

## ON DEMOCRATISM OF THE CITIZENS OF SLOVAKIA COMPARATIVELY

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The article rests on the database obtained in summer 1995 within the Czech-Polish-Slovak research project “Actors and strategies of social transformation and modernization”. The author compares the democratization potential of Slovak citizens (956 respondents) with the compatible potential of Czech citizens (1,233) and Polish citizens (2,000). In agreement with the project he underlines the necessity to distinguish three types of civil actors: individual, associated in groups (political parties, civic movements), and generalized (state administration).

### *1. Formulation of the problem*

The social system of Slovakia was formed as a consequence of World War II in 1939-1945. The original foreign and epigonic native architects prophesied – in sharp contrast with their own noisily proclaimed dialectic faith – the unprecedentedly endless future of the system with magnificent political, economic, and spiritual parameters, which, as if in spite of this, did not even live to be fifty. It collapsed towards the end of the commemorative year 1989, being accompanied to the graveyard of history by the jingling keys of the citizens who, though a little side-tracked, were not at all grieving. It was not able to make any serious act of self-preserving resistance. It fell powerlessly like a blasted oak, providing evidence through its eloquent lack of action that the merciful death had come with a delay.

This led to the necessity of perceiving the situation of Slovakia in the last decade of the second millennium once again as a turning point from the perspective of social systems. Some structural components are gradually taken apart together with their interfunctional relations, and different functional components with qualitatively different characteristics replace them. We use a neutral word *transformation* to name it. The humanly irritating neutrality of the meaning is immediately corrected to humanize it by adding some other words to the word transformation; recently *modernization* has been an increasingly popular word.

By using the term modernization, we want to point to the desirable historic meaning of the process of transformation, to its aim. This means that it should not be *any* transformation but explicitly a *modernizing* one. However, besides this future-oriented desirability there is also its retrospective modality. At the level of retrospection, the point is the delimitation of the place of the abandoned social system within a wider historic process of modernization.

It is certainly valid that if the preceding socio-system relations played a kind of identifiable modernizing role in their historically ascending developmental phase, of course, in relation to pre-industrial (and pre-urbanization) types of social order, their original positive functionality was exhausted in a relatively short time and passed to its contradiction. In Slovakia, this was not perceived so intensively and sharply as in the Czech part of the federation because of the less developed social conditions on entering the system and the following relatively greater progresses and profits; but also here, as the outcomes of a number of sociological surveys show, the pillars of the system dissolved and it was only a matter of time when and how the latent destructive system would become visible. In any case the number of those participants, whom the official apologia for the status quo did not preliminarily provoke to derogative ironizing, decreased. By contrast, the number of those, who reassured themselves that the existing anti-modernizing social system should undergo a more thorough repair than so-called reform communists could have done and wanted to do in the sixties, was increasing.

More than seven years after the earthquake of the social system, we are still in the midst of transformation tasks. The point is that not only the transformation in terms of its completion by integrating Slovakia into European structures is still not behind us but it is not certain whether it will ultimately be a thoroughly modernizing transformation or a variant of a farcical pasquinade. We see a greater urgency of the reason to make a careful analysis of the situation in which we find ourselves at the moment.

I certainly cannot be expected to make a full analysis of all details in this paper. Even the title indicates that I will focus on the phenomenon of citizenship, which is actually just one of a number of aspects of the problem. I will not subject this partial phenomenon to an all-round investigation. I will just raise a question about the status of the democratization civil potential of the Slovak population.

The measurements can be done using the database obtained in the summer of 1995 within the framework of the project entitled *Actors and strategies of social transformation and modernization*. This database is valuable not only because it contains the data about the levels of democratism of persons representatively selected from a general sample of Slovakia. It is also important that the same research project was implemented at the same time in the Czech Republic and in Poland according to coordinated methods, which enables us to pose and solve the question of Slovak specifics within the particular circle of problems. The Polish participation in the comparative project is particularly welcome. It is a chance for Slovak sociology

to make a breakthrough in the comparatist stereotype which pressurized Slovakia, as part of the Czecho-Slovak federation, into holding up only a mirror of the Czech reality in vital self-realizing reflexive acts.

