Why Determinism in Physics Has No Implications for Free Will

Rok, strany: 2019, 62 - 85

This paper argues for the following three theses: (1) There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equa-tions: such theories are maximally rich in information and usually also maximally simple. (2) There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific system we can reasona-bly expect under ignorance of its exact initial conditions. This pro-cedure works in the same manner for both classical and quantum physics. (3) There is no cogent reason to take the parameters that enter into the (deterministic) dynamical equations of physics to refer to properties of the physical systems. Granting an ontological status to parameters such as mass, charge, wave functions and the like does not lead to a gain in explanation, but only to artificial prob-lems. Against this background, I argue that there is no conflict be-tween determinism in physics and free will (on whatever conception of free will), and, in general, point out the limits of science when it comes to the central metaphysical issues.

ISO 690:

Esfeld, M. 2019. Why Determinism in Physics Has No Implications for Free Will. In Organon F, vol. 26, no.1, pp. 62-85. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26105

APA:

Esfeld, M. (2019). Why Determinism in Physics Has No Implications for Free Will. Organon F, 26(1), 62-85. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26105

Vydavateľ: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Michael Esfeld