

# “Well, I Have to Believe In Myself; Otherwise, It Makes No Sense” – An Outline to the Path of Non-religiousness of Young People in Slovakia

JURAJ MAJO



DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/SN.2022.4.39> © Ústav etnológie a sociálnej antropológie SAV, v. v. i. © 2022, Juraj Majo. This is an open-access article licensed under the Creative Commons license.

*Juraj Majo, Department of Economic and Social Geography, Demography and Territorial Development, Faculty of Natural Sciences, Comenius University Bratislava, Ilkovičova 6, Mlynská dolina, 842 15 Bratislava, Slovakia; e-mail: juraj.majo@uniba.sk*

Non-religious identity, just like religious identity, is a matter of long evolution over time that often crosses multiple generations. Many papers have shown that young adulthood seems to be the key period of life when the personality is formed and often reaffirms its religious and worldview identity as well. I attempted to outline how this process can be extrapolated from the Census 2021 data, the ISSP Religion 2018 and 2008 surveys, as well as interviews with several young people to reveal the background of this transformation. The most significant evidence we see in the national census data is that the age of early adulthood is notable for the sudden growth of non-religious people (nones) and a decrease of Roman Catholics. Such a transformation seems to be crucial in terms of the background identities of nones in contemporary Slovakia, where a slight majority of nones were raised in any of the denominations. Although such transformations are only small, they seem to be essential and deserving of attention in the process of general changes in the religious landscape of a secularising Slovakia.

*Keywords:* non-religion, young generations, secularisation, deconversion, Slovakia

*How to cite:* Majo, J. (2022). “Well, I Have to Believe In Myself; Otherwise, It Makes No Sense” – An Outline to the Path of Non-religiousness of Young People in Slovakia. *Slovenský národopis*, 70(4), 493–506. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31577/SN.2022.4.39>

## Introduction

One of the most essential characteristics of faith is its maintenance through dissemination. This can be seen through sometimes very controversial ways of conversion and proselytism. However, the most typical way to spread faith and a worldview is through socialisation in childhood. This is when parents follow a chain

of rules and social expectations to successfully pass on the worldview of their own parents. Historically, there were several strategies to make this process go smoothly, such as a rule of endogamy or sharing a living space with people who adhere to the same values and form an environment where growing up in faith seems somehow natural and is an integral part of an individual's identity. These schemes have a greater chance to operate in a rural environment with low migration flows and not very diverse communities. Such relatively closed rural and agricultural communities existed mainly until 1950, and the transmission of identities worked quite well for many centuries. But these times seem to be gone forever.

The world has changed since the end of World War II in this part of Europe. With growing industrialisation and urbanisation at a time when the region was ruled by the atheistic ideology of socialism, it became much more difficult to follow the faith transmission pattern of ancestors that had worked for centuries. Cultural patterns between old and middle-aged generations show signs of discontinuity, and most of the younger generations grew up in a time when the officially transmitted ideology only offered arguments against religion (Tomka, 2005: 24–25). This not only involves an actual transformation of the physical and social landscape where cities and factories grow and villages are dwindling; people also are achieving higher education, settling down far away from their home communities, and often mating with a partner of a different denomination. All of this is catalysed by the diversification of worldviews under a large umbrella of secularisation, just like the loosening impact of the church on the society, community and the life of an individual. This all goes well with modernity – it erodes the dominance of religion in society, as the church is withdrawn from many sectors and, due to economic growth, people become more independent of the influence of fate (Henkel, Knippenberg, 2005: 6). Yet, the relationship between modernity and secularisation is not straightforward, as it is not necessarily secularising but necessarily pluralising (Berger, 2008: 23).

The growing dynamics of society in terms of both geographical and social mobility have challenged the strength of ties with previous generations and their cultural settings, as they began to weaken. Modernity as a pluralistic phenomenon has fragmented many aspects of our society, including our memory (as an important aspect in the transmission of religious identity). According to Hervieu-Léger (2000: 129, 130), in modern societies, people are members of many groups, which bring up fragmented memories; thus, collective memories are composed of bits and pieces. This makes it difficult to organise such a mass of information in a lineage that can be perceived as belonging. The aspect of diversification is one of the key elements in the rupture in transmission between generations. One such demonstration can be disaffiliation between generations, where fully affiliated parents have all children, or at least one child, who do not adhere to any denomination. Such dissonance can be analysed with the aid of specific census data from individual nuclear households comprising two generations. We presume, but due to the unavailability of more complex data, it is difficult to show, that there are a considerable number of families where non-religion is passed through three generations (see, for example, a study from Germany – Gärtner, 2022).

