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A Dialectic of Tension: Anthropology, Action, and Freedom in Luigi Pareyson

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This paper explores Pareyson's constant drive toward an ontological dimension, despite the presence of a "dialectic of tension" that shifts heterogeneously throughout his entire work. To support this thesis, we first demonstrate how his philosophy, while rooted in Gentile's actualism, functions as a critique of Hegelianism, aligning itself with the tradition of Italian personalism and the legacy of European existentialism. Within Pareyson's ontological personalism, the person's intimate existential bond with truth is not restricted to a theoretical framework based on a "dialectic of necessity"; rather, it is characterized by a participatory relationship with being. By showing that the foundation of his philosophy of action lies in the specific phenomenological structure of "initiative," we argue that this dialectic of tension culminates in an ontology of freedom: a concept that, until the very end, preserves its ethical and anthropological essence alongside its purely speculative value.

Keywords: Pareyson – dialectic – Italian personalism – philosophical anthropology – action – freedom

I. Personalism, Anti-Hegelianism, and Existentialism

Historically, Italian neo-idealism stems from a single Hegelian root, yet it branches into two distinct trajectories reflecting divergent theoretical needs. On one hand, Croce's approach emphasizes the necessity of interpreting reality through a Hegelian dialectic, viewed as the continuous unfolding and progressive manifestation of the Spirit. On the other, the Gentilian perspective advocates for Actualism, positing reality as pure "thought in act" (*pensiero in*

atto) where the unfolding of the Idea occurs entirely within the present. These two theoretical paradigms provide the backdrop for, and deeply shape, the major philosophical movements in twentieth-century Italy, most notably Marxism and, above all, Italian personalism.

While the historical and philosophical context of personalism's development was profoundly Hegelian, and despite the many theoretical overlaps between personalist thought and Gentilian idealism, the personalists took a different path than the early Italian Marxists. Unlike Labriola, for whom Hegelian philosophy remained the sole point of reference, the personalists drew inspiration from a second philosophical root: spiritualism. The first generation of Italian personalists studied French spiritualists such as René Le Senne, Louis Lavelle, and Hamelin with keen interest; they were united by an effort to infuse a spiritual spark into the life of the person and to restore a connection with religion. In their view, religion was no longer a mere stage of the spirit manifested as "representation" – positioned above the image but below the concept – but rather the essential horizon and indispensable condition for all philosophical inquiry. A significant example is Luigi Stefanini, a philosopher of Gentilian background who, in proposing a "metaphysics of the person" as distinct from a "metaphysics of being,"[1] was primarily inspired by the philosophy of religion of Rosmini and Gioberti (Stefanini 1925). This same anti-Gentilian trend toward the recovery of religious discourse is evident in Pietro Martinetti. Although Martinetti is not typically categorized within the tradition of Italian philosophical personalism, his Neo-Kantianism–developed apart from the influence of Croce and Gentile – sought a metaphysics of individual consciousness that was both critical and convergent with religion (Martinetti 2016), recalling the fundamental roots of philosophical speculation.

Like Stefanini and Martinetti, many Italian personalists consistently refused to align their thought with the Gentilian framework, emerging instead as significant critics of Hegelianism. This critique can be further illustrated by examining two of Pareyson's mentors, Augusto Guzzo and Armando Carlini, who both incorporated a religious-philosophical dimension into their work. Although Guzzo was initially linked to Gentile's idealism and Actualism (Guzzo 1925) – under whom he studied – he eventually challenged several unresolved philosophical tenets in Gentile's system. According to Guzzo, the

[1] As Stefanini writes: "The metaphysics of the person does not seek to reject a metaphysics of being as false; it simply regards it as incomplete, as if it were telling the truth, but not the whole truth" (Stefanini 1950, 3).

focus shifts from the "actuality" of the spirit's truth to the person's ongoing search and metaphysical tension toward truth; by integrating Christian spiritualism into his personalist outlook, he argued that truth finds its pivot in the person, specifically through an ethical commitment. Armando Carlini, also originally associated with the idealist school (Carlini 1934), similarly moved away from Gentilian Actualism. Carlini maintained that, in contrast to the actuality of the spirit's self-consciousness, emphasis should be placed on the nexus between problematicity and existence. In Carlini's "pre-existentialism" (Pareyson 2001, 277 – 328), every problem and crisis originates and is reflected within the actual interiority of the person, conceived in an Augustinian sense as the junction of all cognitive activity. Thus, while a Gentilian historical foundation is philologically evident in these personalist thinkers, their direction reflects an urgent need to explore philosophical paths beyond Hegelianism. Pareyson's personalism aligns with this trajectory; even more radically than his predecessors, he pursues a thorough critique of Gentilian Hegelianism, reaffirming the centrality of the person through the lens of existentialism.

