Brunero’s Non-Normative Disjunctivism and Means-Ends Reasoning

Strany: 323 - 347

Jazyk: eng

On Brunero’s non-normative disjunctivism, agents exhibiting means-ends incoherence are irrational because they are guaranteed to have at least one attitude that fails to achieve its constitutive aim, and such an aim failure is not a failure of reason. This paper primarily aims to show that this account fails to adequately explain the irrationality of means-ends incoherence. More specifically, I argue that agents exhibiting this incoherence can be justifiably criticized for irrationality, and they cannot ward off such criticism by claiming that there is no reason to be means-ends coherent. Furthermore, I argue that Brunero’s three objections to the strong normativity of means-ends coherence are not successful.

ISO 690:

Lee, B. D. 2025. Brunero’s Non-Normative Disjunctivism and Means-Ends Reasoning. In Organon F, vol. 32, no.3, pp. 323-347. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32303

APA:

Lee, B. D. (2025). Brunero’s Non-Normative Disjunctivism and Means-Ends Reasoning. Organon F, 32(3), 323-347. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32303

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, v.v.i, Filosofický ústav AVČR

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