News

Daniela Vacek from the Institute of Philosophy SAS deals with issues of artificial intelligence from an ethical point of view, but also philosophy and logic of responsibility.  She received the 2023 SAS Award in the young researchers category for her scientific activity. She considers the freedom of thought and the possibility to work on topics that interest only (a few) philosophers to be very important.

You also received an award for results in the field of ethical issues of artificial intelligence. It's a very current topic, what exactly are you researching?

At the moment, I´m researching three main topics concerning the ethics of artificial intelligence. The first is responsibility for the negative consequences of artificial intelligence. I started to pursue this question after dealing with the philosophy of responsibility and deontic logic (the logic of what is commanded, forbidden or permitted). The main research output on this topic was an article co-authored with my colleague Matteo Pascucci on vicarious liability as a solution to the problem of gaps in responsibility (Vicarious liability: a solution to a problem of AI responsibility?), published in the journal Ethics and Information Technology, following our article on the theory of responsibility, Making sense of vicarious responsibility: moral philosophy meets legal theory, published in the journal Erkenntnis). The second is the control over artificial intelligence. One of the research outputs is my article on the new problem of control over artificial intelligence (Two remarks on the new AI control problem, published in the journal AI and Ethics). The third topic is positive responsibility for the "good" results of artificial intelligence. This topic is still new to me, but I have already achieved results that I consider promising, although they have not yet been published.

Scientific articles are one thing, application is another. Are there any conclusions or recommendations based on your articles?

Research in AI ethics often has practical conclusions and recommendations. Such is, for example, the research we are doing with my colleague Matteo Pascucci on the control of intelligent technologies or research in the area of ​​responsibility of artificial intelligence. In my opinion, it is a positive thing if philosophers also produce results that are interesting and relevant even for non-philosophers. At the same time, however, I consider freedom of thought and the possibility to work on topics that interest only (a few) philosophers to be extremely important. Even if someone were to consider practical applicability as the only research value, given the interdisciplinary nature of most practically significant philosophical problems and their intertwining with other philosophical problems and questions, it would be harmful to "cut off" topics that are not practically relevant at first glance. I am glad that some of the results are of practical use, but I do not consider them a necessity.

There are other activities connected to your research and publications for which you have received awards. How do you manage it - with a baby?

Academic life does not end with publications, although we are predominately evaluated for them. I am involved in many other activities: I give lectures at conferences and workshops, review articles for prestigious magazines or large international projects, organize academic events, I am a member of committees such as the executive committee of the Slovak Philosophical Association at the SAS or the Slovak Bioethics Committee for UNESCO, I write projects, lead discussion seminars, etc. Managing projects requires quite a lot of time, starting with administration and ending with their implementation. To a lesser extent, I am also involved in pedagogical activities. If possible, I like to attend research stays, especially in the British Isles area. At the moment, things are a bit more complicated with mobility, because the most important project is now my baby. However, other activities persist, mainly thanks to my husband's competence and full support of my research at work. I am very grateful for both.

You mentioned projects. You lead (inter)national projects "Persons of Responsibility: Human, Animal, Artificial, Divine" and Philosophical and methodological challenges of intelligent technologies. What do you research?

We obtained the international project "Persons of Responsibility: Human, Animal, Artificial, Divine” from the Ian Ramsey Centre at Oxford University and it is funded by the John Templeton Foundation. This project addresses the question of actors and "patients" of responsibility (who is responsible to whom). The project also considers less-explored "persons of responsibility", whether animal, artificial or divine. The national project Philosophical and methodological challenges of intelligent technologies (APVV-22-0323) deals with methodological, ethical and legal issues and problems of artificial intelligence. It features moral and legal responsibility for artificial intelligence and (potential) gaps in this responsibility. In addition to philosophers, we also have lawyers involved in the project, which enables the necessary interdisciplinarity. The Kempelen Institute of Intelligent Technologies is a co-researcher of the project, which I find very useful. This institute received excellent reputation and great international and national successes in a short period of time under the leadership of prof. Bieliková.

In your articles, we also come across a topic related to poetry or the semantics and metaphysics of fictional characters. On the outside, it seems far from artificial intelligence. Are there any common points in these researches? What do the semantics and metaphysics of fictional characters actually mean?

I'll start from the end, philosophers like the mysteries of language and concepts. One of them is the question of how we can meaningfully talk about fiction (for example, about literary works or films), although the objects and events described in them are often unreal, non-existent. For example, how can we attribute to Harry Potter the property of being a wizard when he does not even exist? As a rule, we assign properties only to objects that exist. There are quite a few such mysteries in the field of aesthetics. Another example is the question of how and if poetry can be translated at all when the poetic experience cannot be fully replicated in another language. Of course, the research on analytic aesthetics is different from my research on the ethics of artificial intelligence. I think, it is an advantage if a philosopher´s focus is not too narrow and at least somewhat resists the current trend that leads to extremely specific and limited research focuses. The perspective is also very useful because many interesting questions (whether in the area of philosophy of artificial intelligence, philosophy of responsibility, or analytical aesthetics) are interdisciplinary. However, there are also research questions directly at the intersection of my focus: for example, the question of authorship and copyright or credit for works created by artificial intelligence or ethical issues of art vandalism.

Edited by Andrea Nozdrovická

Foto: Martin Bystriansky a archív D. V.