In: Filozofia, vol. 81, no. 3
Galen Strawson 
Detaily:
Strany: 277 - 293
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
Kant – free will – commitment theory of freedom – moral law –
cognitive phenomenology – self-creation
Typ článku: Original articles / State
Typ dokumentu: journal / časopis
O článku:
According to a Subjectivist theory of X, reference to belief in the existence of X enters essentially into a full account of what the existence of X consists in. A Subjectivist theory doesn’t claim that X is a ‘merely subjective’ phenomenon; it’s a theory of what the existence of X consists in as a matter of objective fact. A Commitment theory of X is a theory of X that holds that we are inescapably committed to believing in the existence of X. It may also be a Subjectivist theory of X and hold that our commitment to belief in the existence of X is part of what makes it the case that X exists. This paper aims to specify the character of Subjectivist and Commitment theories, before suggesting that Kant may be said to have held a Subjectivist and indeed Commitment theory of freedom.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Strawson, G. 2026. Freedom and Commitment: Does Kant Hold a Subjectivist Theory of Freedom?. In Filozofia, vol. 81, no.3, pp. 277-293. ISSN 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2026.81.3.1
APA:
Strawson, G. (2026). Freedom and Commitment: Does Kant Hold a Subjectivist Theory of Freedom?. Filozofia, 81(3), 277-293. ISSN 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2026.81.3.1
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Institute of Philosophy SAS, v. v. i. / Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Publikované: 15. 5. 2026
Verejná licencia:
