On IND-CCA security modeling in cryptographic protocols

In: Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, vol. 33, no. 1

Dennis Hofheinz - Jörn Müller-Quade - Rainer Steinwandt

Detaily:

Rok, strany: 2006, 83 - 97

O článku:

Two common notions of security for public key encryption schemes are shown to be equivalent: we prove that indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND–CCA) is in fact polynomially equivalent to (yet “slightly” weaker than) secure realizing the ideal functionality $F_PKE$ in the general modeling of cryptographic protocols of [Ran Canetti: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, October 2001]. This disproves in particular the claim that security in the sense of IND–CCA strictly implies security in the sense of realizing $F_PKE$ (see [Ran Canetti]). Moreover, we give concrete reductions among such security notions and show that these relations hold for both uniform and non-uniform adversarial entities.

Ako citovať:

ISO 690:

Hofheinz, D., Müller-Quade, J., Steinwandt, R. 2006. On IND-CCA security modeling in cryptographic protocols. In Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, vol. 33, no.1, pp. 83-97. 1210-3195.

APA:

Hofheinz, D., Müller-Quade, J., Steinwandt, R. (2006). On IND-CCA security modeling in cryptographic protocols. Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, 33(1), 83-97. 1210-3195.