In: Filozofia, vol. 81, no. 3
Zhihan Li 
Details:
Pages: 294 - 308
Language: eng
Keywords:
practical knowledge – observation – self-consciousness – G. E. M.
Anscombe – Jean-Paul Sartre – Adrian Haddock
Article type: Original articles
Document type: journal
About article:
G. E. M. Anscombe famously argues that our self-knowledge of intentional action (“practical knowledge”) is both non-observational and yet concerns happenings in objective reality. This combination seems to present a strong tension. Recently, Adrian Haddock offered a novel account of the role of observation in practical knowledge, claiming that such knowledge is a unity of self-knowledge (non-observational) and other-knowledge (observational), both of which are indispensable. Yet Haddock’s view faces several problems. This paper suggests that Sartre’s phenomenology resonates deeply with Haddock’s account and provides a rich resource for addressing his problems. Through Sartre’s discussions of self-consciousness, intentionality, and perception-action unity, we gain a deeper understanding of how observation functions within practical knowledge. This account shows that observation is not merely an aid (as Anscombe suggests) but a constitutive part of practical knowledge.
How to cite:
ISO 690:
Li, Z. 2026. The Role of Observation in Practical Knowledge. In Filozofia, vol. 81, no.3, pp. 294-308. ISSN 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2026.81.3.2
APA:
Li, Z. (2026). The Role of Observation in Practical Knowledge. Filozofia, 81(3), 294-308. ISSN 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2026.81.3.2
About edition:
Publisher: Institute of Philosophy SAS, v. v. i.
Published: 15. 5. 2026
Rights:
