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Simple power analysis attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem

In: Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, vol. 67, no. 3
Tomáš Fabšič - Ondrej Gallo - Viliam Hromada
Detaily:
Rok, strany: 2016, 85 - 92
Kľúčové slová:
simple power analysis attack, QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem
O článku:
It is known that a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the McEliece cryptosystem allows an attacker to recover the secret matrix $P$ by measuring the power consumption. We demonstrate that a similar threat is present in the QC-LDPC variant of the McEliece cryptosystem. We consider a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. We demonstrate that this implementation leaks information about positions of ones in the secret matrix $Q$. We argue that this leakage allows an attacker to completely recover the matrix $Q$. In addition, we note that the quasi-cyclic nature of the matrix $Q$ allows to accelerate the attack significantly.
Ako citovať:
ISO 690:
Fabšič, T., Gallo, O., Hromada, V. 2016. Simple power analysis attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. In Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, vol. 67, no.3, pp. 85-92. 1210-3195.

APA:
Fabšič, T., Gallo, O., Hromada, V. (2016). Simple power analysis attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications, 67(3), 85-92. 1210-3195.