## Methodological Aspects

There are two sources of data that we used in this study. First, the specific and publicly unavailable set of data from the 2011 census that comprised data on complete two-generational families (both parents and at least one child present in a household) with additional data on the religious affiliation of all present members (N=760,000 households), which exhaustively allowed comparing different aspects of religious transmission or non-transmission. Data from the census 2021 were classified according to other demographic variables (such as age) and published by the Slovak Republic Statistical Office. Similarly, data from the International Social Survey Programme on Religion in 2018 and 2008 are publicly available.

Quotes in this paper are derived from the transcripts of semi-structured interviews that were carried out within the project VEGA 2/0090/19 *Ethnographic Research of Non-Religion and Secularism in Modern Slovak Society (Life Trajectories and Stories)* in various regions of Slovakia. For the purposes of this article, we have selected interviews with 5 young students (2 women, 3 men) between the ages of 21–28 from various regions of Slovakia (all of Slovak ethnicity) who were students or recent graduates of Comenius University Bratislava. They all considered themselves to be non-affiliated. The recordings, transcripts and legal protocols related to the interview process are archived at the Institute for Ethnology and Social Anthropology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava.

## Young and non-religious in the scope of scholarship

The current generation of young people is undergoing specific and very dynamic processes that encompass all aspects of their lives. Most of them were born after the beginning of the new millennium, and a typical characteristic of this generation is that they have been raised and fully integrated into the world of the most modern IT in all forms, and their social life has been formed by social networks and the Internet. Their social location of being a millennial has placed them in a social environment where they experience similar formative aspects, and they might resemble in key attitudes and behaviours and might be perceived as a generation different from their predecessors, just as from the generation to come (Wilkins-Laflamme, 2022: 14) with an important aspect that has never been experienced so far: youth culture has never been as globalised as we see it now (Klingenberg, Sjö, Moberg, 2022: 34).

Studies in the field of religious socialisation and the intergenerational aspects of religious transmission are mostly bound to Western Europe and mostly to Christianity (Shipley, Arweck, 2019: 3) but in certain aspects also cover Central Eastern Europe (Gärtner, 2022; Paleček, Vido, 2014; Váně, Hášová, 2017; Pusztai, Demeter-Karászi, 2019). This is not a matter of a sudden decision but goes across multiple generations (Gärtner, 2022) and is gradual in time (Thiessen, Wilkins-Laflamme, 2017: 65). Religious socialisation can be a lifelong process with the possibility of varying intensity in other

stages of life (Klingenberg, Sjö, 2019: 174) and is set within the frameworks of religious studies, youth studies, education, gender and sexuality studies (Shipley, Arweck, 2019: 4). An important aspect lies not only in the religious or non-religious education of parents and family, but also in the interaction with peers (Wittberg, 2021: 468) and socialisation in schools and the role of the child's agency in its construction within two fields: home and school (Strhan, Shillitoe, 2019: 3). Myers (1996: 864) points out three factors of adult children's religiosity: parental religiosity, quality of family relationships and traditional family structure, although parental religious preferences and church attendance vary among those who were raised in non-religiosity (Merino, 2012: 3). One specific aspect that could cause disruption of religiosity transmission (and possibly lead to non-religion) is parental divorce and remarriage (Bengtson, 2013: 118); in a U.S. sample, divorce adversely affected transmission from mothers but not from fathers or grandmothers (Copen, Silverstein, 2008: 67), but divorce has little relationship to the non-organisational or subjective facets of children's spiritual life (Zhai et al., 2007: 140).

### How young nones in Slovakia see their faith and relationship to their transmission

One of the aspects that emerges from such growing societal diversity is the vector of relationships and sources of non-religious (or perhaps alternative) views of this generation. Wallis (2014) examines the ontological aspect of meaning and purpose in the lives of a sample of British Generation Y and whether non-religious youngsters search for purpose beyond religion or if any metaphysical or existential beliefs are part of their lives. As this generation has grown up in relative economic and social stability, and together with rationalisation and pluralisation, the reliance on supernatural higher power, like the social relevance of religion, may diminish (Thiessen, Wilkins-Laflamme, 2017: 65, 66). As this process is not straightforward, it cannot be focused on one type of non-religious identity but is seen as a continuum comprising various attitudes toward faith, or links with personal or organised religion (Madge, Hemming, 2016: 882). They are unable to define their faith, or some simply do not consider any aspect of their faith as a topic to be bothered with, and they just do not care.

