reduction of discursive practice to textual traces; the elision of the events that are produced there in order to retain nothing but marks for a reading; the invention of voices behind texts in order not to have to analyse the modes of implication of the subject in discourse; assigning the spoken and the unspoken in the text to an ordinary place in order not to have to reinstate the discursive practices in the field of transformations where they are effectuated" (Foucault, 1971: 602).

Neither Derrida's treatment of *text* as an all-encompassing entity found a favorable reception with Foucault who comments on this daringly untradition-

al theory with an unconcealed irony: "It is an historically sufficiently determined little pedagogy which manifests itself most visibly. A pedagogy that tells the pupil that there is nothing outside of the text, but that within it, in its interstices, in its white spaces and unspokennesses, the reserve of the origin reigns; it is not at all necessary to search elsewhere, for exactly here, to be sure not in the words, but in words as erasures, in their *grill*, 'the meaning of being' speaks itself. A pedagogy that conversely gives to the voice of the teacher that unlimited sovereignty which permits them to read the text indefinitely" (ibid.).

One of the most notorious and the most enigmatic concepts of the postmodern discourse is, no doubt, Derrida's *deconstruction*, closely associated with a group of related concepts moving in its orbit: *différance, erasure,* and a number of already mentioned (as well as still unmentioned) notions.

In the Part-ii lexicon of Names and Terms we read that 'deconstruction is a term coined by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida in the late 1960s to offer a mode of reading which is attentive to a *text*'s multiple meanings'. As a mode of reading it exposes a text's repressed contradictions attempting to show 'how the logic of its language can differ from and play against the logic of its *author*'s stated claims . . .' (221-222). Here, it might have been interesting to recall that in the first published version of *De la grammatologie* (1967) the term *destruction* was used instead of the recent *deconstruction* (Spivak xlix).

In reply to a Japanese translator asking from Derrida at least approximate definitions of his usage of the term 'deconstruction' Derrida made it clear: "All sentences of the type 'deconstruction is X' or 'deconstruction is not X', *a priori* miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false. As you know, one of the principal things at stake in what is called in my texts 'deconstruction', is precisely the delimiting of ontology and above all of the third–person present indicative: S is P" (Derrida in: Wood, D. (ed.) 1985: 1-8).

Irrespective of whatever is said about ontology in Derrida's writings, the fact remains that Heidegger's conception of Being and its separation from the beings under the slogan of 'destruction of metaphysics' found its reincarnation in Derrida's 'deconstruction' (Habermas 2000: 161). Heidegger's ontology of Being, in its innermost core, was inspired by Leibnitz's famous question which is, after all, the starting point of any philosophical thinking: *Pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien?* Heidegger was to rephrase the question in a number of ways: "What is the Being (das Sein) which renders possible all being (das Seiende)?" or: "Why is there anything or something or everything, when there could be nothing . . .?" (Steiner 1991: 35). Heidegger's *kreuzweise Durchstreichung* or 'crossing out', applied to the word 'being' to distance himself from the language of Western philosophy and its principles (*Zur Seinsfrage:* 83), is evidently the prototype of Derrida's concept *under erasure (sous rature)*. A word placed 'under erasure' in the process of deconstruction has to remind us that language is unstable and meaning indeterminate (Sim 240-241).

To explain what 'deconstruction' actually is, does not seem to be an easy task. Let Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak attempt it: "If in the process of deciphering a text in the traditional way we come accross a word that seems to harbor an

unresolvable contradiction, and by virtue of being *one* word is made sometimes to work in one way and sometimes in another and thus is made to point away from the absence of a unified meaning, we shall catch at that word. If a metaphor seems to suppress its implications, we shall catch at that metaphor. We shall follow its adventures through the text and see the text coming undone as a structure of concealment, revealing its self-transgression, its undecidability. It must be emphasized that I am not speaking simply of locating a moment of ambiguity or irony ultimately incorporated into the text's system of unified meaning but rather a moment that genuinely threatens to collapse that system... At any rate, the relationship between the reinscribed text and the so-called original text is not that of patency and latency, but rather the relationship between two palimpsests. The 'original' text itself is that palimpsest on so-called 'pre'-text that the critic might or might not be able to disclose and any original inscription would still only be a trace: 'Reading then resembles those X-ray pictures which discover, under the epidermis of the last painting, another hidden picture: of the same painter or another painter, no matter, who would himself, for want of materials, or for a new effect, use the substance of an ancient canvas or conserve the fragment of a first sketch' (Derrida 1972: 397, in: Spivak 1997: lxxv-lxxvi).

