An Objection to Railton’s Full-Information Analysis of Non-Moral Value

Strany: 29 - 41

Jazyk: eng

This paper presents an objection to Peter Railton’s full-information account of non-moral value. According to this account, if an idealized individual A who is fully rational and has full information wants the non-idealized A to desire X, then X is good for A. Those desires like X are called objective interests. Railton’s analysis holds that non-moral values are constituted by natural facts that are independent of subjective opinions. I argue that it is hard for the full-information analysis to achieve all its goals. My discussion focuses on intrinsic interests—those good for an individual without reference to any other objective interests. I attempt to show that either it is hard for the full-information account to give a normative force on individuals, or the account is circular. The conclusion I reach is moderate: in its current version, the full-information analysis of non-moral value cannot explain the link between the normative and the empirical.

ISO 690:

Zhuang, X. 2025. An Objection to Railton’s Full-Information Analysis of Non-Moral Value. In Organon F, vol. 32, no.1, pp. 29-41. 2585-7150. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32102

APA:

Zhuang, X. (2025). An Objection to Railton’s Full-Information Analysis of Non-Moral Value. Organon F, 32(1), 29-41. 2585-7150. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32102

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR

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