The primary break between Pareyson and Hegel stems from the latter's insistence on a philosophy of totality that bridges the gap between the finite and the infinite. For Pareyson, however, this chasm is insurmountable, echoing the position found in the late Schelling's philosophy of revelation. Pareyson maintains that, for Hegel, it is unthinkable for reality to exist apart from thought, which inherently strives toward totalization. The truth of thought is consistently real, and the various "shapes of spirit" – demonstrating the spirit's progressive unfolding and development in reality – validate this movement toward universal totalization. In this light, Hegelianism appears not merely as a philosophy of the absolute, but as a philosophy for the absolute: a philosophy of the Idea that seeks and aspires to its own realization as the Absolute. Consequently, Pareyson argues for a radical "dissolution of Hegelianism."

Within the pages of *Esistenza e Persona* (1950), Pareyson highlights Kierkegaard and Feuerbach as two pivotal figures among those who established the foundations for a radical critique of Hegel's philosophy (Pareyson 2002, 39 – 74). He contends that while for Feuerbach the dissolution of Hegelianism occurs via a direct inversion, Kierkegaard effects the dismantling of Hegelian thought through fragmentation rather than reversal. Pareyson identifies existentialism as the primary force in the dissolution of Hegelianism. In his view, existentialism and its forerunners cannot be classified, in Hegelian terms, as a mere negative moment in the becoming of the spirit, nor as a form of "unhappy consciousness"

that stymies its progress. Rather, he maintains that existentialism is the most formidable response to Hegelianism because it acknowledges the unbridgeable gap and irreconcilability between the finite and the infinite. In *Studi sull'esistenzialismo* (1943), Pareyson traces a threefold historical root of European existentialism rooted in human finitude: The Russian (Dostoevsky), the French (Pascal), and the German (Kierkegaard) (Pareyson 2001, 26 – 31). Although there are significant differences among the philosophers discussed in this work, these three matrices share common ground. Most notably, they reject systematic totalization and conceptual universalization in favor of a theoretical focus on existence. For these thinkers, existence is not defined by its contrast with essence – as seen in Thomism – but is instead understood as a radical assertion of human finitude, a recovery of the individual's condition, and a metaphysical participation in being. While Heidegger and Jaspers famously shunned the existentialist label, Pareyson embraced it (Pareyson 2002, 251), believing that existentialism is not only a response to crisis but also the ideal point of departure for deeper ontological inquiry.

In contrast to Bobbio, Banfi, or Spirito, who dismissed existentialism as an epigonal and decadent movement, Pareyson contends that it is not a mere philosophy of crisis that remains stuck in negation. Rather, he believes that existentialism, shaped by personalist insights, can evolve into a philosophy of personal affirmation. A similar path is found in the work of Michele Federico Sciacca. Having moved away from Gentilian Actualism to embrace Rosmini's thought, Sciacca engaged with the crisis of contemporary consciousness in his 1976 book, *Il magnifico oggi*. Amidst the political turmoil of 1970s Italy, he advocated for a return to philosophy and religion as an intertwined "remedy and cure." To halt the steady decline of modern awareness, Sciacca proposed a philosophical anthropology rooted in ancient and medieval traditions, emphasizing the "absoluteness of the person" within an ontological framework. Pareyson shares this same orientation. Ultimately, the active and assertive power of the person to confront the reality of crisis, the orientation toward ontological inquiry, and the enduring relevance of the philosophy of religion are pillars that support Pareyson's entire intellectual journey.

II. The Person and the Relationship with Philosophical Truth

In his anthropological and theoretical inquiries, Pareyson seldom employs the term "subject," favoring "person" instead. The person is not an abstract subject whose existential possibilities are derived through pure formalism.