## *2. Democratism of individual actors*

Democratization is generally a process in which a pre-modern subservient type of state undergoes restructuring criticism in the direction of becoming and gradually improving modern civil type of a state. The dichotomic typology of states used is taken from the English political scientist Roger Scruton (1989) because there is nothing better for expressing what democratization is about. In contrast to typologies of many variants which succeed in making the issue foggy, Scruton's dichotomic model clarifies it and makes it fully understandable. Every time when an empirical model is subjected to modernizing criticism (not excluding pre-November CSSR) we do it in the interest of strengthening its civil and legal character to the detriment of the residues of non-free, "god-fearing" subservience and vassalage.

In representative analyses of large selections, the presence of democratization potential in individual actors is identifiable in two ways: a) by the method of subjective introspections, b) by the method of objective tests.

The first method is applied when we simply ask respondents whether they consider themselves to be democrats – yes or no? The veracity of this method depends on both the semantic refinement of a particular social milieu and the semantic maturity of the respondent. For instance, we cannot overlook the fact that in the milieu of post-communist countries the former regime called itself democracy, although socialist democracy, in contrast to the bourgeois one. We cannot be sure whether all respondents have already freed themselves from this semantic stereotype and whether they understand the same thing under democratism. When we asked them in the 1993 survey what mark would they give to themselves as an assessment of their ability to distinguish between democratic and undemocratic behaviour, the Czech sample contained 47% of those with marks "one" and "two", while in the Slovak sample there were only 35% of these. The completely insufficient level of knowledge in the field of democracy was confessed by 11% of the Czechs and 19% of Slovaks.

The method of objective tests is applied when the absence or the presence of democratism in respondents is not determined by registering their subjective response but by observing and appraising their factual performances on the so-called conative models. I understand conative model as a briefly formulated problem situation which is solvable either in harmony with or at variance with the compatible rule of democratic behaviour. I drew inspiration from practical driving tests in driving schools. If during such a test you respect a traffic sign, you prove your ability to drive a motor vehicle. If you do not respect it, your driving potential is zero in the particular problem situation. Analogously, any human, civic or social potential is measurable.

I applied this testing method in the research “Civil society 1992”. I included the following problem situation into the battery of eight situation tests: “Do you agree that a competent government should be granted the right to control an incompetent parliament?” It was shown that undemocratic agreements with the offered solution to the relation between legislative and executive power prevail over democratic disagreements, in the ratio of 67% : 33%. This result, not very flattering to Slovakia, was partly caused by the fact that we included two complicating and confusing components into the formulation of problem situation, namely “competence” (of the government) and “incompetence” (of the parliament). Our intention was to bring the model nearer to reality. In everyday life antidemocratism is also masked by various sorts of trickeries. Therefore the democratism of a citizen also includes the ability to recognize them and not to be taken in.

I consider it a success that we were able to apply (not insisting on applying puzzling components) the idea of testing democratism on conative models in the Slovak-Czech-Polish project of comparative investigation *Actors and strategies of social transformation and modernization 1995*. The particular block in the questionnaire contains 8 items, but only 5 of them satisfy the criteria of the conative model. Table 1 shows the measured values.

**Table 1**  
**Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland from the perspective of the size of democratization potential (% of positive points in the test of democratism)**

| T E S T S   | SR    | CR    | PR*   |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| A. Protection of the rights and freedoms of those who did not win election is an important component of democracy | 49.7  | 65.7  | 74.6  |
| B. Parliamentary opposition is necessary for the good government of a country                                     | 68.1  | 82.7  | 65.6  |
| C. Parliamentary opposition only keeps the government from work by constant objections                            | 38.1  | 38.2  | 40.8  |
| D. The press, radio and TV should be controlled not to endanger the policy of democratic government               | 50.9  | 65.5  | 57.6  |
| E. It is correct to put a ban on persons with a communist past performing certain functions                       | 45.7  | 33.5  | 32.2  |
| Summary of potential points from tests A-E  | 252.5 | 285.6 | 270.8 |

Source: Transformation and modernization of the SR, CR, PR 1995.

\* In the Polish mutation of the questionnaire the test A was used to find the relationships to minorities in general, which makes the comparative value of the figure problematic.

The overall value of potential points (of 500 theoretically possible) placed the Czech Republic in the first position, Poland in the second, and Slovakia in the third position. The loss of the points of the last with respect to the first one and especially to the second is, however, not so catastrophic. It is important that all three post-communist countries got over 50%, although Slovakia only narrowly.

The total positions are only partly identical with the positions in partial tests. The Czech Republic leads significantly in test B (necessity of opposition), less significantly in test D (freedom of mass media). Poland leads significantly (although problematically!) in test A (minority protection) and with a negligible lead in test C (practicality of opposition). Slovakia boasts one first place too, namely in test E (discrimination against former communists). This signals at least two facts: 1. the more positive experience of Slovakia with the communist regime (Machonin P., 1994), 2. the better self-realizing chance of former communists in post-communism. Apart from this, Slovakia was placed second in test B (necessity of opposition), where Poland was exceptionally pushed to the last place.

### 3. *Democratism of associated actors*

After presenting the results from the measurement of democratic potential at the level of individual actors, it is the turn of associated actors. In this connection a serious methodological question arises, of to what extent the tests of democratism tailored to individual citizens can also be applied to groups. The reply will follow from the next conceptualization excursion.

The concept of civil or democratization potential would hang in the air if we would took it out of connection with its living bearer and implementer. Thanks to the French inspiration (social scientist A. Tourain) this bearer and implementer is called the actor in the context of our research project. An actor is a person who is equipped with a civil potential and who applies it in his practical civil self-realization. He has thereby a chance to combine three kinds of action: *individual, collective, generalized*.

The modality of individual action occurs when the civil act is performed without assembling with other citizens (participation in election, personal protest against the violation of the legal order, etc.) Collective action takes place when particular activities can only be done through associations of individual citizens (political parties, civic movements, pressure groups). The generalized civil action should be spoken about when an individual citizen becomes a state administrator.

The concept of the *institutional actor* often shelters associated or generalized actors. This indicates that individual actors are not institutionalized. This is, however, a mistake, since the civil status of every individual actor is a state principle of the same type as the status of a political party or of a state administrator. It is equally inappropriate to eliminate the ordinary citizen from the circle of constitutional actors. This happens when president, prime minister, head of parliament, etc.

but not ordinary citizens, are understood to be constitutional actors. And this is in spite of the fact that the constitutional law formulates the rights and duties of a state's citizens just as explicitly as the rights and duties of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the state.

The fact that three noninterchangeable types of civil actors coexist closely correlates with the fact that there are also three noninterchangeable types of civil potentials.

The individual civil potential is the basic source and in this sense one-sidedly determining, but this is an epistemological fiction. Our database of 1995 reveals just this type of potential. The plurality of *collective* civil potentials creates a sort of secondary superstructure above it. Classical political parties are their more rigid branches dominantly characterized by the effort to win and keep the decision-making powers in the state. The objectives of the more flexible civic movements are to exert an influence over the execution of the state power by corrections. The concept of the party as a movement (KDH – Christian Democratic Movement, HZDS – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) does not mean renunciation of the rule. It is rather an expression of the search for a more attractive organizational form and means of achieving this aim in the situation when, together with the regimented type of social organization also the regimented type of organization of political parties was discredited.

Collective civil potential is an autonomous quality which cannot be expressed by a sum of qualities of individual civil potentials gravitating towards the particular collective actor. The strategic programme vision of the collective actor, projection of the vision into the programme objectives for the future period and the implementation of the aims in the political rule or in the practice of the civil movement oriented toward corrections are decisive for determining this quality.

If I do not miss the opportunity of showing which individual civil-potential types gravitate towards particular parties rather than towards others, I shall bear in mind the formulated methodological warning. Two situations may arise. The collective civil potential is at the level either of the most developed or of the most backward gravitating individual potentials. In both cases the collective actor influences reversely the basic individual potential – once positively, once negatively. The exploration of the structure of individual potential types in the circles of individual political parties is therefore also important from the point of view of understanding some lengthy internal disputes and unexpected turns in the actions of their top leadership.

The first column summarizes the points from five partial tests and fulfils the function of the introductory informant. We learn that the results for potential voters for the coalition government parties (HZDS, SNS, ZRS) are worse than for potential voters for the opposition parties (DS, DÚ, KDH, SDL). It might seem that the practical remedy is quite simple: it will be enough to shift the ruling parties to the opposition and the opposition parties to the government. It is not so easy at all. When in 1992 we tested the democratism of the potential voters for the current op-

position and for the then ruling parties DS and KDH, their performances were weaker than those of the then opposition subjects of HZDS and SNS. This means that democratism and the hold of power are, within certain limits which have to be better defined, indirectly proportional quantities. It seems as if by coming to power, particular parties were robbed of their democratism, while their departure give it back to them, they have regeneration effect.

**Table 2**  
**Democratization potential of the sympathizers of influential political parties in the Slovak republic 1995 (in points 0-100)**

|                | Tests A-E | Test A | Test B | Test C | Test D | Test E |
|----------------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Slovak sample  | 50.8      | 49.7   | 68.1   | 38.1   | 50.9   | 45.7   |
| DS (n=15)      | 83.2      | 85.0   | 94.2   | 100.0  | 100.0  | 36.7   |
| DÚ (n=74)      | 68.3      | 70.1   | 87.7   | 78.0   | 69.6   | 36.9   |
| KDH (n=57)     | 57.6      | 58.8   | 77.0   | 55.6   | 59.3   | 37.2   |
| MK (n=24)      | 47.5      | 54.2   | 75.0   | 62.5   | 33.3   | 16.7   |
| SDL (n=69)     | 68.9      | 63.4   | 85.6   | 50.9   | 65.3   | 79.1   |
| SNS (n=46)     | 50.9      | 56.0   | 69.5   | 28.1   | 54.0   | 44.0   |
| HZDS (n=184)   | 41.3      | 49.9   | 62.5   | 16.6   | 32.4   | 44.9   |
| ZRS (n=47)     | 37.6      | 34.8   | 55.8   | 27.9   | 40.4   | 28.8   |
| KSS '88 (n=81) | 61.7      | 60.5   | 82.7   | 37.0   | 56.8   | 71.6   |

Source: Transforming and Modernizing SR, CR, PR 1995.

Note: Test A – minority protection, B – necessity of opposition, C – practicality of opposition, D – freedom of mass media, E – discrimination of communists.

DS = Democratic Party, DÚ – Democratic Union, KDH – Christian Democratic Movement, MK – Hungarian Coalition, SDL – Party of Democratic Left, SNS – Slovak National Party, HZDS – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, ZRS – Association of Slovak Workers, KSS – Communist Party of Slovakia

The current situation on the Czech political scene also indicates the justification of such a generalizing conclusion. While the average collective potential of democratism reaches the top value of 64.8 in the opposition ČSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party) and 62.3 in the opposition KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), in coalition government parties it markedly decreases: KDU-ČSL (Christian DU – Czechoslovak People's Party) = 54.5, ODS (Civil Democratic Party) = 53.7, ODA (Civil Democratic Alliance) = 50.5.

This conclusion can also be verified on a group of persons, who confess their membership in the totalitarian ruling pre-November Communist Party of Slovakia in the control year of 1988. The mean potential value of 61.7 obtained not only leaves behind each of the three coalition parties but also the opposition KDH. It is a pity we do not have the level of the democratization potential of this group from the

time of the ruling KSS. It was certainly much lower in 1988. I dare cast doubt on the exaggerated arguments that it was “zero”. From February 1948, I was a witness of the phantom visions of the need and usefulness of political opposition in the minds of a not insignificant proportion of Slovak communists and how it could not be uprooted. I have arguments to assume that this group of communists grew and strengthened in proportion to the approaching end of the communist experiment, and that this was a significant factor in the peaceful course of anticommunist revolution.

