Deconstructing the Constituency of the Public Reason. Taking Systematic Conspiracy Theorists out of the Legitimation Pool

Rok, strany: 2020, 363 - 278

In the present article I argue that there is a class of conspiracy theorists that pose a threat to liberal democratic regimes, who tend to subscribe to potentially harmful conspiracy theories and can be regarded as unreasonable in two ways: i) do not accept the burdens of judgment; ii) are not motivated by a sense of justice. If we endorse political liberalism, we ought to partially exclude these citizens from the legitimation pool. The qualifier “partially” is important here, as I only endorse their exclusion qua bearers of an unreasonable conception. To the extent that they can employ other arguments, they will continue to be a part of the legitimation pool. Towards the end of the paper I investigate a potential counterargument to my position, which could be addressed by someone who postulates a Waldronian right to do wrong. I show that Quong’s distinction between a right to do wrong and a non-right to be unreasonable can be extended in this instance and thus invalidate this potential criticism.

ISO 690:

Dumitru, A. 2020. Deconstructing the Constituency of the Public Reason. Taking Systematic Conspiracy Theorists out of the Legitimation Pool. In Filozofia, vol. 75, no.4, pp. 363-278. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2020.75.4.1

APA:

Dumitru, A. (2020). Deconstructing the Constituency of the Public Reason. Taking Systematic Conspiracy Theorists out of the Legitimation Pool. Filozofia, 75(4), 363-278. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2020.75.4.1

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV / Institute of Phillosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia

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