Compulsion, Ignorance, and Involuntary Action: An Aristotelian Analysis

Year, pages: 2024, 367 - 387

Some remarks in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicho- machean Ethics indicate that the voluntariness of actions is significantly related to compulsion and ignorance. According to a plausible interpretation, these remarks suggest that if an agent performs an action under compulsion or due to ignorance of some relevant facts, then she does so involuntarily. An objection to this interpretation with regard to compulsion is that an agent can voluntarily do what she is compelled to do. With regard to ignorance, one might object that it is necessary to clarify the proper range of relevant facts when considering whether an action performed out of ignorance is involuntary. In this paper, I develop two principles that align with the view that compulsion and ignorance are sufficient conditions for involuntary actions, while accommodating potential counterexamples and complications.

Yi, H. 2024. Compulsion, Ignorance, and Involuntary Action: An Aristotelian Analysis. In Organon F, vol. 31, no.4, pp. 367-387. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31402

Yi, H. (2024). Compulsion, Ignorance, and Involuntary Action: An Aristotelian Analysis. Organon F, 31(4), 367-387. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31402

Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR

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