In: Filozofia, vol. 77, no. 8
Lukáš Zámečník 
Detaily:
Rok, strany: 2022, 590 - 607
Jazyk: cze
Kľúčové slová:
Non-causal explanation – Explanatory monism and pluralism – Counterfactual and unificationist views of explanation
Typ článku: State / Original articles
Typ dokumentu: Časopis / Journal
O článku:
The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of non-causal explanations.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Zámečník, L. 2022. Explanační monismus u nekauzálních vysvětlení. In Filozofia, vol. 77, no.8, pp. 590-607. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.2
APA:
Zámečník, L. (2022). Explanační monismus u nekauzálních vysvětlení. Filozofia, 77(8), 590-607. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.2
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i. / Institute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i.
Publikované: 19. 10. 2022
Verejná licencia:
