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Pojem verzus koncepcia spravodlivosti v analytickej filozofii práva (2. časť)

In: Filozofia, vol. 77, no. 5
Marek Neština Číslo ORCID
Detaily:
Rok, strany: 2022, 339 - 356
Jazyk: slo
Kľúčové slová:
Concept – Conception – Constitution – Interpretation – Law – Marmor – Polysemy – Pragmatics – Semantics
Typ článku: State / Original articles
Typ dokumentu: Časopis / Časopis
O článku:
The article is a continuation of the author’s contribution Concept vs. Conception of Justice in Analytic Philosophy of Law (Filozofia 2022/4). It focuses on explaining polysemy as a kind of linguistic indeterminacy that constitutes one of the main reasons why courts come to interpret legal texts. The study discusses polysemy from the perspective of the theory of language used by A Marmor in his theory of interpretation. The author shows the limits of semantic analysis in law and the role of normative presuppositions, which influence the final outcome of judicial decision-making not only in terms of content, but are also important for the choice of formal means that are applied in the context of this decision-making.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Neština, M. 2022. Pojem verzus koncepcia spravodlivosti v analytickej filozofii práva (2. časť). In Filozofia, vol. 77, no.5, pp. 339-356. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.5.3

APA:
Neština, M. (2022). Pojem verzus koncepcia spravodlivosti v analytickej filozofii práva (2. časť). Filozofia, 77(5), 339-356. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.5.3
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i. / Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, v.v.i.
Publikované: 20. 5. 2022
Verejná licencia:
Creative Commons License
Toto dielo je licencované pod Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License