*Perhaps I believe in something supernatural, but I cannot define it. I cannot define it, but certainly there is something we cannot explain by physics or so... perhaps some energy between heaven and earth, maybe yes. (F 28)*

*I do not know whether (God) exists. Even if he exists, I do not find any sense in praying for him or so. Because if God were real, I think he cares only for goodness and other things than for our prayers. (M. 21)*

*Hmm, well, of course, I believe in something, but I do not think concretely that there is God who created everything. (F 22)*

*...I don't think so. I do not want to say that I am rational or they are irrational, but simply I do not believe it, I think. (M 22)*

One of the most common ways of distinguishing non-religious individuals is by their path to it. On the one hand, some were raised as nones, while others became nones during their lifetime, either suddenly or as a result of the long evolution of its disaffiliation. Slovakia, with its religious landscape, belongs among countries where non-religion is mainly the type of identity of post-war generations.

The typical model for many families where generational differences occurred was based on attempts by the grandparental generation to participate in a religious community. The strongest influence of the grandmother is in cases where both grandmothers and mothers are consistently strong in their beliefs (Copen, Silverstein, 2008: 67). Bengtson et al. (2009) underlined a certain influence of grandparents on grandchildren's religiosity independently of the parental generation. This can be part of broader attempts at value transmission, yet the transmission effect over a generation in a time of increasing diversity and complexity of families is likely to diminish (Norris et al., 2004: 368). There are attempts of generations of grandparents (especially grandmothers) to socialise their grandchildren into religion, while their own children have not successfully socialised. This may seem like a second chance to transmit one's faith, as the generation of parents (the skipped generation) (Bengtson, Putney, Harris, 2013) has grown out of their faith.

*My grandmother, she tried to help her children when they were young; they attended church with her from time to time or at some festival, but later they turned away, although paradoxically, they were not baptised... My grandmother taught me to pray, but I did not do it by my own will but to make her happy, and she took me to church, but I stood there just for her. (M 22)*

*My grandmother tried to get me to faith, but I did not take the bait. (M 22a)*

The rupture of transmission and incorporation into religion can have several stages. In many cases, the first and last touch with religion was baptism as an infant. This has a certain meaning as a family ritual of welcoming a new member and it does not necessarily indicate that a child will be raised in the faith. Sometimes, it can also have an apotropaic meaning:

*Baptism? Yes, I was baptised as a Lutheran... my grandmother tried, but I did not succumb to her. (M 21)*

or some might approach other rites of passage such as first communion or confirmation:

*I only have baptism and first communion. I refused to be confirmed. (F 28)*

Some might have even attended a church school with serious religious education, which the evolving and rebelling young personality found quite difficult to cope with.

*I then had several conflicts with the principal and I remember that last year she yelled at me in the hallway to keep my opinions to myself or leave the school. (F 28)*

The decision to leave the church, sometimes in a very demonstrative way, can have various influences on the generation of parents. Some parents might give their children a choice in their preteen or teenage years about whether they want to be involved in church (see, for example, Thiessen, Wilkins-Laflamme, 2017), and then the disaffiliation does not ignite conflicts.

*Well, my family, mostly my great-grandmother, pushed me for confirmation, but my mother told me just to give up, that unless I want to get married in a church, it is useless for me. (F 22)*

Rebellion against the religion of parents can have its ritualistic dimension and individuals try to step out of the family religious socialization patterns and look for an individual course (Pusztai, Demeter-Karászi, 2019: 6). Sometimes the situation evolves in attempts of parents to persuade children to change their minds, but the attitude remains stable and parents have to come to terms with the new situation.

