

## PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE POTENTIAL OF HISTORY EDUCATION

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Philosophers of historiography are constantly trying to answer the question about the nature of historical practice. However, various philosophical conceptions are often sought out by theoreticians of history education who require answering the very same question to utilise history's potential in achieving didactic goals. This paper seeks to explore three different philosophical conceptions of historiography and their potential for passing on crucial skills of critical thinking and media literacy. It will be shown that despite the competitive nature of vastly different philosophical schools of thought, they all can offer valuable incentives for history educators if they are willing to abandon some dogmas that have originated in the philosophy of historiography itself.

**Keywords:** Philosophy of historiography – Critical thinking – Media literacy – Explanation – Narrativism – Evidence

### 1. Introduction

The philosophy of historiography is a comparatively young discipline consisting of academics (both philosophers and historians) scrutinising historical research and writing in a similar vein as philosophers of biology approach the work of professional biologists. It is not unheard of for historians to read philosophical texts about their enterprise and to engage in conversation. The debates range from rejections of philosophical analysis as irrelevant or even misleading (e.g., Ginzburg 2012, 17) to acceptance and attempting to implement philosophical insight into the actual practice (e.g., Tamm 2014).

However, we will not focus on the reception of philosophical inquiries among professional historians here, and we will shift our focus to an often overlooked group of professionals who occasionally seek out the philosophy of historiography, hoping

to gain some inspiration, namely history teachers and theoreticians of history education.<sup>1</sup>

The questions about the nature of historical knowledge, its meaning, origin, and utility are indisputably philosophical questions that history teachers need to answer (consciously or not) before identifying their goals and structuring their lessons. While seeking these answers, some of them do not steer away from the philosophy of historiography,<sup>2</sup> and some influential didactic textbooks explicitly refer to the philosophers of historiography. The names often appearing in texts on didactics include prominent philosophers like R. G. Collingwood (his contribution is crucial in Lévesque 2008), H. White (Kokkinos 2011), F. Ankersmit (Köbl, Konrad 2015, 19), or L. J. Goldstein (Chapman 2011). The book *Principles of History Teaching*, written by W. H. Burston and originally published in 1963, contains a lengthy discussion with crucial philosophers of the sixties, namely C. G. Hempel and W. H. Walsh (Burston 2021, 66 – 88).

When read by philosophers, these texts may often appear idiosyncratic or eclectic and necessarily so. Understandably, history education theoreticians aim at different goals than philosophers of historiography. Their conception of history does not need to be the most accurate image of actual professional practice, but it must highlight the potential for historical education in the current socio-political environment. One of these goals, as often stated within didactic texts, is cultivating “historical consciousness.” The exact nature of this consciousness is constantly debated (for an international overview, see, e.g., Köbl, Konrad 2015), and this leads some theoreticians to claim that the construct of historical consciousness “is as elusive, or perhaps as mythical, as the Yeti” (Shemilt 2011, 110).

Even though the concept of historical consciousness may prove useful and attempts at clarifying its meaning are inspirational, it is beyond the scope of this philosophical paper to engage in these branching debates. However, other concepts of comparatively greater philosophical clarity are often brought up together with historical consciousness and they often form the basis for curricula across

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<sup>1</sup> In a recent paper (Černín 2022), I have explored the tensions between populist politics and scientific historiography or archaeology. It was briefly noted that the current situation should be addressed by history education and I am very grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers who has proposed that another paper should elaborate further. This is the paper offered as an answer, and it is an outcome of a three-year-long collaboration with experts on history education, teachers, and after testing various lessons in practice. This research was funded by TAČR as a project TL03000187 *Propaedeutic of Critical Thinking and Media Literacy in History Education at High Schools*. Its outcomes, including sample lessons, will be available at <https://ff.osu.cz/dej-krit/> when the project is finalized. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> The term philosophy of historiography was coined by Aviezer Tucker (2004). It entails philosophical reflection of scientific historiography and historical sciences. I use it loosely to denote even earlier traditions like the analytic philosophy of history.

different subjects – *critical thinking* (see, e.g., Duquette 2015, 59 – 60) and *media literacy* (Wineburg 2018).