Furthermore, the person cannot be explained solely through biological interactions, a path taken by philosophers like Von Uexküll and Arnold Gehlen. On the contrary, the person is defined by relationship: with alterity, society, the world, and, most crucially, with truth. Discussing the person's link to truth is not an assertion of their cognitive grasp of the world or a claim that their judgments hold value based on a gnoseological ability to explain phenomena. The person's perspective on reality and alterity is never neutral or objective; it cannot be grasped through a stance of self-detachment. The exploration of truth is always rooted in one's own existence, where reflecting on life involves acknowledging ontological inquiry as an essential component. This framework allows Pareyson to describe the deep-seated bond between the person and being: "Being is in relation to man only insofar as man is a relation to being; that is, being reveals itself to man only within the very relationship that defines what man is" (Pareyson 2005a, 14).

> Between man and being, there exists a primordial solidarity, an initial complicity, which manifests man's inherent ontological character and the inseparability of existence and transcendence. Herein lies the fundamental concept of the unobjectifiability of being, which demands the abandonment of ontic metaphysics and the adoption of a critical ontology (Pareyson 2005a, 15).

If the person's connection to truth is an intimate accord and a conscious agreement based on exposure and participation, then the bond between man and being is participatory rather than simply dialectical. This participation is not an interaction of opposites or a balance between personal finitude and infinite truth, as suggested by Hegelianism, nor is it the "ontological difference" theorized by Heidegger.

To explain this "solidarity" and "complicity," Pareyson defines interpretation as the nexus of expressive and revelatory thought. Though "revelatory" typically carries religious weight – referring to the *Depositum Fidei* or the manifestation of divine will – Pareyson employs it in a strictly philosophical capacity. Revelatory thought is essentially personal; it implies that truth reveals itself only through the unique, irreducible lens of the individual. Here, truth emerges within the singularity of the one inquiring into the meaning of being. Consequently, in the act of interpreting being, the human person becomes the source and manifestation of truth itself. In contrast, expressive thought accounts for how philosophical truth is always situated within a specific horizon, indicating that existence is synonymous with existential historicity. This historical dimension is vital; it shows that truth-claims are not just

personal but are always historically grounded. From this perspective, the historical horizon of expressive thought affirms the human being's receptivity, absolute finitude, and inherent contingency.

It could be argued that a dialectic operates between expressive and revelatory thought. Yet Pareyson does not view the interpretation of truth as a dialectic resolved in discourse or as a necessary tension between history and revelation[2]. Beyond the fact that Heidegger is the primary interlocutor in *Verità e Interpretazione*, Pareyson argues that the gap between truth and interpretation arises from the manifold nature of interpretations facing an inexhaustible truth. It is not a conflict between immanent interpretation and transcendent truth, which would merely replicate a Hegelian dynamic between finite and infinite.

Simultaneously, Pareyson should not be regarded as purely Heideggerian; he asserts that truth is by no means indifferent to the word: "If truth resides in the word without being identified with it, it is not because, disappointed by discourse, it loves to hide, but because no revelation worthy of the name exhausts it" (Pareyson 2005a, 28). As a "radiation of meanings," truth diffuses into multiple interpretations: "Truth is one, but its formulation is always manifold" (Pareyson 2005a, 61). This plurality is exactly what makes its inexhaustibility possible. For this reason, as Claudio Ciancio notes, we should speak of "many authentic interpretations" rather than the "many truths" of relativism (Ciancio 2012, 81). Ultimately, truth for Pareyson is neither a rational totalization nor an ineffable mystery, nor the Spirit's final result. Truth is inexhaustibility itself. Although Paolo Diego Bubbio suggests Pareyson oscillates between Heidegger and Hegel – particularly on subjectivity (Bubbio 2018, 139 – 157) – Pareyson clearly identifies the limits of both; neither of them fully captures the depth of the relationship between person and truth.

Finally, it is necessary to clarify that this relationship must not be received within a strictly theoretical context. On the contrary, if the human person is the site and the instrument through which truth is revealed, then philosophical investigation must account for the centrality of truth in human action.

[2] Pareyson's existential approach to history and revelation is closer to Heidegger than Hegel. Revelatory thought involves listening to and "guarding" truth, while expressive thought denotes truth's rootedness in existential historicity. Consequently, history is not to be understood as the unfolding of the Idea. In an anti-Hegelian and in a more Heideggerian vein, Pareyson claims truth does not manifest progressively in history: "Being abandons those who betray it, and entire epochs remain without truth" (Pareyson 2005a, 43).