*I felt pressure from my father that today is Sunday and you have to go to church, so I rebelled, that voluntarily he will never get me to church, and literally, for half a year he kept asking me if I have a headache, or if I'm sick, to determine my reason for not going, and he really pushed me, but later he accepted that I am really too stubborn to be broken, so he did not convince me. (F 28)*

*First, my older sister insisted on not attending church, and when I saw the possibility of not going, then I quit too...then when they saw that I did not want to go, they were so disappointed that I no longer believe in God. (M 21)*

Participation of parents in religious activities is catalysed by the feeling of responsibility for the life of another human being, the openness to sacred meaning and the motivation to become a role model for their children (Denton, Uecker, 2018: 17). Therefore, relatively unexpected responses from the generation of parents occur when disaffiliation causes a reassessment of their own attitudes toward the church and church attendance. Roof and McKinney (1989: 59–60) showed an example of a lifecycle aspect in many mainline Protestant churches in the late twentieth century, when many middle-class parents tend to affiliate on behalf of their children as a result of pressure about socialisation. But as young people grow up, they do not feel comfortable being active in their congregations, and when the children are offered to drop church attendance, oftentimes so do their parents too (Thiessen 2016: 4).

*My dad no longer attends church. Shortly after me, he also decided not to go...now I feel that he does not believe in God. My mother goes from time to time to meet the priest and attend the mass. But she is not as active as she used to be. (M 21)*

Although young age is not full of memories and evaluation of previous deeds and decisions, diversion from an official religion can leave certain traces in the personalities of teenagers that could be a matter of further evaluation or challenge. Such a form of identity was marked as *secular Catholics* (or any other denomination) by Váně, Hásová (2017: 10), where such individuals on one hand divert from the dogmatics and religious praxis, but intentionally or unintentionally keep their connection with their roots, and in some forms individuals may draw from it and to a certain level, we can find it among our respondents as well.

*...those elementary items, such as Thou shall not steal, Thou shall not commit adultery, have their meaning although it is a decalogue. It has a meaning, but it does not have to be related to faith; these are the essential values on one hand such as: treating others like you want to be treated, and on the other side: doing what fits you. (F 28)*

*Well, not that I would start to believe in God again, but somehow it is still a part of my life... I had a certain education in it, I know the essential elements, so it influences my thinking in some way... and now I want to be a good person, so this way. (M21)*

Although religious teachings about morality and attempts to be a good person remained in the spiritual profile, the critical standpoint toward the church (mostly Roman Catholic) remained; the financial aspect of the church reputation is particularly audible.

*...it is a certain system, which requires financing, but I find it unjust to simply ask money from those who believe, who attend, for example, church because mostly there are also poor people, pensioners, and so on. I don't know, I find that I wouldn't do it. (M 22)*

*We had many different pastors, but those were just greedy, money, money, there was not enough for church renovation, so they lamented to those grannies, and the grannies coughed up 100 € and gave it to them. (F 21)*

*Hmm, actually this year after years of consideration, I decided to officially leave the Roman Catholic Church. They accepted my letter and I am waiting for the result. (F 28)*

*...right, and with those finances, simply, they always claim that they have nothing and, meanwhile, they have a lot of money. (M 22a)*

## What about survey and census data?


One of the specificities of the population of nones is that higher proportions of them are concentrated in younger generations and among the generations within the so-called productive age group. However, this does not necessarily mean that the non-affiliated population is considerably younger than the entire population of Slovakia. For example, the proportion of the youngest generation (0–14) is very similar (15.2%) to the proportion of children of the entire population of Slovakia (15.9%), while the proportion of the age group 15–65 among nones (67%) is higher than at the national level (60.5%), and this trend is evident from older censuses (2001). The specificity of such age distribution resides in more dynamic processes that influence the group of nones during their lifetime, that at certain ages (especially during early adulthood) it takes a completely opposite course to the Roman Catholic Church (see Fig. 1), and this undergoes transformation not just in a lifetime, but in time as such. Although in 2001 more than 70% of children aged 0–14 were declared in the census as Roman Catholics and 13% as non-affiliated, in 2021 this was 54.7% Roman Catholics and 22.7% nones. The growth rate of non-affiliated persons aged 0–14 between 2001–2021 is 47%, and for Roman Catholics it is –33.6% (the total population of 0–14 in Slovakia decreased in 2001–2021 by 14.6%). Such trends show that the process of changing the religious landscape in Slovakia involves many streams, and the notable increase in the non-affiliated among the youngest part of the population is a trend-setting process that will definitely influence the demographics of the main religious groups in Slovakia in the future.