The importance of these learned skills in the current geopolitical atmosphere cannot be overstated. They are often seen as an appropriate antidote to problems like fake news, misinformation, declining trust in sciences and experts, the downfall of traditional media and political parties, etc. At the same time, the overuse (and occasional misuse or even abuse) of these terms may leave educators grasping at straws and unsure how exactly they should be implemented in different school subjects to satisfy curricula.

Critical thinking enjoys plenitude of attention, and the consensus regarding its necessary properties is mostly stable. It is active and reflective thinking; it is a skillful activity that must meet various intellectual standards. “Critical thinking only occurs when the reasoning, interpretation or evaluation is challenging and non-routine” (Fisher 2019, 23 – 24). Our success rate in routine activities may benefit from repeated exercises and engaging in hours of practice. Still, in specific contexts, a more reflective and much slower way of thinking is required to avoid traps like cognitive biases.

Media literacy is also a widely discussed concept describing a specific skill or competency (see, e.g., De Abreu 2020). It revolves around a number of key issues, which include: the relationship between media and reality; the constructivist nature of media; negotiation of meaning; commercial, social, political, and ideological implications; form and content; and aesthetics. It concerns not only the understanding of media but also skills related to students’ own creative pursuits.

Since we apparently understand these concepts better than historical consciousness, we may ask how exactly teachers should implement them during their lessons and how to pass on these skills during a lesson about history. It is clear that we learn history through various forms of media and historians sometimes offer diverging accounts of what happened in the past. Thus, there is some potential for passing on media literacy skills during history lessons. The historical inquiry also proceeds by careful examination of evidence, skilful interpretation, and active reflection. Subjects tackled by historians are often non-routine and highly context-dependent and we can assume that critical thinking also plays an important part in achieving historical knowledge. We may now seek ways to impart critical thinking and media literacy to history students.

Nevertheless, the philosophical question regarding the nature of historiography remains. We may have side-stepped the problem with the loosely defined nature of historical consciousness by focusing on much clearer goals that are both relevant to historical consciousness and present in curricular documents, but we still need to know what

is essential to history and historiography. The recourse theoreticians of didactics take to the philosophy of historiography is still warranted.

However, we may decide to follow a different set of road rules on our journey. We will explore three vastly different and often opposing philosophical conceptions of historiography. We will steer away from choosing one of them as the most accurate representation of historical practice. Instead, we will accept each of these visions as a distinct approach to the subject matter that may offer a unique theoretical perspective on history and historiography and – consequently – a unique incentive for the implementation of critical thinking or media literacy into historical education.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. Explanations and Generalisations

The very first conception of historiography we introduce might also turn out to be the most controversial. Most overviews of the developments in the philosophy of historiography<sup>4</sup> also begin with this approach, which is widely considered a starting point for future discussions. This also means that its opponents had several decades to scrutinise it thoroughly.

The (in)famous paper by C. G. Hempel (1942) is also considered to be the best presentation of the covering law model of explanation, despite being applied to the least suitable field, i.e., history (see von Wright 1971, 9 – 10). Hempel focuses solely on the level of historical explanation, claiming that the explanations provided by historians in their text do not substantially differ from the structure of explanation in other sciences. A subject of explanation, i.e., an event (*explanandum*) is explained deductively from a set of preceding events and conditions coupled with a set of universal hypotheses or general laws. Both sets together form an *explanans* (Hempel 1942, 36).

Thus, the exemplary case of Dust Bowl farmers' migration is explained by listing preceding conditions (continual droughts and sandstorms) and pointing out the vaguely formulated universal hypothesis that "populations will tend to migrate to regions which offer better living conditions" (Hempel 1942, 41). It is important to realise that these are not uniquely historical laws (as those criticised famously by Karl Popper), but laws belonging to other scientific disciplines (social sciences, etc.) and can theoretically be tested on various instances of events covered by the general law

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<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that the paper does not address how historians employ critical thinking and media literacy. This topic would require a more extensive study, and it would be necessary to draw a line between critical thinking itself and professional rules of discourse, which may prove difficult or arbitrary.

<sup>4</sup> The paper focuses mainly on the Anglo-American discourse, which, however, can be traced back to German neo-positivism. Other notable approaches to historical knowledge, like Kosselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte* or French historical epistemology, are omitted. Nonetheless, they may also provide a unique incentive for history education, especially regarding the conceptual change or the situatedness of historians.

in question can be observed. Most laws used by historians are probabilistic and statistical (Hempel 1942, 41).

