Bertrand Russell and the Ethics of Truth: A Critique of Pragmatism from James to Orwell

Strany: 106 - 118

Jazyk: eng

This article examines Bertrand Russell’s engagement with pragmatism through his critical yet respectful treatment of William James and John Dewey in A History of Western Philosophy (1945). While Russell endorses the metaphysical innovation of neutral monism, especially in James’s doctrine of radical empiricism, he rejects the pragmatist redefinition of truth as a function of practical success. The analysis reconstructs Russell’s main arguments against pragmatist epistemology, emphasizing his insistence on truth as correspondence between belief and reality. Particular attention is given to Russell’s theory of belief, his conception of the “bearer of truth,” and his critique of instrumentalist approaches that conflate usefulness with validity. The article concludes by drawing a parallel with George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, showing how Russell’s concerns anticipate the political and ethical risks of subordinating truth to utility. In light of current challenges such as misinformation, algorithmic manipulation, and post-truth politics, Russell’s critique emerges as a timely defense of objective truth and the conditions for free inquiry and public discourse.

ISO 690:

Latinov, E. 2026. Bertrand Russell and the Ethics of Truth: A Critique of Pragmatism from James to Orwell. In Organon F, vol. 33, no.1, pp. 106-118. 2585-7150. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33104

APA:

Latinov, E. (2026). Bertrand Russell and the Ethics of Truth: A Critique of Pragmatism from James to Orwell. Organon F, 33(1), 106-118. 2585-7150. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33104

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, v.v.i, Filosofický ústav AVČR

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