One of the most notable turning points appears to be the age of 18, when a young individual reaches legal adulthood (see Fig. 1). But this process is not bound to a discrete age; it seems to be a process that goes through the complex transformation of a young individual. For example, between 15 and 24 years of age, the proportion of Catholics in each age category continuously decreases from 56% to 50%. In the case of non-affiliated young people, it increases from 22% to 29%. We do not see such an extensive change in the proportion of Lutherans in the population according to individual age, in part because of its low representation. In the case of Lutherans, it is interesting to see a growing share along the age category. Literally, the lowest proportion is at ages 0 and 1 and starts steadily growing up to the oldest age groups. The culturally closest experience from Czechia indicates that in the process of deconversion daughters deconvert with lower intensity than sons, and this is influenced by the level of religious behaviour of their parents and perceived importance of religion for them (Paleček, Vido, 2014: 31).

Although censuses are perceived as static data providing a snapshot of a population in one place at one time, with comparable data from previous censuses, certain dynamics can be added to them. This helps us to find patterns of demographic change in religious groups in Slovakia. One of the most interesting tasks is to reveal in such data hints of a relatively complicated process of the degree of deconversion at young ages. Data from different age groups between censuses were compared to see how the proportions changed (see Tab. 1).



Fig 1. Age-specific church affiliation rate (in %) in Slovakia in 2021



Source: 2021 Population and Housing Census in Slovakia


Tab. 1. Selected age groups deconversion rate in Slovakia in 2021 in %

	20–34 (0–14 in 2001)	35–44 (15–24 in 2001)
Roman Catholics	-26,7	-23,3
the nones	122,3	51,0
Lutherans	-16,4	-15,3
Greek Catholics	-5,5	-0,6
total	1,8	-2,3

Source: 2001 and 2021 Population and Housing Censuses

With this model, we presume the population to be relatively closed (no notable migration inflows and outflows) to see how it behaves in time. The main breaking age seems to be late teens and early adulthood, when young people change their identity. This may be partly their intentional decision, or in early childhood, they were formally “ticked” as Catholics without being raised in this denomination. Still, the degree of decrement at the level of -27% is quite high, and with more or less similar trends it continued even later (probably to the point of leaving the nest in the late 20s). What is more intriguing is the surge of figures among non-affiliated young generations. This raises the question of why there is such an increase around reaching

Fig. 2. Types of religious socialization in childhood of nonaffiliated respondents in ISSP survey in Slovakia



Source: ISSP Religion 2018 and 2008

adulthood and why it drops in later ages (while the level of deconversion remains similar in the population of Catholics and Lutherans, as well).

These figures lead us to the conviction that a significant part of the non-affiliated population in Slovakia are so-called “nonverts” from early adulthood, and the process of leaving the church affects more Roman Catholics than the other two strongest denominations in Slovakia (Lutherans and Greek Catholics). It can be presumed that nones in Slovakia are more nonverts than those who have been raised as nones since their early childhood in the latest ISSP Survey in 2018, where more than half of the respondents who declared themselves as non-affiliated were raised in one of the denominations, but later disaffiliated (see Fig. 2).

One of the most important agents of religious socialisation is the family. This is not only a space where religious identity is transmitted with variations depending on the sociocultural context but is also a space where religious identity undergoes a transformation in terms of not being transmitted at all or being transmitted and not accepted by all children. It can be assumed that everything seems clear with the identity of children whose parents are homogenous in terms of religious identity, and we would expect that in the cases of religiously heterogamous parents, children “inherit” the affiliation of one parent. According to census data from 2011, there are many strategies in families where two generations live (so the identity of the transmitting (or not) and receiving (or not) generations can be revealed).

*Tab. 2 Shares of homogamous partners' households where at least one child is not affiliated in Slovakia in 2011*

Roman Catholic	7.2 %
Lutheran	9.1 %
Greek Catholic	2.6 %

*Source: 2011 Population and Housing Census in Slovakia*

According to Tab. 2, there are families, more likely in Protestant environments, where some children do not have the identity of their parents, although from the census data we are unable to read whether this is intentional or not. Generally speaking, the higher probability of not transmitting the religious identity exists in heterogamous partnerships (non-affiliated excluded), where more than 12.6% of such type of households have children without affiliation. This seems to be an acceptable compromise when there is no agreement on the way of religious socialisation in the family.

