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Horwich on the Value of Truth

In: Organon F, vol. 27, no. 2
Byeong D. Lee
Rok, strany: 2020, 263 - 279
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
Horwich; deflationism about truth; the value of truth; moral values; epistemic values.
Typ článku: Research Article
O článku:
On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed in this norm is a moral value. I accept a deflationary theory of truth, according to which truth is too thin a concept to be constituted by any substantial norms. Thus I agree that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. In this paper, however, I argue that the alleged value of true beliefs can be better explained in terms of epistemic normativity rather than moral normativity.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
D. Lee, B. 2020. Horwich on the Value of Truth. In Organon F, vol. 27, no.2, pp. 263-279. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204

D. Lee, B. (2020). Horwich on the Value of Truth. Organon F, 27(2), 263-279. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR
Publikované: 2. 5. 2020
Verejná licencia:
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.