However, we have to take into account the difference between the necessity of recognizing the opposition and personally sharing the fate of a member of an opposition party. Many former communists do not enjoy the regenerating food of opposition. We obtained a picture of the movements of former communist party members. About one third of them declare their association with the current government coalition parties, particularly to HZDS. About one fourth are linked to the opposition SDL, with which they have experienced their transformation-modernization rebirth. Five per cent of former communists directed themselves towards the DS and 4 per cent towards the DÚ. The only party which has resisted successfully the infiltration of former communists is the KDH (unless, of course, the politically unidentified former communists concealed their mobility in this direction). It undoubtedly deserves appreciation that in spite of this the result of the delicate test E is for KDH better than for several other parties.

However, the unflattering results from testing the democratism of the sympathizers of the parties of the coalition government do not allow us (see the warning above!) to label these parties as undemocratic. They are undemocratic only as far as the possibility is concerned, which either changes into reality or more or less energetic steps are taken to stop its implementation. Unfortunately, the results of monitoring the practical politics of the coalition government from the legendary November 1994 night till today show that it is precisely the undemocratic methods in the behaviour of the coalition government parties that are determining. If we take a look at the undemocratic activities of the current Slovak government which have been the targets of criticism by recent foreign demarches, we take into account with satisfaction that almost all of them were monitored in the Slovak-Czech-Polish sociological research 1995 through our tests of democratism.

#### *4. Democratism of generalized actors*

The last potential is the *generalized* civil potential of the state. As the collective potentials represent autonomous qualities in relation to individual potentials, so the state’s generalized potential is the autonomous quality in relation to collective potentials. It should be noted that in the case of generalized potential we do not speak about qualities (plural) but about a quality (singular). There are a lot of individual potentials, there are several collective ones but there is only one generalized poten-



tial. The identity of a state with itself does not admit the existence of even two generals side by side. It can only transit from one general to another one, of course at the cost of discontinuity in the identity of the state. This is the main reason why the histories of states are so dramatic and full of changes.

The generalized civil potential of a state is primarily limited by the country's constitution as the fundamental law from which the richly branched legislation is derived. Legislation must be compatible with fundamental law (which is sometimes a matter of dispute and then the Constitutional court has to deliver the ruling). The point is also that the participatory individual and collective civil actors should be willing to uphold the laws and obey them. That is, their civil potential should be at the level of the current period. The dispute to what extent post-communist Slovakia has been successful is a matter that polarizes our society. The characteristic feature of this polarization is that apart from individual and associated actors it also touched the actor-state. It is reflected in the antagonism of the two institutions – the Prime Minister and the President of the Slovak Republic.

I personally insist on the hypothesis that there is something more serious projected into the lengthy conflict between the President and the Prime Minister than might appear to a superficial commentator. It reflects a hidden “civil war”, a mass struggle for the civilocratic character of the young independent state, for the purity of the democratic functioning of its institutions, for hindering the returns to the deep-rooted and bureaucratic-centralistic methods of government. Because of the specifics which characterized the development of Slovakia during the four pre-November decades, this struggle could not be completed before the state emancipation of the republic. It is a task which is being undertaken (and must be completed) now.

The political profile of both generalized actors will be hinted at by the difference in the levels of the democratization potential of individual actors gravitating towards them (see Table 3).

**Table 3**  
**The democratization potential of the citizens of the SR presenting the relation of absolute confidence in a) the President of SR b) the Slovak government (in points 0-100)**

|                      | Tests A-E | Test A | Test B | Test C | Test D | Test E |
|----------------------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| President<br>(n=147) | 64.3      | 73.4   | 64.6   | 59.6   | 79.4   | 38.8   |
| Government<br>(n=73) | 36.7      | 45.5   | 12.2   | 27.7   | 61.9   | 33.9   |

Source: Transforming and modernizing SR, CR, PR 1995

Note: Test A – minority protection, B – necessity of opposition, C – practicality of opposition, D – freedom of mass media, E – discrimination against communists.