A more specific situation occurs when one of the partners is not affiliated and lives in a partnership with an affiliated partner. One might think that it should be equally divided, but denominational identity prevails slightly in all three largest church bodies in Slovakia in 2011. A slight majority of children living in such partnerships have a certain religious affiliation, whereas the strongest influence has a Greek-Catholic partner (see Tab. 3).

*Tab. 3. Proportion of unaffiliated children in partnerships of affiliated partners with non-affiliated partners in Slovakia in 2011*

	<b>non-affiliated</b>
Roman Catholic	42,2
Lutheran	47,7
Greek Catholic	38,7

*Source: 2011 Population and Housing Census in Slovakia*

## Conclusion

Aspects of believing or not believing definitely gained a new dimension in Slovakia and broadly in East Central Europe after 1990. The invigoration of church life with all its variations has for many conceived the idea that society somehow is returning to the pre-Socialism era, when church had a strong position in many aspects of life, from the sphere of family and community to the nation. Not many people have realised that the world has shifted to new dimensions, and that these dimensions introduced pluralism, diversity, weaker ties to the church and its activities and

authority, and not unusually became the view of not believing in any superpower, not feeling attached to any religious body and not even having any information of teachings of the church. The secular part of society has become stronger, and stronger and in competition with churches; it seems that it has gained new power and operates in society much faster and with more stamina.

Increasingly, data and surveys after 1990 reveal that our society is open to secular and non-religious ideas and formations. Initially perceived as a marginal group of weirdos (how is it possible not to believe?) to a group that gains more than just statistical power. Furthermore, with the increasing importance of the non-affiliated population, more internal diversity will inevitably be revealed. And detailed data provide more scope for study. Especially with respect to demographics, the immersion into age structure and the specific relationship to age groups and generations are salient for showing outlines of internal dynamics. In the case of the non-affiliated, we see that its source is not simply in reproduction but gains its power from nonverts or those who were targets of various forms of religious socialisation in their childhood but later went astray. Census data, survey data and interview examples show that entering adulthood is connected with certain coming to terms with the worldview and choosing the right path to go. It is not surprising that such processes connected with college enrolment and leaving the parental house are common in many parts of Europe.

Specific attention to non-religiosity in society should be paid to the process of interaction with other denominations as a result of the growing and more or less admitted diversity of the religious landscape. It can be seen that in certain cases the non-religious identity evolves even in denominationally homogamous families, either intentionally from the position of parents or as a matter of rejection from the position of their children. More attention in the future should be paid to the process of intergenerational transmission to unveil structures that are beyond the decisions on reproducing or not reproducing own religious identity in broader social and increasingly diverse contexts (family, community).

#### Acknowledgements:

*This article was supported by the VEGA 2/0060/19 grant – Ethnographic Research of Non-religion and Secularism in Modern Slovak Society (Life Trajectories and Stories) – and the APVV-20-043 grant “Suburbanisation: Community, Identity and Everydayness”.*

## REFERENCES

- 2001 Population and Housing Census in the Slovak Republic* (2001). Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
- 2011 Population and Housing Census in the Slovak Republic* (2011). Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
- 2021 Population and Housing Census in the Slovak Republic* (2022). Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.

