In: Organon F, vol. 31, no. 2
Byeong D. Lee
Detaily:
Rok, strany: 2024, 95 - 113
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
Epistemic rationality; practical rationality; evidentialism; the right kind of reasons; the wrong kind of reasons.
Typ článku: Research Article
O článku:
There are cases in which epistemic rationality seems to conflict with practical rationality. Evidentialists such as Parfit, Shah, Skorupski and Way deny that there are practical reasons for belief. On their view, the only genuine normative reasons for belief are epistemic rea-sons, and so the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief. But I argue in this paper that the evidentialists can still face a genuine dilemma between epistemic and practical rationality which cannot be resolved on the grounds that the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Lee, B. D. 2024. An Epistemic-Practical Dilemma for Evidentialism. In Organon F, vol. 31, no.2, pp. 95-113. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31201
APA:
Lee, B. D. (2024). An Epistemic-Practical Dilemma for Evidentialism. Organon F, 31(2), 95-113. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31201
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR
Publikované: 31. 5. 2024
Verejná licencia:
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0)