Hempel was aware that this type of explanation is not usually clearly visible in historical texts; therefore, he claimed that historians often form mere “explanation sketches” (ibidem, 42) that indicate some tacitly assumed general laws. He also noticed that general laws are essential for historians even outside the area of historical explanation regarding *pure descriptions* of the past (e.g., using tree rings for dating events depends on biological regularities; ibidem, 47).

With an exaggeration, we may attempt to claim that the overwhelming response to this paper may have started the field of philosophy of historiography itself. Next to many historians, one of the leading critics of the covering law model was W. H. Dray (Dray 1957). As criticism mounted, it became obvious that the covering law model cannot be seen as a complete philosophical account of a historian’s work or, even worse, it might be entirely wrong since historians have zero interest in the *general* and focus solely on the *individual*. This last type of criticism voiced by Dray is echoed even by the theoreticians of history education of the 60s. In his *Principles of History Teaching*, W. H. Burston reiterates Dray’s arguments and refuses the idea of general laws in history (Burston 2021, 79).

Interestingly, the stalwart denialism of the covering law model among philosophers of historiography is starting to show some cracks after 80 years of exploring different routes. Hempel’s model might never be a complete philosophical account of what historians do, but it still may bear some fruits. Herman Paul shows that texts of historians commonly contain relatively trivial generalisations that could satisfy Hempel’s model. Paul states that the covering law model exists with other models (intentional and comparative) and that they “are easy to keep apart in theory, but usually merge in practice” (Paul 2015, 108).

Can this model help us in any way to achieve our goal of teaching critical thinking in history classes? Should we be concerned by the ubiquitous counter-claim that history concerns individuals and uniqueness? It is possible to see this claim as somewhat contradictory. Even if we ask the question: “What was unique about the Second World War?” we do not escape the realm of generalisations. To identify the unique aspects of WW2, we presuppose some knowledge about the general concept of “war”. Furthermore, suppose we recognise some aspects of WW2 as pertaining to this conflict in particular (i.e., being unique). In that case, we may proceed by looking for an explanation of these elements (e.g., why was aerial combat more common than before?). This additional explanation may have the form proposed by Hempel. We should be reminded of Hempel consistently claiming that the assumption of general laws in historical explanation is usually tacit (Hempel 1942, 47).

One of the many critical thinking definitions states: “We define critical thinking as a cognitive process of actively and carefully evaluating the reasoning and evidence behind knowledge and arguments, and developing defensible knowledge and arguments ourselves” (Ivory 2021, 23).

In other words, critical thinking should improve our knowledge by identifying our tacit assumptions in explanations. By identifying our implicit assumptions, we may scrutinise them and develop defensible knowledge and arguments. Unreflected and silent assumptions are dangerous to our knowledge and argumentation. Hempel himself knew this very well and in his paper, he was concerned with vague concepts like “the method of empathetic understanding” (Hempel 1942, 44), “mission in history”, or “predestined fate” (ibidem, 37). It is naturally challenging to engage with terms critically if they lack well-defined meaning and empirical content.

Fons Dewulf quotes from the radio interview Hempel gave shortly after his immigration to the USA from nazi-controlled Germany:

This criticism of unscientific methods in philosophy also has a practical use, since unscientific reasoning in philosophy also “involves the danger that (its results) might be misused to give a pseudo-justification of principles which in fact do not admit of any scientific justification”. Hempel, implicitly referring to Nazism, adds “and such misuse has happened” (Dewulf 2018, 163).

We should now see that the strange choice of topic for introducing the covering law model of explanation was conditioned by experiencing the dangers of pseudoscientific discourse that attempts to explain without clarified terms, empirical content, and generalisations. It might be true that Hempel does not offer a complete theoretical account of a historian’s work, but the aspect he explores is a necessary component of critical thinking. When students explain historical events, they tacitly employ generalisations and implicitly assume some general (probabilistic) laws. By highlighting the theoretical framework of otherwise mundane explanations, teachers may bring many non-trivial steps to students’ attention in order to pass on the skills closely associated with critical thinking, which are helpful in everyday life. We encounter various “explanations” all the time, but we should also learn to question the structure of explanations and presuppositions or theories that are implicit in them. Superficial persuasiveness of some faulty explanations might be achieved via rhetorical means, but it does not reflect their inner structure.