Table 3 is interesting, among other things, by showing not only a simply immense difference in the levels of the democratization potential of the President's and PM's "hard-line proponents". It also signals a high degree of political polarization in Slovak society. A more precise idea of the extent of the phenomenon will be obtained when we subtract from the sum of the respondents without a sign of polarization.

Under *unpolarized* citizens I understand both those who showed confidence (absolute + partial) in both generalized state's actors (21.5%) and those who do not trust in either of them (22.1%). Together they are a clear minority.

The polarized citizens are then those who eliminate one of the polarizing actors from their confidence. They create a clear majority (56.4%), whereby, 35.2% of persons from the Slovak sample trust exclusively in the President, and 21.2% of them trust exclusively in the PM's government.

Of course, this reflects the situation of summer 1995. However, the results from the survey of the confidence in the institutions of the president and the government carried out in December 1995 by the FOCUS agency did not correct our results too much, or, actually, it did not correct them at all.

The data from the Slovak-Czech-Polish research corroborate those who perceive the president-government polarization of the Slovak society as genuinely Slovak folklore. The first peculiarity concerns the unrepeatable mass occurrence of polarized citizens (Slovak – 56.4 points, Czech – 46.8 points, 34.7 Polish points). The second peculiarity consists in the fact that the proportion of the citizens with exclusive confidence in the president is much higher than that of the citizens who trust exclusively in the government. The third is the unrepeatable ratio between the number of polarized citizens and the number of citizens who still trust in both generalized actors and fulfil thus function of a sort of integrating segment. The strength of this segment in Slovakia (21.5%) is on the one hand incomparably lower than in the Czech Republic (51.1%) but on the other hand, it is incomparably higher than in Poland (6%). The fourth peculiarity consists in the fact how Slovakia differs from the Czech Republic and from Poland in the size of the group of citizens who refuse to express confidence in both the president and the government. With its 22.1% of these "opponents to both sides", Slovakia highly exceeds the Czech Republic (2.1%) but there is still enough to be done to catch up with Poland (59.3%). And the last peculiarity: it is only in Slovakia that the polarization of the citizens coincides with the contradiction of above-average high and below-average low individual democratisms.

There remains the task of mapping the degree of political polarization of Slovakia at the level of political parties as associated actors. We know already that there are two different aspects in this game. The first is the aspect of programme political behaviour as produced by political leaders. This is the situation, which has so far been clear and transparent from the legendary night from November 3 to November 4, 1994, when the coalition government declared the policy of confrontation according to the principle "the winner takes all". All the opposition parties enforce democratiza-

tion during the fight for the character of the SR, that means they support the President in this point. The second is the aspect of political behaviour as produced by individuals from the circle of the potential voters of particular parties. The situation is not so clear and transparent. Because the Slovak political scene is known as not crystallized, it would be daring to expect that each sympathizer of a particular party thinks the same as the party leaders. Moreover, the leaders of the same parties are mostly not consolidated either. The factual empirical status can be determined by a targeted field probe. Our findings are listed in Table 4.

**Table 4**  
**Confidence in the Slovak president and in the government from the point of view of the voters of political parties in 1995 (in %)**

| Potential voters:                         | President | Government |
|---|-----------|------------|
| HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) | 26.7      | 73.3       |
| SNS (Slovak National Party)               | 29.2      | 70.8       |
| ZRS (Association of Slovak Workers)       | 61.7      | 48.9       |
| SDL (Party of Democratic Left)            | 69.4      | 25.0       |
| DÚ (Democratic Union)                     | 87.8      | 17.6       |
| KDH (Christian Democratic Movement)       | 91.2      | 33.3       |
| MK (Hungarian Coalition)                  | 91.7      | 4.2        |
| DS (Democratic Party)                     | 93.3      | 13.3       |

Source: Transforming and modernizing SR, CR, PR 1995.

### 5. Concluding conceptual remarks

Democratism represents a fundamental component of civil potential and the civil potential capable of actions is what guarantees the historical process of the transition of pre-civil societies organized on the family basis to modern civil societies organized according to the principle of citizenship. In any case the concept of the civil potential would remain a torso if we put aside the question of the relationship between *civil society* and the *state*. It is in a way a crucial problem. In the context of the developing new Slovak statehood it is even twice as valid.