- Berger, P. (2008). Secularization falsified. *First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life*, 180, 23–27.
- Bengtson, V. L., Copen, C. E., Putney, N. M., Silverstein, M. (2009). A longitudinal study of the intergenerational transmission of religion. *International Sociology*, 24(3), 325–345.
- Bengtson, V., Putney, N. M., Harris, S. (2013). *Families and Faith. How religion is passed down across generations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Copen, C. E., Silverstein, M. (2008). The Transmission of Religious Beliefs across Generations: Do Grandparents Matter? *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 39(1), 59–71.
- Denton, M. L., Uecker, J. E. (2018). What God has joined together: Family formation and religion among young adults. *Review of Religious Research*, 60, 1–22.
- Gärtner, Ch. (2022). Secularity as a Point of Reference: Specific features of a Non-Religious and Secularized Worldview in a family across Three Generations. *Religions*, 13(6), 1–13.
- Henkel, R., Knippenberg, H. (2005). Secularization and the Rise of Religious Pluralism. Main features of the changing religious landscape of Europe. In: H. Knippenberg (Ed.), *The Changing Religious Landscape of Europe* (pp. 1–13), Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Hervieu-Léger, D. (2000). *Religion as a Chain of Memory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- ISSP Research Group (2018). International Social Survey Programme: Religion III – ISSP 2008. *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4950 data file Version 2.3.0*.
- ISSP Research Group (2020). International Social Survey Programme: Religion IV – ISSP 2018. *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7570 data file Version 2.1.0*.
- Klingenberg, M., Sjö, S., Moberg, M. (2022). Young Adults as a Social Category: Findings from an International Study in Light of Developmental and Cohort Perspectives. In: P. Nynäs et al. (Eds.), *The Diversity Of Worldviews Among Young Adults Contemporary (Non)Religiosity And Spirituality Through The Lens Of An International Mixed Method Study* (pp. 23–46). Cham: Springer.
- Klingenberg, M., Sjö, S. (2019). Theorizing religious socialization: A Critical Assessment *Religion*, 49(2), 163–178.
- Madge, N., Hemming, P. J. (2016). Young British religious ‘noners’: findings from the Youth On Religion study. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 20(7), 872–888.
- Merino, S.M. (2012). Irreligious Socialization? The Adult Religious Preferences on Individuals Raised with No Religion. *Secularism and Nonreligion*, 1, 1–16.
- Myers, S.M. (1996). An Interactive Model of Religiosity Inheritance The Importance of Family Context. *American Sociological Review*, 61(5), 858–866.
- Norris, J. E., Kuiack, S., Prat, W. Michael (2004). ‘As long as they go back down the Driveway at the End of the day’: Stories of satisfactions and challenges of grandparenthood. In: W. M. Pratt, B. H. Fiese (Eds.), *Family Stories and the Life Course: Across time and generations* (pp. 353–373). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.
- Paleček, A., Vido, R. (2014). Náboženské vyznání v České republice z perspektivy intera intragenerační transmise. *Naše společnost*, 2, 24–35.
- Pusztai, G., Demeter-Karászi, Z. (2019). Analysis of religious Socialization Based on Interview Conducted with Young Adults. *Religions*, 10, 365.
- Roof, W. C., McKinney, W. (1989). *American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future*. New Jersey, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Shipley, H., Arwek, E. (2019). Young People and the Diversity of (Non)religious Identities in International Perspective: Introduction. In: H. Shipley, E. Arwek (Eds.), *Young People and the Diversity of (Non)Religious Identities in International Perspective* (pp. 1–12). Cham: Springer.

- Strhan, A., Shillitoe, R. (2019). The Stickiness of Non-Religion? Intergenerational Transmission and the Formation of Non-Religious Identities in Childhood. *Sociology*, 53(6), 1–17.
- Thiessen, J. (2016). Kids, You Make the Choice: Religious and Secular Socialization among Marginal Affiliates and Nonreligious Individuals. *Secularism and Nonreligion*, 5(6), 1–16.
- Thiessen, J., Wilkins-Laflamme, S. (2017). Becoming a Religious None: Irreligious Socialization and Disaffiliation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 56(1), 64–82.
- Tomka, M. (2005). *Church, State, and Society in Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Váně, J., Hášová, V. (2017). Jaká je spolehlivost odhadu přenosu náboženství mezi rodiči a dětmi? *Naše společnost*, 1, 3–13.
- Wallis, S. (2014). Ticking ‘no religion’: A case study amongst ‘young nones’. *Diskus*, 16(2), 70–87.
- Wilkins-Laflamme, S. (2022). *Religion, Spirituality, and Secularity among Millennials. The Generation Shaping American and Canadian Trends*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Wittberg, P. (2021). Generational Change in Religion and Religious Practice: A review essay. *Review of Religious Research*, 63, 461–482.
- Zhai, J. E., Ellison, C. G., Glenn, N. D., Marquardt, E. (2007). Parental Divorce and Religious Involvement among Young Adults. *Sociology of Religion*, 68(2), 125–144.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JURAJ MAJO (ORCID: 0000-0001-5525-9624) – is an assistant professor at Comenius University Bratislava, Faculty of Natural Sciences, Department of Economic and Social Geography, Demography, and Territorial Development. His research interests include various demographic aspects of ethnic/religious identities (such as transmission and intergenerational dynamics) in their temporal and regional perspectives. He has co-authored several atlases of topics in this field. His recent projects include various aspects of demographic aging in urban landscapes, changes of the identities in suburban spaces and research on the ethnographic aspects of non-religiosity in contemporary Slovakia.