In a practical classroom scenario, this might be achieved by choosing a novel theory that helps explain some well-known historical events in a new light. For example, various types of national revivals in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were traditionally explained

by stories of struggles against larger forces. Showing alternative theoretical explanations (e.g., Ernest Gellner's rise of nationalism as a sociological necessity) may provide an intriguing new framework and incentives to pursue different lines of thought.

### **3. Constructing the Facts and Using the Evidence**

The explanation is not the only thing historians do and Hempel's account is not an exhaustive philosophical analysis. Other philosophers have tried to produce more comprehensive accounts of history as a discipline. These may provide further ideas for teaching critical thinking or media literacy in history classes. We shall now follow one of Hempel's students who embraced his project but later moved on to a different conception – Leon J. Goldstein.

In his early texts, on the one hand, Goldstein walked in his teacher's footsteps and defended the role of generalisations in historical explanations (Goldstein 1962). On the other hand, he already exhibited a particular interest in a topic overlooked by Hempel. When we find a round weathered piece of precious metal in the ground, we may realise that it is a coin due to our general concept of currency. However, understanding it as a trace of some inaccessible past is a further step that requires knowledge of other theories and the ability to associate a more significant number of present empirical data together (ibidem, 176). Goldstein plainly states that historical events themselves are explanations in a certain sense: "It is the function of the event to explain the evidence, that is, it must make intelligible the grouping together of some particular constellation of historical evidence which is believed to belong together" (ibidem, 182). This controversial idea that historical events themselves are of hypothetical character became dominant in Goldstein's thinking.

Many years later, he describes his journey from covering law model to his particular strain of constructivism by naming his book *The What and the Why of History*. According to Goldstein, Hempel and other philosophers of historiography were interested in the Why of history, i.e., historical explanation. Goldstein, however, focused his mature texts on the What of history, i.e., the process of constituting the historical past. The historical past is distinct from the real past, and he contended that holding any historical statement as true "simply expresses the hope that historical past is identical with the real past" (Goldstein 1996, 334). Historians constitute the historical past; thus, it is some form of social construct. To succeed in this act, historians must identify some empirical data as historical evidence (there is no intrinsic property of historical evidence) and they achieve this via a large number of inferences and theoretical background accepted in their professional framework.

Thus, Goldstein focuses on the fact that historical evidence is theory-laden. It is possible to read his work as an extreme example of historical anti-realism or some

form of radical presentism. When the omnipresent danger of relativism rears its frightful head, should we hope to arrive at some useful ideas for history teaching? Some prominent theoreticians of history education, like Arthur Chapman, certainly think so (Chapman 2011, 175). Goldstein stresses the theoretical structure that must be built around the evidence to form statements about the past. Evidence-based education plays an essential role in relation to current methods of history teaching and to the concept of critical thinking.

Chapman describes the transition between different hierarchical modes of thinking with regard to evidence in this way:

... (first), students model historians as depicting the past in story-like collages of pre-existing truths and after it, histories become more like theories than stories and theories that propose solutions to delimited problems that historians pose (Chapman 2011, 175).

To have students engage with historical evidence is undoubtedly a good idea. However, to indeed promote critical thinking, we must go beyond purely soliciting an emotional response and asking students to use their vocabulary to describe their inner states. Even presenting something as historical evidence (be it a text, visual media, or another type of empirical datum) immediately places a given object in a network of relations, theories, and facts. The degree of our knowledge of this network relative to the evidence in question determines our understanding of the evidence and our idea of the past. Showing the dependence of our judgments regarding a newly presented piece of evidence on our prior knowledge and concepts may help us develop a more cautious and self-aware approach to other types of evidence in the future.