> We must avoid falling into theoreticism, which treats the bond with being as solely cognitive. From that perspective, practice would be a mere byproduct or application of a pre-established theory, causing truth to disappear beneath an absurd and arrogant absolutization of philosophy. Instead, truth exists within action itself, and it is precisely this truth that needs to be reclaimed (Pareyson 2005a, 186).

Integrating truth into a philosophy of action does not imply that deeds should follow a set of philosophical dogmas; on the contrary, it means the philosopher's commitment to safeguarding truth within the act itself. Philosophy, then, emerges primarily *as* action: "Not philosophy of action, but philosophy *as* action, and action *as* philosophy" (Pareyson 2002, 100). In this vein, Armando Rigobello maintains that the metaphysical nature of the person is not limited to cognition, "as its path is already imbued with profound ethical significance even at its speculative inception" (Rigobello 1994, 161).

III. The Intentional Structures of Initiative and the Phenomenological Foundation of Action

During the academic years of 1968 – 1969 at the University of Turin, Pareyson delivered a series of lectures on moral philosophy and the philosophy of action, compiled in *Iniziativa e Libertà*. In these courses, which preceded *Verità e Interpretazione*, he argued that understanding the foundations of moral conduct requires an investigation into the person's innermost intentional core.

A pivotal concept in Pareyson's moral philosophy – acting as a catalyst for shifting from a dialectic of necessity to a dialectic of freedom – is the notion of "initiative." To clarify this, Pareyson suggests starting with a phenomenological inquiry: "Moral experience is focused entirely on initiative, so that moral philosophy necessarily begins with a phenomenology of initiative" (Pareyson 2005b, 221). This is not, however, a phenomenology concerned with the abstract conditions of moral possibility or one that uses eidetics to define the boundaries of intentional autonomy. Rather, it is a phenomenology that describes the latent potentials within subjectivity that manifest through action. Thus, even when approached dialectically by Pareyson, the foundations of action seem to stem primarily from the structural properties of intentional consciousness.

Pareyson maintains that initiative has a clear structure consisting of three deeply interconnected elements: exigency, judgment, and decision (Pareyson 2005b, 221 – 227). To grasp how moral value relates to the philosophy of action, these aspects should be seen not as a chronological sequence, but as converging within the intentional nexus to reveal the organizing power of action.

> Exigency is "demand, claim, instance, postulation, invitation, appeal, urgency, stimulus, or solicitation"; decision is "resolution, definition, determination, enactment, fulfillment, act, operation, realization, execution, choice, or option"; judgment is "evaluation, appraisal, discrimination, distinction, or sanction – whether as validation or condemnation." These are not separate stages of a process but three facets of a single experience (Pareyson 2005b, 221).

a) Exigency. For Pareyson, initiative as exigency is not a blind urge or an empty craving. Instead, it is a compelling call or an "invitation" that contains latent horizons of possibility, which action then defines and shapes. In this vein, exigency appears as an "occurrence" for intentional consciousness, something that presents itself with an inherent authority to the consciousness in the world.
b) Decision. Rather than a random choice, decision is an intentional quality that realizes itself through a focused determination. From a phenomenological standpoint, decision is the unifying force of initiative, as it focuses a multiplicity of possibilities into a specific direction.
c) Judgment. Finally, judgment is not a retrospective evaluation of an act already performed. Rather, it is internally woven into the intentionality that recognizes the emerging exigency and the unfolding decision. Phenomenologically, judgment is never an afterthought; it is always already active within the initiative, and it is precisely what allows "value" to emerge.

Within this triadic structure of initiative, a further element emerges: "possibility." Rather than a mere dialectical alternative to determination, possibility expresses the original openness of consciousness toward a world that manifests through plural modes of action. In other words, possibility reveals that every action has the power to be projected not toward a single path, but across a manifold. From this perspective, the horizon of possibility is the common ground shared by these three aspects of initiative.

a) One might argue that exigency is pure necessity without alternative, and that every action is thus constrained by what precedes it. However, exigencies are not uniform: some are more intense or "blinding" than others. In this sense, the appeals to which consciousness responds emerge from a polyvocal depth that embodies possibility as a form of inherent multiplicity.
b) One might object that decision – as an act that delimits the horizon of possibilities and channels intentionality into a single direction – inevitably

severs and renounces alternatives. Yet, a decision is never merely a "decision of" something; it is inherently teleological – a decision "for" something or "toward" someone.

c) Similarly, judgment might be seen as a mere retrospective justification or a critique of a necessity already fulfilled. Yet, the act of judging is itself grounded in possibility: there would be no judgment without a spectrum of values that renders one decision preferable to another.