According to Derrida, deconstruction is not either a 'method', a 'technique' or a species of 'critique', nor has it anything to do with textual 'interpretation'... of course, it might have taken one or another of these forms with Derrida's disciples 'who have found in deconstruction a useful means of saying new things about literary texts (Norris 18). Derrida's most typical deconstructive moves consist in dismantling conceptual oppositions and hierarchical systems of thought to reinscribe them 'within a different order of textual signification' (ibid. 19).

In terms of another negative description, deconstruction is *not* 'primarily a matter of philosophical contents, themes or theses, philosophemes, poems, theologemes or ideologemes, but especially and inseparably /of/ meaningful frames, institutional structures, pedagogical or rhetorical norms, the possibilities of law, of authority, of representation in terms of its very market' (Derrida: 1982/a/: 44-45; in: Norris 14).

The master concept of deconstruction, *différance*, a neologisme coined by Derrida in order to suggest 'how meaning is at once *differential* and *deferred*, the product of a restless play within language that cannot be fixed or pinned down for purposes of conceptual definition' (Derrida: 1982/b/: 3-27; in: Norris 15).

Ideological, political and generally behavioral issues are not immune from deconstructive challenges, either. Thus the intricate question of how a representative democracy gets started, to take one of many similar examples, would also be a suitable object of deconstructive reading, since those participating in its creation were, at the moment of its inauguration, not democratically auhorized to it by any existing set of rules (Norris 195). Or the ignominious case of Heidegger, considered by many as the father of the whole deconstruc-

tionist hermeneutic. His pro-Nazi *Rektoratsrede* 'constitutes nothing less than a fundamental revaluation of the role of thought and education in the modern state, and its significance in reference to such concepts as *consciousness* and *destiny* ...' (Steiner 1991: xxvii).

Attempting to illustrate the relation of linguistics to grammatology, Derrida resorts to a rather curious verbal substitution of grammatology to semiology in the text of Saussure's *Cours in General Linguistics:* "I shall call it /grammatology/ ... Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of /that/ general science ... ; the laws discovered by /grammatology/ will be applicable to linguistics" (Saussure 1931: 33; English version 1959: 16; in: Derrida 1997: 51). In Derrida's view, this substitution will give to the theory of writing the scope needed to counter what he calls logocentric repression and the subordination to linguistics, it will liberate the semiological process from what remained governed by linguistics (ibid.).

Roland Barthes, however, reverted the order of dependence on the intellectual scene of postmodernism, postulated by Saussure, by subordinating semiology to linguistics: "From now on we must admit the possibility of reversing Saussure's proposition some day: linguistics is not a part, even if privileged, of the general science of signs, it is semiology that is part of linguistics" (*Communications* 4, 1964: 2; in Derrida 1997: 51).

The fate of the crucial concept of 'sign' is not dissimilar to that of most other concepts used in postmodern discourse. The postmodern rhetoric of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in her presentation of 'sign' as being *half not there, and half not that* (Sim 358) stands, apparently, closer to the point than Derrida's circumventing answer to the question 'what is the sign?' with two relevant elements *put under erasure:* "One cannot get around that response, except by challenging the very form of the question and beginning to think that the sign ~~is~~ that ill-named ~~thing~~, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: 'what is ... ?' (Derrida 1997: 19).