Immediately after November 1989, when Slovakia set out on the journey of the restoration of civil society and the issue had to be also discussed on a theoretical basis, P. Pitthart's journalist statement that civil society should be "everything that is not the state" resounded. This conception might have evoked a superficial idea in a not well-informed recipient that civil society is a sort of self-sufficient externality with respect to the state and the state is a sort of self-sufficient externality with re-

spect to civil society. In his book “ Občanská společnost v moderním státě” (1995, p. 6), F. Šamalík puts the thing right, defining the state as a subsystem of civil society, which means that he internalizes the relation between them.

It might seem that either the externalist Pitthart or the internalist Šamalík is right and that the famous non-dialectic “tertium non datur” is valid. A more detailed investigation will show that it would be a hasty conclusion. Both authors are right from a certain point of view and both are wrong from another point of view. The point is that they use the same word – state for denoting considerably different ontological and epistemological contents, they speak about something different. The externalist Pitthart bears in mind the relationship between the civil society and the type of state which Roger Scruton specified as *subservient*. By contrast, the internalist Šamalík describes the relationship of the civil society to the type of the state which was specified by Scruton as a civil state. And I repeatedly argue that the name *civilocratic* would suit it better.

Only in the civilocratic type the state power is derived from citizens as elementary constituents of civil society and exclusively this type of the state can be defined as a subsystem of civil society. The subservient type of state deriving its power from something else, e.g. from God as in theocracies, or from the Messianic group interest, is in relation to civil society an alien, inorganic counterproductive externality which cannot be implanted for a longer period as the experiment to introduce the Soviet variant of the subservient type of state into Central Europe with its more developed civil society showed.

As far as the relationship between civil society and the civil type of state is concerned, the reason to place the state in sharp contrast to self-government is at least weakened. A civilocratic state is a self-governing organ of civil society. The fact that it is not directly but representatively functioning self-government would not change the situation. If direct self-governmental procedures and techniques are not sufficient even for much smaller communities (hamlet, village, town, academic community, church community, ethnic community, etc.) then they will not be enough for modern communities-states with millions or tens of millions of citizens, let alone the integration groupings of communities-states of the European Union type, where the numbers of citizens amount to hundreds of millions.

It is valid in any case that the transition from self-government (it is the same whether of state or non-state type), administered by a community not large in number over a small space, to the self-government administered by a large population across enormous territories, requires the members of the community to complete the arrangement and development of their civilocratic potential. They have to admit the fact that they will not be able to execute their (inalienable) decision-making powers directly themselves but only with the aid of their mediating delegates or representatives.

This harsh structural-functional fact has led me to an idea that delegation forms a substantial dimension of modern democratism and therefore has to be included

into the collection of key civil-potential typological criteria, as early as in the previous stage of exploration of the types of civil potential. It was immediately shown that it was a productive contemplation. Among six types of democratism revealed by means of the 1992 database (research project "Občianska spoločnosť 1992") there were two, which were primarily characterized by the polarized position on the scale of delegation. The citizens on one pole (with strongly below-average potential of delegation) were called *priamaci* (direct democrats) and the citizens on the other pole (with highly above-average delegation) *zmocňovači* (delegators).

In content tests of democratism, the results were much better for the latter than for the former ones. The first citizens can be said to form the type support of the so-called plebiscite authoritarian regimes (B.S. Turner, 1990), to which our pre-November regime also belongs.

Unfortunately, the reality of post-November Slovakia is represented more by the first group of citizens rather than by the second group. It is for a simple reason that there are 3–4 members of the first group per one member of the second group. The first group makes up about one third of the total number of the citizens of Slovakia as the database of 1992 showed. I do not think that much has changed since then. Mečiar's populism has worked and still works mainly because it resounds throughout the mass Slovak milieu of the citizens from the first group. Who attends regular HZDS meetings in the Bratislava sports hall and leaves in high spirits with a feeling that he has participated in the decision-making once again? Obviously, especially the famous member of our first group.

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