Ultimately, exigency, decision, and judgment always presuppose a background of multiplicity, that is, the possibility that the person finds open before them and their future. In this light, initiative stands as an affirmation and a primordial gesture that resonates within the triadic framework of exigency, decision, and judgment. Moreover, this sense of possibility is tied to moral inventiveness, which shows how every action is defined by a personal intention that remains, at its core, a possible relational intention: "Which means that what is essential to the person is the *possibility* of relationship with others, not the actual *reality* of that relationship" (Pareyson 2002, 177).

While we have provided a phenomenological account of initiative,[3] a dialectical approach consistently underpins Pareyson's treatment of these themes. This dialectic is visible in the interplay between normativity and inventiveness, intention and realization (Pareyson 2005b, 232 – 235), duty and the awareness of an action's consequences (Pareyson 2005b, 235 – 237), originality and the enduring nature of historical values (Pareyson 2005b, 237 – 239), and work and habitus (Pareyson 2005b, 246 – 249). These oppositions, however, are less a foundational principle of his moral discourse and more of an argumentative strategy. Pareyson's ultimate goal is to ground initiative in freedom itself. This is evident in the concluding pages of *Iniziativa e Libertà*. While examining the nexus between values and freedom (Pareyson 2005b, 259-261), Pareyson posits that an ontological inquiry into freedom becomes an inescapable necessity. It is freedom that provides the foundation and confers meaning to both initiative

[3] In exploring the concept of initiative, Pareyson states that it "requires a phenomenological investigation" (Pareyson 2005b, 221), yet he does not explicitly refer to a specific phenomenological tradition or a particular philosopher. Nevertheless, given his recurring focus on the centrality of value, his approach seems more aligned with Max Scheler's phenomenology than with the work of Husserl or Merleau-Ponty: "Initiative is, essentially, a 'necessity of making value prevail'. As such, initiative inherently involves an exigency that seeks value, a decision that establishes value, and a judgment that acknowledges value and ensures its recognition" (Pareyson 2005b, 221).

and the values which the individual encounters and recognizes as objective reality (Pareyson 2005b, 261 – 262).

IV. A Dialectic Toward Freedom as Foundation

To the question of whether a dialectic exists within Pareyson's thought, the answer is undoubtedly affirmative. As Maurizio Pagano has aptly noted, the relationship between Hegel and Pareyson can be deeply examined through the specific role dialectics plays in their work (Pagano 2017, 134). Nevertheless, this should not be viewed as a Hegelian "dialectic of necessity," but as a "dialectic of tension" or "dialectic of freedom." Pareyson elaborates on this point:

> My aim is to affirm a dialectic of freedom rather than necessity; a dialectic of tension instead of process, of necessary progress. It is a dialectic of the co-presence of opposites, where each element gains its meaning only alongside and in conflict with the other. It is not a dialectic that must end in a synthesis where the thesis and antithesis are overcome. It is, in fact, a reversal of Hegelian dialectics. For Hegel, the dialectic is significant because it produces a result – the Whole, the Idea, the Absolute Spirit. That which Hegel places at the end is actually present at the very beginning. Without that initial presence, there would be no dialectical process, no interplay of opposites, and no contradiction at all (Pareyson 2007, 29).

As this quotation illustrates, Pareyson rejects the Hegelian notion that the beginning already carries the seed of historical fulfillment. In fact, Claudio Ciancio notes that "the positivity allowed by the Hegelian form of return to the origin is unacceptable, insofar as setting the future as the origin means closing it off" (Ciancio 2012, 26). In contrast to Hegel, the "dialectic of freedom" or "dialectic of tension" is not a conclusive movement; it cannot be resolved factually or formally on a historical level. Instead, it appears as a rupture or a fracture at the very origin, one that is coextensive with the finite condition of the person, who recognizes the impossibility of a synthesis within the infinite. This dialectic does not seek to reconcile the finite and the infinite; it is not a "rooting" dialectic, but rather an "opening" one, which invites a multiplicity of interpretations and a plurality of possible actions.

A question arises as to whether a new dialectical configuration emerges within *Ontologia della libertà*. This is a legitimate inquiry, given that the coveted yet unacceptable dialectic between finite and infinite is seemingly replaced by an unconfessable dialectic between good and evil. As Pareyson puts it: "The placid dialectic of eternity yields to the immense conflict between good and

evil that ignites in history" (Pareyson 1995, 191). One might argue that the bond between good and evil merely replicates an oppositional dialectic on a higher plane. Yet, in *Ontologia della libertà*, Pareyson's trajectory is explicitly ontological. Guided by key figures like Heidegger, Leibniz, Jaspers, and particularly the late Schelling (Pareyson 1995, 353 – 383), he moves toward a "fundamental question" (Pareyson 1995, 353) where the alleged dialectic between good and evil is resolved within the singular foundation of freedom, that is, the ultimate peak of his philosophical path.

According to Pareyson, being is neither necessity (Hegel) nor destiny (Heidegger); it is freedom. He describes freedom as absolute, an autonomous and willed act asserting itself over non-being: "Freedom is self-origination and original choice: in the beginning was the choice" (Pareyson 1995, 61). As a faculty that is simultaneously divine and human[4], freedom precedes the dialectic of good and evil, imposing itself as the foundation: "But good and evil do not pre-exist the choice: they follow it; they are the good and evil chosen; they begin to exist after the choice as a positive or negative choice, as chosen good or chosen evil" (Pareyson 1995, 51). Moreover, the freedom Pareyson envisions – clearly rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition – is not merely theoretical but profoundly moral. He aims to contemplate freedom through a religious hermeneutics that underpins human moral experience, where good and evil manifest with a force that transcends conceptual analysis or speculative constraints: "If moral experience were not accompanied by an experience of transcendence, any distinction between good and evil would vanish, and everything would be permitted" (Pareyson 1995, 94).

Therefore, the foundation does not merely precede good or evil ontologically, nor does it simply come before action chronologically. Instead, because it holds a moral core, it is already embedded within the realm of choice. Claudio Ciancio notes: "The fundamental principle of Pareyson's ontology of freedom is that freedom is not only a beginning, but in being so, it is also a choice" (Ciancio 2012, 14). The foundation is also what is decided in favor of good or evil. It is freedom that, though placed at the origin, presents itself as a choice *for*. Consequently, asserting that the foundation is a choice *for*,

[4] On this point, Giuseppe Riconda notes: "This hermeneutics reveals not only the abyssal nature of human freedom as the capacity for good and evil, but also that man's freedom can only be affirmed within the horizon of divine freedom. Pareyson places himself in the school of Schelling: the existence of such a mysterious and unsettling fold within being as freedom – viewed as the faculty of good and evil – necessitates a rethinking of being that reaches as far as a rethinking of the divine being itself (Riconda 2011, 191).

and not merely a choice *from*, shifts the emphasis to an eschatological dimension – a plane entirely oriented toward the future.

Understood this way, what counts in the "path toward freedom"[5] is no longer merely the origin to be recovered, as seen in Heidegger's persistent search for a starting point – a method that implies always reclaiming a memory to start over. Instead, we must conceive, as Ciancio suggests, a "dynamic principle" or a non-hypostatic tension that invokes possibility and the future: "On the contrary, the instance of an ever-greater distance from the origin, and the opposite pull of a simple return to it, are what turn the origin into an immobile, totalizing principle, rather than a dynamic one that opens toward the novelty of the future and ontological increase" (Ciancio 2012, 27). While this "dynamic principle" theoretically aligns with the multiplicity of interpretations and "ontological increase," ethically it resonates with the theme of hope. Hope is not a mere awareness of an inevitable end, nor an absolute wisdom descending from the future to the present; it is an existential posture that sustains the path toward freedom. It is a state of attentiveness to the present where waiting is harmonized with an eschatological promise.

> And hope means the trust that evil will end.…in the universe at large, evil exists only as conquered, even annihilated; not in the Hegelian sense of history's completion, but in the eschatological sense of the fulfillment of time: that is, fulfillment is not the final act of temporal history, but lies beyond it (Pareyson 1995, 431).

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[5] *In cammino verso la libertà* (On the Path Toward Freedom) is the title of a series of lectures delivered by Pareyson in April 1988 at the Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies.

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