Superadditivity in fuzzy extensions of coalition games

Rok, strany: 1999, 109 - 116

The classical coalition game theory describes the negotiation process in which all players and coalitions exactly know the expected results of their eventual cooperation. In the reality, this determinism is not usual, and the players' idea about the expected profits is more or less vague. In this paper we briefly study the consequences of this vagueness of input expectations on the vagueness of the superadditivity concept in such coalition games. We distinguish the simpler case of games with side-payment and the more complicated case of general coalition games without side-payments.

ISO 690:

Mareš, M. 1999. Superadditivity in fuzzy extensions of coalition games. In Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, vol. 16, no.1, pp. 109-116. 1210-3195.

APA:

Mareš, M. (1999). Superadditivity in fuzzy extensions of coalition games. Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, 16(1), 109-116. 1210-3195.