In: Organon F, vol. 33, no. 3
Karol Lenart
Detaily:
Strany: 281 - 317
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
de re modality; essence and essentialism; modal representation; haecceitism; possible worlds; transworld identity.
Typ článku: Research Article
O článku:
Modal essentialism holds that some x is essentially F if and only if at every possible world at which x exists, x is F. This view entails (ignoring the case of extreme essentialism) that distinct possible worlds can represent de re (singular) possibilities for the same individual. In the literature we find haecceitist and anti-haecceitist explanations of de re representation. The aim of this paper is to analyse which explanations of de re representation are consistent with genuine (nontrivial, objective) and plausible variants of modal essentialism. As I demonstrate, only moderate haecceitism meets this criterion. However, its weakness lies in its inability to account for intuitions about the variability of our modal judgments. In contrast, extreme haecceitism and moderate anti-haecceitism (modelled on qualitative counterpart theory) have the advantage of accommodating both essentialist and variability intuitions, provided both views are supplemented with a notion of quasi-essentiality.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Lenart, K. 2026. Modal Essentialism, Possible Worlds and the Problem of De Re Representation. In Organon F, vol. 33, no.3, pp. 281-317. 2585-7150. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33303
APA:
Lenart, K. (2026). Modal Essentialism, Possible Worlds and the Problem of De Re Representation. Organon F, 33(3), 281-317. 2585-7150. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33303
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, v.v.i, Filosofický ústav AVČR
Publikované: 31. 8. 2026
Verejná licencia:
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0)