On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance

Rok, strany: 2010, 115 - 135

In this paper we analyze the Chosen Target Forced Prefix (CTFP) preimage resistance security notion for hash functions firstly introduced in [Kelsey, J.—Kohno, T.: \textit{Herding hash functions and the Nostradamus attack}, in: Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT '06, 25th Annual Internat. Conf. on the Theory and Appl. of Cryptographic Techniques (S. Vaudenay, ed.), St. Petersburg, Russia, 2006, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 4004, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2006, pp. 183–200]. We give a formal definition of this property in hash function family settings and work out all the implications and separations between the CTFP preimage resistance and other standard notions of hash function security (preimage resistance, collision resistance, etc.). This paper follows the work of [Rogaway, P.—Shrimpton, T.: \textit{Cryptographic hash-function basics: Definitions, implications, and separations for preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance}, in: Fast Software Encryption, 11th International Workshop—FSE '04 (B. Roy et al., eds.), Delhi, India, 2004, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 3017, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp. 371–388], where they define seven basic notions of hash function security and examine all the relationships among these notions. We also define a new property for security of hash function families—always CTFP preimage resistance, which guarantees CTFP security for all the hash functions in the family.

ISO 690:

Rjaško, M. 2010. On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance. In Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, vol. 47, no.3, pp. 115-135. 1210-3195.

APA:

Rjaško, M. (2010). On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance. Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, 47(3), 115-135. 1210-3195.