On Two Underappreciated Motifs of Quine’s Naturalism; Or, Quine on Reality and Naturalistic Philosophy

Strany: 224 - 259

Jazyk: eng

This essay deals with two often underappreciated Quinean naturalistic motifs. The first motif concerns the metaphysical status of reality under naturalism, by examining what can be viewed as Quine’s attempt to dissolve realism and idealism into each other; the second motif concerns the metaphilosophical dimension of naturalized epistemology. I aim to demonstrate that Quine’s way of approaching these two motifs turns out to be not only complementary, but also highly indicative of his overall naturalistic outlooks as well as professional preferences. As a result, this essay reassesses Quine’s influence on the development of naturalism and naturalistically conceived philosophy from the second half of the 20th century onwards.

ISO 690:

Hubálek, M. 2025. On Two Underappreciated Motifs of Quine’s Naturalism; Or, Quine on Reality and Naturalistic Philosophy. In Organon F, vol. 32, no.2, pp. 224-259. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32205

APA:

Hubálek, M. (2025). On Two Underappreciated Motifs of Quine’s Naturalism; Or, Quine on Reality and Naturalistic Philosophy. Organon F, 32(2), 224-259. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32205

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, v.v.i., Filosofický ústav AVČR

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