Since we used an example of national revivals for the first approach, we may continue in a similar line. National revivals were times of feverous history writing and searching for new evidence. Amid the discoveries of genuinely new and vital pieces of evidence, forgeries and fake artefacts also appeared. The Kensington Runestone might be one example, and the *Dvůr Králové* and *Zelená Hora* manuscripts as a famous example originating during the Czech National Revival might be next. Two groups of students may receive an identical excerpt from one of these manuscripts for their work. However, the theoretical network and task surrounding these documents could be different: The first group will receive the text with the original claim that it comes from the middle-ages, while the second group will receive a more contemporary assessment that these texts are forgeries from the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The first set of questions for both groups is the same: what does the text (evidence) reveal about the time of its origin? The subsequent comparison of answers should demonstrate that they are vastly different since the first group was deliberately misled by receiving



an inappropriate framework. This may open the way to new questions: Can we recognise the deceiving nature of the text just by reading it? Are there some clues? How can other disciplines (chemistry, comparative linguistics<sup>5</sup>) help us and which way is the most efficient in establishing the nature of the evidence in question (i. e., is it evidence for medievalists or is it a great piece of evidence for exploring the intellectual history of the 19<sup>th</sup> century?).

The engagement with evidence and intellectual activities of historians in constituting the historical past were considered a part of the history infrastructure by Goldstein (1976, 140 – 141). The superstructure of history was the final product, a historical text meant for a broader audience.<sup>6</sup> In *Historical Knowing*, Goldstein (ibidem, 148) considered the superstructure of history to be of no philosophical interest and criticised philosophers who focused on historical narration. Later, he weakened his claim slightly:

There are, of course, interesting things to be done with a past already emerged. One could explain it; or one could interpret it. And one could contemplate it in the belief that it must surely contain lessons for us that may be put to use as we seek to confront our present and effect our future (Goldstein 1986, 83).

This additional function of historical writing Goldstein overlooked will be discussed in the next section.

#### **4. Telling a Story and Scrutinising the Media**

Historians explore (or constitute) the facts of the past and explain historical events. That much is trivially true. However, they also write histories and they often use narrative structure during their endeavour. Most of the students who leave school will not engage in historical research; they will not attempt scientific explanations themselves. Due to the epistemic division of labour (see, e.g., Hallsson, Kappel 2020), they will rely on others presenting historical facts and supplying them with explanations and narratives. This should be of concern to us as well.

Finished historical accounts are communicated to us in various forms of media, like books, articles, documentaries, movies, or full-scale presentations in the case of open-air museums. The purpose of these outputs of historical research is not to explain but to present and answer questions about the past. They may also educate, motivate,

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<sup>5</sup> Elementary knowledge of ancillary science of history is a common part of history education curricula. Since Goldstein focused on these disciplines (Goldstein 1962, 181), his approach may complement these goals.

<sup>6</sup> Arthur Chapman also uses the same distinction in his didactic text (Chapman 2011, 175).

warn, or amuse their audience. These different results of historical research did not escape the attention of philosophers.

The narrativist theorists of history, as Goldstein termed them, allegedly made a mistake by focusing on the superstructure of history (Goldstein 1976, 159). However, looking at one of the most prominent narrativists – Hayden White – we may start to suspect that what on the surface appears to be opposing positions are, in fact, complementary conceptions. White’s analysis of a historian’s work starts at the moment when she already possesses a chronicle which is White’s term for “the arrangement of the events to be dealt with in the temporal order of their occurrence” (White 1973, 5). Strictly speaking, Goldstein focused on the nature and constitution of these events, while White was interested in the subsequent steps in which the events in the chronicle are transformed into a story.

It is not necessary to delve into the technicalities of White’s analysis. It is more important to highlight the features he considers essential to the historical enterprise. Hayden White advocates a historian’s vast freedom to choose what story she wants to write; he is sceptical of the idea that a historian should follow some unique methodology to arrive at the objective account of the past (White 1978, 41); and he considers ideology to be an essential part of historical work (see very revealing conversation with White in Domanska 2008, 20). Historians should understand their task as giving meaning to unstructured real past and answering the most pressing questions the audience may have. They should provide guidance, advice, and vision.

Given our goal here, we may now wish to draw a line between the normative aspects of White’s account (historians *should* accept that they need some ideology) and the descriptive aspects (historians often exhibit some ideological leanings). It is the second statement that is of concern to us here. It cannot be denied that some historians do (maybe more often than not) include ideological implications in their work (White 1973, 22) and they (consciously or not) write from a particular perspective. Furthermore, historians often opt for the most approachable way to communicate with their audience – by using ordinary language, metaphors, folk psychology concepts, and value-laden terms. It is hard to disagree with this observation.

