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McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge

In: Filozofia, vol. 76, no. 6
Filip Čukljević Číslo ORCID
Detaily:
Rok, strany: 2021, 423 - 435
Jazyk: eng
Kľúčové slová:
Observational knowledge – Justification – Reliability – Empirical content – Inference
Typ článku: State / Original articles
Typ dokumentu: Časopis / Journal
O článku:
In this paper, I will analyze whether John McDowell’s critique of Robert Brandom’s account of observational knowledge is a success. First, I will present Brandom’s view of observational knowledge. Then I will lay out the main objections that McDowell raises against it. I will argue that McDowell’s arguments can be divided into semantic and epistemic. The analysis will show that the epistemic arguments face serious difficulty and that McDowell should focus on semantic critique.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Čukljević, F. 2021. McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge. In Filozofia, vol. 76, no.6, pp. 423-435. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.6.3

APA:
Čukljević, F. (2021). McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge. Filozofia, 76(6), 423-435. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.6.3
O vydaní:
Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV / INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SLOVAK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Publikované: 22. 6. 2021
Verejná licencia:
Creative Commons License
Toto dielo je licencované pod Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License