Lévi-Strauss's failure to present the incest taboo as belonging to one, and only one, of the two mutually exclusive categories offered some postmodernists (Derrida) convincing proof of the failure of the binary principle as a whole (Sim 201-2). The general tendency of postmodernists to reject binary oppositions, typical of structuralism, cannot rule out, in its entirety, the whole conceptual and terminological load associated with them. The Saussurean relationship of *signifié* and *signifiant* may serve as an illustrative example: "The difference between signified and signifier belongs in a profound and implicit way to the totality of the great epoch covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality ... And this distinction is generally accepted as self-evident by the most careful linguists and semiologists, even by those who believe that the scientificity of their work begins where metaphysics ends ... Of course, it is not a question of 'rejecting' these notions; they are necessary and, at least

at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them. It is a question at first of demonstrating the systematic and historical solidarity of the concepts and gestures of thought that one often believes can be innocently separated . . . The age of the sign is essentially theological. Perhaps it will never *end*. Its historical *closure* is, however, outlined" (Derrida: ib., 13-14).

Returning once again to the Part-ii alphabetic lexicon: after an adventurous reading of some Derrida´s and Heidegger´s texts, it seems that the problem of translatability (as related to that of understandability) of both ´modern´ and ´postmodern´ texts would have perhaps deserved a special entry. Its aim might have been to collect salient problems the readers and quite particularly translators have to struggle with on their thorny way towards understanding, rephrasing and/or translation. A cumulative reference to the authors producing particularly problematic texts would have been helpful, too, as also a further reference to the literature specifically designed to deal with the topic, such as Joseph F. Graham (ed.): *Difference and Translation,* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press 1985 (Derrida´s writings), and others.

With Heidegger in mind, G. Steiner (1991: 10-12) calls into question the very possibility of translating some of his texts: "He had praise for what his translators achieved in *Being and Time.* But he regarded efforts at translating his other writings, and the later texts in particular, into any other language as largely wasted . . . It is not ´understanding´ that Heidegger´s discourse solicits primarily. It is an ´experiencing´, an acceptance of felt strangeness. We are asked to suspend in ourselves the conventions of common logic and unexamined grammar in order ´to hear´, to ´stand in the light of´. . . To write in German about Heidegger´s German is arduous enough. To do so in English, a language natively hostile to certain orders of abstruseness and metaphoric abstraction, is well-nigh impossible."

As an Arabicist, I often have occasion to view the problem in a strongly contrasting interlinguistic and intercultural dimension. The comparison of Edward Said´s *Orientalism* (1978) with Abū Dīb´s Arabic translation *Al-Istišrāq* (1981) will show the translator´s struggle with phrases derived from the Said´s text, such as "the hold . . . of the academic and imaginative demonology of ´the mysterious Orient´" > *saiṭarat al-maᶜrifa aš-šaiṭānīya al-jāmiᶜīya wat-taḫayyulīya liš-šarq al-mubham al-ġāmiḍ,* "... or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it" > *´aw mā yusammīh mīšēl fūkō ´inšā´an, yakūn wujūduh ´aw ṯiqluh al-māddī, lā l-´aṣāla allatī yatamattaᶜ bihā mu´allifun mā, mas´ūlan fī l-ḥaqīqa ᶜan an-nuṣūṣ allatī tanbaᶜ minhu,* and the like.

The reading of the Arabic text is accompanied by a strong feeling of inadequecy. It is more than doubtful to assume that even a highly qualified Arab intellectual with an acceptable literacy in humanities and generally cultural issues would be able to follow the author´s mind with sufficient clarity. The lack of cultural and scholarly tradition in the domain of what is translated is apparently the main reason for this. Let us present Said´s own point of view: "The main

achievement of Abu Deeb's painstaking translation was an almost total avoidance of Arabized Western expressions; technical words like *discourse, simulacrum, paradigm,* or *code* were rendered from within the classical rhetoric of the Arab tradition. His idea was to place my work inside one fully formed tradition, as if it were addressing another from a perspective of cultural adequacy and equality" (1978: 339).

Finally a word of value. *The Routledge Critical Dictionary* is an expertly designed guide and a reliable companion on the way towards understanding the era we live in. As a well-balanced introduction and an invaluable contribution to the postmodern discourse, it will be used with profit by unexperienced readers in search for quick short-hand reference and by highly qualified specialists alike. In other words, the book has been written for all those in mind who are fascinated by the adventurous world of thought.

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