We shall not tackle the question of whether historians should change their way of writing or whether they should lean in the White’s vision of their craft. Still, we must account for this situation in our deliberation concerning history education. It is clear that students will encounter “history” in different forms (historical movies, references to historical narratives in political debates, etc.) after they leave school, and they should be able to perceive them analytically.

Here, I propose moving from the concept of critical thinking to the concept of media literacy. We may, for example, recall influential eight key concepts for media literacy (De Abreau 2020, 11):

- 1) All media are constructions.
- 2) The media construct reality.
- 3) Audiences negotiate meaning in media.
- 4) Media have commercial implications.
- 5) Media contain ideological and value messages.
- 6) Media have social and political implications.
- 7) Form and content are closely related in the media.
- 8) Each medium has a unique aesthetic form.

Let us now compare these eight aspects with a stipulation White makes at the outset of his inquiry:

I will consider the historical work as what it most manifestly is – that is to say, a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them (White 1973, 2).

Since White explicitly skips the step of finding out about the facts and events of the past (remember that his historian starts with a chronicle), he focuses on mediation itself, and he explores the same key concepts as media literacy.

Students of history should be aware that history is mediated to us. Previous approaches focused on the fact that our ability to explain rests on generalisations and the ability to discuss hypothetical laws and historical facts are constructed through an intricate network of theories and accepted practices. Nonetheless, these approaches do not constitute a captivating narrative. When we read about our ancestors, we may become emotionally invested in their stories and seek inspiration, courage, or cautionary tales to influence our present and guide our actions. Some historians write in a way that makes these features more salient and captivating.

We may agree with White that there is a large degree of freedom in how a story might be composed and presented to an audience. However, what can we really learn from the narrative? Let us consider the following example: two of our friends leave for a supposedly calm holiday, which, despite all expectations, turns out to be wildly adventurous and unpredictable. We may then meet both of them separately. The first friend enjoyed the sudden change of plans and describes the holiday as an experience of a lifetime. The second friend does not share the same opinion. In the second friend's

view, the holiday was a horrible mistake never to be repeated. We should keep in mind that both of them are talking about the same holiday, even though their narratives are vastly different. Additionally, we should realise that the differences between the narratives tell us less about the nature of the holiday, but they reveal much more about the person telling the story.

Following the same logic, history students should be able to differentiate between historical facts, explanations, and narratives (i.e., interpretation, value judgments, analogies, etc.). They should also be able to analyse the narrative and make some educated guesses about its target audience, intended function, and background assumptions. Political, social, ideological, and commercial considerations are part of this structure as well.

Going back to our example of national revivals and forgeries, we can proceed to a text written by one of many prominent historians who has defended the authenticity of the given forgery. The discussion should entail questions about the motivation, cultural significance, and justifiability of the act.<sup>7</sup> Like any other kind of media, the historical text could be shown fulfilling many different functions and roles, some of which can remain hidden or unreflected. Practising our awareness of complex inter-media relations is crucial in education and school history harbours excellent potential given its subject and common form of presentation.

## 5. Conclusion

Historians explore (or constitute) the facts of the past and explain historical events. Political and ideological agents frequently abuse historical knowledge and historical narratives. Not much has changed since the time of Hempel, whose tragic experience of Nazi pseudohistorical discourse stood behind the paper that is generally considered to be the starting point for the overwhelming interest in the philosophy of historiography. Even though various philosophical positions may compete for the best possible description of actual historians' practice, they each offer inspirational analysis of a chosen aspect of the historical enterprise. It would be a mistake for history educators to limit their attention to one philosophical position only. Theoreticians of history education should be careful about the often-repeated claim that history concerns only unique and particular (e.g., Burstson 2021).

The realms of historical explanation offer fascinating vistas that can promote critical thinking during history lessons. Evidence-based teaching should highlight the fluid nature of the evidence and the essential role theoretical background plays

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<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that we can also focus on the argumentative structure historians use when proposing their narratives. Our philosophical inspiration may include historical non-representationalists like Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen (2015) or Eugen Zeleňák (2021).

in identifying and reading the evidence. And finally, classes dedicated to media literacy can draw heavily from the fact that historical works are themselves the type of media and, as such, require careful examination.

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