In: Filozofia, vol. 79, no. 9
John Cottingham 
Detaily:
Rok, strany: 2024, 955 - 969
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
soul – body – human being – Aristotle – Aquinas – Descartes –
hylemorphism – intellect – passions
Typ článku: Original articles / State
Typ dokumentu: journal / časopis
O článku:
The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our ‘compound’ nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions – the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Cottingham, J. 2024. The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature. In Filozofia, vol. 79, no.9, pp. 955-969. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.9.1
APA:
Cottingham, J. (2024). The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature. Filozofia, 79(9), 955-969. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.9.1
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Institute of Philosophy SAS, v. v. i. / Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Publikované: 15. 11. 2024
Verejná licencia:
